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UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON 
ABSTRACT 
FACULTY OF LAW, ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
SCHOOL OF LAW 
Doctor of Philosophy 
INSURANCE LAW AND THE FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE 
by Judith Penina Summer 
 
This thesis is the only study there is of the workings of the Financial Ombudsman 
Service („FOS‟) and a comparison between court and FOS attitudes and approaches to 
insurance cases.  A court and the FOS may decide matters differently because the FOS 
does not have to apply the law strictly, whilst a court does.  The author of this thesis has 
examined the FOS and Financial Services Authority („FSA‟) websites, handbooks and 
other material, and all of the near monthly journals of Ombudsman News („O.N.‟) since 
the FOS began in 2001, analysing it against the law to determine the question of this 
thesis: whether the FOS should in fact apply the law strictly, and not allow principles of 
fairness and reasonableness to override the law in the particular circumstances of a 
case.  Should certainty of outcome and of applying law established and modified over 
hundreds of years be sacrificed to allow the FOS to apply its overriding discretion in the 
interests of justice in a relatively few cases?  Should both insurers and insureds be able 
to obtain legal advice on their relative positions, without that advice having to mention 
unpredictable outcomes if the ombudsman chooses not to follow the strict legal position?  
If the law does not offer the consumer insured enough protection, should the FOS be the 
forum that does, and if so, does it give enough protection?  This study does not look at 
the decisions of the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau („IOB‟) which preceded the FOS.  
Where a point is not dealt with below, it has not been highlighted in FOS publications to 
date and it is unclear how relevant IOB decisions on that point will be.   
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Issue 1:  January 2001 
 
01/1   
 
medical expenses – exclusion – chronic conditions – formerly acute condition – whether 
insurer required to notify policyholder when condition considered chronic.     
 
The policyholder suffered from heart disease and received various treatments between 
1998 and 1999. The insurer met his  claims for the cost of these treatments, making 
payments of approximately £40,000. Open heart surgery was recommended in August 
1999 but, for reasons which were unclear, the insurer did not receive the claim form until 
20 September 1999. 
 
The insurer made enquiries and, on 8 October, notified the hospital that it had decided 
the  policyholder‘s  condition  was  chronic  so  it  would  not  meet  his  claim.  The  policy 
specifically excluded ‗treatment of a chronic condition‘. It defined ‗chronic‘ as ‗a disease 
where  you  need  observation  or  care,  and  treatment  will  only  relieve  or  control  the 
symptoms but not cure the medical condition‘. The policyholder was informed of this 
decision  either  that  day  or  on  9  October.  Nevertheless,  surgery  was  performed  as 
scheduled  on  13  October.  The  policyholder  did  not  survive  and  his  widow  claimed 
£11,595 to meet the cost of surgery. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
The operation was clearly a serious one and the prognosis was uncertain. But there was 
some significant prospect that the operation would successfully arrest the decline in the 
policyholder‘s condition without the need for further extensive treatment. 
 
Whether  this  would  have  amounted  to a  ‗cure‘  was  debatable.  However,  the  insurer 
failed to give the policyholder any notice that it had decided his condition had become 
chronic.  Given  the  conflicting  medical  evidence  and  the  need  for  urgent  action  in 
September  1999,  the  insurer  should  have  accepted  the  claim.  It  might  then  have 
explained that any further treatment would be excluded. We required the insurer to meet 
the cost of the treatment. 
 
01/2 
 
medical expenses – acute illness or injury – ‗occurrence of brief duration‘ – meaning of 
‗brief duration‘.  
 
The policyholder was involved in a motor accident in May 1999 and sustained serious 
injuries, leaving her paralysed below the waist. She was hospitalised for three months. 
The  insurer  met  all  her  medical  costs.  The  policyholder  continued  to  receive 
physiotherapy  as  an  outpatient  until  December  1999.  The  insurer  then  decided  her 
condition was no longer acute and terminated payments. It relied on the policy definition 
of  ‗treatment‘.  This  provided  that  benefit  was  only  payable  for  ‗surgical  or  medical 
procedures the sole purpose of which is the cure or relief of acute illness or injury. An 
acute illness or injury is characterised by an occurrence of brief duration, after which the 
insured person returns to his/her normal state and degree of activity‘. 
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The policyholder argued that further physiotherapy was essential for her recovery and 
cited her consultant‘s opinion that her condition was still acute. He considered she would 
continue to improve and expected her to achieve 90% of her previous functional abilities 
within one to two years. The insurer maintained it had always intended to transfer the 
policyholder‘s treatment to the NHS. However, it produced no evidence to prove her 
condition was no longer acute. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
Although the policy only covered ‗acute‘ illness or injury, this was not clearly defined. We 
considered that the phrase ‗occurrence of brief duration‘ should be interpreted according 
to  the  extent  of  the  injury.  For  example,  a  broken  finger  might  mean  a  few  days‘ 
disability, whereas a broken back – as in this case – would mean many months‘. 
 
The medical evidence established that the policyholder‘s condition would continue to 
improve as a result of treatment. We were therefore satisfied that it was still acute and 
thus covered under the policy. We also agreed with the policyholder that her claim had 
not  been  administrated  properly.  However,  the  insurer‘s  apology  and  its  ex  gratia 
payment  of  £1,800  towards  the  cost  of  the  policyholder‘s  home  care  were  sufficient 
compensation for the distress caused. 
 
01/3 
 
medical expenses – exclusion – pre-existing condition – whether undiagnosed condition 
excluded.  
 
The  policyholder  submitted  a  claim  under  his  company  medical  scheme  for  his 
daughter‘s  tonsillectomy  and  adenoidectomy.  The  insurer  rejected  the  claim  on  the 
ground that the daughter‘s GP disclosed that she had suffered from tonsillitis since 1991, 
almost seven years before the policy was purchased. 
 
The policyholder complained about this decision. He stated that surgery had not been 
recommended until February 1999 and contended that his daughter‘s consultations had 
been for illnesses typical of childhood, not indicative of a serious condition which had not 
been diagnosed. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
The clinical notes revealed a long history of bouts of tonsillitis which were not indicative 
of ordinary childhood infections. The policy clearly excluded claims for treatment of any 
illness or related condition which originated prior to the policy cover. The insurer was 
therefore fully entitled not to accept liability for the daughter‘s operations. 
 
01/4  
 
medical  expenses  –  exclusion  –  pre-existing  condition  –  representations  by  insurer‘s 
agent – whether insurer estopped from relying on exclusion.  
 
In  December  1998,  when  the  policyholder  decided  to  switch  insurers,  she  had  had 
medical expenses cover for over 20 years. She discussed her situation with the new 
insurer‘s agent, who completed an application form for her. Details of previous medical Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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problems were recorded on the form. Before she signed the form, she asked the agent 
to double-check her position and ensure she would maintain her existing level of cover. 
 
In October/November 1999, the policyholder began experiencing pain in her hip and 
requested  a  claim  form.  She  saw  her  consultant  the  following  month  and  he 
recommended a complete hip replacement without delay. The insurer refused to meet 
the cost of surgery on the ground that it was due to a pre-existing medical condition. 
 
The policyholder contended that she had informed the agent of a previous hip operation 
in  February  1996,  with  further  surgery  in  December  1996.  She  said  the  agent  had 
advised her that the insurer did not consider as relevant any operations which took place 
more than two years before the start date. He had also confirmed that her level of cover 
would remain the same. She said she had never received any policy documents and 
was not aware of an exclusion for pre-existing conditions. 
 
The  insurer  agreed  to  meet  the  consultation  fee  and  X-ray  costs  and  to  return  the 
premiums paid by the policyholder, but refused to reimburse the £12,000 cost of her 
private operation. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We were satisfied that the policyholder had the highest possible level of cover under her 
first policy. The insurer no longer employed the agent and was unable to investigate how 
the subsequent policy had been sold. As there was nothing to rebut the policyholder‘s 
allegations, we accepted her version of events. 
 
The actions of the insurer and/or its agent had seriously prejudiced the policyholder‘s 
position and we did not agree that a premium refund was an acceptable settlement. The 
insurer accepted our recommendation that the policy should be reinstated – subject to 
payment of the outstanding premiums – and that the claim should be met, in accordance 
with the level of cover originally selected. It also agreed to pay £500 compensation for 
distress and inconvenience. 
 
01/5 
 
medical expenses – group scheme – provision of medical services in UK – policyholder 
resident abroad – whether overseas medical expenses covered.  
 
The policyholders retired in 1989 and moved to Mallorca. They had been allowed to 
continue as members of their employer‘s private medical insurance scheme after their 
retirement, paying the premiums personally. It was not drawn to their attention that cover 
was restricted to ‗medical services specified in this Policy if they are provided in the 
United Kingdom, Channel Islands or Isle of Man‘. 
 
Their employer asserted that it had written to them in 1994, explaining that cover was not 
provided for people residing abroad. The policyholders did not receive that letter as it 
was  sent  to  the  wrong  address.  In  any  event,  the  employer  continued  to  collect 
premiums and renew the policy. 
 
One of the policyholders needed dental surgery and part of the treatment was carried 
out in Mallorca. He submitted a claim for the cost of this and also for further treatment he Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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required. The  insurer rejected the claims on the ground that there was no cover for 
treatment performed abroad. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
There  was  no  formal  agency  agreement  between  the  employer  and  the  insurer. 
However,  we  considered  that  by  confirming  the  policyholders‘  membership  of  the 
scheme after they retired and collecting their premiums, the employer was acting as the 
insurer‘s agent. Given that the policy was clearly unsuitable for the policyholders, we 
decided  the  claims  should  be  settled  without  reference  to  the  restriction  on  where 
treatment could be performed. 
 
The policy included cover for ―oral surgical operations‖, so the policyholder‘s claims were 
valid if the territorial restriction were ignored. We required the insurer to meet the cost of 
both treatments. 
 
01/6 
motor – theft – exclusion for theft if keys left in car – whether policyholder in breach of 
exclusion.     
 
The policyholder stopped his car on his driveway and got out, leaving the engine running 
and the door open, in order to lift up his garage door. However, before doing so he 
stopped to put his briefcase in the unlocked porch adjacent to his garage. As he did this 
he heard a noise and turned round to see someone jump into his car and reverse away 
at high speed. He was very close to the car but could not prevent it from being stolen. 
 
The insurer declined the claim on the basis of exclusion for ‗losses arising from the use 
of keys which had been left in or around the vehicle‘. 
 
01/7 
 
The policyholder arranged cover for her Fiat Marea, over the telephone, on 9 August 
1999. The next day the vehicle was stolen while she was paying for petrol. She said she 
had inadvertently left her keys in the ignition.  
 
The insurer rejected the claim, relying on a policy term excluding theft ‗if the insured 
vehicle has not been locked, windows and sunroof closed and keys removed, when left 
unattended or unoccupied‘. The policyholder maintained that when she telephoned to 
arrange the insurance she had been told all the good points of the policy but not about 
the restrictions, and the policy did not arrive until after the car was stolen. 
 
01/8  
 
The policyholder was picking up his children from school. He left his car in a busy street 
with the door shut but the keys in the ignition while he went to speak to his son, about 
eight feet behind the car. Less than two minutes later, two youths ran up, jumped into 
the car and drove off, despite the policyholder‘s best efforts to stop them. The youths 
were involved in an accident and the policyholder‘s car was a total write-off.  
 
The insurer refused payment on the ground that the policy excluded claims for theft if 
‗the car is left unattended or unoccupied and the doors and boot are not locked or any Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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window  or  roof  opening/hood  has  not  been  secured  closed  or  if  the  keys  are  not 
removed from the car‘. It said that the policy wording was clear and that the commentary 
in the policy also explained that theft was not covered ‗unless the car is fully locked and 
the keys are removed when it is left unattended or unoccupied‘. The policyholder argued 
that he had left the car on the spur of the moment because he needed to speak to his 
son; he had been only feet away and the car had been in sight the whole time. 
 
01/9 
 
The policyholder reversed his car out of his garage and got out of the car to return briefly 
to the house, leaving the car keys in the ignition and closing but not locking the car door. 
He said he had only been away from the car for approximately 30 seconds but came 
back out of the house to find the car had been stolen. The insurer declined the claim on 
the ground that the policy excluded theft ‗if the car is left unattended or unoccupied and 
the  doors  and  boot  are  not  locked  or  any  roof  opening/hood  has  not  been  secured 
closed or if the keys are not removed from the car‘.  
 
Complaints upheld 
 
We considered the four complaints above were valid. We interpreted these exclusions as 
removing theft cover only when the car driver has clearly gone away from the vehicle. 
This  applies  regardless  of  whether  the  exclusion  referred  to  leaving  the  vehicle 
‗unattended‘ or simply stated there was no theft cover if the keys had been ‗left‘. This 
interpretation required evidence that the driver had either gone a significant distance 
from the vehicle or had left it for an extended period. It was not sufficient for the driver 
merely to have turned his back or gone inside his home briefly. While we would not 
generally interpret such exclusions in a wide sense, we would not require insurers to 
meet this type of claim if we were satisfied the driver had behaved in a reckless fashion. 
 
01/10  
 
motor – theft – lack of reasonable care – policyholder aware of risks – whether loss 
excluded. 
 
In May 1999, the policyholder paid £17,000 cash for a Volkswagen Golf GTI turbo to be 
imported from Belgium. He arranged insurance to take effect on the anticipated delivery 
date. Nine days after accepting the car, he filled it with petrol. Later that afternoon, he 
returned to the filling station to put the car through the jet wash. 
 
Leaving  the  key  on  the  driver‘s  seat,  he  went  to  the  tap  to  wash  his  hands.  The 
policyholder noticed a man who did not appear to have a car and who was standing in 
front of the jet wash. 
 
However, the policyholder did not feel particularly concerned. As he was washing,  he 
heard a car revving up. At first he did not realise the car was his, but then he saw it being 
driven out of the garage by the man he noticed earlier. The insurer rejected the theft 
claim on the ground that the policyholder had breached the duty to take reasonable care 
of his car. 
 
Complaint rejected 
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The courts had decided that the duty of reasonable care was breached if the individual 
acted ‗recklessly‘ – meaning that the individual recognised a risk but deliberately took no 
steps to avoid it or took steps that were clearly inadequate. 
 
In this case, the policyholder saw someone loitering near his car but had left the car 
unlocked with the keys on the driver‘s seat. We were satisfied he had taken no steps to 
protect his car from a known risk of theft. 
 
01/11  
 
motor – theft – exclusion for car left unattended and doors unlocked – whether car left 
unattended.  
 
The policyholder was building a house and, in January 1999, visited it to drop off some 
equipment. He parked his Mazda off the road, leaving it unlocked and the car key among 
a bunch of keys in the lock on the front door of the house. The car was stolen and was 
later recovered in a damaged condition, requiring nearly £3,000 to repair. 
 
The insurer rejected the claim. It explained that the policy excluded liability for thefts if 
‗the  car  is  left  unattended  or  unoccupied  and  the  doors….  are  not  locked‘.  The 
policyholder  argued  that  he  had  acted  reasonably  and  he  produced  photographs 
showing that the car would have been visible only to someone close to the house. He 
also pointed out that his household insurer had met his claim for tools and equipment 
stolen with the car. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
We were satisfied that the car was both unattended and unoccupied at the time of the 
theft. We accepted that the household insurer was satisfied that the policyholder had 
behaved reasonably, but that was not the motor insurer‘s reason for declining liability 
and was therefore not relevant in this situation. 
 
01/12  
 
motor – theft – exclusion for theft if keys left in unattended car – whether car unattended. 
 
The  policyholder‘s  husband  parked  their  Landrover  Discovery  in  front  of  a  terraced 
house where he was working. He removed the keys from the ignition, but left the vehicle 
unlocked. A spare set of keys was kept in the car in the pocket on the driver‘s side. The 
driver entered the house to close windows upstairs and downstairs and to set the alarm. 
He returned to the pavement to see the car disappearing up the road. 
 
The insurer rejected the policyholder‘s theft claim on the ground that the policy excluded 
any claim for ‗loss or damage if the Motor Car has not been locked, with the windows 
closed and ignition key removed, when left unattended or unoccupied‘. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
The case law established that an item was ‗unattended‘ if someone was not in a position 
to observe any attempt to interfere with it, and was close enough to have a reasonable 
prospect of preventing any unauthorised interference. It was clear that the husband had Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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not been in any position to observe the attempt to interfere with the vehicle. We were 
satisfied that the car was ‗unattended‘ and therefore within the scope of the exclusion. 
 
01/13  
 
extended warranty – option to repair or replace – extent of insurer‘s obligation if repair or 
replacement impossible.   
 
The policyholder paid £300 for a five-year warranty in July 1997, covering her new suite 
of furniture against a number of eventualities including staining. An armchair was stained 
in  February  1999  and  the  policyholder  put  in  a  claim.  The  insurer  sent  her  a  stain 
removal kit, but this did not successfully clean the chair. 
 
After making two unsuccessful attempts to remove the stain, the claims administrator 
finally  advised  the  policyholder  that  the  fabric  would  have  to  be  replaced.  The 
policyholder was asked to submit a fabric sample for matching. Four months passed but 
the administrator failed to obtain new fabric. Given the lack of progress, the policyholder 
demanded that her policy be cancelled and that she should get compensation and a 
refund of the premium. The insurer cancelled the policy and returned the premium, but 
did not offer any compensation. It stated that the premium refund was the full extent of 
its liability. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
The insurer‘s decision to allow the policyholder to cancel as if this brought its liability fully 
to an end was disingenuous. It had already accepted the claim and, as it had been 
unable either to remove the stain or replace the fabric, the insurer was required by the 
terms of the warranty to replace the damaged furniture if no other solution could be 
found. 
 
The insurer accepted that the policyholder had not been adequately compensated. It 
acknowledged that she might have felt less aggrieved and frustrated, and therefore less 
likely to cancel, if it had kept her informed of the progress of her claim. Following our 
involvement,  in  addition  to  the  premium  it  had  already  agreed  to  refund,  as 
compensation for distress and inconvenience, the insurer offered to pay the cost of re-
dyeing the suite (subject to a limit of the full cost of replacing it). We considered this the 
appropriate response. 
 
01/14  
 
extended warranty – cashback offer – time limit for registration – policyholder in breach 
of time limit – whether insurer entitled to refuse to register policyholder.  
 
The policyholder  took out a five-year extended warranty when she bought a teletext 
televideo  in  October  1997.  One  of  the  features  was  a  cashback  offer,  described  as 
‗Make a claim or your money back!‘ Policyholders could obtain a full premium refund if 
they made no claim during the period. However, the terms of the policy stated that this 
offer only applied if policyholders registered for the scheme within 21 days of purchasing 
the policy. The policyholder did not register until January 1999. The insurer refused to 
accept her registration. It argued that she had not complied with the policy terms and 
that her breach had prejudiced its position. It contended that it was essential to have Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
Appendix A: O.N. Case Studies  10 
accurate  information  about  the  potential  risk  in  order  to  make  adequate  reinsurance 
arrangements. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
The cashback offer was one of the elements of cover provided for the purchase price of 
the  policy.  It  was  emphasised  in  the marketing  material  as  a  significant  benefit.  We 
appreciated that the insurer wanted information regarding potential claims. However, it 
was not acceptable that largely procedural obstacles should be placed in the way of 
policyholders, primarily to minimise the number of otherwise justifiable claims. ‗Small 
print‘ procedural requirements such as this were wholly inappropriate and might well be 
considered unfair contract terms. 
 
We  therefore  required  the  insurer  to  issue  the  policyholder  with  a  certificate  of 
registration  and  to  pay  her  £25  to  compensate  her  for  her  costs  in  pursuing  her 
complaint. We noted that the policy also stipulated that a cashback claim would only be 
valid if the policyholder returned the certificate to the insurer within 30 days of the end of 
cover. Although this clause had not formed any part of this complaint, we considered it 
likely that a claimant‘s failure to meet the insurer‘s strict deadline would not be sufficient 
ground for rejecting the claim. 
 
01/15  
 
extended warranty – repairs – delay – whether policyholder entitled to compensation.  
 
The policyholder began to experience problems with his video cassette recorder (VCR) 
in May 1999. He notified his insurer, in accordance with his extended warranty, and his 
VCR was taken away for repair. It was returned in mid-June but broke down again in late 
August. It was taken away again but the tester was unable to trace the fault until it had 
been returned once more to the policyholder. It was eventually restored to full working 
order  in  November.  The  policyholder  sought  compensation  from  the  insurer  for  six 
months‘ loss of use, poor claims handling and inconvenience. He said he had to make at 
least 50 calls to the insurer and had been visited 25 times by technicians. He had been 
given a replacement VCR while his was undergoing repairs, but only for two weeks. He 
also claimed that his warranty period should be extended for a further six months. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
While we did not doubt that the policyholder had experienced much inconvenience, we 
did not agree that the insurer or repairer had failed to provide a satisfactory standard of 
service. The fault was difficult to diagnose and only became known when the VCR was 
replaced in its usual cabinet. 
 
It could not be said that the policyholder had lost the benefit of six months‘ cover under 
the warranty. If another fault had appeared, the insurer would have met a claim. The 
insurer was not obliged to arrange for the loan of equipment while repairs were being 
carried out, or to offer compensation for inconvenience. 
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01/16   
 
maladministration – travel – repatriation – failure to embalm body before repatriation – 
whether insurer responsible for failure.     
 
The complainant‘s son and daughter-in-law went on holiday to Madeira, where the son 
died following a heart attack. The widow contacted the assistance company appointed 
by  the  insurer  to  arrange  repatriation  of  the  body  and  local  funeral  directors  were 
instructed. 
 
When the mother went to view her son‘s body in the UK, she was not allowed to see it as 
it had not been embalmed before repatriation and had deteriorated badly. The mother 
was  greatly  distressed.  She  complained  to  the  insurer,  which  undertook  extensive 
enquiries and liaised with the local British Consulate. It was established that the funeral 
directors were not on the assistance company‘s approved list. 
 
The funeral directors explained that they would not normally carry out embalming unless 
they received specific instructions to do so. The Consulate confirmed that embalming 
was not the usual practice in Madeira. The mother considered that the failure to ensure 
the body was embalmed resulted from the insurer‘s wish to cut costs. 
 
The insurer stated that embalming expenses were reasonable and necessary and that it 
would have met the charges. It contended that only an error had prevented its general 
practice  being  followed  in  this  case.  Normally,  the  assistance  company  would  have 
contacted local funeral directors. They did not do so in this case because the funeral 
directors were not on its approved list. It could not be established who had appointed 
them. And the insurer was not able to identify who had been responsible for the decision 
not to embalm to body. 
 
Complaint upheld in part 
 
The failure to embalm the body resulted from a series of oversights and genuine errors 
on the part of a number of organisations. These oversights and errors did not seem part 
of  any  attempt  by  the  insurer,  or  any  of  the  other  parties,  to  avoid  their  proper 
responsibilities.  However,  we  concluded  that  the  insurer,  through  its  agents  –  the 
assistance company and funeral directors – had failed to provide the service it should 
have done. All of these had also failed to give the mother‘s initial concerns the attention 
they deserved. 
 
The insurer confirmed it  would  implement steps to ensure that, in future, embalming 
would always be specifically requested. It would advise all its assistance companies that 
it would meet the cost of preparing a body for repatriation. The mother had made it clear 
that her complaint was not about financial compensation. Nevertheless, we required the 
organisations concerned to provide a full apology and to make donations to the British 
Heart Foundation. 
 
01/17  
 
travel  –  cancellation  –  duty  of  disclosure  –  change  in  medical  condition  –  whether 
policyholder under continuing duty to disclose any change in medical condition.  
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In June 1999, the policyholder booked a cruise for himself and his fiancée from 5-20 
March 2000 and took out insurance. He signed a declaration relating to himself, anyone 
travelling with him and anyone else whose health might affect the trip. This stated that no 
one was waiting for an operation, hospital consultation or other hospital treatment or 
investigations. The declaration stated that – 
 
―If there is a change in your medical condition or the medical condition of anyone who 
the trip depends on (after you take out this insurance, but before you travel) and you can 
no longer agree with the declaration, you must contact [the insurance company]. We will 
then tell you if cover can continue. If we cannot continue cover, you can claim for the 
cost of cancelling your holiday at that time. 
 
―If you do not tell us about anything we have asked for above, we may not pay your 
claim.‖ 
 
The fiancée‘s mother was diagnosed with cancer in December 1999. She underwent 
surgery  in  January  2000  but  was  told  in  February  that  further  treatment  would  be 
required. The policyholder cancelled the cruise then and claimed reimbursement under 
his travel insurance. 
 
The insurer settled the claim by paying £250 – the cost of cancelling in December 1999. 
The policyholder sought reimbursement of the full cancellation charge of £1,394. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
The declaration  imposed two duties of  disclosure on the policyholder, the second of 
which was an extended or continuing duty that applied to the period – just over eight 
months – immediately before departure. We regarded the continuing duty of disclosure 
as both unusual and unduly onerous. It was not inconceivable that, after a policyholder 
had notified a change in someone‘s medical position, the policyholder and insurer might 
hold conflicting views about whether cancellation was necessary at that stage. 
 
The practical effect of the declaration was to make the insurer the sole arbiter of whether 
any policyholder should cancel the holiday. We considered this inherently unfair and a 
possible contravention of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. 
 
We were not persuaded that the policyholder should have cancelled in December 1999. 
There was no evidence that he and his fiancée had realised at that time that they should 
cancel the cruise immediately, even though it was not due to take place for 11 weeks. 
The insurer accepted our recommendation and paid the balance of the charges plus 
interest. 
 
01/18  
 
travel – personal accident – total and irrecoverable loss of sight – policyholder retaining 
3% vision – whether loss of sight claim valid.  
 
The policyholder went on holiday with her family to Florida on 1 January 1998. Three 
days after arriving, they were involved in a serious road accident. They contacted the 
assistance company and the policyholder and her daughter were hospitalised. 
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The policyholder submitted a claim for loss of sight under the personal accident section 
of the policy. She said she had no useful vision in her left eye and there was no prospect 
of improvement. 
 
The insurer insisted on obtaining additional medical evidence. The insurer‘s consultant 
concluded that the policyholder had lost all central vision but retained a small amount of 
peripheral  vision,  which  he  estimated  at  2-3%.  In  his  opinion,  ‗In  theory,  [the 
policyholder] had retained sight in the left eye. However, it was so minimal, it [would] be 
of no practical use to her. For practical purposes, [the policyholder] had lost all sight with 
the left eye‘. The policy stipulated that the £25,000 benefit was payable only for ‗total 
and irrecoverable loss of all sight in one or both eyes‘. The insurer contended that this 
provision  should  be  interpreted  literally  and  that  therefore  the  claim  was  not  valid. 
However, following our involvement, it offered an ex gratia payment of £12,500. The 
policyholder considered her claim should be met in full. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We  noted  that  the  World  Health  Organisation  defined  ‗  profound  blindness‘  as  the 
inability to distinguish fingers at a distance of 10 feet. The Royal National Institute for the 
Blind advised that only about 18% of blind people were classed as totally blind and the 
majority of those could distinguish between light and dark. We concluded that ‗sight‘ 
implied an ability to discern objects. On this basis we were satisfied that the policyholder 
had, for all practical purposes, suffered a total loss of sight. We required the insurer to 
meet the claim in full, together with interest, from the date of the accident. 
 
01/19  
 
travel  –  curtailment  –  requirement  that  policyholder  return  home  –  earthquake  – 
policyholders  relocating  at  holiday  destination  –  whether  holiday  curtailed  –  whether 
assistance company authorised expenses.  
 
The policyholder and his family were on holiday in Cyprus when, on 11 August, there 
was a series of earthquakes, one of which shook their holiday apartment so violently that 
the occupants were evacuated. They returned to the apartment for the next two nights 
but  by  13  August  cracks  had  appeared.  The  family  was  frightened,  tremors  were 
continuing and the policyholder decided to move them out of the apartment. He claimed 
the cost of re-arranging his family‘s holiday. 
 
The  insurer  rejected  the  claim.  It  explained  that  curtailment  of  a  holiday  was  only 
covered if the policyholders returned to the UK. The policy did not cover relocation at the 
holiday destination. The policyholder maintained this was unfair as the policy did not 
exclude earthquake. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
Earthquakes were not excluded by the policy but they did not need to be – they were not 
covered  in  the  first  place.  The  nearest  section  of  the  policy  to  the  policyholder‘s 
circumstances was curtailment. This provided that the insurer would pay if the holiday 
was curtailed by a policyholder‘s returning home before the end of the holiday because 
of  specified  reasons  such  as  death,  illness,  etc.  But  it  did  not  include  curtailment 
following a natural disaster in the holiday destination. Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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We were required to look beyond the strict legal position and to make a decision which 
was fair and reasonable in all the circumstances. Had the policyholder returned home, 
matters might have been different. In this case, whatever the policyholder‘s fears, they 
were  not  sufficient  to  cause  him  to  return  home  before  the  scheduled  date.  We 
concluded that the insurer had acted reasonably. 
 
01/20  
 
travel – curtailment – cover limited to disaster at home – earthquake at resort – whether 
policyholders‘ claim covered.  
 
In  October  1999  the  Turkish  holiday  of  these  policyholders  (aged  74  and  76)  was 
disrupted  by  a  severe  earthquake.  Their  tour  operator  offered  to  fly  them  home 
immediately but they decided to remain. They slept that night on the beach but changed 
their minds about continuing the holiday when the magnitude of the disaster became 
clearer. The hotelier was unwilling to allow guests to sleep in the hotel and suggested 
they slept instead on loungers by the pool. Further earth tremors could not be ruled out, 
so the tour operator flew the policyholders home at no cost. 
 
The policyholders made a claim for curtailment. This was refused on the ground that the 
policy did not cover curtailment following an earthquake. The policyholders argued that 
this was unfair, as Acts of God were not excluded. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
If  a  particular  risk  was  not  covered  by  the  policy  in  the  first  place,  it  was  irrelevant 
whether or not it was excluded. So far as cutting short the holiday was concerned, the 
policy covered curtailment in the event of the death, injury or illness of the policyholders 
etc, or if the policyholders had to return home because of burglary, fire, etc affecting their 
home in the UK. There was no cover for curtailment following a natural disaster in the 
holiday destination. 
 
However, we were required to make a decision which was fair and reasonable in all the 
circumstances. In our view, when they took out the travel insurance as part of the holiday 
package, the policyholders would have envisaged that it would cover them for exactly 
the type of problem they had encountered. The absence of cover for events giving rise to 
a real need to curtail the holiday restricted the cover and had not been highlighted in the 
policy material. According to the insurer‘s position, the policyholders would only have 
had a justifiable claim if they had become ill or been injured. It was arguable that this 
was a significant possibility, given the policyholders‘ ages and their having to sleep in the 
open. Taking all these points into consideration, we decided the fair and reasonable 
solution was for the insurer to meet the claim. 
 
01/21  
 
travel – curtailment – death of relative – relative resident abroad – whether policyholder‘s 
return to UK covered.  
 
Following the death of his mother in Kenya, the policyholder and his wife had to return 
home to the UK from their holiday in Amsterdam. The insurer refused to meet the claim Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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as the policyholder‘s mother was not resident in the UK. It referred to the policy section 
which  covered  curtailment  due  to  ―the  death,  severe  injury  or  serious  illness  of  an 
immediate relative resident in the United Kingdom‖. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
Although the policy wording was unambiguous, we considered that its application was 
unfair in the circumstances. The country in which the policyholder‘s mother was resident 
at the time of her death did not seem relevant, as he and his wife had first to return home 
to the United Kingdom. The insurer agreed to meet the claim. 
 
01/22   
 
motor  –  non-disclosure  –  ―accidents  or  losses‖  –  whether  policyholder  required  to 
disclose unsuccessful claims.   
 
The policyholder applied for motor insurance. The proposal form asked: ‗Have you or 
anyone who will drive been involved in any motor accidents or made a claim (fault or 
non-fault including thefts) during the last five years?‘ His answer was ‗No.‘ 
 
When the policyholder‘s car was stolen, the insurer learnt that he had made a theft claim 
under his previous motor policy within the five year period. The insurer voided the policy 
from its start date and rejected the policyholder‘s claim. The policyholder argued that he 
did not have to disclose his previous theft claim because the insurer concerned had 
decided not to meet it. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
The policyholder‘s answer on the proposal form was incorrect. Although the question 
was  confined  to  claims  and  did  not  extend  to  losses  not  claimed  for,  it  was  clearly 
worded: it was not limited to successful claims, nor did it ask what the outcome was. The 
policyholder had pursued his previous claim all the way to a conclusion and ought to 
have disclosed it. The insurer was fully entitled to treat the policy as void. 
 
01/23  
 
motor – non-disclosure – mistake – whether insurer entitled to cancel policy.    
 
In  June  1999  the  policyholder  applied  for  motor  insurance  over  the  telephone.  The 
insurer‘s  standard  practice  was  to  ask  about  claims  made  within  the  previous  three 
years.  The  policyholder  remembered  that  he  had  made  a  claim,  but  was  not  sure 
whether it fell within that time span. He maintained that he mentioned this to the insurer‘s 
telesales operator, who told him she would check the position. When the proposal form 
arrived  without  any  mention  of  the  claim,  the  policyholder  signed  it,  assuming  the 
insurer‘s  investigation  had  revealed  it  was more  than  three  years  old.  In  reality,  the 
insurer  had  not  carried  out  any  investigations,  and  the  claim  was  not  noted  on  its 
records. 
 
A  few  weeks  later,  the policyholder‘s  car  was stolen.  On  investigating  his  claim,  the 
insurer discovered he had made a motor theft claim previously, in August 1997. The Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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insurer refused to indemnify the policyholder for his loss, on the  ground that he had 
failed to disclose the earlier claim on the proposal form. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
There was no tape-recording of the policyholder‘s initial telephone call, so it was difficult 
to  know  exactly  what  was  said.  At  worst,  however,  it  seemed  to  us  that  the  non-
disclosure resulted from a misunderstanding, and – on a balance of probabilities – we 
were  satisfied  the  policyholder  had  acted  innocently.  The  insurer  would  only  have 
charged  a  small  additional  premium  had  it  known  about  the  previous  claim.  In  the 
circumstances, we asked the insurer to meet the present claim in full, with interest. 
 
01/24  
 
motor  –  non-disclosure  –  ―accident  or  loss‖  –  named  driver  –  whether  policyholder 
obliged to disclose named driver‘s loss.  
 
The  policyholder  applied  for  motor  insurance,  answering  ‗no‘  to  the  following  two 
questions on the proposal form: 
 
―Has the car been altered/modified from the maker‘s specification (including the addition 
of optional fit accessories such as spoilers, skirts, alloy wheels etc.?) 
 
―Have YOU or ANY PERSON who will drive ... during the past five years been involved 
in any accident or loss (irrespective of blame and of whether a claim resulted)?‖ 
 
When the insurer investigated a new claim, it came to light that the car had been fitted 
with  oversized  alloy  wheels,  spoilers,  and  chrome  wheel  arches,  and  that  the 
policyholder‘s husband, a named driver on the policy, had made two significant claims in 
the previous five years. The insurer refused to meet the claim and cancelled the policy 
from its start date. 
 
The policyholder stated that she had bought the car with the all the modifications already 
fitted, and she assumed they were all part of the car‘s original specification. She further 
explained that she did not realise her husband had made one of the two earlier claims, 
and that his other claim had been rejected because he had only third party cover at the 
time. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
On the evidence presented, we accepted the policyholder genuinely believed the car 
was not modified when she bought it. The fact remained, however, that she failed to 
disclose  her  husband‘s  previous  claims.  The  question  in  issue  was  clear  and 
unambiguous, and asked for details of any ‗loss‘ irrespective of whether a claim was 
made. The policyholder ought, therefore, to have appreciated the need to disclose those 
previous incidents. By not doing so, she misled the insurer into accepting a risk it would 
only otherwise have agreed to cover, if at all, in return for a substantially higher premium. 
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household contents – non-disclosure  – ―property stolen,  lost or damaged‖  – whether 
policyholder liable to disclose attempted break-in.  
 
The  policyholder  applied  for  household  contents  insurance.  His  local  bank  manager 
completed a proposal form on his behalf, which he signed. One of the questions asked 
was: 
 
‗Have you or any member of your household ... had any property or possessions stolen, 
lost or damaged or had any claims made against you, in the last three years (whether 
insured or not)?‘ 
 
The policyholder remembered telling the bank manager of an attempted break-in which 
occurred some months previously. 
 
The advice he said he was given in reply was that, because the intruders had not gained 
entry into the house or stolen anything, the incident did not count as a burglary and need 
not be mentioned on the form. 
 
This  previous  incident  came  to  light  when  the  insurer  appointed  loss  adjusters  to 
investigate two burglaries. The insurer refused to pay either claim, and voided the policy 
from its start date. The policyholder was aggrieved, and sought reinstatement of the 
policy, payment of both claims and compensation for inconvenience suffered.  
 
Complaint upheld  
 
On the question as worded, the policyholder had not supplied an incorrect answer. The 
question would have had to be phrased differently to elicit disclosure of an attempted 
burglary which did not result in any quantifiable loss. Even if there had been quantifiable 
loss, and the policyholder had declared the attempted break-in, it was apparent from the 
insurer‘s underwriting guidelines that it would still have been prepared to accept the risk. 
The insurer agreed to reinstate the policy, deal with both claims, and pay compensation 
of £250. 
 
01/26  
 
motor – renewal – policy replaced – insurer failing to notify policyholder of new policy 
terms – whether insurer entitled to rely on new terms.  
 
The policyholder bought a new car in April 1998. He was given a year‘s free insurance 
as part of the purchase arrangements. The policy provided, amongst other benefits, that 
if the car were damaged beyond economic repair within two years, the insurer would 
replace it with a new car of the same make and specification. The policy was due to 
expire on 23 April 1999. On 1 April, the policyholder received a letter from the dealer 
offering to renew the policy. The letter enclosed a new proposal form and details of the 
new cover but did not draw attention to any differences. The policy had a new title but 
was underwritten by the same insurer. The policyholder was involved in an accident in 
December 1999 and his car was written off. 
 
The insurer settled his claim by paying the market value, but the policyholder contended 
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to  the  first  policy  and  was  not  included  in  the  terms  of  the  second  policy.  The 
policyholder argued that he had been misled. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
The insurer had offered two years‘ free insurance to some purchasers, but this was not 
available to purchasers of the model bought by the policyholder. He was therefore not 
offered renewal of his policy, only the option of taking out a new policy. However, the 
same policy booklet was given to both types of purchaser. 
 
We were satisfied that the policyholder had not understood that cover under the  new 
policy was different from that under the first one. The insurer‘s agent‘s offer to ‗renew‘ 
the policy on behalf of the insurer had led the policyholder to misunderstand the nature 
of the cover being arranged. The insurer‘s duty to notify changes in cover had not been 
met, so the insurer should deal with the claim as if the original policy terms applied. 
 
The insurer accepted our view that the policyholder was entitled to be paid the balance 
of the cost of a new car, plus interest, together with his out-of-pocket expenses of £25. 
 
Issue 4:  April 2001 
 
04/1 
 
loan protection – joint insureds – calculation of benefit – whether each insured entitled to 
full monthly benefit.   
 
Mr and Mrs H took out insurance to protect their joint mortgage repayments, choosing a 
monthly benefit of £500. In October 1998, Mrs H became unemployed and submitted a 
claim. The insurer made monthly payments of £250. Mrs H and her husband argued that 
she was entitled to £500 per month. In their opinion, the policy covered each of them for 
that amount. They said this was what they were told when they bought the policy and it 
had been confirmed in the insurer‘s letter accepting the claim. 
 
The insurer did not accept this argument, stating that the policy explained clearly how 
benefit would be calculated. However, it offered £50 compensation ‗for the errors and 
incorrect advice‘. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
Neither  the  application  form  nor  the  insurance  certificate  explained  the  amount  of 
monthly  benefit  that  would  be  paid  in  the  case  of  joint  applicants.  Both  documents 
showed the amount of the monthly benefit required as £500 and contained no more than 
a general reference to the booklet which detailed the conditions. There was no specific 
reference to the limitation of cover in the case of joint borrowers. 
 
The layout of the conditions booklet was confusing and unlikely to help anyone wishing 
to ascertain the position for joint borrowers. On Page 4, ‗monthly benefit‘ was defined as 
‗the amount you have agreed with us as specified in your certificate of insurance‘ but 
there was no reference to the limitation that applied to joint borrowers. The sections of 
the booklet, ‗What we will pay‘, ‗What we will not pay‘ and ‗How to claim‘ also failed to 
reveal the relevant limitation. Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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The limitation was, in fact, set out under the heading ‗Eligibility‘ – ‗If the mortgage has 
been taken out by joint borrowers who are all eligible for cover … each borrower‘s cover 
is limited to an equal share of the monthly benefit, eg if the monthly benefit is £600 and 
there are three borrowers eligible for cover, each would be covered for £200‘. 
 
The insurer appeared to have accepted at an early stage that there was some substance 
in  the  complaint.  It  accepted  our  recommendation  that  it  should  make  an  additional 
payment to Mrs H on the basis that her true entitlement was to benefit payments of 
£500, plus interest. It also increased its compensation offer to £200. 
 
04/2 
 
loan protection – accidental death – meaning of ‗accidental‘.  
 
A  young  couple,  Mr  and  Mrs  R,  had  mortgage  payment  protection  insurance  which 
included accidental death cover. When Mrs R died suddenly, her husband claimed the 
policy benefit. The insurer made enquiries and was advised that the cause of death was 
pneumococcal meningitis and pneumonia. It rejected the claim on the ground that the 
death was not caused by an accident. 
 
Mr R argued that the policy defined ‗accident‘ as ‗a sudden unforeseen unintentional 
violent external event‘ and that his claim was therefore valid, particularly as the policy did 
not exclude death by sickness or disease. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
An exclusion for death by sickness or disease would only be necessary if the definition of 
‗accident‘ were wide enough to include such deaths. It was not. Mrs R‘s death resulted 
not  from  an  accident  but  from  a  viral  infection.  We  accepted  that  the  death  was 
accidental in the sense that it was not anticipated. However, it could not be regarded as 
due to a ‗violent external event‘ in any ordinary use of that term. We did not agree there 
was any ambiguity in the policy terms and we considered the insurer was entitled to 
reject the claim. 
 
04/3  
 
loan  protection  –  eligibility  –  self-employed  insured  on  ‗maternity  leave‘  –  whether 
‗actively working at her business‘.  
 
Mrs M was a self-employed dietician for a dieting organisation. After the birth of her child 
in February 1998, she did not return to work for some months. In June 1998, while she 
was still unemployed, a lender telephoned to offer a loan to her and her husband, who 
was in full-time employment. She was also offered insurance to cover the repayments 
and she agreed to take out both the loan and the insurance. The paperwork named only 
Mrs M as the borrower but she did not consider this important. 
 
Mrs M returned to work in September 1998, but was offered less work than previously 
and her earnings were only £12 per week. Her husband fell ill in November and was 
diagnosed as having a brain tumour. 
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When the couple put in a claim for disability benefits, they were told the policy did not 
cover him. Mrs M contended that when the policy was sold she had provided full details 
of her husband‘s earnings and her own status, and had discussed the recent birth of 
their child. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
It was up to the insurer to prove that the policy had been properly sold and that the sale 
complied with the provisions of the ABI Code. The insurer was clearly aware that Mrs M 
was both self-employed and on ‗maternity leave‘. Since she was not ‗actively working at 
her business‘ she was not eligible for the policy. However, we did not consider that the 
insurer‘s refunding the premium constituted an appropriate resolution of the dispute. 
 
We accepted the insurer‘s contention that the policy could have been transferred into the 
husband‘s name at Mrs M‘s request. However, we did not agree that her failure to make 
such a request meant she had deliberately chosen not to take out cover for her husband. 
We were satisfied that the policy had not been properly explained at the time of the sale. 
 
The appropriate outcome was for the insurer to amend its records to include the name of 
the husband on the policy and to meet his disability claim. 
 
04/4 
 
loan protection – unemployment – fixed-term contract – whether claim for unemployment 
at end of fixed-term contract valid.  
 
A university lecturer, Dr J, took out a loan with loan protection insurance in May 1999. 
On  1  October  that  year,  he  became  unemployed  and  claimed  benefit  under  the 
insurance.  The  insurer  rejected  his  claim,  stating  that  the  policy  did  not  cover 
unemployment occurring at the end of a fixed-term contract. 
 
Dr J maintained that his claim was covered, as the policy stated that the exclusion did 
not apply because he had been ‗in continuous work for the same employer for at least 
24 months, and [his] contract has been renewed at least twice and [he had] no reason to 
believe that it would not be renewed again‘. 
 
However, Dr J‘s employer stated that his contract had been from 20 January 1997 until 1 
October  1999  and  that  he  had  been  told  on  27  October  1998  that  it  would  not  be 
renewed. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
It was clear that Dr J had been aware before taking out the loan that he would become 
unemployed  on  1  October  1999.  There  were  no  grounds  for  requiring  the  insurer  to 
make any payment to him. Moreover, on the facts, Dr J did not meet the other conditions 
of the exception as there was no evidence that his contract had been renewed twice. 
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04/5  
 
loan protection  – disability  – exclusion for any mental or nervous disorder  – insured 
made  redundant  and  affected  by  stress  –  whether  insurer  liable  for  disability  or 
unemployment benefit.  
 
Miss K was made redundant in January 1999. She subsequently became unwell and her 
GP signed her off with depression. When she submitted a claim for disability benefits 
under her loan payment protection insurance, the insurer rejected it on the ground that 
the policy specifically excluded claims ‗caused or aggravated by any psychiatric illness 
or  any  mental  or  nervous  disorder‘.  She  was  unable  to  claim  unemployment  benefit 
because  her  illness  prevented  her  from  signing  on.  She  was  not  therefore  ‗actively 
seeking new employment‘. Miss K maintained it was unfair to deny her benefit on either 
ground because of her circumstances. 
 
Complaint upheld in part 
 
We  were  concerned  about  the  impact  of  the  two  exclusions  on  the  claimant. 
Redundancy is likely to be a difficult time for anyone and stress and/or depression can 
be common. The policy clearly excluded any claim for mental illness, so Miss K was not 
entitled to disability benefit. 
 
However, since she would have been entitled to redundancy benefits if she had not been 
signed  off  with  depression,  we  did  not  consider  it  would  be  fair  for  her  to  forgo  all 
benefits.  In  the  circumstances,  we  concluded  that  payment  of  50%  of  the maximum 
benefit was appropriate. 
 
04/6  
 
loan  protection  –  unemployment  –  exclusion  for  employees  working  outside  UK  – 
insured employed abroad but registered as unemployed in UK – whether claim valid.  
 
Mr D worked as an oil industry welder in the UK. In March 1999 he bought a car on hire 
purchase  and  took  out  insurance  to  cover  the  loan  repayments.  In  June  1999  his 
employment  was  terminated.  He  obtained  work  as  a  welder  through  an  agency  in 
Manchester and was employed in Belgium from August 1999 until January 2000, when 
that job was terminated. He then returned to the UK and signed on as unemployed. 
 
The insurer rejected his claim for unemployment benefit on the ground that the policy 
contained an exclusion for anyone working outside the UK. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
Mr D was a UK citizen who had returned to the UK and was registered for employment 
here. This was not a case where there was a need for the insurer to make enquiries of 
the relevant authorities abroad to see whether he met foreign criteria for state benefits. 
We considered that Mr D had complied with the spirit of the policy terms, if not with the 
strict wording. The insurer agreed to our recommendation that it should meet the claim 
and reimburse any penalties charged by the lender. 
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04/7 
 
loan  protection  –  unemployment  –  insured  unable  to  sign  on  as  disabled  –  whether 
unemployment claim valid – whether payment of disability claim reduced entitlement to 
unemployment benefits.  
 
Mr  E  was  employed  as  a  courier/driver  from  November  1998  until  spring  1999.  He 
submitted disability claims for benefits under a number of loan payment policies, stating 
that he had been signed off work by his GP from 13 April 1999 for whiplash injuries and 
anxiety. 
 
When the insurer asked for confirmation of Mr E‘s employment, his employer stated that 
his last day at work was 11 April 1999, although on Mr E‘s P45 the employer had given 
the date as 31 March. The employer refused to answer all further enquiries from the 
insurer. 
 
The  insurer  rejected  the  claim  on  the  ground  that  Mr  E  had  ceased  working  before 
becoming unwell. However, after Mr E won a claim for unfair dismissal at an industrial 
tribunal it agreed to review the claim. The insurer paid Mr E disability benefits under the 
three policies from 13 April until 12 December 1999, the date when his GP said he was 
fit for work. 
 
Thereafter, Mr E submitted an unemployment claim and was paid benefit under one of 
his policies for the balance of the policy maximum of 360 days. The insurer rejected Mr 
E‘s claims on the other policies because he had cancelled the policies. Mr E said he had 
only done this because the insurer had refused his disability claims. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
Mr E had taken out protection against both disability and unemployment and both these 
misfortunes had befallen him at the same time. His first sick note was dated 12 April, 
immediately after his employment was terminated. 
 
We  therefore  considered  that  a  separate  maximum  benefit  period  applied  for  the 
unemployment  claim  and  that  the  insurer  should  not  have  combined  this  with  the 
disability claim. Both policies clearly provided for a maximum unemployment benefit of 
360 days. So Mr E‘s claims should not have been limited by the payment of the earlier 
disability benefits and his unemployment benefit should have run from the date he was 
first able to sign on. 
 
With  respect  to  the  two  cancelled  policies,  we  put  it  to  the  insurer  that  Mr  E  had 
cancelled them simply because of justifiable frustration at the handling of his claims, not 
because he no longer wished the insurer to consider claims under those policies. The 
insurer agreed to treat the claims as if the policies had continued in force. 
 
04/8  
 
legal  expenses  –  policy  covering  ‗acts  any  affecting  policyholder‘s  legal  rights‘  – 
policyholder claiming cover to determine his legal rights – whether claim valid.  
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When Mr and Mrs G bought their house in July 1997, they found their drive obstructed 
by a fence panel which their neighbours had erected. They could not reach agreement 
with their neighbours as to the correct boundary and, in February 2000, the neighbours 
issued proceedings. 
 
Mr and Mrs G notified their legal expenses insurer that they were claiming indemnity for 
their legal costs. The insurer rejected their claim, stating that the policy only covered ‗any 
act which affects [their] legal rights arising out of or to do with [their] living in or owning 
[their] home‘. The insurer contended that until Mr and Mrs G had proved that their rights 
had been affected by the neighbours‘ action, it had no liability to provide any indemnity. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
If the court decided that Mr and Mrs G were wrong, then it could not be said that the 
neighbours‘ act had affected their legal rights. Nevertheless, it could not be correct that 
cover only operated after the issue in dispute had been determined. 
 
The insurer was, of course, entitled to receive sufficient evidence to show that a ‗prima 
facie‘  case  existed,  but  in  our  view  the  policyholder  could  establish  his  ‗rights‘  by 
producing evidence, such as documents, before the case had come to court. 
 
In this instance, in April 2000 the policyholders‘ solicitor had sent the insurer documents 
which established that Mr and Mrs G had a prima facie case, and the insurer had not 
explained why the claim was not covered. We upheld Mr and Mrs G‘s complaint and the 
insurer agreed to provide indemnity for all ‗reasonable and necessary costs‘ they had 
incurred since 28 February 2000, the date when it had rejected the claim. 
 
04/9  
 
household contents – policy limits – limit for high risk items – whether insurer making 
limits clear to policyholder.   
 
The insurance Mrs M arranged for her household contents had a standard limit of £7,500 
for high risk items. She was sent confirmation of her policy details which stated: 
 
‗Your policy will be issued with a limit of £11,500 for High Risk Items and a High Risk 
Item single article limit of £1,000. If you require the total High Risk Items limit to be 
increased, please state the amount required. If there are any High Risk Items which 
exceed £1,000, please provide the descriptions and values in the box below.‘ 
 
Mrs  M provided the insurer with details of a number of items she wished to specify 
separately. When she was burgled, the loss adjusters recommended settlement of her 
claim at £11,504.09 for the high risk items and £7,179 for the specified articles. The 
insurer refused to make these payments, stating that Mrs M was under-insured. It said 
the values she stated for the high risk Items should have been sufficient to include all the 
specified items as well as those not specified. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
The  insurer  had  failed  to make  the  policy  limits  clear  to  Mrs  M.  The  wording  of  the 
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of their conversation before the policy was issued. We were not satisfied that the insurer 
had asked clear questions, as it was required to do under the ABI Statement. 
 
We concluded it was not appropriate for the insurer to reduce the claim because the high 
risk items limit was insufficient to include the items specified separately. We considered 
it should meet the claim in full, subject to deduction of the additional premium it would 
have charged. 
 
04/10  
 
household contents – policy limits – valuables – conflicting limits – whether both limits 
had to be drawn to policyholder‘s attention.  
 
Mrs L had a collection of ornaments and claimed £1,200 under her household insurance 
when  her  granddaughter  accidentally  damaged  some  of  them.  Initially,  the  insurer 
rejected  her  claim,  stating  that  she  had  not  chosen  the  optional  accidental  damage 
policy extension to her contents cover. She disputed this and the insurer accepted that 
the  ornaments  came  within  the  definition  of  ‗valuables‘  for  which  she  was  covered. 
However, it sent her a cheque for only £500, the maximum payable. This was because 
the policy stated that the single article limit applied to ‗any item, collection or set‘. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
There was no doubt that the damaged items were part of a collection or set. However, 
we agreed with the policyholder that there was a discrepancy in the policy wording. The 
schedule simply referred to the single article limit and did not mention collections or sets. 
That limit appeared only on page 21 of the policy. 
 
Moreover, this was a significant restriction which should have been clearly drawn to Mrs 
L‘s attention. It would not be difficult for the £500 limit to be exceeded by almost any 
collection of jewellery, pictures or works of art. The insurer accepted our view that the 
claim should be met in full. 
 
04/11  
 
personal possessions – cover for lost property – exclusion for unattended property – 
whether exclusion a significant restriction on cover.  
 
Mr B bought a mobile telephone and insured it. The policy provided an indemnity if the 
phone  were  lost  or stolen.  However,  it  specifically  excluded  ‗theft or  damage  arising 
where equipment is left unattended by the insured … in any property, place or premises 
or in or on any form of public conveyance‘. 
 
After a shopping trip, Mr B reported that his phone had been lost or stolen, probably after 
he had left it on a shop counter. The insurer repudiated liability, in accordance with the 
exclusion. It also contended that Mr B was in breach of a policy condition to take all 
reasonable precautions to prevent loss or damage. 
 
Complaint upheld 
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Within 20 minutes of realising that he did not have his phone, Mr B returned to the shop 
where he thought he had left it. The phone had clearly been ‗unattended‘ during his 
absence. However, by applying the exclusion to losses as well as to theft claims, the 
insurer had severely restricted the cover it purported to provide. This exclusion should 
therefore have been drawn to Mr B‘s attention before he bought the policy. Since the 
insurer could provide no proof that this had happened, we did not consider it could rely 
on the exclusion. 
 
As to lack of reasonable care, the insurer had to prove that Mr B had been reckless and 
there was no evidence of this. Mr B had acted inadvertently and had not exhibited any 
lack of care. We therefore required the insurer to reimburse the cost of the phone and to 
add interest to its payment. 
 
04/12  
 
household buildings – landslip – exclusion for ‗faulty design‘ – boundary fence failing to 
prevent landslip – whether design of fence ‗faulty‘.  
 
The house Mr A bought in 1992 was part of a new development whose back gardens 
overlooked  a  railway  embankment.  His  garden  was  separated  from  the  top  of  the 
embankment  by  a  large  fence,  set  into  the  embankment  with  tall  posts  similar  to 
telegraph poles. 
 
By  the  following  year,  the  fence  was  leaning  outwards over  the  embankment and a 
fissure appeared in the lawn. Mr A replaced the fence and built a patio over the lawn. 
But by 1995, both were showing signs of downward creep. A new fence was put up in 
1997, but did not remedy the problem, so Mr A claimed for the cost of stabilising his 
property. 
 
The insurer refused indemnity. It concluded that the original fence was built to retain the 
embankment and its replacement had failed to prevent movement of the site. As the 
policy excluded damage due to ‗faulty design‘, it said it had no liability for the cost of 
repairs. 
 
Complaint upheld in part 
 
We appointed a surveyor to advise whether the original fence had been constructed in 
order  to  retain  the  embankment.  He  concluded  that  the  builder  had  not  taken  the 
possibility of landslip into account and that the design of the fence could not be regarded 
as  faulty.  In  any  event,  we  were  not  persuaded  that  a  fence  could  ‗retain‘  an 
embankment which lay below it. 
 
We required the insurer to deal with the damage to Mr A‘s property. However, it did not 
have any liability for stabilising the embankment. The embankment was not part of Mr 
B‘s property and such works would constitute significant betterment. 
 
04/13  
 
travel – cover terminating on return home – policyholder returning home before end of 
trip – whether cover in force.  
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Mr and Mrs N took out holiday insurance to cover them from 6–30 October 1998. They 
spent the first part of their holiday in Italy, where they met an old friend, Mr G. They 
decided  to  return  home  earlier  than  they  originally  intended  –  on  26  October.  They 
planned to collect fresh clothes and provisions before setting off for Wales with Mr G. 
However, after Mrs N had dropped off her husband at home, together with Mr G, while 
she went to fill up the car with petrol, she was killed in an accident. 
 
Mr N made a claim under the policy for death benefit of £60,000. However, the insurer 
said the policy stated that cover ‗finishes immediately [they returned] to [their] home … 
for any reason‘. Mr N argued, first, that his wife had not returned home since she had 
merely dropped him off there with Mr G before going to the filling station. Second he 
contended that the insurance had not expired because the policy was due to continue 
until 30 October. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
The personal accident section of the policy stated that benefit was payable while the 
policyholders were on their ‗trip‘. This was defined as ‗any journey or holiday … which 
starts and finishes in the United Kingdom … for which [the policyholder has] paid the 
premium‘. 
 
We considered  the  word  ‗trip‘  was  wide  enough  to cover  a  two  stage  holiday,  even 
though that holiday was broken by a stopover at the travellers‘ home, provided that it 
was over by 30 October. The insurer accepted that Mr N had a valid claim for benefit and 
interest. 
 
04/14 
 
travel – policy limits – loss or theft of cash – whether limits clear.  
 
Mr  T  took  out  ‗gold  plus‘  travel  insurance  to  cover  his  holiday  in  Corfu.  The  policy 
included cover for loss of money. A table on the front of the policy stated that the limit of 
cover was £500, although it also said ‗This is a guide only. Please read the terms and 
conditions of this insurance‘. 
 
The policy terms provided: 
 
‗We will pay up to £500.00 for the loss or theft of cash or travel cheques, if you can give 
us evidence that you owned them and evidence of their value. We will pay up to £300.00 
for cash for travel outside Area 1 and up to £150.00 for places within Area 1 for gold plus 
cover, winter sports cover and multi-trip cover only.‘ Area 1 was defined as Europe. 
 
Mr T‘s money was stolen while he was on the way to Corfu. The insurer settled his claim 
subject to the £150 gold plus cover limit. Mr T argued that the proper limit was £500, 
which the insurer had several times confirmed as applicable. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
The policy document was confusing. The first line stated that the insurer would pay up to 
£500 if a claimant could provide evidence of ownership and value. Mr T had done this. 
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not clear to the reader. Indeed, it was not clear whether the insurer would ever pay up to 
£500 if the upper limit outside Area 1 was set at £300. 
 
We were satisfied not only that the limit had not been pointed out to Mr T, but that he 
had been assured there was cover for up to £500. We recommended that the insurer 
should pay Mr T the outstanding balance between its settlement and his loss, up to 
£500, and it agreed to do this. 
 
04/15 
 
medical expenses – exclusion for treatment related to engagement in professional sport 
– meaning of ‗professional sport‘.  
 
The policyholder had insurance to cover his family‘s medical expenses and submitted 
claims for the cost of treatment for his daughter, a member of the Great Britain Ladies 
Hockey Team. The insurer made enquiries and established that she had been given an 
award from the Sport England Lottery Fund (World Class). It considered that treatment 
of her sports injuries was excluded under the policy. This was because it decided the 
treatment  consisted  of  ‗care  and/or  treatment  arising  from  or  related  to  engaging  in 
professional sport‘. 
 
The  policy  defined  ‗professional  sport‘  as  ‗a  sport  where  a  fee  or  benefit  in  kind  is 
received either directly or indirectly for playing or training‘. The policyholder stated that 
the Inland Revenue did not treat the lottery grant as ‗income‘. He said the insurer had 
not notified him when it added this restriction to the policy and he denied his daughter 
was a ‗professional‘ player. 
 
The  insurer  did  meet  the  claims,  but  it  did  not  admit  liability.  The  policyholder  was 
dissatisfied with the way the insurer had handled matters and claimed compensation for 
the distress and inconvenience caused by the insurer‘s disputing liability. 
 
Complaint upheld in part 
 
The insurer seemed to have interpreted its definition of ‗professional‘ sports people as 
including  those  who  were  seriously  committed  players.  This  extended  the  definition 
beyond its generally accepted meaning. The lottery grant was not directly related to past 
or future appearances, performance or training requirements; it could more properly be 
described as a charitable donation. We did not agree that it was a ‗fee or benefit in kind‘ 
or that receiving this payment had altered the status of the policyholder‘s daughter from 
amateur to professional. We agreed with the policyholder that the insurer was liable for 
the cost of his daughter‘s treatment. 
 
However, the insurer‘s handling of the claims was not unacceptable. We had not agreed 
with the insurer‘s interpretation of the exclusion, but the judgment was a fine one and the 
insurer‘s  position  was  not  without  merit.  Any  annoyance  the  policyholder  had 
experienced did not amount to material maladministration. We therefore concluded it 
would not be right to award any compensation. 
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04/16  
 
household – sum insured – inflation-linking causing policyholder to be over-insured – 
whether policyholder entitled to premium refund.   
 
Mrs  G  and  her  aunt  had,  for  many  years,  held  household  buildings  and  contents 
insurance for their two-bedroom terraced house in Wales. The policy was inflation-linked 
and premiums increased by 15% annually. Mrs G did not query the sums insured until 
1999,  when  her  daughter  began  managing  her  affairs.  The  annual  premium  had 
increased  by  then  to  £1,674.91.  The  contents  were  insured  for  £141,488  and  the 
buildings sum insured was £212,042. The correct amounts should have been £40,000 
and £55,000 respectively. 
 
The insurer accepted that the values for both buildings and contents were far too high 
and it offered a rebate of £1,000 and a further year‘s cover without charge. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
Although  it  was  the  policyholder‘s  responsibility  to  assess  the  replacement  cost,  the 
consequence in this case of the firm‘s applying an automatic annual increase was  an 
insured  value  which  was  totally  unjustified.  If  the  policyholder  submitted  a  total  loss 
claim, the sums insured would have had no bearing on the insurer‘s liability. 
 
We  considered  a  fair  result  would  be  achieved  if  the  insurer  refunded  50%  of  the 
premiums paid over the previous five years, with interest, and it agreed to do this. 
 
04/17 
 
household contents – minimum security requirements – policyholder noting requirements 
before start of insurance – whether policyholder entitled to compensation for distress and 
inconvenience.- mladministration – distress and inconvenience – whether cancellation of 
policy by policyholder justified compensation. 
 
Mr C telephoned the insurer on 12 June to ask about household insurance. He wanted 
the cover to start on 1 July. When he received the policy documents, he was dismayed 
to learn that cover depended on his complying with a minimum security condition. He 
protested, saying no one had mentioned this when he enquired about the policy, and he 
cancelled the policy on 21 June. The insurer returned his premium in full but rejected his 
demand for a payment of £3,000 as compensation for the inconvenience he said the 
insurer had caused him. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
The insurer recorded most calls made to its call centres and we were able to listen to 
tape recordings of Mr C‘s conversations with the insurer‘s staff. On several occasions, 
matters  of  security  had  been  discussed  at  considerable  length.  We  were  therefore 
surprised that Mr C alleged he had not been told of the insurer‘s requirements. He had 
not been put to any unnecessary inconvenience and we agreed that the insurer was fully 
justified in refusing to pay compensation. 
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04/18  
 
household buildings – sum insured – reinstatement – whether insurer entitled to limit 
cost of reinstatement to sum insured.  
 
Following a serious fire at Mrs  Y‘s house in March 1999, the insurer appointed loss 
adjusters to assess the damage. They considered that repairs would not exceed the sum 
insured of £110,000. They also calculated that the sum insured was too low and that the 
cost of rebuilding would be £135,000. Mrs Y increased the sum insured to the amount 
they recommended. 
 
The insurer paid over £7,000 for emergency works to make the property safe, but there 
was bad weather in April and further damage occurred. When tenders for the repairs 
came in, however, the lowest was for £139,250. The insurer agreed to reinstate the 
property, but it limited repair works to a total of £103,000 – the sum insured less the cost 
of emergency work. This was sufficient to rebuild the property, but left the first floor a 
shell. 
 
Mrs Y said she had been promised that if she increased the sum insured to the amount 
the loss adjusters recommended, the insurer would meet the claim in full and would 
make no deduction for under-insurance. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
The policy gave the insurer the option of making a cash settlement, repairing, replacing 
or reinstating. The insurer had clearly opted to reinstate and was therefore bound to 
replace  as  new,  with  no  deduction  for  wear  and  tear  or  depreciation.  The  cost  was 
accordingly not limited to the sum insured. 
 
If  the  insurer  wished  to  impose  a  ceiling  of  £110,000  on  its  liability,  it  had  to 
communicate that to the policyholder. It had not done this until after the house had been 
demolished and it could not impose the limit in the middle of agreed works. We required 
the insurer to meet the full cost of reinstatement. 
 
04/19 
 
maladministration  –  confidentiality  –  insurer  disclosing  information  in  breach  of 
policyholder‘s instructions – whether compensation payable.  
 
Mr D insured his house and garage with one insurer, while the business property, which 
he stored in the garage, was insured by a different insurer. When he made a claim under 
the business property policy, the loss adjusters appointed by that insurer wrote to Mr D‘s 
household insurer, seeking information. The household insurer responded, confirming 
that it insured the house and garage, giving the policy number, and stating that no claim 
had been received. 
 
Mr  D  was  extremely  aggrieved  to  learn  that  his  household  insurer  had  provided 
information to the loss adjusters, asserting that this was in breach both of his specific 
instructions  and  the  Data  Protection  Act.  He  demanded  £60,000  compensation  for 
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information to the loss adjusters. It offered Mr D £100 in recognition of the distress and 
inconvenience it had caused. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
There  was  no  link  between  the  household  insurer‘s  unauthorised  disclosure  of 
information to the loss adjusters and any loss by Mr D. No evidence had appeared which 
indicated that the disclosure had influenced the loss adjusters‘ handling of the business 
insurance claim. In the circumstances, we were satisfied that the insurer‘s offer was 
appropriate  and  we  stated  that  we  would  not  require  it  to  increase  its  offer  or  to 
contribute to Mr D‘s alleged losses. 
 
04/20 
 
household – sum insured  
 
Mr J insured his house for an index-linked sum – £285,000 – when he renewed the 
insurance in 1993. In February 1995, he discovered landslip damage to his tennis court. 
He  appointed  an  engineer  and  notified  the  insurer.  It  became  apparent  almost 
immediately that the damage was progressing rapidly and, in March 1995, the insurer 
agreed to pay for emergency work to stabilise the site. 
 
This work did not halt the slippage and a meeting was held in June 1995 to discuss 
possible remedies. Mr J asked the insurer to settle his claim by declaring the property a 
total loss and paying the full sum insured. However, the insurer‘s loss adjusters were of 
the opinion that the insurer‘s liability was limited to underwriting the cost of remedial work 
up to the sum insured. 
 
Work continued, becoming more complicated as time went on, until eventually the site 
was stabilised. The insurer informed Mr J that the sum insured had been exhausted. He 
complained, asserting that the insurer had elected in June 1995 to reinstate the property 
instead  of  making  a  cash  settlement,  and  that  it  was  therefore  bound  to  meet  the 
balance of the full cost of repairing his house. This was estimated at £145,000. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
Cases of catastrophe such as this are fortunately very rare. The sum insured had been 
correctly calculated and was sufficient to cover the rebuilding and associated fees, as 
stipulated in the policy. However, it  was not sufficient to cover the additional cost of 
stabilising the site. Although insurers are generally aware there is a theoretical possibility 
of rebuilding costs exceeding an adequate sum insured, the insurer in this case had not 
advised Mr J of this possibility. 
 
The insurer had never agreed to reinstate the property regardless of cost. However, we 
did not accept it was appropriate for it to limit its settlement of this claim to the sum 
insured. The insurer had been closely involved in approving repairs and, once they had 
begun, both the insurer and the policyholder had effectively been committed to their 
completion. It was reasonable for Mr J to believe his property would be fully reinstated 
and he could not be said to have been indemnified if he was left with a badly cracked 
house on a stable site. 
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More  generally,  Mr  J  was  not  in  a  position  to  assess  the  likelihood  of  such  rare 
combinations of events when he decided on the sum insured. The sum insured was 
generally accepted to be appropriate and we concluded that, in such cases, the sum 
insured should not act as an absolute cap on the insurer‘s liability. We therefore required 
the insurer to pay £100,000 towards Mr J‘s repair costs. We  also recommended the 
insurer to meet the balance of his costs, although we had no jurisdiction to make a 
binding award for any amount in excess of £100,000. 
 
04/21 
 
household  buildings  –  cover  dependent  on  satisfactory  survey  –  delay  by  insurer  in 
arranging survey – whether policyholder prejudiced by cancellation of cover.   
 
Miss  F  had  a  mortgage  valuation  survey  carried  out  in  November  1998  before  she 
purchased  her  rented  property.  The  surveyor  noted  the  presence  of  minor  hairline 
differential cracking and a slight bulge in one wall. He concluded there was no indication 
of  recent  or  continuing  movement  and suggested  the most  likely  cause  was  historic 
bomb  damage.  Miss  F  telephoned  the  insurer  asking  for  insurance  cover.  Policy 
documents were issued on 15 December, with the proviso ‗Cover is provided subject to 
a satisfactory building survey.‘ 
 
The  insurer  did  not  have  the  survey  carried  out  for  two  months,  but  progressive 
movement  was  then  identified  and  the  insurer  cancelled  the  policy.  Miss  F  was 
dissatisfied  and  asserted  that  the  insurer‘s  delay  in  carrying  out  the  full  survey  had 
prejudiced her. The insurer maintained that she was advised during her initial telephone 
conversation that cover was conditional on a satisfactory survey and it stated that the 
risk did not meet its underwriting criteria. However, it agreed to extend cover until May 
2000. Miss F remained dissatisfied and sought compensation. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
It was not possible to determine whether Miss F was advised of the need for a full survey 
during  the  telephone  conversation.  Even  if  she  was,  she  might  not  have  acted  any 
differently. She was clearly aware of the cracking and did not consider it significant. 
Moreover,  she  had  the  opportunity  of  cancelling  the  policy  when  she  received 
confirmation of the proposal, highlighting the insurer‘s requirement. However, the delay 
in carrying out the survey was regrettable and the insurer‘s decision to cancel the policy 
meant Miss F would almost certainly be unable to find alternative cover. 
 
The insurer accepted that its delay had prejudiced Miss F. It would now be extremely 
difficult for her to go back to her last insurer or to find another. We considered the insurer 
should reinstate the policy without conditions, which it agreed to do. However, we did not 
think there was any justification for awarding compensation in addition to reinstating the 
policy. 
 
04/22  
 
caravan – minimum security requirements – theft – whether theft linked to breach of 
requirements – whether insurer entitled to reject theft claim. 
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Mr J submitted a claim for the theft of his caravan and its contents. The insurer rejected 
the claim on the ground that he had not complied with the policy‘s security requirements. 
The caravan‘s storage facility did not have security lighting and the gate to the caravan 
park had been unlocked. 
 
Mr J pointed out that he had fitted the caravan with a hitch lock and wheel clamp and 
that the park had some 25 other caravans. Although he accepted that there was no 
security lighting, he stated this was usual and that, in any event, lighting would not have 
deterred the thieves. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
There was no evidence as to whether the theft had taken place at night or in the daytime 
or whether the gate was open or merely unpadlocked. In the circumstances, we were not 
persuaded that Mr J‘s failure to comply with all the security requirements was linked to 
the theft. The ABI Statement says that insurers will not reject claims on the ground of a 
breach  of  condition  unless  the  loss  is  connected  with  the  breach.  We  therefore 
recommended that the insurer should meet the claim in full and it agreed to do so. 
 
04/23 
 
caravan  –  minimum  security  requirements  –  theft  –  whether  policyholder‘s  failure  to 
secure caravan justified rejection of theft claim.  
 
Mr S purchased a caravan on 20 June 2000. He took it on a trip on 10 July and brought 
it back on 13 July, when he left it at a friend‘s house for four days. He was aware that he 
needed to buy a wheel clamp and other accessories, but on 16 July, before he had done 
so, the caravan was stolen. 
 
The insurer rejected Mr S‘s theft claim on the grounds that he had failed both to exercise 
reasonable care and to safeguard the vehicle, because it had no wheel clamp and was 
neither attached to a hitch post nor stored in a secure compound. Mr S explained that he 
had been about to comply with the insurer‘s requirements but the caravan was stolen 
before he could do so. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
Although  the  caravan  had  been  left  unsecured  for  only  a  short  period,  the  policy 
endorsement applied regardless of the length of time. We were satisfied that Mr S knew 
which precautions he was required to take and had simply failed to secure the vehicle 
when he left. In the circumstances, we were satisfied that the insurer‘s rejection of his 
claim was justified. 
 
Issue 7:  July 2001 
 
07/1 
 
travel  –  accidental  death  benefit  –  exclusion  for  ‗hazardous  activities‘  –  whether 
exclusion brought to insured‘s attention. 
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Mr H took out an annual travel policy for his two adult sons before they went to America 
in May 1999. The insurer took approximately three weeks to issue the policy and then 
sent it to Mr H. As he was away at the time, the sons were unable to check – before they 
set out on their trip – whether the policy was suitable for their needs. In fact, it was not. It 
restricted cover for individual trips to 30 days, whereas they planned to be away for 74 
days,  and  it  did  not  cover  claims  arising  from  hazardous  activities,  including  riding 
motorcycles over 125cc. 
 
The following April, one of Mr H‘s sons went out to Australia. Whilst there, he had a fatal 
accident riding a 600cc motorcycle. Mr and Mrs H put in a claim for repatriation and 
funeral expenses and for the accidental death benefit of £30,000. 
 
The  insurer  explained  that,  because  of  the  motorcycle  exclusion,  the  policy  did  not 
provide any cover. However, it accepted that it had not sold, issued or explained the 
policy correctly. It therefore met the repatriation and funeral expenses as a gesture of 
goodwill. Mr and Mrs H did not accept that the motorcycle exclusion was valid, since it 
had not been drawn to their attention, and they felt they were entitled to the full death 
benefit. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
Mr H bought the policy specifically for the trip to America and had decided to buy an 
annual policy because of the length of the trip. The insurer had accepted that the policy 
had  not  been  properly  sold  and  it  confirmed  that  it  would  not  have  relied  on  the 
exclusions or restrictions to repudiate any claims arising during the trip to America. 
 
However, by the time of the second trip, the family was aware that the policy did not 
cover all hazardous activities and the policyholders had had ample opportunity to check 
whether  the  policy  was  appropriate  for  their  needs  and  to  request  an  amendment  if 
necessary. The policy was, in any event, due to lapse shortly after the son‘s departure to 
Australia  yet  they  had  not  checked  that  it  would  cover  the  trip  or  the  activities  he 
planned. In these circumstances, we took the view that the insurer‘s offer to pay the 
repatriation and funeral costs was reasonable and that it had no liability for the death 
claim. 
 
07/2 
 
travel – baggage – temporary loss – meaning of ‗temporary‘. 
 
Mr and Mrs N flew to Barcelona to join a cruise and the airline lost Mr N‘s baggage. He 
notified  the  cruise  operator  and  was  advised  that  the  insurer  would  reimburse 
emergency purchases. He bought some shirts and, some days later, other clothing. His 
bag was found fairly quickly and was sent to the ship when it docked at Athens. 
 
Mr N claimed £345 from the insurer. It sent him a cheque for £150, explaining that this 
was the maximum payable for temporary loss of baggage. The insurer submitted a claim 
to the airline and in due course received £150, which it regarded as reimbursment of its 
payment to Mr N. 
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Mr N argued that his claim should not be limited because the loss was not ‗temporary‘. 
He had restricted his purchases until the ship had left port and had no means of knowing 
when or if his bag would be found. 
 
Complaint upheld in part 
 
We accepted that a claimant could not know for some time whether the loss of baggage 
was  temporary  and  that  Mr  N  had  taken  all  reasonable  steps  to  minimise  his 
expenditure. However, he had received his bag within a week and the policy terms made 
the limited nature of this cover clear. The insurer was justified in limiting its payment to 
£150. 
 
However, Mr N was entitled to payment from the airline in priority to the insurer‘s right to 
recover its payment to him. We decided the insurer should not have kept the airline‘s 
payment and should send it to Mr N, giving him a total recovery of £300. 
 
07/3 
 
travel – baggage – theft – exclusion for theft at night from unattended vehicle – whether 
exclusion onerous. 
 
Miss H went on holiday with her partner to Crete. They left a beach bag containing a 
camera, two mobile phones, a tape player and some cash, in the locked boot of their 
hire car. The car was broken into and Miss H claimed for theft of the bag. The insurer 
rejected the claim on the ground that all the items were within the policy definition of 
‗valuables‘ and therefore excluded from cover in unattended motor vehicles. 
 
The  policy  defined  ‗valuables‘  as  ‗photographic  and  video  equipment,  camcorders, 
radios  and  personal  stereo  equipment,  computers,  computer  games  and  associated 
equipment,  hearing  aids,  mobile  telephones,  telescopes  and  binoculars,  antiques, 
jewellery, watches, furs, precious stones and articles made of or containing gold, silver 
or other precious metals or animal skins or hides‘. 
 
Miss H argued that the policy was self-contradictory, in that another exclusion stated that 
the insurer would not be liable for ‗any theft from motor vehicles left unattended at any 
time between 10 pm and 8 am‘. 
 
Complaint upheld in part 
 
We did not agree that there was a contradiction between the two exclusions; the more 
onerous exclusion applied only to valuables and meant that they were not covered at 
any time in an unattended car. 
 
However, that exclusion was unusually onerous and required Miss H to take specific 
action in order to maintain cover under the policy. The insurer should therefore have 
drawn it to her attention at the time she bought the insurance. There was no evidence 
that the insurer had done so. 
 
The fact that she had been given time to read the policy and the option to cancel it was 
not  sufficient  for  the  insurer  to  comply  with  its  duty  to  draw  such  exclusions  to  the 
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However, the policy contained a limit of £200 for all valuables and an excess of £45 for 
cash. These meant that Miss H and her partner would not be reimbursed for the majority 
of their losses. 
 
07/4 
 
travel – cancellation – disability – cause known to policyholder when buying insurance – 
whether claim valid. 
 
On 28 January 2000, Mr A booked air tickets for his family to travel from Manchester to 
Saudi Arabia on holiday from 8 to 30 March. On 26 February, he bought insurance to 
cover their travel. He cancelled the flights on 2 March, stating that Mrs A was suffering 
from complications of her pregnancy and that travel was inadvisable for her. 
 
The insurer‘s investigation established that Mr A had tried unsuccessfully to amend the 
air tickets on 7 February and that his wife‘s GP had made a formal diagnosis a week 
later. The insurer rejected the claim, explaining that the policy did not include cover for 
any medical condition which existed when the policy was issued on 26 February. Mr A 
argued that they had no reason to believe that the trip might have to be cancelled when 
they  bought  the  tickets  and  he  said  the  sales  operator  had  told  him  he  would  be 
reimbursed if Mrs A became ill. However, the insurer would only refund the premium, not 
meet the claim. 
 
Complaint rejected 
We  accepted  that  Mr  and  Mrs  A  did  not  know  that  the  pregnancy  was  subject  to 
complications  when  the  flights  were  booked.  However,  they  had  been  aware  of  the 
problem for two weeks before they bought the insurance. The insurer was therefore fully 
justified in refusing to meet the claim. 
 
07/5 
travel – cancellation – disability arising after start of insurance – whether insurer liable for 
cancellation cost. 
 
In January 2000, Mr W and Mrs G arranged to go on a holiday in July. Mrs G‘s son was 
admitted to hospital in April and underwent a series of tests. Mr W and Mrs G paid the 
balance of the holiday costs on 5 May. The son was discharged in the middle of that 
month but was referred back to a consultant on 24 May, readmitted to hospital a few 
days later, and died on 13 June, one day after his illness had been diagnosed. 
 
Mr W and Mrs G claimed reimbursement of the cost of cancelling their holiday, but the 
insurer refused to make any payment beyond the £200 deposit. It relied on a condition in 
the policy which required policyholders to notify the insurer‘s helpline if an immediate 
relative was ‗receiving, recovering from, or on a waiting list for, in-patient treatment in a 
hospital‘ or ‗waiting for the results of tests or investigations or referral for an existing 
medical condition‘. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We interpreted the requirement as applying only at the time the policy was issued in 
January 2000, as is usual with this type of wording. If the  insurer had intended this 
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onerous obligation and the insurer would have had to have made it much clearer in its 
documentation, as well as drawing it to the attention of potential policyholders. 
 
Moreover, even if we considered it reasonable to treat the condition as if it applied when 
the balance of the money was paid, the claim would still be valid. Although Mr G was in 
hospital when the payment was made on 5 May, the insurer accepted that it would have 
provided full cover after his discharge from hospital in mid-May. He would therefore not 
have come within the terms of the condition when he saw the consultant on 24 May or 
was readmitted to hospital on 28 May. The insurer agreed to pay the balance of the 
holiday cost, which the couple had forfeited when they cancelled. 
 
07/6 
 
travel – cancellation – disability arising after start of insurance – whether insurer liable for 
full cancellation charge. 
 
In February 2000, Mr and Mrs T booked a holiday in Florida for May and paid a deposit. 
On 17 March, Mrs T fell off a ladder, breaking bones in her foot. 
 
The foot did not heal well and, when the balance of the holiday cost was due to be paid, 
Mr T telephoned the insurer for advice. 
 
The  insurer  would  not  take  responsibility  for  deciding  whether  the  couple  should  go 
ahead with the holiday. It told Mr T that if they went ahead and then found Mrs T was not 
well enough to travel in May, it would only reimburse the deposit, not the balance of the 
holiday  cost.  Mrs  T‘s  foot  was  not  sufficiently  recovered  before  departure  and  they 
cancelled the holiday. Mr and Mrs T claimed the full cost of the holiday, but the insurer 
refused to pay more than the deposit. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
It was Mr T‘s decision to pay the remaining balance, trusting that his wife‘s foot would 
have  recovered  before  the  holiday  started.  We  were  satisfied  that  the  additional 
expenditure he incurred when paying the balance of the cost of the holiday was a risk he 
had personally agreed to take. In these unusual circumstances, the insurer was justified 
in refusing to indemnify him. 
 
07/7 
 
travel – cancellation – event leading to cancellation pre-dating insurance – policyholder 
choosing date of departure as start date of policy – whether insurer liable for cancellation 
due to event occurring after insurance bought but before start date. 
 
On 9 February 2000, Miss S bought insurance to cover her holiday, which was to begin 
on 20 February. On 17 February, she injured her back and had to postpone the holiday. 
A month later, she gave up hope of being fit to travel and cancelled the holiday. She 
submitted a claim for the cancellation cost, but the insurer refused to make any payment. 
It explained that she had asked for the policy to come into force on 20 February, which 
was  after  her  injury  had  occurred.  Even  though  the  cancellation  date  was  after  the 
policy‘s start date, the insurer considered that the event leading to cancellation had pre-
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Complaint upheld 
 
It is normal practice for policyholders to ask for their insurance to start on the date they 
book a holiday so that cancellation cover operates immediately. Miss S had bought the 
policy from her travel agent, but he had apparently not given her any advice as to how 
she should complete the application form. She had not intentionally inserted an incorrect 
date for the policy to start, but it was not the insurer‘s fault that she had asked for cover 
to begin only on the date of departure. On a strict interpretation, Miss S was not entitled 
to  reimbursement  of  the  cancellation  charges.  However,  owing  to  the  unusual 
circumstances, we asked the insurer to meet the claim without admitting liability and it 
agreed to do so. We could not agree that Miss S was also entitled to interest, or to 
reimbursement of the fee her GP charged for completing her claim form. 
 
07/8 
 
travel – cancellation – exclusion for pre-existing medical conditions – need for exclusion 
to be drawn to policyholder‘s attention. 
 
Mr R booked a week‘s holiday in January 2000, with a departure date of 12 May. He 
knew he was due to undergo surgery for his hernia and the operation was scheduled for 
June. When Mr R was told the operation would be performed in April, his daughter asked 
the travel agent what alternatives were available. The travel agent said that the insurer 
would meet the cost of cancelling the holiday. 
 
However, when Mr R cancelled, the insurer said it was not liable to make any payment, 
since Mr R had known about his operation since October 1999. The policy excluded any 
claim  arising  out  of  a medical  condition  which  the  policyholder  was  aware  of before 
buying the insurance. Mr R contended that he had not had any reason to expect the 
surgery  would  interfere  with  his  holiday.  He  also  said  that,  had  the  travel  agent  not 
misled his daughter, he would have rearranged the holiday or transferred it to someone 
else. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
Mr R could not have been expected to disclose his operation to the insurer unless the 
travel agent had made him aware of the need to do so, and had explained that the 
insurer would not otherwise cover any claim resulting from his medical condition. The 
insurer did not comply sufficiently with the industry selling code by simply requiring the 
person  applying  for  the  insurance  to  sign  a  declaration  that  they  had  read  and 
understood the policy terms. 
 
Unless there was evidence that the exclusion for pre-existing medical conditions had 
been drawn to Mr R‘s attention before he bought the insurance, we considered that the 
insurer had to meet the cancellation claim. It accepted our view. 
 
07/9 
 
travel  –  cancellation  –  exclusion  for  pre-existing  medical  conditions  –  whether 
complications of surgery a pre-existing medical condition. 
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Mr D booked a holiday for himself, his wife and daughter to start in August 1999. In 
June,  his  daughter  underwent  a  kidney  transplant  and  suffered  complications,  Mr  D 
cancelled the holiday and claimed reimbursement of the cost. 
 
The  insurer  rejected  the  claim  because  Mr  D‘s  daughter  had  suffered  from  kidney 
problems and been on dialysis for some years. 
 
Mr D argued that they had not cancelled because of his daughter‘s kidney problems but 
because of complications that had arisen after her operation. The operation had not 
been planned when they booked the holiday, but was a one-off life-saving opportunity 
that they could not pass up. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
The policy excluded any condition ‗which [they] knew about at the time [they] bought the 
insurance … unless [the insurer] agreed to cover it  in  writing‘. This clearly excluded 
liability for the claim, even though we acknowledged that the reason for cancelling the 
holiday was because of deterioration in Miss D‘s condition. 
 
Although Mr D denied that this exclusion had been discussed with him, he had signed a 
declaration that he was aware of it. There was clear advice to call the insurer‘s helpline 
to arrange cover for any pre-existing condition. However, Mr D had not done so. We 
considered that the insurer‘s rejection of the claim was fully justified. 
 
07/10 
 
travel – cancellation – illness of relative – definition of ‗relative‘ – whether illness of next 
of kin covered. 
 
Mrs and Miss M were due to fly to Rome on 6 August 2000. In July, their parish priest 
was  admitted  to  hospital  as  an  emergency  case  and  put  in  intensive  care.  Mrs  M 
cancelled her holiday to stay by his bedside. The insurer rejected her claim for the cost 
of  cancelling  the  holiday  since  the  policy  stated  that  benefit  would  be  paid  for 
cancellation ‗because of the death, injury or illness of a relative, travelling companion or 
a business colleague‘, and the priest did not come into any of these categories. The 
policy definition of ‗relative‘ listed various blood relations. Although the priest was not a 
blood relation, Mrs M produced proof that she was specifically named as his next of kin. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
Although the policy definition of ‗relative‘ was clear and the priest did not come within it, 
the  situation  was  highly  unusual  and  not  one  which  a  policy  could  be  expected  to 
mention. In the circumstances, we considered that anyone who is named as ‗next of kin‘ 
for someone hospitalised on an emergency basis should be treated as a ‗relative‘ of that 
person. We required the insurer to meet the claim in full. 
 
07/11 
 
travel  –  cancellation  –  missed  departure  –  failure  or  disruption  of  pre-booked  public 
transport – ‗additional expenses‘ – whether cancellation claim valid – whether cost of taxi 
to and from airport ‗additional expenses‘. Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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Mr D booked a flight to Malta for a week‘s holiday and arranged for a car to take him to 
the airport. A motorway accident, causing serious congestion and tailbacks, meant that 
he missed the plane. The next flight was not for more than 25 hours and would have 
cost a further £115, so Mr D decided to give up his holiday and return home. 
 
The insurer refused to reimburse the cost of the flight (£173) because the policy only 
covered  cancellation  in  the  event  of  ‗failure  or  disruption  of  the  pre-booked  public 
transport service in which the insured is due to depart from the UK‘. As the flight had not 
failed or been disrupted, Mr D‘s claim was not covered. 
 
Mr D then contended that the insurer should reimburse the cost of the car taking him to 
the airport as ‗additional expenses‘ for missed departure due to failure of his ‗pre-booked 
connecting public transport‘. He produced a taxi receipt for £90 for the return trip. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
The insurer correctly rejected the cancellation claim. However, Mr D‘s claim for missing 
the plane‘s departure would have been valid, if he could have proved he had incurred 
additional expenses. 
 
Mr D had not mentioned the costs of the ‗taxi‘ until three months after his claim had been 
rejected, having previously indicated that a friend drove him to the airport as a favour. 
And despite the receipt, we were not persuaded that he had actually made any payment. 
 
In  any  event,  we  considered  that  Mr  D  had  not  proved  that  he  had  incurred  any 
‗additional‘ expenses as a result of missing the flight. He would have had to meet the 
cost of travel to and from the airport, even if we accepted that he had agreed to pay the 
driver. We therefore rejected the complaint. 
 
07/12 
 
travel  –  exclusion  for  unattended  baggage  –  policyholder  sitting  next  to  bag  but 
distracted by thief – whether bag ‗unattended‘. 
 
Mr N was on holiday in New York. While he was sitting on a subway platform bench 
waiting for a train, another traveller started a conversation with him. When Mr N looked 
around a minute or two later, he found his rucksack had been taken from the seat beside 
him. He claimed for theft of £2,000 of personal belongings and about £400 cash. The 
insurer  rejected  the  claim  on  the  ground  that  the  rucksack  was  ‗unattended‘  and 
therefore specifically excluded from cover. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
It could not be said that the bag was unattended when Mr N was in reasonable proximity 
at the time. Indeed, this was borne out by the circumstances of the theft. There would 
have  been  no  need  for  one  of  the  thieves  to  distract  Mr  N  by  engaging  him  in 
conversation if the bag had been unattended: the thieves could just have taken it. 
 
The mere fact that a theft had occurred did not prove that property was ‗unattended‘. If 
there had been any indication that Mr N had walked away from his bag and returned to Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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find it stolen, it would have been different. The insurer accepted our view that it should 
meet the claim, subject to the policy limits of £1,500 per bag and £400 total cash, less 
the policy excess. 
 
07/13 
 
travel – fraud – burden of proof. 
 
Mrs B‘s handbag was stolen when she was on holiday in Spain. She claimed for the bag 
and contents, including a neck pendant. The insurer asked her to provide receipts and 
the receipt for the pendant showed a price of £474. After making enquiries, the insurer 
established that the receipt had been altered. The true cost was £74. 
 
The insurer rejected the claim in full, quoting the policy provision that it would not pay for 
any claim ‗if it is either in whole or in any part fraudulent‘. Mrs B asserted that she had 
bought the pendant from a friend and had not altered the receipt, although her friend 
might have done. The insurer was unable to make contact with the friend and Mrs B 
could not produce anything from him to support her story.  
 
Complaint rejected  
 
There was no evidence or other information to support Mrs B‘s assertion. Although she 
alleged that her friend had defrauded her, there was no evidence she had bought the 
necklace from the friend and she had not initiated any legal action against her friend. 
Whilst she might be entirely innocent of any attempt to defraud the insurer, our informal 
procedures  were  not  suitable  for  the  full  examination  of  witnesses  that  would  be 
necessary to try and establish all the facts of the case. We recommended Mrs B to 
consider pursuing her claim through the courts, where witnesses could be compelled to 
attend and undergo a thorough cross-examination. 
 
07/14 
 
travel – loss – proof – policyholder failing to provide police report – whether insurer liable 
for claim. 
 
Miss K left her wash bag in the aeroplane toilet when travelling to Spain. She submitted 
a claim for make-up and jewellery valued at £3,200. The insurer rejected her claim on 
the ground that she had not obtained a written police report of the loss, as required by 
the travel policy terms. She argued that a report was unnecessary since the police would 
not be interested, but she stated that she had informed the police. 
 
This statement was contradicted by the claim form, in which she said only that she had 
told  the  airline  crew  and  ground  staff.  The  insurer  made  enquiries  with  the  Spanish 
police. However, they did not recognise the police reference number Miss K had quoted 
and there was no mention of Miss K in the police records. Nevertheless, the insurer 
agreed  to  reconsider  the  claim  if  Miss  K  could  provide  any  evidence  that  she  had 
reported the loss to anyone. 
 
Complaint rejected 
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The burden of proving a loss which is covered by the policy rests with the claimant in the 
first place. We could not say the insurer was unreasonable in refusing to accept Miss K‘s 
account  without  independent  verification.  It  was  somewhat  unusual  that  she  had  no 
other insurance, such as a household policy, to protect such valuable items, and her 
word alone was not sufficient to validate the claim. 
 
07/15 
 
travel – loss – proof – written police report – whether report essential to validate claim. 
 
Mrs M‘s ring was damaged while she was on holiday in Malta. She made a claim for 
£124, the cost of repairing it and replacing one stone. The insurer refused to make any 
payment, citing the policy wording which stated that it would not pay ‗for loss or theft of 
valuables … and any item valued over £100 not reported to the police‘. Mrs M argued 
that the requirement was not appropriate in her case, as the police would not have been 
prepared to document the damage to her ring. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
The  policy  defined  valuables  as  ‗items containing  precious  or  semi-precious  stones‘. 
Although the ring came within the definition, Mrs M had not lost the ring, only one stone. 
The estimate for replacing it was less than £100 and therefore it was neither a ‗valuable‘ 
nor ‗any item valued over £100‘. 
 
One of the reasons insurers require police reports is to provide independent evidence 
that a loss has occurred. In addition to submitting an estimate, Mrs M had provided a 
letter from the holiday group leader confirming that the ring had been damaged. The 
insurer agreed to meet the cost of replacing the stone and repairing the ring, less the 
£35 policy excess. 
 
07/16 
 
travel – medical expenses – exclusion for pre-existing medical conditions – policyholder 
required  to  obtain  permission  to  travel  –  whether  permission  could  be  given 
retrospectively. 
 
Mr M went on a long cruise. He was robbed in Singapore and then, two weeks later, 
became ill with chest pains. He was transferred to a hospital in Jordan, where he was 
found to be suffering from unstable angina. Subsequently he was repatriated. When the 
insurer carried out medical enquiries it learnt that Mr M had an extensive history of heart 
problems. It referred him to the policy conditions and to a declaration he had signed on 
the policy application form saying he was in good health. These conditions provided that 
the insurer would not be liable for claims if the policyholder had ‗during the 12 months 
prior to taking out this policy suffered from any chronic and/or recurring illness of a very 
serious nature which has necessitated consultation or treatment, and has not obtained 
permission from their doctor that he/she is fit to travel …‘. 
 
The insurer rejected Mr M‘s claims for medical expenses and curtailment of his holiday. 
Mr M acknowledged that he had had cardiac problems for many years, but asserted that 
he was in good health when he embarked on the cruise. He provided letters from his 
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Complaint upheld 
 
The wording of the application form did not require Mr M to inform the insurer or the 
intermediary  of  his  pre-existing  medical  history,  as  the  insurer  had argued.  It  simply 
required  him  to  obtain  permission  to  travel  from  his  doctor.  The  policy  document 
contained similar wording. The exclusion stated that the insurer would not meet a claim 
from someone who had suffered from a chronic or serious condition in the previous 12 
months unless the person‘s doctor had given them permission to travel. There was no 
requirement that this permission had to be in writing or presented to the insurer before 
the holiday. 
 
It was clear that Mr M had seen his GP a week before his cruise. Although it was not 
clear  that  Mr  M‘s  reason  for  visiting  his  GP  was  to  obtain  permission  to  go  on  the 
holiday, his GP was certainly of the opinion that Mr M had been fit to undertake the 
holiday.  In  the  circumstances,  we  considered  Mr  M  had  satisfied  both  the  policy 
condition  and  the  declaration  he  had  signed  on  the  application  form.  The  insurer 
accepted  our  view  and  agreed  to  meet  both  the  medical  expenses  and  curtailment 
claims. 
 
07/17 
 
travel – non-disclosure – pre-existing condition – insurer repudiating liability for medical 
expenses – delay in communicating repudiation – whether insurer liable for expenses 
despite non-disclosure. 
 
Ms  S  and  Mr  C  were  on  holiday  in  America  when  Mr  C  injured  his  leg.  He  was 
hospitalised  with  deep  vein  thrombosis,  but  his  condition  was  exacerbated  by  liver 
cirrhosis, hepatitis and alcoholism. Ms S notified the insurer, but after several days it 
refused indemnity. 
 
Ms S argued that the insurer‘s delay had resulted in large medical bills. She said that if it 
had notified them of its decision more quickly, she could have given Mr C an alcoholic 
drink and his withdrawal symptoms would have stopped. They could then have taken 
their flight home. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
It was clear from Mr C‘s medical notes that he had a long history of alcoholism, fairly 
severe liver disease and thrombocytopenia. His GP had only reluctantly agreed that Mr 
C was fit to travel and had advised him to declare his medical history to the insurer. 
Despite plain warnings in the policy, Mr C had not done so. We considered that he had 
accepted responsibility for the risk of travelling. 
 
We did not agree that stopping treatment and giving Mr C a drink would have been 
acceptable. Mr C was not fit to fly and no doctor would have certified him as fit. There 
was no unreasonable delay on the insurer‘s part in deciding whether to accept the claim. 
It  had  made  the  necessary  enquiries  as  quickly  as  possible.  In  any  event,  the 
seriousness of his illness meant that Mr C could not have flown home as quickly as Ms S 
later suggested, regardless of the insurer‘s decision. 
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07/18 
 
motor  –  misrepresentation  –  owner  of  vehicle  –  father  insuring  son‘s  car  –  whether 
insurer entitled to cancel policy. 
 
Mr H insured his car, with his son as a named driver. After the car was stolen from a 
supermarket car park, the insurer investigated Mr H‘s theft claim and discovered the car 
was, in fact, registered in the name of the son, and the son was also responsible for the 
financing arrangement. The insurer refused to meet the claim and cancelled the policy 
from its start date. 
 
Mr H admitted that he had taken out the policy in order to reduce the premium by using 
his no claims discount, but he argued that his son was the main user of the car. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
We  accepted  that  the  fact  the  son  was  the  registered  owner  of  the  car  was  not 
conclusive. However, the evidence showed clearly that the son – rather than Mr H – was 
the main user. Mr H had misrepresented the position to the insurer and its decision to 
treat the policy as if it had never come into force was fully justified. 
 
07/19 
 
motor  –  misrepresentation  –  whether  innocent  –  whether  insured  entitled  to  full 
indemnity. 
 
Mr L insured his car in April 2000, with his wife and son named as ‗additional drivers‘. 
The  car  was  stolen  a  few  days  later,  after  being  driven  by  the  son.  The  insurer 
concluded, after investigation, that contrary to his declaration on the policy application 
form, Mr L was not the car‘s main user. However, the insurer did not cancel the policy. 
Instead, it offered to pay a proportional settlement. This was based on the premium it 
would have charged if it had known the son was the main driver and it was calculated at 
52% of the total claim. 
 
Mr L denied that his son was the main user of the car and he argued that the insurer‘s 
investigators  had  misunderstood  the  answers  he  and  his  son  had  provided.  He 
contended that the claim should be settled in full. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
There was sufficient evidence to satisfy us that Mr L‘s son was the main user of the car 
and that the insurer had not misunderstood the answers. Both the son and Mr L had told 
the  insurer  that  the  son  was  the  main  user.  Moreover,  there  were  a  number  of 
discrepancies and inconsistencies in Mr L‘s accounts. The strict legal position was that 
the insurer was entitled to treat the policy as if it had never come into force and to reject 
the claim, subject to refunding the premium. Its offer of a proportional settlement, based 
on  the  assumption  that  all  the  misrepresentations  were  innocent,  was  a  fair  and 
reasonable response to the dispute. We were not satisfied that the misrepresentations 
were innocent and there was no ground for requiring the insurer to increase its offer. 
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07/20 
 
motor – misrepresentation – whether named driver was ‗owner‘ of car – whether insurer 
entitled to cancel insurance. 
 
Mr D, a police officer who had taken early retirement on medical grounds, took out motor 
insurance for his new car. He stated that he owned the car and that his family did not 
own or use any other car. His adult son was named as a driver. 
 
Two days after Mr D took out the insurance, the car was stolen. On investigating the 
claim, the insurer learnt that the purchase receipt was in the son‘s name, as was the 
finance  agreement  and  the  direct  debit  mandate  for  the  premium  payments.  The 
personalised registration number corresponded with the son‘s initials. When questioned, 
both Mr D and his son agreed that the son‘s old car had been sold in part exchange 
towards the purchase price. They did not dispute that Mr D also had another car. 
 
The insurer cancelled the policy, on the ground that both the answers Mr D had given on 
the proposal were untrue. Mr D argued that his son was only an occasional user of the 
car and that the investigation did not prove otherwise. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
It was very difficult to believe that Mr D, rather than his son, was the car‘s owner and 
main driver. Mr D had not been able to explain why it was necessary for him to use the 
car extensively when he had the use of another car, or why his son would use the car 
only occasionally when there were two cars in the family. We were satisfied that Mr D 
had not answered the questions on the proposal form correctly. 
 
If the insurer had known the son was the car‘s owner, it would not have issued this 
policy, since it was a policy offered only to retired police officers to cover their own cars. 
In the circumstances, the insurer was entitled to treat the policy as if it had never come 
into force. 
 
07/21 
 
motor – non-disclosure – whether clear questions asked – whether insurer entitled to 
cancel policy. 
 
Mrs B took out insurance for her car, with her son as a named driver. She was asked 
various questions, one of which was whether she had ‗use‘ of another car. She later 
received a printed ‗Statement of Facts‘ which recorded her answer to that question as 
‗No‘. 
 
Almost two years later, her son was involved in an accident. Mrs B completed a claim 
form, on which she stated that she had ‗access‘ to another car. The insurer cancelled the 
policy, rejecting the claim and denying liability for damage to the third party vehicle, on 
the ground that Mrs B had misrepresented the risk. Mrs B explained that she did not 
normally drive the other car, which belonged to her husband and that she was the main 
user of this car. However, the insurer contended if it had been aware she had access to 
another car, it would only have covered this car for a premium of £4,319. 
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Complaint upheld 
 
There was no evidence of the questions the insurer had asked Mrs B at the outset, other 
than the Statement of Facts. We were not satisfied that asking Mrs B if she had ‗use of 
another  car‘  was  a  clear  question.  The  insurer  had  issued  no  guidance  as  to  the 
meaning of the question and Mrs B had interpreted it as asking whether she wanted the 
policy to cover more than one car. 
 
We did not accept that the fact of Mrs B‘s having access to another car made a material 
difference to the risk she had represented to the insurer when she took out the policy. 
We  were  satisfied  that  she  was  the  main  user  of  the  car  and  that  the  son  was  an 
occasional  user.  The  situation  was  not  altered  because  she  occasionally  drove  her 
husband‘s car. We therefore required the insurer to deal with Mrs B‘s claim. In addition, 
we awarded Mrs B £200 compensation for the mishandling of her claim. 
 
07/22 
 
motor – total loss – salvage – whether insurer entitled to retain salvage – compensation 
for wrongful disposal of salvage. 
 
Miss G's car was damaged in an accident and the insurer settled her claim on a ‗total 
loss‘ basis. She wanted to keep the salvage, but the insurer refused and passed the car 
to salvage agents. Some months later, Miss G learnt from the Driver Vehicle Licensing 
Agency  that  someone  had  applied  to  re-register  the  car,  apparently  with  a  view  to 
repairing it and putting it back on the road. She complained to the insurer and demanded 
compensation for the additional cost she had incurred in having to buy a new vehicle, 
plus interest. 
 
The insurer explained that it was unwilling to allow its policyholders to keep cars which 
were unroadworthy. In this, it believed it was acting both in the public interest and in 
accordance with industry and government guidelines. However, it accepted that, on this 
occasion, it should have allowed Miss G to keep her car. In recognition of its error and 
other minor failings, the insurer offered her £500 compensation. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
The  salvage  of  a  car  remains  the  policyholder‘s  property  until  settlement  has  been 
agreed. Insurers are not entitled to dispose of the salvage without the policyholder‘s 
express  permission. Where  there  is  some  unusual  delay  in  reaching agreement,  the 
insurer could ask for the policyholder‘s permission to dispose of the salvage. This would 
prevent  storage  charges  accruing,  particularly  where  the  only  point  in  dispute is  the 
amount offered. 
 
If a policyholder seeks to retain and repair a car, the insurer should consider the request 
on the basis of the extent of repairs required. Where the car has sustained structural 
damage which cannot be repaired economically, then there will be serious issues of road 
safety to resolve. However, where much of the damage is cosmetic, it would not be 
unreasonable to agree to a policyholder‘s request to keep their car. 
 
In this instance, we were satisfied that the insurer's compensation offer was reasonable, 
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inconvenience except as a result of the insurer's retaining and disposing of the salvage. 
The offer was in line with awards we had made in similar situations. By settling Miss G‘s 
claim on a ‗total loss‘ basis, the insurer had already paid her enough to enable her to 
replace her car with a similar one. 
 
07/23 
 
commercial  –  contractor‘s  liability  –  policy  condition  –  ‗suitable  fire  extinguishing 
appliance‘ – whether spray bottle met terms of condition. 
 
Mr S, a contractor, took out liability insurance. In 1997, while two of his employees were 
working on the exterior of a building, using a blowtorch to burn paint off a window frame 
and doorframes, the window frame caught fire. They tried to put out the fire with a 5-litre 
spray bottle of water. This was insufficient to extinguish the fire, so they broke down the 
door and covered the flames with a duvet. However, their efforts were unsuccessful and 
extensive damage had been caused by the time the fire service arrived and put out the 
fire. 
 
Investigation established that the window was not fully sealed, as it had appeared to be. 
At  some  time  a  hole  had  been  drilled  through  the  sealed,  double-glazed  aluminium 
frame and subsequently concealed with filler. Mr S stated that the fire would not have 
spread to the curtains inside the building if this hole had not been there. He provided an 
expert‘s report supporting his argument. The insurer repudiated liability on the ground 
that  Mr  S  had  not  complied  with  a  policy  condition  which  required  ‗suitable  fire 
extinguishing appliances to be kept available‘. It argued that the 5-litre spray bottle did 
not meet this condition as it would only damp down a fire. It also contended that the 
bottle‘s capacity was only 1.25 litres. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We  had  to  consider  whether  the  spray  constituted  a  ‗suitable  fire  extinguishing 
appliance‘ in accordance with the policy condition. There was insufficient evidence to 
determine the spray bottle‘s precise size, but we considered that it satisfied the terms of 
the condition. The policy did not contain any guidance on the insurer‘s criteria and we 
did not agree that the bottle was so obviously inadequate that it was unsuitable as a fire-
extinguishing appliance. 
 
Issue 10  October 2001 
 
10/1 
 
household buildings – flood – rise in water table – whether ‗flood‘. 
 
During heavy rainfall in November 2000, Mr B‘s cellar filled with around four inches of 
water. He claimed under his household buildings insurance, which included cover for 
accidental damage. The insurer concluded that the damage was due to a rise in the 
water table and informed Mr B that this was not covered by the policy. 
 
Mr  B  argued  that  the  damage  was clearly  due  to  a  ‗flood‘  and  that  therefore it  was 
covered under his policy.  
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Complaint upheld  
 
Although in the past we had held that such claims were not covered, the 1998 decision 
by  the  Court  of  Appeal  referred  to  above  (Rohan  Investments  Ltd  v  Cunningham) 
indicated that they might be valid. 
 
We considered that, as a result of this decision, the complaint should succeed. This was 
partly because the wider interpretation of ‗flood‘ was closer to the ordinary expectations 
of householders. The decision in this court case was contrary to a previous Court of 
Appeal ruling (Young v Sun Alliance) in 1977, but we considered Mr B was entitled to the 
benefit of the more favourable case. 
 
10/2 
 
household buildings  – exclusion for dry rot  – rot discovered in course of subsidence 
repairs – whether exclusion applied. 
 
Mr N‘s household buildings insurer agreed to repair his property when it was affected by 
subsidence. The property was underpinned and superstructure repairs were undertaken. 
However,  the  repairer  then  found  rising  damp  and  stopped  work  until  it  had  been 
rectified. While installing a damp-proof course, workmen found widespread woodworm 
and dry rot. 
 
Mr N accepted that his policy did not cover the cost of eradicating either woodworm or 
dry rot and he arranged for the additional work to be carried out. However, his contractor 
discovered that the bearer wall supporting the infected timbers along the flank side of the 
house had collapsed in several places. 
 
The insurer accepted this was further subsidence damage and it paid for rebuilding the 
wall. But it refused to meet the cost of removing and replacing the timbers and joists, 
maintaining that it was not liable, even though this work was required in order to carry 
out the subsidence repairs. This was because the timbers and joists were affected by dry 
rot, which was excluded from cover. 
 
Mr N argued that the insurer should at least pay the proportion of the costs which related 
to the damaged part of the wall. 
 
Complaint upheld in part 
 
The insurer was responsible for repairing property damaged as a result of an insured 
peril. Had the insurer noticed the damage to the bearer wall at a different time, it would 
have had to remove and replace the floor in order to complete the repairs. We concluded 
that the fact the damage was only noticed in the course of other repairs did not affect the 
insurer‘s liability. 
 
However,  that  liability  was  limited  to  the  section  of  the  floor  affected  by  the  insured 
damage. The insurer accepted our view that it was liable for the cost of removing and 
refitting the timbers adjacent to the damaged part of the bearer wall. 
 
Mr N argued that the insurer should reimburse the full cost of removing the floor. We did 
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of putting in new boards and joists was not covered by the policy and the insurer was not 
liable. Moreover, the replacement wood meant that Mr N was in a better position after 
the repairs than before. 
 
10/3 
 
household buildings – deliberate damage – damage caused deliberately to limit greater 
loss – whether policyholder covered for deliberate damage. 
 
When a blocked pipe caused water to flow back up into Mr J‘s kitchen, he quickly called 
out a plumber. The plumber broke the pipe and diverted the water before it caused any 
damage. However, when Mr J put in a claim for reimbursement of the plumber‘s charges 
(£70.50), the insurer rejected the claim on the grounds that the policy did not include any 
cover for accidental damage. Damage due to escape of water was covered under the 
policy, but Mr J had not claimed for any damage to his property other than the broken 
pipe. He argued that it was only the plumber‘s prompt action that prevented damage 
from occurring. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We  agreed  with  Mr  J  that  the  plumber‘s  actions  were  a  direct  and  necessary 
consequence of the escape of water and were consistent with his duty under the policy 
to  take  all  reasonable  steps  to  prevent  loss.  The  insurer  did  not  dispute  that  the 
plumber‘s action had prevented considerable damage to the cupboards and floors. This 
damage would have been covered under the policy and could well have exceeded the 
cost of fracturing and repairing the pipe. 
 
In such cases we would not consider it reasonable to require an insurer to reimburse the 
cost of deliberately-caused damage unless the claimant satisfied us that: 
 
    * he had acted reasonably and in order to prevent damage which was covered under 
the insurance policy; and 
    * the damage he was acting to prevent would cost significantly more than the damage 
deliberately caused. 
 
Mr  J  satisfied  both  elements  of  this  test  and  we  therefore  required  the  insurer  to 
reimburse him for the plumber‘s bill. 
 
10/4 
 
household buildings – subsidence – preventative work – whether insurer liable for cost. 
 
In 1997, Mr and Mrs L noticed cracking in their garage. The loss adjusters appointed by 
their insurer concluded that it was caused by conifer trees owned by Mr and Mrs L‘s 
neighbour – Mr G. Mr G‘s insurer also appointed loss adjusters. They did not think the 
conifers were to blame, but they recommended the removal of several other trees. 
 
Mr and Mrs L‘s loss adjusters monitored the property for the next twelve months and 
were satisfied that it had stabilised. The couple‘s insurer offered to carry out repairs but, 
after consulting a solicitor, Mr and Mrs L rejected the offer. 
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Both insurers agreed that three of the conifers would be removed, the remainder kept at 
their existing height, and that a new fence should be constructed. Mr and Mrs L said that 
Mr G‘s insurer should pay for the work. They argued that Mr G was benefiting whereas 
they had been unfairly obliged to pay the £1,000 policy excess towards the cost of the 
work. They sought compensation for their insurer‘s delay of three and a half years in 
progressing matters and said that this, in addition to their being subjected to Mr G‘s ‗foul 
and abusive‘ language, had made them ill. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
Mr and Mrs L‘s insurer was not obliged to force Mr G to remove all his trees, as the 
couple required, nor did it have any duty to fund the legal proceedings they wished to 
undertake. Mr and Mrs L were unable – or unwilling – to take legal action at their own 
expense and had not chosen to include legal expenses cover in their insurance. 
 
We considered that the insurer had dealt with the claim properly and was justified in 
deciding not to have repairs carried out until the property had stabilised. 
 
10/5 
 
household  contents  –  exclusion  for  undamaged  items  –  matching  sets  –  clothing  – 
business suit – whether separate ‗items‘. 
 
Mr C bought a suit in the summer sales, which was a real bargain. Three weeks later, he 
accidentally leant on a bleached surface and the trousers were discoloured. He claimed 
under his household contents insurance and the insurer agreed to pay for a new pair of 
trousers. As they were not sold separately, it offered him £206, which was 40% of the 
cost of the suit, less the policy excess of £50. 
 
Mr C complained that he could not replace the trousers on their own and said he was 
entitled to the cost of a new suit (£515). The insurer increased its offer to include a 
contribution of 50% of the cost of a replacement jacket, but it refused to pay the full cost 
of a new suit. It said the policy stated: 
 
    ‗We will treat an individual item of a matching set of articles or suite of furniture or 
sanitary fittings or other bathroom fittings as a single item.‘ 
 
    ‗We will pay for damaged items but not for the other pieces of the set or suite which is 
not damaged.‘ 
 
Dissatisfied with the insurer‘s response, Mr C brought his complaint to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We did not accept that the insurer should regard the suit as ‗a matching set of articles‘. 
The jacket and trousers could only be purchased together, so we did not agree that – 
individually – they were ‗single items‘. On the contrary, the two pieces were together a 
‗single item‘ and we considered that settlement should be reached on that basis. The 
clause the insurer had relied on was not appropriate in these circumstances and we 
required the insurer to pay the balance of the claim, plus interest. 
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10/6 
 
Fraud – household contents – damage to one part of three-piece suite – whether claim 
that all of suite damaged was ‗fraud‘. 
 
Mrs M telephoned her insurer to notify it of damage to an armchair, which was part of a 
three-piece suite. She said that dye from her husband‘s trousers had stained the fabric. 
The insurer agreed to clean the chair, but Mrs M insisted that the whole suite would have 
to be cleaned, otherwise the chair would no longer match the other items in the suite. 
 
After the insurer explained that it had no liability for the undamaged furniture, Mrs M said 
that all three pieces of furniture had been stained in the same way. The investigator 
appointed by the insurer to assess the damage reported that only one chair was stained. 
 
The insurer then told Mrs M that it was cancelling her policy because she had ‗used 
fraud to gain a benefit‘. Mrs M explained that she had no intention of defrauding the 
insurer and had only said the other furniture was damaged because she was dissatisfied 
with the insurer‘s decision not to pay for the whole suite. The insurer sent her a tape 
recording of the telephone conversation in which she said all three items were stained, 
but she maintained she had only been joking. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
The insurer‘s tape made it clear that Mrs M had stated there was damage to all three 
pieces of furniture. She did not seem to be joking. Moreover, she had allowed the insurer 
to arrange for an investigator to visit her rather than simply arranging for the chair to be 
cleaned. This indicated that she was pursuing her claim that all three parts of the suite 
were stained and should be cleaned. 
 
Mrs M had attempted to gain an advantage by deception and the policy terms clearly 
entitled the insurer to cancel the policy. We were satisfied that the insurer had treated 
her fairly and in accordance with the policy terms. 
 
10/7 
 
Household  buildings  –  replacement  –  loss  of  match  –  tiles  –  whether  policyholder 
entitled to compensation for loss of match in replacement of damaged tiles. 
 
Fourteen tiles in Mr and Mrs J‘s bathroom were damaged. The insurer agreed to replace 
these tiles but refused their request to re-tile the entire room. It explained that the policy 
specifically  excluded  ‗the cost  of  replacing  any  undamaged  item  or  part  of  any  item 
solely because it forms part of a set, suite, or one of a number of items of similar nature, 
colour or design‘. 
 
After the couple expressed their dissatisfaction, the insurer made an additional payment 
representing 50% of the cost of re-tiling the remainder of the room. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
The insurer had drafted its policy carefully. There was no reason why the policy should 
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wording might not allow them to claim for re-tiling the whole room. On the other hand, 
strict application of the terms would leave many householders – if not most – with a 
finish they would regard as unacceptable. The insurer‘s payment of 50% of the cost of 
total re-tiling was in line with our usual approach and we were satisfied it was reasonable 
in the circumstances of this case. 
 
10/8 
 
household contents – accidental damage – lack of reasonable care – burden of proof. 
 
While Mr M was touching up the paintwork on his sitting room wall, there was a knock at 
the front door. He put the tin of paint on a table and went to the door. As he opened it, a 
gust of wind blew through the house and the kitchen door swung open, letting his dog 
loose. The dog rushed into the sitting room and knocked into the table, tipping the tin of 
paint over the sofa – part of a three-piece suite. 
 
Mr M claimed under the accidental damage section of his household insurance. The 
insurer  rejected  his  claim,  on  the  ground  that  he  had  not  complied  with  the  policy 
condition to take reasonable steps to prevent damage. It considered he was negligent 
because he had not covered the sofa before starting to paint. 
 
However, after Mr M explained that he had not been redecorating – only touching up 
some marks on the wall, the insurer made an offer of £600 towards the cost of replacing 
the three-piece suite. Mr M refused this offer and referred the complaint to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
To prove the alleged lack of reasonable care, the insurer had to show that Mr M had 
been reckless. That meant proving that he had recognised there was a risk of damage 
but had failed to take reasonable precautions to prevent it. 
 
There was no indication that Mr M had been reckless and we considered the insurer 
should meet the cost of replacing the damaged sofa. If the sofa could no longer be 
replaced, then the insurer should also pay 50% towards the cost of replacing the other 
matching parts of the suite. 
 
10/9 
 
household buildings – repairs – failure to repair properly – policyholder suffering distress 
and inconvenience – appropriate compensation. 
 
After Dr I's flat was seriously damaged by fire in October 1997, the insurer appointed 
loss adjusters and builders to handle his claim. Extensive work was necessary, but the 
flat was expected to be ready for Dr I to move back into by May 1998. 
 
In the event, the work was not carried out to an acceptable standard and a second firm 
of builders had to be brought in to put matters right. 
 
For the first few months, Dr I lived in rented accommodation but he then moved in with 
his father. Repairs were finally completed in December 1999. Dr I complained about the 
insurer‘s  failure  to  get  the  work  done  properly  in  the  first  place,  and  he  sought Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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compensation in excess of £309,000. This included £216,000 for 20 months of distress 
and  aggravation;  reimbursement  of  various  costs  including  telephone  bills,  legal 
expenses, and mortgage charges; payments for his time spent supervising and reporting 
on the work; and finally a payment in recognition of his inability to sell the flat while the 
work was in progress. 
 
Complaint upheld in part 
 
The insurer acknowledged that it failed to ensure the original repair  work was  up to 
standard, but we were satisfied that it took appropriate steps to remedy the situation. 
What we had to decide was how much compensation the insurer should pay to reflect 
the added inconvenience to Dr I, and any expenses he incurred, over and above what 
he would have had to endure anyway as a result of the fire. 
 
We  took  the  view  that  whatever  had  happened,  he  would  still  have  had  to  pay  his 
mortgage and other property-related costs. We were not persuaded that he would have 
sold the flat, had it not been for the problems encountered; nor were we satisfied that he 
needed to involve solicitors to progress the remedial work. In our opinion, the insurer had 
already  paid  Dr  I  at  least  £4,000 compensation  for  alternative accommodation  costs 
while he was living with his father. Taking this into account, we awarded Dr I a total of 
£3,750 compensation. This comprised £1,000 for the time he spent in overseeing and 
reporting on the work, £750 for distress and general inconvenience, and £2,000 for loss 
of  use  and  enjoyment  of  his  flat  for  the  period  between  the  expected  and  actual 
completion dates. 
 
10/10 
 
Fraud – motor – policyholder submitting false receipt in proof of purchase  – whether 
insurer entitled to reject damage claim. 
 
Miss F submitted a claim after her car was damaged by thieves. The insurer‘s engineer 
decided the car was beyond economical repair and the insurer would not settle the claim 
without proof of the amount Miss F had paid for the car. In fact, Miss F‘s boyfriend had 
given the car to her, but she produced a receipt showing she had paid £3,800. 
 
The investigator appointed by the insurer discovered that it was the boyfriend who had 
purchased the car and that he had only paid £2,700. The insurer advised Miss F that it 
would not make any payment because she had presented false evidence in support of 
her claim. It explained that the policy terms justified its rejecting a claim entirely if a 
claimant submitted any forged or false document. Miss F argued that her boyfriend had 
given her the receipt and that she had no reason to believe it was not genuine. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
The insurer‘s liability under the policy terms was limited to settling the claim by paying 
the car‘s market value. The insurer‘s aim in asking to see the receipt was not to establish 
the car‘s value but to obtain proof that Miss F had owned the car and to confirm its 
make, model and age. There was independent proof both of the car‘s existence and of 
Miss F‘s ownership of it. Clearly, we would not support any customer who produced 
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here. The insurer‘s liability would have been the same even if Miss F had told the truth 
and said the car was a present from her boyfriend. 
 
In the circumstances, we were satisfied that Miss F had suffered a genuine loss and that 
she had not attempted to claim more than her proper entitlement under the policy terms. 
We concluded that the insurer should pay Miss F the car‘s market value, plus interest. 
 
10/11 
 
Personal accident – quadriplegia – policyholder disabled in four limbs – policy definition 
of ‗quadriplegia‘ more restrictive – whether policyholder entitled to benefit. 
 
An  extremely  serious  accident  left  Mr  F  with  a  major  permanent  disability.  He  was 
covered under a personal accident policy and the insurer made a payment of £125,000, 
the policy benefit for paraplegia – paralysis of the lower part of the body. 
 
Mr F claimed he was entitled to a total payment of £250,000 on the ground that he was 
disabled in all four limbs. The insurer rejected his claim. It stated that Mr F did not fit its 
policy definition of ‗quadriplegia‘ – ‗permanent and total paralysis of the two upper limbs 
and two lower limbs‘. The insurer relied on a medical report it had obtained. This stated 
that Mr F retained ‗gross motor function in terms of shoulders and arms‘ and could ‗form 
a primitive handgrip‘, even though he had lost the majority of his hand function and his 
‗pincer grip‘ was dramatically reduced. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
When  Mr  F  took  out  the  policy  in  March  1996,  it  did  not  include  cover  for  either 
paraplegia or quadriplegia. These benefits were added in June 1998, but this ‗re-launch‘ 
of  the  policy  had  not  included  the  definition  on  which  the  insurer  relied.  In  the 
circumstances, we considered the claim should be assessed in the light of the ordinary 
meaning of the word ‗quadriplegia‘. Mr F‘s own medical advisers were satisfied that – in 
general medical terms – he was ‗quadriplegic‘. We therefore considered it unreasonable 
for the insurer to use a narrower definition. After our involvement, the insurer agreed to 
pay Mr F the balance of £125,000. 
 
10/12 
 
extended warranty – theft – exclusion for claims without proof of ‗forced and violent entry 
or exit‘ – whether proof of theft sufficient. 
 
Among  other  items  stolen  in  a  burglary,  Mr  O  lost  his  ‗surround  sound‘  television 
speakers. Mr O had extended warranty insurance for the speakers, but this only included 
cover for theft so long as the product had ‗been stolen by forced and violent entry or 
exit‘.  The  insurer  repudiated  the claim  because  Mr  O  could  not  provide  evidence of 
‗forced and violent entry or exit‘. 
 
After the burglar had been caught and convicted, Mr O asked the insurer to reconsider 
his claim. He asserted that the burglar had gained entry to his flat by damaging the front 
door, its frame and lock. The insurer checked with the police, but rejected the claim 
again on finding none of this damage was mentioned in the crime report. 
 Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
Appendix A: O.N. Case Studies  54 
Complaint rejected 
 
There was a clear distinction between ‗forced‘ and ‗violent‘ entry. Unless the burglar had 
entered through an open door or window, his entry was doubtless ‗forced‘. However, 
‗violent‘ required proof of some physical damage to the property. Mr O could produce no 
evidence of this,so the insurer was justified in rejecting the claim. 
 
10/13 
 
personal accident – loss of fingers – assessment of compensation. 
 
Mr J made a claim under his personal accident policy after cutting three of his fingers 
with a knife. He was dissatisfied with the insurer's offer of £4,221.30, based on loss of 
function of the affected fingers, and instead sought the full permanent total disablement 
benefit of £105,000. He maintained that his injuries meant he could no longer use his left 
hand  well  enough  to  continue  his  job  as  a  sheet  metal  worker.  He  also  sought 
compensation totalling £125,000. This comprised: £25,000 for time off work and loss of 
potential earnings, £20,000 a year for having to seek employment with lower earning 
potential and £80,000 for loss of the projected value of his company pension scheme. 
 
Complaint upheld in part 
 
We  did  not  consider  Mr  J  was  entitled  to  permanent  total  disablement  benefit.  This 
benefit was only payable to those whose injuries prevented them ‗from engaging in any 
occupation for which he/she is fitted by reason of education, training or experience for 
the  remainder  of  their  life‘  and  the  medical  evidence  available  did  not  justify  this 
conclusion. Indeed, Mr J had retrained to work as a clerk. The policy did not provide 
cover for the other consequential losses for which he sought compensation. The policy 
did provide for 10% of the sum assured to be paid for the loss of use of any finger and 
we were satisfied the insurer was correct in approaching Mr J‘s claim on that basis. 
However, following a reassessment of the medical evidence, we decided the insurer 
should increase its offer to £5,171.09. 
 
10/14 
 
household contents – non-disclosure – convictions – whether insurer entitled to avoid 
policy. 
 
In 1999, Mr N – a gardener – took out household insurance through his bank. He signed 
a form stating that he had no criminal convictions. However, when he made a theft claim 
the  following  year,  the  insurer  learnt  that  he  had  been  sentenced  to  four  years‘ 
imprisonment in 1985 for theft from commercial premises. As this conviction was still not 
‗spent‘ in 1999, the insurer treated the policy as if it had never been issued. 
 
Mr N argued that his previous insurance company had been aware of his conviction and 
had covered him regardless, telling him the conviction was ‗spent‘. He also asserted that 
his  bank manager  knew  of  his  conviction.  However  the  bank manager  was  certainly 
aware that policy applications from anyone with a conviction were unacceptable and 
there was no record of his having any conversation with Mr N about this. 
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Mr  N  did  not  provide  us  with  any  details  of  his  criminal  record,  though  it  seemed 
surprising  that  he  received  such  a  long  sentence  for  a  relatively  minor  offence.  We 
invited him to clarify this but he failed to respond. We were therefore satisfied that there 
was no ground for requiring the insurer to alter its decision. Mr N had not provided a 
correct answer to a clear question and we were unable to accept his contention that the 
insurer had been made aware of the true facts. 
 
10/15 
 
Household buildings – escape of water – exclusion if property unoccupied – whether 
insurer would have covered unoccupied property. 
 
Mr D was trustee of a trust whose property included a house that he insured under a 
standard buildings policy. After the house became vacant on 25 October 1999, he left 
the  central  heating  on  and  inspected  the  property  once a  week,  but  did  not  tell  the 
insurer that the house was unoccupied. During December 1999, he was ill for a fortnight 
and unable to visit the house as regularly as before. When he next inspected the house, 
at the end of December, he discovered that a pipe had burst, causing extensive water 
damage. 
 
The insurer rejected Mr D‘s claim, stating that the policy did not cover damage caused 
by escape of water if the property was unoccupied for more than 30 days. 
 
Complaint upheld in part 
 
It  was  clear  that  the  house  had  been  unoccupied  for  more  than  30  days  when  the 
damage occurred. And we were satisfied that the insurer had taken all reasonable steps 
to draw Mr D‘s attention to the exclusion. 
 
However, when we asked the insurer what steps it would have required Mr D to take if 
he had told it the house was unoccupied, it said it would have required him to keep the 
central heating on and to inspect the property at weekly intervals. As Mr D had – in fact – 
complied with these requirements, until he became ill, we considered the insurer should 
deal with his claim. But because Mr D‘s illness had prevented him from inspecting the 
house every week, and this gap in inspections had increased the amount of damage, we 
decided the insurer should pay 80% of the claim, less the excess. 
 
Issue 13  January 2002 
 
13/1 
 
Private medical  expenses  –  transfer  of cover  to  new  insurer  –  exclusion  for  ‗mental 
illness‘ – insured not advised of change in terms – whether claim valid. 
 
Mr B had the benefit of an employer‘s group medical expenses scheme. He suffered 
from intermittent mental ill-health and the insurer had paid for his treatment. In January 
2000, his employer changed insurers. The terms of the new policy excluded ‗treatment of 
psychiatric and mental disorders unless your company has specifically applied to include 
this benefit‘. The employer had not paid the additional premium required for this benefit. 
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In May 2000, Mr B was hospitalised for mental problems. The new insurer refused to 
cover the cost of treatment, relying on the policy exclusion. Mr B argued that he had not 
been made aware of the change in policy cover. The new insurer said that the employer 
had made a specific enquiry about continuing mental health benefits for Mr B and it 
contended that the employer was under a duty to advise Mr B that it had decided not to 
pay for this extension. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
The new insurer had taken no steps to ensure that employees such as Mr B were aware 
of the new policy terms. And despite being informed of Mr B‘s situation, the insurer did 
not make any effort to notify him of the change, nor did it require the employer to provide 
him with this information. 
 
If Mr B had been told of the restricted terms of the new insurance, he could have chosen 
to continue cover for himself under the old policy. The failure to give him correct advice 
had prejudiced his position. 
 
We required the new insurer to deal with any claims Mr B made during the first year of 
cover, if these claims would have been valid under the terms of the old policy. However, 
we did not agree with Mr B that he was entitled under the new policy to indefinite mental 
illness cover. 
 
13/2 
 
Private medical expenses – transfer of cover to new insurer – exclusion for ‗elective‘ 
surgery – whether new insurer entitled to rely on exclusion. 
 
Mrs L was an employee of JI, which provided private medical insurance for its staff. 
When  she  became  pregnant,  her  doctor  told  her  that  her  baby  would  have  to  be 
delivered by Caesarean section. This was because Mrs L had undergone uterine surgery 
some years previously. She telephoned the insurer for advice and was told the operation 
would be covered. 
 
In March 2000, JI transferred the insurance to a different insurer. Mrs L‘s baby was born 
the following month and she submitted her claim to the new insurer. It refused to make 
any  payment,  explaining  that  the  policy  specifically  excluded  ‗elective  sections‘  for 
maternity claims. It concluded that the Caesarean was ‗elective‘ because the pregnancy 
was normal and there was no emergency relating to the delivery. 
 
Mrs L complained that no one had told her that the change of insurer meant that, despite 
the previous insurer‘s decision, she was no longer covered for the operation. She noted 
that the company secretary had told her that the new insurer had not asked him any 
questions about the health of employees or the treatment proposed for any of them. 
Instead, it had told him that the transfer of cover between insurers was ‗on protected 
underwriting terms‘, although these were to be based on the new policy wording. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We accepted that the surgery was ‗elective‘, but we did not agree that the limitations on 
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difference in cover was explained to staff, but there was no evidence that the insurer had 
drawn those differences to the attention of the company secretary. 
 
Although the policy had been transferred ‗on protected underwriting terms‘, the meaning 
of this phrase was not clearly defined. In our opinion, it indicated continuous cover. No 
policy document had been sent to employees by the time the surgery was performed 
and Mrs L could not have known of the exclusion. 
 
In the circumstances, we decided that the insurer was liable for the cost of the surgery. 
 
13/3 
 
Private medical expenses – moratorium – whether emergency condition exempt from 
moratorium – whether blood pressure ‗related to‘ stroke. 
 
Mr  and  Mrs  L  took  out  insurance  in  May  1999  to  cover  the  cost  of  private  medical 
treatment. The policy included a moratorium exclusion. This excluded treatment ‗of any 
illness or injury … which existed or was foreseeable prior to or which recurs after the 
Insured Person‘s Date of Entry, until a continuous period of two years has gone by. 
 
In February 2000, Mrs L suffered a stroke and was admitted to hospital. Her claim under 
the insurance was rejected. The insurer said that her stroke was related to the high 
blood pressure for which she had been treated during the past few years. As the two-
year moratorium period had not passed, she was not entitled to any benefit. Mr and Mrs 
L argued that the insurer should meet her claim, since she had been admitted as an 
emergency  patient  and  the  insurer  did  not  require  prior  authorisation  in  such 
circumstances. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
It was true that emergency admissions did not require pre-authorisation in the same way 
as other claims, but when Mr L notified the insurer of the claim, it explained that he and 
his wife would be liable for all expenses if it did not accept the claim. 
 
Mrs L was receiving treatment for hypertension at the time the policy came into force, so 
hypertension would not be covered until two years had passed without her needing any 
treatment for it. This exclusion covered not just the condition itself but also ‗any other 
illness … related to it‘. Hypertension was a contributory factor for strokes and Mrs L‘s 
stroke was therefore covered by the exclusion. The insurer was entitled to reject the 
claim. 
 
13/4 
 
Income protection – ‗totally disabled‘ – disability due to stress – policyholder physically 
well – whether possible future stress sufficient to render policyholder ‗disabled‘. 
 
On  holiday  in  France,  Mr  N  had  a  transient  ischaemic  attack.  He  was subsequently 
diagnosed as suffering from heart disease and he gave up work. He claimed benefits 
under  his  permanent  health  insurance  on  the  ground  that  his  state  of  health  totally 
prevented  him  from  working.  The  insurer  made  medical  enquiries  and  found  that 
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give up work, they agreed that he was physically fit to resume work. His occupation, as 
managing  director  of  the  company  he  had  started  many  years  before,  was  highly 
stressful. The insurer maintained that there was no physical reason why Mr N should not 
return to work. 
 
The  medical  evidence  was  inconclusive.  So  we  arranged  for  Mr  N  to  undergo  an 
independent examination. The independent consultant considered there was no medical 
reason why Mr N could not return to work, but that he should not do so because of the 
risk to his health. The consultant felt that Mr N‘s occupation involved such a degree of 
stress that the risks of further disability would be increased if he went back to work, and 
there would be a very real risk of his illness recurring. 
 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
This was an unusual case. Generally, a person with a stable medical condition who is 
fearful that returning to work may aggravate their condition – perhaps through stress – 
will have difficulty demonstrating they are not able to work. Here, however, the medical 
evidence pointed strongly to a worsening of the policyholder‘s condition being not just a 
worry but a foreseeable result of returning to work. So although Mr N‘s position had 
clearly stabilised after he gave up work, that was not sufficient justification for rejecting 
his claim. The medical evidence made it clear that he was only well so long as he did not 
work. Returning to work would put his health at risk, so it was not right to conclude that 
he was not ‗disabled‘. 
 
We required the insurer to meet Mr N‘s claim from the end of the deferred period of six 
months, and to add interest to the back payments. 
 
13/5 
 
Critical illness – misrepresentation – underwriting limits – proposer outside underwriting 
limits – whether misrepresentation justified cancellation of policy. 
 
A salesman called on Mr L, a pub landlord, and recommended that he should take out 
critical illness insurance. This would pay him £10,000 if he were diagnosed with any of 
the conditions listed in the policy. The salesman completed the application form and Mr L 
signed it. The form stated that Mr L‘s height was 6‘ 1‖ and his weight, 17 stone. 
 
The policy was issued in November 1999. In December 2000, Mr L was diagnosed with 
cancer and he submitted a claim. The insurer‘s enquiries revealed that Mr L had mis-
stated his height (he was actually 5‘ 10‖). It therefore cancelled his policy on the ground 
that he had misrepresented his measurements. It told Mr L that it would not have insured 
him if it had known his actual height as, combined with his weight, it put him outside its 
underwriting guidelines. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
Mr L‘s mis-statement was innocent and not an unusual mistake for someone to make. 
The difference in height was within a 3% margin and the insurer ought to have made an 
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correct height – and his weight had not exceeded 17 stone – it would have covered him. 
The difference between his actual weight and that stated was also within a 3% margin. 
 
The  policy  had  been  sold  to  Mr  L  in  person.  The  salesman  should  therefore  have 
appreciated that Mr L‘s size brought him close to the insurer‘s underwriting limits, and he 
should have stressed to Mr L the importance of giving accurate measurements. There 
was no reason why Mr L should have been aware of the insurer‘s underwriting limits. It 
was irrelevant whether Mr L gave the salesman inaccurate information, or had simply 
failed to notice that the salesman had recorded the information incorrectly. 
 
In the circumstances, we concluded that the insurer was not justified in relying on the 
misrepresentation to cancel the policy. It accepted our conclusion that it should pay the 
£10,000 policy benefit. 
 
13/6 
 
Critical illness – non-disclosure – whether insurer entitled to cancel policy because of 
innocent non-disclosure. 
 
Mrs C applied for life assurance and critical illness insurance in May 1999. One of the 
questions she was asked was whether she had a ‗lump, growth or tumour of any kind‘ – 
she answered ‗No‘. She was also asked whether she had ‗consulted, or been prescribed 
treatment by a doctor during the last 5 years‘. She answered ‗Yes‘ and listed what she 
and her GP considered relevant information from her medical records. 
 
In July 2000, Mrs C claimed benefit under her critical illness policy as she had been 
diagnosed with a malignant melanoma. The insurer sought information from her GP and 
discovered that, in March 1999, Mrs C had asked her GP to look at a mole that had been 
on her left thigh since birth, and was starting to bother her. The insurer accepted that 
Mrs  C‘s  failure  to  tell  it  about  this  incident  was  innocent,  but  it  cancelled  both  her 
policies. It considered that she should have disclosed this particular GP ‗consultation‘ in 
response to its direct question about ‗growths‘ and that by failing to do so, Mrs C had 
prejudiced its position. 
 
Mrs C disputed this decision. She said her GP had told her the mole was nothing to 
worry about and she had not sought further advice or treatment for it until May 2000. Her 
GP‘s  notes  confirmed  that  the  mole  was  only  mentioned  casually  at  the  end  of  a 
consultation for an unrelated matter, and that Mrs C was told it was benign and had no 
sinister features. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
A brief mention of a minor problem was not a ‗consultation‘ and we did not consider that 
Mrs C had provided an incorrect answer to the question about consultations. The GP 
had not organised any further investigation of the mole or made any recommendation 
about it. It seemed only to have been included in the GP‘s notes in case a problem 
occurred in future. 
 
As to the question about lumps, growths or tumours, Mrs C had acted reasonably in 
answering  ‗No‘.  She  had  to  answer  the  insurer‘s  questions  only  ‗to  the  best  of  her 
knowledge‘ – and – to the best of her knowledge, she did not have any condition that Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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she needed to tell the insurer about. Her GP had told her the mole was inconsequential 
and  since  it  had  been  present  all  her  life,  and  was  apparently  not  a  matter  of  any 
concern, she could not have been expected to mention it. 
 
We did not consider the insurer had sufficient grounds for cancelling the policies and we 
said it should reinstate them and assess the claim. We also awarded Mrs C £400 for 
distress and inconvenience. 
 
13/7 
 
Pension  – non-disclosure – questions regarding current consumption of tobacco and 
alcohol – whether proposer required to disclose past excesses. 
 
In  June  1998,  Mr  S  took  out  a  personal  pension  which  included  death  benefit.  He 
answered  questions  on  the  proposal  regarding  his  past  health,  his  weight  and  his 
cigarette and alcohol consumption. 
 
In December 1999, Mr S died and his widow applied for the death benefit. As a result of 
its  enquiries,  the  insurer  concluded  that  Mr  S  had  not  given  truthful  answers  to  its 
questions.  In  particular,  it  was  satisfied  that  he  had  failed  to  disclose  episodes  of 
bronchitis and had not given correct information about his weight, smoking and drinking 
habits. Mr S was obese, according to his GP, and had smoked 30 cigarettes and drunk 
about  a  bottle  of  vodka  every  day.  He  had  suffered  several  episodes  of  bronchitis 
between 1970 and 1975. 
 
Mrs S disputed this evidence and asserted that although Mr S had been a heavy drinker 
and smoker, he had changed his habits after the birth of their first child in 1984. She said 
that his height and weight had been correctly recorded. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
The  insurer  was  unable  to  produce  the  signed  proposal  and  this  omission  had 
undermined its case. There was no evidence that Mr S had not answered the questions 
truthfully. Moreover, from a sample proposal form that we obtained from the insurer, it 
seemed  that  the  questions  all  related  to  the  current  health  and  consumption  of  the 
person wanting to obtain the critical illness cover, not to their past history or old habits. 
 
So far as could be ascertained from the medical evidence, Mr S had changed his habits 
by the time he signed the proposal. There was no reference to his drinking or smoking 
after 1988. He did not seem to have consulted or been treated for bronchitis after 1975. 
 
We  decided  that  the  insurer  was  not  justified  in  concluding  that  Mr  S  had  failed  to 
provide correct answers to its questions. The insurer agreed to pay Mrs S the death 
benefit of over £30,000. 
 
13/8 
 
Loan  protection  –  exclusion  for  pre-existing  medical  conditions  –  failure  to  highlight 
exclusion – whether customer prejudiced by failure. 
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Mr G purchased a car from his local garage. He took out a hire purchase agreement and 
a loan protection insurance policy – both purchased at the garage. Nine months later he 
suffered a major heart attack and he has not worked since. The firm rejected his claim 
for  the  critical  illness  benefit  because  he  had  suffered  previously  from  angina  and 
generalised  chest  pain.  The  policy  excluded  any  medical  conditions  for  which  the 
policyholder had sought advice in the 12 months before starting the policy. A ‗condition‘ 
was defined as including ‗any symptom of [any sickness]‘. 
 
Mr  G  said  that  he  had  wanted  cover as  he had  suffered  a  heart  attack  eight  years 
previously and was concerned about his ability to continue working if he was ill again. He 
said he had explained this to the car salesman, but the exclusion was not pointed out to 
him. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
The firm‘s reliance on the exclusion for pre-existing conditions was questionable. Mr G 
had  suffered  in  recent  years  from  some  generalised  chest  pain  symptoms  but  his 
condition appeared to have been minor and reasonably stable. It was perhaps debatable 
whether such relatively minor symptoms could reasonably be described as symptoms of 
the heart attack that followed. However, this was not a matter we needed to resolve in 
this particular case because the main dispute rested on whether the policy had been 
sold properly. 
 
Mr G had signed a declaration that he had read and understood the policy. In fact, it 
seemed  highly  unlikely  that  he  had  read  and  understood  it.  The  policy  wording  was 
complex and little or no effort had been made to draw the important provisions to the 
attention of policyholders. In particular, the exclusions for pre-existing conditions were 
not highlighted in any way (either in the policy or in a customer leaflet). 
 
Exclusions  for  pre-existing  conditions  are  recognised  both  by  the  industry  and  by 
customer groups as being particularly significant and needing to be explained and drawn 
clearly to policyholders‘ attention. In this case, this clearly didn‘t happen and advice was 
either not given or misleading. Overall, the sale did not meet the requirements set down 
in the codes of either the General Insurance Standards Council or the Association of 
British Insurers. 
 
Our general approach in these cases is to put customers back into the position they 
would  have  been  in  had  the  firm not made  an  error.  This  will  often  be  achieved by 
returning the premium, as many of these customers would not have bought the policy if 
they had been correctly advised. In other cases, we may conclude that the customers 
suffered no material detriment from a mis-sale, as they would probably have purchased 
the policy in any event. Conversely, if the unexplained exclusion is unusual or onerous, 
we may require the firm to meet the claim in full, as alternative policies with wider cover 
may have been available. 
 
In Mr G‘s case, the exclusion itself was not unusual. But we were satisfied that if he had 
been aware of the true nature of the policy, he might well not have bought the car at all, 
or he might have made more cautious financing arrangements. 
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On this basis, we required the firm to meet the claim in full; to meet any costs arising 
from Mr G‘s inability to make the loan repayments since the claim was made; and to pay 
him £300 for distress and inconvenience. 
 
13/9 
 
Household contents – accidental damage to carpets – exclusion for damage caused by 
domestic animals. 
 
Ms E‘s dog died in her lounge. As it was some time before the unfortunate dog was 
found, the carpet was badly stained. Ms E arranged for the carpet to be cleaned but 
without success. The staining and foul odour was permanent. Ms E claimed under the 
accidental  damage  section  of  her  policy  for  replacement  carpets  –  valued  at  about 
£1,100 – as well as for the initial cleaning costs. The firm declined to meet the claim on 
the basis of an exclusion that covered damage caused by domestic animals. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
This was scarcely a case of damage caused by a badly housetrained animal. The dog 
was dead when the accidental damage occurred. It did not seem reasonable to apply the 
exclusion in these circumstances and we required the firm to meet the claim in full. 
 
13/10 
 
Travel – loss of goods when location known – reasonable steps to recover – whether 
gameboy game a ‗disk‘. 
 
Mr H‘s son left a bag containing his ‗gameboy‘ and associated games on the back seat 
of the taxi that took the family to the airport on their way home from the Canary Islands. 
Mr  H  contacted  the  taxi  firm  through  the  resort  and  the  missing  bag  was  located. 
However, the taxi driver concerned had not returned to the airport with the bag by the 
time the family had to board the plane. Back in the UK, Mr H again tried (through the 
holiday resort) to get the bag located and returned. He had no success, so he claimed 
£305 for the ‗gameboy‘ and games under his travel policy. 
 
The insurer rejected the claim – initially on the basis that the loss had not been reported 
to the police. It then claimed that the bag was not, in fact, lost and that Mr H had not 
taken ‗adequate steps to recover the goods‘ (as required by the policy). As a subsidiary 
point, it argued that the games should be considered as ‗cassettes or tapes or disks‘, 
which were excluded from cover under 
the policy. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
It seemed to us that Mr H had made appropriate and – in the circumstances – more than 
adequate efforts to recover the goods. It was not reasonable of the firm to require him to 
do more. Equally, we did not accept the insurer‘s argument that since the location of the 
goods was known, the goods were not lost. Just as if the items had been dropped from a 
boat  and  were  now  at  the  bottom  of  the  ocean,  there  was  no  practical  prospect  of 
recovering Mr H‘s lost goods. Goods can be ‗lost‘ if their  location is known but they 
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The  list  of  exclusions  from  cover  was  lengthy.  It  therefore  seemed  appropriate  to 
interpret  the  provisions  narrowly  and,  in  case  of  doubt,  to  favour  the  customer‘s 
interpretation. A ‗gameboy‘ game was not, strictly speaking, a disk (cassette or tape) and 
we therefore required the firm to meet the claim in full. 
 
13/11 
 
Personal accident – specified injuries – whether other injuries also covered. 
 
On the flight home from a family holiday, Mrs M‘s toddler son hit her in the face, breaking 
her nose. She submitted a claim to her travel insurer for the policy benefit of £20,000. 
The  insurer  rejected  her  claim,  stating  that  the  benefit  was  only  payable  in  three 
situations: death, loss of one or more limbs or eyes, and permanent total disablement. 
As none of these had occurred, it maintained it was not liable for Mrs M‘s injury. 
 
Mrs M argued that the policy wording did not make it clear that only three events would 
give rise to the benefit. She also felt that she was entitled to be indemnified under the 
personal liability section of the policy. This provided a maximum payment of £2 million 
for any personal injury. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
The policy wording was unambiguous and provided for payment of the personal accident 
benefit only if one of the three specified events occurred. There was nothing in the policy 
to suggest that any other personal injury would give rise to a benefit entitlement. 
 
As to the liability section, we did not accept that a two-year-old was capable of being 
held  liable  for  the  injury  by  a  court.  The  insurer  therefore  had  no  responsibility  for 
indemnifying the child against any liability to his mother. Moreover, the policy specifically 
excluded liability to family members. 
 
13/12 
 
Income protection – disability from ‗normal pursuits‘ – meaning of ‗normal pursuits‘. 
 
Mrs B took out income protection insurance in 1981. This protected her dual occupations 
of nurse and housewife and would provide a weekly benefit of £50 if she became too ill 
or disabled to continue work. 
 
When she became ill, the insurer rejected her claim on the ground that she was not 
disabled from ‗the normal pursuits‘ of a housewife. Mrs B protested, arguing that her 
disability prevented her from continuing with her nursing work, and that this was the 
situation she had intended the policy to cover. She pointed out that the policy did not 
define ‗normal pursuits‘ and therefore she could not tell whether her claim met the policy 
criteria.  The  insurer  still  maintained  that  no  benefit  was  payable  unless  Mrs  B  was 
unable to follow the normal pursuits of a housewife. It said that this must have been clear 
to Mrs B because all the usual references to income had been deleted from the policy. 
 
Complaint upheld 
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Mrs B had clearly purchased the policy to protect her income, which was solely derived 
from nursing. The policy was called an ‗Income Protection Policy‘ and the the fact that it 
would only pay a benefit if she was also unable to perform a housewife‘s normal duties 
had not been explained to her. The wording of the policy was vague, at best, and where 
an insurer has drafted its contract terms ambiguously, we take the interpretation least 
favourable to the insurer. 
 
Moreover,  since  the  policy  contained  no  definition  of  ‗normal  pursuits‘  –  it  was 
reasonable to interpret it as referring to her occupation of nursing. Mrs B derived no 
income from housework and it was unreasonable to interpret the policy as meaning that 
benefit was not payable unless she was unable to perform housework. 
 
We required the insurer to pay benefits to Mrs B from the date of her disability, subject to 
any deferred period, and to add interest to the amount it paid her. 
 
13/13 
 
Household buildings – heave – exclusion for damage to swimming pool when house not 
damaged  –  damage  resulting  from  previous  subsidence  repairs  –  whether  insurer 
entitled to rely on exclusion in relation to heave damage. 
 
Mr E‘s house was affected by subsidence in 1996 and his insurer dealt with the claim. Its 
loss adjusters decided to stabilise the property by removing and reducing trees on both 
Mr E‘s and the next-door properties. Superstructure repairs were completed in 1998, 
after the property had stabilised. In 1999, Mr E noticed that his swimming pool was 
seriously affected by heave, which had pushed up the underlying soil and cracked the 
pool. There was no damage to the house. 
 
Mr  E  notified  the  insurer  and  it  appointed  the  original  firm  of  loss  adjusters  and  an 
engineer to investigate. The engineer concluded that the cracking of the swimming pool 
was not connected with the removal of the trees. The insurer rejected the claim. It did not 
accept that the damage was a continuation of the 1996 claim. The claim was therefore 
for new damage and only covered under the policy if the house were affected at the 
same time. 
 
Mr  E  obtained  his  own  engineer‘s  report.  This  concluded  that  the  damage  to  the 
swimming  pool  was  a  direct  consequence  of  the  tree  management  programme 
implemented by the insurer. However, the insurer refused to alter its decision. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We appointed an independent engineer to assess the damage, and the insurer agreed 
to accept his conclusions. The independent engineer advised that  the tree reductions 
had most likely caused heave of the site. He accepted that the reduction programme had 
been undertaken in good faith, but he was concerned that no heave predictions had 
been made and that the heave consequences of removing the trees had been largely 
ignored. In the circumstances, he did not think it would be fair for the insurer to rely on 
the exclusion. 
 Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
Appendix A: O.N. Case Studies  65 
The insurer accepted that it should deal with the claim and agreed that the independent 
engineer should  take over management  of  the claim  from  the  loss adjusters.  It  also 
agreed to reimburse Mr E‘s engineer‘s fee. 
 
13/14 
 
Motor – driving other cars – extension of cover for driving abroad – whether driving other 
cars abroad covered. 
 
For many years Mrs H had held motor insurance with the same insurer. She had family 
in Northern Ireland and her policy covered her for driving in the Republic of Ireland and 
for driving other cars. In September 1999, she had an accident, hitting another vehicle 
while driving her brother‘s car in the Republic of Ireland. 
 
Mrs  H  claimed  indemnity  under  her  policy  against  a  third  party  claim.  However,  the 
insurer rejected the claim, saying that her brother‘s insurer should deal with it. 
It referred her to the policy, which stated: ‗Cover for driving other cars does not apply … 
in any country outside the United Kingdom‘. 
 
Mrs  H  argued  that  this  was  overridden  by  the  extension,  noted  in  the  Statement  of 
Insurance, that permitted her to drive in the Republic of Ireland. However, the insurer 
explained that this extension was limited to her car only. She also contended that the 
insurer  was  in  breach  of  the  law  that  required  insurers  to  provide  minimum  cover 
throughout the European Union. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
It was only by reading the policy document in conjunction with the schedule and the 
Statement of Insurance that it was clear that Mrs H was not covered for driving other 
cars outside the UK. However, none of these documents made it plain that all three 
documents had to be read together. We accepted Mrs H‘s argument that the policy was 
not  clear  and  that  she  should  therefore  be  given  the  benefit  of  the  doubt.  She  had 
believed she was covered for driving other cars in the Republic of Ireland and that belief 
was not unreasonable. We therefore required the insurer to deal with the third party 
claim. 
 
As to the legal position, the legislation required insurers to provide minimum insurance 
cover, but did not state whether – in this type of situation – it was the insurer of the car or 
the insurer of the driver which should deal with any third party claim. The Road Traffic 
Act 1988, as amended, referred to the obligation to insure ‗such person … as may be 
specified in the policy‘. In the light of this, it might be reasonable to expect the driver‘s 
insurer to accept liability. However, we did not need to determine this point as the first 
argument succeeded. 
 
Mrs  H  had  also  claimed  compensation  for  the  fees  her  representative  charged  for 
pursuing the complaint. We only award these in very rare cases, for example, where the 
policyholder required legal advice in order to respond to an insurer‘s arguments. This 
was not such a case so we did not award any additional compensation. 
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13/15 
 
Motor – non-disclosure – policyholder stating he had not been asked about ownership or 
use of car – whether insurer entitled to cancel insurance. 
 
Mr O applied over the telephone for motor insurance for his son‘s car. He answered a 
series of questions and the insurer then sent him a statement of facts, for checking, 
based on the answers he had given. The statement showed that there were two drivers, 
Mr O and his son. 
 
A few months later, the car was stolen and Mr O claimed compensation. The insurer‘s 
enquiries revealed that the car was registered in the son‘s name. Mr O and his son said 
they had bought the car jointly and that the son was the main user. The insurer then 
cancelled the policy, telling Mr O that if it had known these facts, it would have charged a 
premium six times higher. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
The insurer did not ask Mr O to sign a proposal and it did not keep any record of his 
answers to its questions. Although it maintained that Mr O had described himself as the 
‗main  user‘,  this  information  was  not  recorded  in  the  statement  of  facts  and  it  was 
impossible to verify whether he had been asked this question. We required the insurer to 
deal with the claim on the ground that there was insufficient evidence that Mr O had 
failed to disclose all relevant information. 
 
13/16 
 
Livestock – cost of veterinary treatment – exclusion for illnesses arising within 14 days of 
cover – whether insurer‘s failure to highlight exclusion prejudiced policyholder. 
 
Over a period of several years, Mrs S had insured a number of different horses. These 
horses did not belong to her, but were lent to her by their owners for long-term use. On 
13 March 2001, one of these horses – Chino – was due to be returned to its owner. Mrs 
S telephoned the insurer that morning to transfer the policy cover from Chino to another 
horse – Sparky. The insurer agreed to do this immediately. 
 
Later that day, Mrs S‘s daughter found that Sparky was unwell. The vet diagnosed colic 
and the total cost of treatment came to over £4,000. Mrs S claimed under the policy but 
the insurer rejected her claim on two grounds. It stated that the policy: 
 
    * did not cover any horse which the policyholder did not own; and 
    * excluded claims for any illness that arose within 14 days of the policy‘s start date. 
 
Mrs S argued that she had not owned any of the horses she had insured, and she 
pointed out that the insurer had never raised this matter before. She also said that the 
insurer had failed to mention the 14-day exclusion, and she presented evidence that 
Sparky had been in good health on the morning she arranged the insurance for him. 
 
Complaint rejected 
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The insurer conceded that it would cover horses on long-term loan to a policyholder, so 
that issue was no longer relevant. However, even if we accepted Mrs S‘s assertion that 
the exclusion had not been drawn to her attention, it was hard to accept that that failure 
had prejudiced her position. Sparky had been well when the insurance was taken out, so 
even if the insurer had pointed out the exclusion, we believe she would still have gone 
ahead and obtained cover from this insurer. 
 
13/17 
 
Household  contents  –  proof  of  loss  –  policyholder  failing  to  cooperate  with  insurer‘s 
enquiries – whether insurer justified in rejecting claim. 
 
On 8 May 2000, Mr S took out household contents insurance, with additional cover for 
specified personal belongings, including legal textbooks and a computer. Two weeks 
later, he set out to travel by train to Glasgow, where he was due to catch a flight to 
Frankfurt. As he had a few minutes before the train went, he left the station to buy food 
from  a  supermarket  and  was  mugged.  He  submitted  a  claim  for  the  computer  and 
textbooks; a silver cigarette case; £300 cash; clothing and his air ticket (a total of some 
£5,000). 
 
The  insurer‘s  enquiries  revealed  numerous  discrepancies.  The  film  from  the  CCTV 
cameras  in  the  station  did  not  support  Mr  S‘s  account  of  the  mugging,  although  he 
provided more than one version of events. Mr S refused to sign the statement taken by 
the insurer‘s investigator and instead submitted his own summary. The insurer refused to 
make any payment, stating that Mr S had failed to prove that the incident had occurred 
or that he had owned the items claimed for. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
It is a claimant‘s responsibility to prove that a loss has occurred and that the loss is 
covered by the insurance policy. There were several unsatisfactory aspects to Mr S‘s 
account that he had failed to resolve. This, together with Mr S‘s failure to cooperate with 
the insurer‘s enquiries, justified its refusal to meet his claim. 
 
13/18 
 
Personal accident – permanent total disablement – accident occurring after policy start – 
disablement due to combined effects of two accidents – whether benefit payable. 
 
Mr M was an avionics engineer with the RAF. In 1990, he injured his back but recovered 
after  treatment.  He  took  out  personal  accident  insurance  in  December  1993.  In 
November 1994, Mr M had another back injury, again returning to work after a temporary 
absence.  However,  following  a  further  injury  in  May  1996,  spinal  instability  was 
diagnosed. An MRI scan in 1997 showed that he had a prolapsed intervertebral disc. 
Several operations were performed but Mr M did not recover and he was discharged 
from the RAF on medical grounds in January 2000. 
 
Mr  M  submitted  a  claim  under  his  personal  accident  insurance  for  the  lump  sum, 
permanent total disablement benefit of £10,000. The insurer accepted that Mr M was 
permanently disabled, but concluded that it was the accident in 1990 that had caused 
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Complaint upheld in part 
 
The  consultant  had  concluded  that  ‗on  a  balance  of  probability,  [Mr  N]  did  have  a 
prolapsed disc following the incident that occurred in 1990‘, even though Mr N had been 
passed fit for work by the RAF after recuperation. We were satisfied that the injury which 
eventually resulted in Mr N‘s disablement was in 1990 and that the incident in 1996 
simply made it worse. 
 
However, Mr N had not been given a copy of the full policy terms, merely a brochure 
describing the cover. This began with the words ‗If an accident were to happen to you, 
how  would  your  finances  cope?‘.  The  benefits  were  said  to  be  payable  ‗If  you  are 
disabled by an accident‘. This wording implied that a policyholder would be entitled to 
benefit if he were disabled by an accident after the policy had been issued. 
 
The  incident  in  1996  had,  according  to  the  consultant,  made  the  original  condition 
significantly worse. We therefore put it to the insurer that it should make a payment of 
£5,000 – in other words 50% of the full benefit. It agreed with our conclusion. 
 
Issue 18  July 2002 
 
18/1 
 
household – non-disclosure – proposal – proof of non-disclosure. 
 
Mr  B‘s  lender  sent  him  a  leaflet  advertising  premium  discounts  for  new  household 
buildings and contents insurance policies. He applied for a policy by telephone and it 
was issued on 1 March 2000. 
 
In November the following year, after settling a claim from Mr B for water damage, the 
insurer searched the industry database. It discovered that – between February 1995 and 
August 1999 – Mr B had made eight claims of which it had no record. The insurer had 
been aware of only one previous claim and said it would never have agreed to insure 
him if it had known he had made so many previous claims. It cancelled his policy and 
offered to pay him the difference between the premiums he had paid to date and the 
amount it had paid to settle his water damage claim. 
 
Mr B said that when he applied for the policy, the member of staff he had spoken to had 
said she required details only of his most recent claim. However, the lender said it had a 
note  made  by  another  staff  member  that,  in  a  later  conversation,  Mr  B  had  denied 
making any previous claims. He had also refused to provide confirmation from his last 
insurer about his claims history. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
There was no recording of the telephone conversation when Mr B applied for the policy. 
So the insurer could not prove that it had asked him clear questions about matters it 
considered  important  for  assessing  his  application.  There  was  nothing  to  support  its 
argument that he had failed to disclose all the information it considered material and it 
could not prove that Mr B misrepresented the details of his claims history. 
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We  took  account  of  the  lender‘s  note  of  Mr  B‘s  subsequent  telephone conversation. 
However, we did not agree that this was sufficient to demonstrate either that the sales 
staff  had  asked  him  clear  questions  about  relevant  matters  or  that  he  had  given 
misleading information. We decided the insurer was not entitled to cancel the insurance 
or to recover its payment of the water damage claim. 
 
18/2 
 
travel – exclusion for pre-existing medical conditions – exception for conditions agreed 
by insurer – whether insurer agreed to cover policyholder‘s heart condition. 
 
Mr and Mrs W‘s son invited them to join a family holiday in Las Vegas and he paid for 
their  trip  and  insurance.  The  travel  agent  said  that  Mr  and  Mrs  W  should  call  the 
insurance company‘s medical advice line to discuss their health. Mrs W did this and told 
the adviser that her husband had suffered from diabetes and angina for some years. 
 
While in Las Vegas, Mr W had a heart attack and was admitted to hospital. The family 
notified the insurer‘s emergency medical service. After some confusion about the policy 
cover, the emergency service told the hospital that there was no cover for Mr W‘s heart 
condition and that it would not meet his expenses. 
 
Mrs W said she had been told that the insurer would cover both of Mr W‘s conditions. 
The insurer said it had agreed to cover the diabetes without charge. But it had said it 
would cover the heart condition only if the couple paid a further premium of £33.60 and 
agreed an excess of £350. As they had not paid, the heart condition was excluded. The 
insurer said that the policy terms excluded Mr W‘s heart condition from cover, so it had 
not needed to send the couple written confirmation of this. 
 
The insurer paid for Mr W to return to the UK, but it rejected the claim for his hospital 
fees of about £250,000. Mr W died shortly after his return home. 
 
Mrs W maintained that her claim was valid and said she would have made the additional 
payment if she had been asked to do so. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We generally settle complaints based on the paperwork and other evidence that the firm 
and the customer provide, rather than at a hearing, where both sides to the dispute meet 
face to face. However, we decided that a hearing would be helpful in this case, so that 
both parties could put forward their versions of events. 
 
The insurer based its position on a computer note made at the time of Mrs W‘s call. This 
said ‗not interested in cover for heart‘. Mrs W was firm in her conviction that she had not 
been asked to pay an additional premium to cover her husband‘s heart condition. 
 
We found Mrs W‘s account generally convincing, particularly since she had taken the 
trouble to telephone the advice line before the holiday. The insurer had an obligation to 
check that Mrs W understood the implications of not paying the additional premium it 
said it had quoted her. She might not have agreed to pay, even if she had understood 
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condition. However, we decided this was unlikely. It seemed possible that there had 
been an innocent misunderstanding. 
 
It  was  unfortunate  that  the  insurer  did  not  record  telephone  conversations  with  its 
policyholders and had not sent the couple any written confirmation of what had been 
agreed. It left the position regarding Mr W‘s heart condition open to misunderstanding. It 
also meant that – had there been any dispute about the insurer‘s agreeing to cover the 
diabetes without additional charge, and amending the terms of the policy – there was no 
evidence other than the insurer‘s computer record. 
 
We required the insurer to put Mrs W back in the position she would have been in if: 
  there had been no misunderstanding; 
  and 
she  had  paid  the  additional  amount  required  to  cover  her  husband‘s  heart 
condition. 
 
We awarded her £100,000 – the maximum amount we can order a firm to pay. However, 
we accepted that if the firm met the balance of the claim, it could deduct the amount she 
would have paid for the additional premium and the £350 excess. 
 
18/3 
 
motor  –  non-disclosure  –  innocent  non-disclosure  –  whether  insurer  treated  non-
disclosure as serious. 
 
Mr C arranged motor insurance over the telephone for himself and for his wife as a 
‗named driver‘. The insurer sent him a printed statement of the questions and answers 
on which it had based its decision to offer him insurance. It asked him to 
check the statement and let it know if anything needed correcting. One of the answers 
confirmed  that  neither  he  nor  his  wife  had any motoring  convictions  in  the  past  five 
years. 
 
Some time later, after Mr C had put in a claim for damage done to the car during an 
attempted  theft,  the  insurer  discovered  that  both  Mr  and  Mrs  C  had  convictions  for 
speeding. So it told Mr C it was treating the policy as void and would not deal with the 
claim. 
 
Mr C insisted that he had disclosed his conviction when he telephoned for a quotation. 
But he admitted that he had not checked the statement carefully before he signed it. The 
insurer conceded that Mrs C‘s conviction was not important. However, it said it would 
have increased the premium by about 5% if it had been aware of Mr C‘s conviction. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We  accepted  Mr  C‘s  assertion  that  his  failure  to  disclose  his  conviction  was  not 
deliberate and that he had genuinely overlooked the mis-statement on the pre-printed 
form. The firm told us that if Mr C had disclosed the convictions, it would have offered 
cover for a minimal premium increase – about £20. 
 
Non-disclosure is a serious matter. But in the circumstances of this case, it seemed to us 
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disclosure. We thought it likely that if Mr C had told the firm about the convictions, he 
would have accepted the quotation and the firm would subsequently have met the claim. 
So  we  required  the  insurer  to  reimburse  the  cost  of  repairs,  after  recalculating  the 
premium to include the increase, and deducting this recalculated premium from the total 
sum it paid Mr C. 
 
18/4 
 
household – non-disclosure – oral representations – burden of proof. 
 
Mr O applied by telephone for household insurance. He answered various questions and 
the  insurer  then  sent  him  a  statement  of  the  facts  it  considered  relevant  to  his 
application. It asked Mr O to check the statement and let it know if any of the facts had 
been recorded incorrectly. The statement read in part: ‗Neither you, nor anyone normally 
living with you, have ever been convicted of, or have any prosecutions pending for, any 
criminal offence (other than motoring offences).‘ Mr O did not make any corrections. 
 
Some  time  later,  Mr  O  needed  to  make  a  claim.  In  response  to  a  question  about 
convictions, he stated on the claim form that he did not have any. However, when a 
claims investigator interviewed him, he said he had been convicted only once – for theft 
– when he was 18. The insurer made further enquiries and found that more recently – in 
1997 – Mr O had been convicted for causing criminal damage. 
 
The insurer cancelled Mr O‘s insurance and said it would not have issued the policy if it 
had been aware of the conviction. Mr O insisted that he had told the telesales operator 
about it, even though he did not consider it relevant to his household insurance. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
Given  Mr  O‘s  incorrect  statement  on  the  claim  form,  we  were  unable  to  accept  his 
assertion that he had disclosed his conviction when he applied for the insurance. We 
considered the insurer had been fully justified in treating the insurance as if it had never 
been issued. It therefore had no liability for meeting Mr O‘s claim. 
 
18/5 
 
motor – non-disclosure – call recorded by insurer – whether proof of non-disclosure. 
 
Mr A‘s son telephoned the insurer to arrange motor insurance for himself and his father. 
After receiving the policy, he telephoned the insurer again to say it had made a mistake. 
He said his father, rather than himself, should be named as the policyholder and main 
driver. He stated that his father was the registered owner of the car. The insurer then 
issued new papers. 
 
When the car was reported stolen, the insurer investigated the claim and found that it 
was the son who was the owner and main user, not the father. Mr A confirmed this. He 
said they had registered the policy in his name because the premium was cheaper this 
way.  The  insurer  then  cancelled  the  insurance,  saying  it  would  not  have  issued  this 
policy if it had known the true situation. 
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Mr A argued that the car belonged to the whole family and had been a joint purchase, 
even though it was registered in the son‘s name. The insurer had recorded the calls and 
produced a transcript of the son‘s second call, in which he said the firm had made a 
‗mistake‘ in naming his father as the policyholder. 
 
Mr  A  then  argued  that  he  did  not  speak  or  read  English  and  he  claimed  that  the 
investigator had not recorded his statement correctly. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
We were not satisfied that Mr A had given the insurer correct information when it agreed 
to issue this policy. Mr A‘s son stated clearly that he was not the main user and that it 
was a mistake to issue the policy in his name. Mr A‘s first statement to the investigator 
confirmed  that  his  son  was  the  car  owner  and  main  user.  Mr  A  subsequently 
contradicted this, but we noted that his signed statement included numerous alterations 
which he had added and initialled. 
 
We concluded that the insurer was fully entitled to cancel the insurance and reject Mr A‘s 
theft claim. 
 
18/6 
 
travel – cancellation – cancellation as a ‗direct consequence of compulsory quarantine or 
subpoena‘ – whether claim by policyholder held on remand valid. 
 
Mr H took out a single trip travel policy for his holiday to Benidorm. However, he was 
unable to take the holiday. Three days before he was due to travel he was arrested and 
kept in custody for seven days. 
 
The insurer rejected his cancellation claim. It said that the policy covered cancellation 
only in certain specified circumstances and this was not one of them. Mr H argued that 
his  claim  was  valid  because  cancellation  as  a  ‗direct  consequence  of  compulsory 
quarantine … [or] subpoena‘ was covered. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
We  did  not  agree  that  Mr  H  was  in  ‗compulsory  quarantine‘  while  he  was  held  on 
remand. His detention may have been similar to being subpoenaed to appear in court 
but it was not the same. The reason he was unable to travel was because he was in 
prison, not because he was required to appear in court. In the circumstances, the insurer 
was justified in rejecting Mr H‘s claim. 
 
18/7 
 
payment protection – insured increasing loan but not insurance – how insurer should 
calculate benefits. 
 
Mrs E arranged a mortgage in 1995 and took out payment protection insurance through 
the lender to cover her repayments. On three occasions during the next six years, she 
arranged remortgages of her property with the same lender. 
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In 2001, Mrs E was made redundant and submitted a claim under the policy. The insurer 
accepted her claim, but it calculated the benefit that was payable to her each month on 
the basis of her monthly mortgage payment in 1995. This was insufficient to cover the 
increased repayments that resulted from the later remortgages. 
 
Mrs E argued that the benefit payable under the policy should have increased each time 
she remortgaged her property, to protect the revised monthly payments. The insurer said 
it had been her responsibility to ensure the policy cover was adequate. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
In our view, each time the remortgage was arranged, the insurer should have suggested 
to  Mrs  E  that  she  should  increase  her  policy  cover.  It  should  also  have  drawn  her 
attention to the inadequacy of the benefit payable under the policy unless she did so. 
This  would  have  been  good  insurance  practice,  since  insurers  and  intermediaries 
arranging insurance policies have a duty to ensure that the policy  is suitable for the 
policyholder‘s needs and resources. 
 
The insurer agreed to recalculate Mrs E‘s benefits as if she had increased the cover 
each time she remortgaged her property. It backdated this additional payment to the 
start  of  her  claim,  deducting  the  amount  she  would  have  paid  in  premiums  for  the 
increased cover. 
 
18/8 
 
household buildings – storm – proof of storm. 
 
Mr M, whose house is on top of a mountain in South Wales, submitted a claim for storm 
damage to the rear windows. He said that in July 2001, storm force winds had caused 
serious damage to all the windows at the rear of his house. However, he did not submit 
the claim until October 2001 and by then he had replaced all the windows and doors. 
 
The loss adjuster appointed by the insurer to inspect the damage had found nothing left 
to inspect – the glazier had disposed of the old windows and doors. The insurer rejected 
the claim on the basis that there was no evidence of storm damage. Mr M sent the 
insurer a letter from the glazier stating that the windows were replaced because they 
were in a ‗very weatherbeaten state, particularly those at the rear‘. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
We spoke to the glazier, who indicated that the windows had not been damaged during 
a single incident of stormy weather, but were in a state of general decay resulting from 
the normal weather conditions in that area. 
 
Weather  reports  recorded  strong  winds  during  July  2001,  but  there  was  insufficient 
evidence to indicate these had been ‗storm force‘. We concluded that the windows had 
not been damaged by storm force winds and we rejected the complaint. 
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18/9 
 
travel – non-disclosure – exclusion for pre-existing medical conditions – whether insured 
required to disclose treatment for related conditions. 
 
Mr N took out insurance to cover his holiday in Canada in May 2001. The policy included 
a declaration that he ‗had not suffered from or received treatment for … a heart-related 
condition,  hypertension,  or  a  stroke  …  [or]  received  in-patient  treatment,  has  been 
prescribed medication or has had a change of medication during the last 12 months …‘. 
 
Mr N told the agent that he had ‗dormant‘ angina and disclosed his age. As a result, the 
insurance premium was doubled. He did not mention any other conditions. While on 
holiday he suffered a stroke and incurred substantial medical costs. The insurer would 
not  reimburse  Mr  N‘s  medical  expenses.  It  said  this  was  because  of  his  failure  to 
disclose that, in 2000, he had suffered from mild hypertension and had been referred to 
a consultant for ‗intermittent claudication‘ (leg cramps). 
 
Mr N disputed this decision. He submitted evidence from his doctor that the episode of 
hypertension  had  ‗resolved  spontaneously‘.  Although  Mr  N  had  received 
antihypertensive treatment, this was for ankle oedema (related to the claudication) and 
not for hypertension. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We concluded that the evidence did not support the insurer‘s decision that Mr N had 
failed  to  disclose a medical  condition  he  was  required  to make  known.  The medical 
evidence  confirmed  that  the  antihypertensive  treatment  Mr  N  received  was  not  for 
hypertension. 
 
His condition of claudication/ankle oedema was not directly related to the disability that 
led to his claim – the stroke – so the insurer was not entitled to reject the claim. Mr N had 
not  failed  to  disclose  hypertension;  he  had  not  received  treatment  for  that  condition 
within the excluded period. 
The insurer agreed to meet the claim and to add interest. 
 
18/10 
 
extended warranty – proof – policyholder claiming for second of two identical losses – 
evidence required to prove loss valid. 
 
Mr D had two fridge-freezers. When one of them broke down and had to be replaced, he 
took out extended warranty insurance to cover both the new fridge-freezer and the one 
he already had. Unfortunately, just three weeks later, the old fridge-freezer broke down 
and that too had to be replaced. Mr D submitted a claim for a replacement and for 
compensation for the food that had been spoilt. He also claimed for the cost of other 
food that he had intended to store in the fridge-freezer which broke down, and that he 
had since had to throw away because it would not fit in the remaining freezer. 
 
The insurer rejected Mr D‘s claim on the ground that it related to the earlier incident, that 
took place before the start date of the insurance. Mr D refuted this and insisted that the 
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Complaint upheld in part 
 
Mr D produced evidence showing that when the first fridge-freezer had broken down, it 
had been removed and replaced. This proved that he had owned two identical models. 
 
The insurer agreed to deal with the claim and also to pay £130 for the spoilt frozen food. 
However, it refused to reimburse the cost of the food that Mr D had intended to store in 
the freezer. We agreed that there was no cover under the insurance for this part of his 
loss. 
 
18/11 
 
household buildings – non-disclosure – cancellation – whether insurer entitled to refuse 
to meet cost of work completed before policy cancelled. 
 
Mr J applied for household insurance in January 2001. When asked about his insurance 
history, he disclosed three previous claims, for which he had been paid a total of £2,800. 
The  insurer  sent  him  a  statement  of  facts  for  checking,  together  with  a  direct  debit 
mandate for the payment of premium instalments. One of the statements confirmed that 
no insurer had ever refused to cover Mr J. 
 
In  June  2001,  Mr  J‘s  pigeon  loft  caught  fire  and  was  damaged  beyond  repair.  He 
submitted  a  claim  form  and  two  estimates  for  replacement  of  the  loft.  The  insurer 
accepted his claim and told him to proceed. However, it then made enquiries. It found 
that Mr J had failed to disclose that two insurance companies had refused to insure him. 
It also discovered that he had not disclosed all his previous claims, for which he had 
received a total of £24,000. 
 
The  insurer  refused  to  pay  for  the  new  pigeon  loft.  It  cancelled  the  insurance  and 
refunded the premiums Mr J had paid. Mr J asserted that he had never received the 
statement of facts, although he had signed and returned the direct debit mandate. He 
denied giving incorrect information to the insurer. He claimed he had read out over the 
phone to the insurer a letter from his previous insurer, saying it would no longer continue 
to insure him. 
 
Complaint upheld in part 
 
Non-disclosure  is  a  serious  allegation.  The  information  that  a  proposer  (someone 
applying for insurance) provides to an insurer is the basis of the contract and only the 
proposer can answer the insurer‘s questions. If Mr J had given false information to the 
insurer, it would have been fully justified in cancelling the policy. 
 
But we were not satisfied that Mr J had provided incorrect information. He had not been 
asked to give written answers to the insurer‘s questions, or even to sign the form on 
which the insurer had recorded the information he had provided. It was possible that he 
had not received the statement of facts or that he had failed to check it carefully. The 
statement of facts was the only record of his telephone conversation with the insurer. 
 
We accepted that the insurer would have refused to issue this policy if it had been aware 
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fundamental mistake, so the insurer was entitled to cancel it. However, we thought it 
would be unfair to allow the cancellation to prejudice Mr J. He had started work on the 
replacement loft on the clear understanding that the insurer had accepted his claim. The 
insurer agreed to meet the cost of all the work that had been carried out up until the time 
it notified Mr J that it was cancelling the insurance. 
 
18/12 
 
motor  –  accessories  –  valuation  –  whether  policyholder  entitled  to  cost  of  new 
replacement. 
 
Mr F was involved in an accident with a third party. Both cars were insured with the 
same company. The third party was 100% liable for the damage to Mr F‘s car and the 
insurer settled Mr F‘s claim on a ‗total loss‘ basis. Mr F also received further payments 
from the insurance company on behalf of the third party. 
 
The insurer agreed to Mr F‘s request to retain the car‘s CD player and roof bars. Mr F 
thought  he  might  also  want  to  keep  the  tow  bar,  although  he  did  not  mention  this. 
However, when he got his replacement car, he found that it was a different model and 
that the old CD player and roof bars did not fit. So he told the insurer he was claiming the 
cost of a new CD player, roof bars and tow bar. 
 
The  insurer  said  there  was  no  cover  for  these  losses,  but  it  agreed  to  increase  its 
settlement to reflect their market value, since he could not use them in his new car. It 
paid Mr F a further £140 for the CD player and £50 for the tow bar. It made no payment 
for the roof bars, but offered to assess their value if Mr F sent them in. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
We did not agree that Mr F was entitled to the cost of a new CD player, roof bars and 
tow bar. His insurer‘s liability was limited to the market value of the car‘s accessories, 
adjusted for ‗wear, tear and loss of value‘ due to their age. The insurer had calculated its 
offer fairly and we did not consider there were any grounds for increasing it 
 
18/13 
 
extended warranty – upholstery – meaning of ‗upholstery‘. 
 
When Mr V bought a sofa in 1997, he took out extended warranty insurance to protect it. 
The policy was headed – ‗A Five Year Policy for Upholstery (excluding leather)‘. The 
following  year,  he  found  that  a  section  of  the  upholstery  was  coming  loose  and 
separating, so he claimed the cost of repairs. The insurer told him that the cover was 
limited  to  ‗structural  defects‘  and  did  not  provide  indemnity  for  problems  with  the 
upholstery. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
There was a clear conflict between the actual terms of the policy and the description of 
the policy cover on its front page. Mr V said that the name of the policy was misleading 
and that he would not have bought the policy if he had understood how restricted the 
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We did not accept the insurer‘s argument that the policy only covered ‗structural defects‘ 
with ‗upholstery‘. The policy did not define ‗upholstery‘, and its ordinary meaning is the 
fabric that covers furniture. If the insurer intended the word to be defined in a more 
restricted way, it should have made this clear. 
 
Since the insurer was unable to show that the limited nature of the policy cover had been 
made clear to Mr V, we concluded it was not justified in rejecting his claim. We also 
awarded Mr V £100 compensation for the insurer‘s poor claims handling. 
 
18/14 
 
travel – driving – breakdown and recovery insurance – whether providing comprehensive 
motor cover. 
 
Mr I took out holiday motoring insurance specifically to cover his European motoring 
holiday. He had an accident while on the holiday, which resulted in his car being written-
off.  His  travel  insurer  refused  to  meet  his  claim,  on  the  ground  that  the  policy  only 
covered ‗breakdown and recovery‘ of his car. It told him he should claim under his UK 
motor insurance. 
 
Mr I was dissatisfied with this response. He argued that he had been led to believe that 
the travel insurance provided him with the same level of cover – abroad – that he held in 
the UK (fully comprehensive motor insurance). If he had been correctly informed about 
the policy, he would not have purchased it, particularly since his motor insurer would 
have  provided  fully  comprehensive  cover  in  Europe  if  he  had  paid  an  additional 
premium. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We were not satisfied that the insurer had used its ‗best endeavours‘ to ensure the policy 
was suitable for Mr I‘s needs, as it was required to do under the terms of the Association 
of British Insurers‘ Code for the Selling of General Insurance. The insurer accepted our 
recommendation that it should deal with the claim as if the policy covered the full loss, 
and that it should refund the storage charges Mr I had paid, together with interest. 
 
18/15 
 
household contents – limit of cover – brochure promising wider cover than policy terms – 
whether insurer entitled to rely on policy exclusion. 
 
Mrs K took out the household insurance recommended by her lender and chose the top 
of  the  range  offered  –‗Supercover  Special‘.  The  brochure  described  it  as  ‗unlimited 
contents cover – accidental damage and personal possession cover outside the home‘ 
and ‗one of the most complete covers available‘. It confirmed that personal possessions, 
including sports equipment and children‘s bikes, were covered up to £1,500 for any one 
article. 
 
The explanatory leaflet stated that the policy did not cover ‗motor vehicles, caravans, 
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leaflet is just a guide and does not summarise all aspects of the cover; only the policy 
document does this.‘ 
 
When Mrs K made a claim for the theft of her son‘s baby-quad bike, the insurer rejected 
it, citing the policy exclusion for ‗mechanically propelled vehicles‘. It said the quad bike 
should have been covered by motor insurance. Mrs K objected, arguing that she had 
never received a copy of the policy document and that the leaflet suggested that the bike 
was covered. She also pointed out that her son was only seven years old and could not 
have used the bike on the road or taken out motor insurance. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
Whether a baby-quad bike was a ‗motor vehicle‘ or a ‗mechanically propelled vehicle‘ 
was  debatable.  However,  we  did  not  need  to  decide  that  point.  There  was  a  clear 
contradiction between the policy exclusion and the wording of the leaflet. Not only did it 
expressly include ‗children‘s bikes‘, but it stated there was ‗unlimited‘ contents cover. It 
did not seem reasonable to assume Mrs K should have known that the insurer did not 
consider her son‘s bike to be part of the ‗contents‘ of her house. 
 
The insurer had not worded its policy leaflet in a clear and unambiguous way, so Mrs K 
was entitled to the benefit of the wording that was most favourable to her. We required 
the firm to meet her claim. 
 
18/16 
 
household contents  – renewal – notification of new restriction on benefits  – whether 
leaflet documenting change constituted sufficient notification. 
 
Mrs H had household insurance for some years. In March 2001, her car was broken into 
while she was visiting a hospital and possessions were stolen from the locked car boot. 
She submitted a claim for £2,385 and provided receipts. 
 
The insurer accepted her claim, subject to the policy limit of £1,000, and it deducted the 
policy excess of £50 from its settlement. Mrs H complained, saying her policy did not 
refer  to  such  a  limit.  The  insurer  said  it  had  imposed  the  limit  when  the policy  was 
renewed in 1999. 
 
The changed terms introduced at that time meant that the insurer would not meet claims 
for – ‗Theft from unattended road vehicles other than from a locked, concealed luggage 
boot … following a forced and violent entry to a securely locked vehicle. The most the 
insurer will pay for any one event is £1,000.‘ 
 
Mrs H denied receiving any information about the change of terms. Although she had 
moved house in 1999, she had kept all the documents that the insurer had sent her. The 
insurer produced computer records to prove it had sent Mrs H notification of the change. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We could not determine whether Mrs H had received the insurer‘s notification. However, 
even if she had, we did not consider the notification was sufficient to draw her attention 
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needs  to  be  highlighted  but  the  leaflet  did  not  do  this  adequately.  So  it  was  not 
reasonable for the insurer to rely on the restriction when it calculated its settlement of her 
claim. 
 
In addition, we considered the wording of the exclusion ambiguous. It could be argued 
that the phrase ‗any one event‘ did not refer to thefts from a locked, concealed luggage 
boot. However, in view of our first conclusion, we did not need to make a decision on this 
point. 
 
Finally, the insurer had not calculated its settlement correctly. It should have deducted 
the excess before it applied the policy limit. We were surprised that the insurer had not 
noticed this error when it reviewed the complaint. We required the insurer to waive Mrs 
H‘s excess – as compensation – and to pay the balance of the amount she had claimed, 
together with interest. 
 
18/17 
 
household contents – renewal – change of policy terms – need to highlight change. 
 
Miss L‘s golf clubs were too big to fit in the boot of her car so she folded down one of the 
back seats and placed the clubs there. When she returned from an afternoon‘s play, she 
forgot to bring the clubs indoors. By the next morning, they had been stolen. The insurer 
rejected her claim. It said that her household contents insurance only covered thefts 
‗from a locked, concealed luggage boot‘ of an unattended car. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We  agreed  with  the  insurer  that  Miss  L‘s  loss  was  caught  by  the  wording  of  the 
exclusion. As at least parts of the golf clubs were visible, they had not been taken from a 
‗concealed‘ luggage boot. 
 
However, we were concerned that the policy terms did not contain this exclusion. The 
insurer explained that it was added to the policy with effect from the date of renewal in 
August 1999 and it said it had sent Miss L documents explaining this at the time. Miss L 
said she had not received any such documents. 
 
The insurer claimed to have sent Miss L: 
 
a standard letter referring to the renewal; 
a page setting out the premium and direct debit details; 
a schedule providing a general breakdown of the cover; 
an advertisement for travel insurance; and 
the policy update entitled ‗important changes to your home protection policy‘. 
 
We did not consider that this set of papers – noting the restriction on cover in the middle 
of the ‗update‘ – was adequate to draw Miss L‘s attention to the change. There was no 
warning that part of the existing cover had been withdrawn and we decided that this fact 
had not been sufficiently highlighted or properly explained. It is important that adverse 
changes are prominently announced. We required the insurer to meet Miss L‘s claim in 
full and to add interest. 
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18/18 
 
household buildings – flood – rising water table – cesspit – whether ‗damage‘ caused to 
cesspit by ‗flood‘. 
 
Mr  G‘s  house  was  150  years  old  and  served  by  a  cesspit,  not  connected  to  mains 
sewerage. Following unusually heavy rainfall between September 2000 and February 
2001,  the  cesspit  was  becoming  full  of  water  within  hours  of being  emptied.  Mr  G‘s 
sanitary  and  washing  facilities  became  unusable.  He  submitted  a  claim  under  his 
household buildings insurance for the cost of remedial work, claiming the cesspit had 
been damaged by ‗escape of water‘ or ‗flood‘. 
 
Mr G‘s insurer rejected his claim, explaining that damage due to escape of water was 
only  covered  if  water  had  escaped  from  a  fixed  water  system.  In  Mr  G‘s  case,  the 
reverse was true, since water appeared to be entering the cesspit from the outflow pipes. 
And  the  insurer  said  that  ‗flood‘  only  occurred  if  there  was  a  ‗rapid  accumulation  or 
sudden release of water from an external source‘. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
According  to  a  recent  decision  by  the  Court  of  Appeal,  the  word  ‗flood‘  should  be 
construed in its ordinary and natural sense and can include prolonged and steady rain or 
a steady, slow build-up of water. 
 
In this case, the cesspit had been affected by rising ground water. It was not an ‗escape 
of water‘ but could be described as a ‗flood‘. The water had not caused physical damage 
to the cesspit but it had prevented Mr G from using it as usual. This was a ‗loss‘ and it 
was therefore covered by the insurance. 
 
We put it to the insurer that Mr G‘s claim was valid and that he was also entitled to 
compensation for the insurer‘s delay in accepting liability. This had meant that Mr G and 
his  family  were  left  without  proper  sanitary  facilities  for  some  months.  The  insurer 
accepted  our  conclusions  and  agreed  to  meet  the  claim  and  to  pay  £1,000 
compensation for distress and inconvenience. 
 
18/19 
 
household – storm – proof of storm – proof that damage caused by storm. 
 
Mr S noticed damage to his roof tiles and internal decorations. He had the damage 
repaired and submitted a claim to the insurer. The insurer rejected the claim after the 
repairer it sent to look at the damage noted that there were visible signs of wear and tear 
on the roof. 
 
Mr S submitted a report from his builder, denying any wear and tear and saying the 
damage was due to a storm. The insurer obtained weather reports that showed there 
were no storm conditions at the time Mr S noticed the damage. Mr S then conceded that 
he did not use the damaged bedroom often, so he was unsure when the storm had 
occurred. 
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It was up to the claimant to show that the damage was due to a particular storm and not 
merely to poor weather over a period of time, or to general wear and tear. We did not 
require the insurer to meet the claim. There was no evidence that the damage to the roof 
had been caused by a storm, or even that there had been a storm around the time of the 
claim. 
 
18/20 
 
personal accident – motor accidents – policyholder assaulted when getting into car – 
whether assault covered under policy. 
 
Mr Y submitted a claim under his ‗4-Way Accident Cash Plan‘, when he was assaulted 
outside a food and wine shop by the shop owner, and injured his knee. 
 
The  insurer  rejected  his  claim  on  the  ground  that  the  policy  only  covered  him  if  he 
sustained  an  accident  when  he  was  getting  into  or  out  of  a  private  car  or  public 
conveyance, or if a vehicle struck him when he was walking on a public road. Mr Y 
argued that his claim was valid because he had been assaulted while he was getting into 
his car, after leaving the shop. 
 
The insurer refused to make any payment. It referred to Mr Y‘s initial statement about the 
injury, which had not mentioned his car at all. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
Mr Y was unable to produce any evidence to support his amended description of the 
incident. Given that he had not originally mentioned the car, we were not convinced that 
the incident occurred as he claimed. Even if we had been convinced about this, the 
claim still did not meet the strict criteria of the policy, which limited benefits to injuries 
sustained as a result of a motor accident. 
 
18/21 
 
motor – non-disclosure – clear questions – modifications – whether tinted windows a 
‗modification‘. 
 
When Miss M took out motor insurance, she was asked to disclose any modifications 
that had been made to her car, such as changes ‗to engine, body, wheel, suspension‘. 
She informed the insurer that the car had a body kit but she did not mention any other 
modifications. 
 
Some  time  later,  after  she  put  in  a  claim  for  theft  damage  to  the  car,  the  engineer 
appointed by the insurer to inspect the car noted that it had tinted windows. The insurer 
rejected her claim and immediately cancelled her insurance from the start date. It said 
she should have mentioned the tinted windows, since they constituted a ‗modification‘ 
and it would not have issued the policy on any terms if it had known about them. Miss M 
then had to act quickly to obtain insurance with another firm, and she had to pay a much 
higher amount for it. 
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It was debatable whether the windows were part of the car‘s ‗body‘ and whether tinted 
windows were a modification that Miss M was required to disclose. We were satisfied 
that  she  had  genuinely  not  realised  that  she  needed  to  tell  the  insurer  about  the 
windows. We thought the insurer should at least have asked her to explain why she 
failed to mention the windows, instead of just cancelling her insurance without warning. 
 
We decided that the firm had not been justified in cancelling the insurance. Miss M had 
by this time taken out an alternative policy with a different firm. So we suggested that the 
earlier  policy  should  be  treated  as  having  been  cancelled  by  her  rather  than  by  the 
insurer. She should give back to the insurer part of the premiums it had refunded, from 
the policy start date until the new insurance began. In any event, we decided that the 
insurer had to reimburse Miss M for the cost of repairing the car, plus interest. We also 
decided  that  the  insurer  should  pay  her  £300  compensation  for  the  distress  and 
inconvenience it had caused. 
 
18/22 
 
mechanical  breakdown  warranty  –  exclusion  for  external  oil  leaks  –  meaning  of 
‗external‘. 
 
The camshaft oil seals on Mr R‘s car broke down and oil leaked on to the cam belt, 
which was contained in housing at the end of the engine, the housing being sealed with 
a gasket. Mr R arranged for the necessary repairs – steam-cleaning of components and 
replacement of the cam cover gasket and the oil seals. He then claimed back the cost of 
the repairs from his insurer. 
 
The insurer rejected the claim on the ground that the policy excluded ‗external oil leaks‘. 
It explained that it would cover internal oil leaks, such as a leak into the cylinders from a 
blown head gasket. However, it would not pay for any leak outside the main engine 
block,  sump  and  cylinder  head.  Mr  R  argued  that  the  wording  of  the  exclusion  was 
ambiguous. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We concluded that the insurer had interpreted the exclusion too restrictively. We did not 
think it was reasonable to expect policyholders to appreciate the narrow distinction it was 
making between different types of oil leaks. And we did not agree that an oil leak into a 
housing, due to the failure of the oil seals, would generally be regarded as ‗external‘. We 
therefore required the insurer to meet the claim in full, plus interest. 
 
18/23 
 
medical expenses – transfer from ‗a similar existing plan‘ – whether previous insurance 
arrangements were ‗a similar existing plan‘. 
 
Mr T was a member of his employer‘s private medical expenses insurance scheme until 
1 September 1993, when he transferred into a personal scheme with the same insurer. 
Then in September 1999, he cancelled that policy and took out a similar policy with a 
different firm, whose explanatory literature promised that ‗cover may be transferred from 
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you were participating in a previous plan will be honoured. No health questions will be 
asked or medical examinations required.‘ 
 
In  July  2000,  Mr  T  saw  a  consultant  about  recurrent  groin  pain  and  underwent 
investigations  and  a  colonoscopy.  However,  after  making  enquiries,  the  insurance 
company rejected his claim to have his costs reimbursed. It said Mr T had not been 
entitled to an automatic transfer because his previous insurer had not asked him any 
questions about his health before it issued him with cover. It also concluded that his 
illness had ‗originated‘ before he had taken out the personal insurance cover in 1993, 
because he had received the same treatment in 1987. It did not accept that Mr T‘s 
corporate membership was relevant. 
 
Mr T argued that his 1987 claim had been met by the insurance company that covered 
him at that time and also that his current claim was for a different illness, even though 
the treatment was the same. He pointed out that the current insurer had not told him that 
his cover could only be ‗transferred‘ if his previous insurer had asked questions about his 
health before offering him insurance. In response, the insurer said that Mr T should have 
understood the terms on which it would allow cover to be transferred. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
The condition on which the insurer relied in rejecting Mr T‘s claim stipulated that cover 
could only be transferred ‗from a similar existing plan‘. It did not define this term or make 
it clear that the previous scheme would not qualify unless it had been underwritten on 
the basis of questions about the policyholder‘s health. 
 
We concluded that it would have been difficult for anyone to understand the insurer‘s 
requirements. Moreover, the explanatory literature only emphasised the ease of transfer, 
not the insurer‘s restrictions. 
 
We  considered  that  the  insurer  should  have  asked  Mr  T  specific  questions  on  any 
matters it regarded as vital, before agreeing to provide cover. We decided that all Mr T‘s 
previous insurances – both the corporate and the personal schemes – should be treated 
as ‗a similar existing plan‘. 
 
We also concluded that the 1987 illness was too remote to be considered as ‗an illness 
that … originated before the enrolment‘. The insurer was not entitled to reject Mr T‘s 
claim on either of the grounds it cited. We required it to reimburse Mr T in full and to add 
interest to its payment. 
 
18/24 
 
payment protection – unemployment – unemployment defined as redundancy – whether 
policy restriction made clear to borrower before sale of policy. 
 
Mr B took out insurance to protect his loan repayments. His lender arranged a ‗Life, 
Disability and Unemployment‘ policy. When Mr B became unemployed, he made a claim. 
The insurer refused to meet his loan repayments, stating that the policy only provided 
benefits if he became redundant. The policy defined ‗unemployed‘ as ‗being without work 
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of ‗redundancy‘: ‗employment being terminated due solely to your employer ceasing or 
reducing the activities for which you were engaged‘. 
 
Mr B argued that he was redundant because he had received a redundancy payment, 
but  the  insurer  did  not  agree.  It  pointed  to  evidence  from  Mr  B‘s  former  employer, 
showing that he had been dismissed because he was incapable of performing his duties 
satisfactorily. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
The  policy  title  referred  to  ‗unemployment‘  cover,  but  the  policy  did  not  include  this 
benefit and restricted cover to redundancy situations. This restriction was only apparent 
after a close reading of the policy, including the definitions section. However, the insurer 
had named and marketed the insurance as if it covered all unemployment. It did not do 
this, so the insurer had to ensure that the lender selling the policy made the actual scope 
of the cover clear to potential purchasers before they committed themselves. 
 
There was no evidence that the lender selling this policy had drawn Mr B‘s attention to 
the limitations of cover and we accepted on balance that the policy had been mis-sold. 
We did not consider that it would be fair merely to give Mr B a premium refund – if he 
had known the policy did not cover all unemployment, he could have bought wider cover 
from  another  insurance company.  He  had  been  prejudiced  by  the  lender‘s  failure  to 
explain the terms of this insurance. 
 
We were satisfied that Mr B had become unemployed through no fault of his own. So we 
required the insurer to meet his claim and to pay any interest or arrears charges he had 
incurred. 
 
18/25 
 
personal  accident  –  mis-sale  –  road  and  travel  plan  –  bicyclist  –  whether  policy 
misrepresented to policyholder. 
 
Mr M and his partner took out a ‗Road and Travel Plan‘ in 1996. The policy benefits were 
set out in a table. Shortly before taking out this plan, Mr M‘s partner had been involved in 
a road traffic accident and had been distressed to find that the insurance she had at the 
time did not provide any cover for her injuries. 
 
In 2001, Mr M was injured while riding his bicycle. No other vehicle was involved in the 
accident. He submitted a claim, but the insurer refused to make any payment. It told him 
the policy only covered accidents involving motor vehicles or public transport. Mr M said 
this  restriction  had  not  been  explained  to  him  and  he  asked  for  a  full  refund  of  his 
premiums. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
The policy‘s title  indicated that it  was concerned with road accidents involving motor 
vehicles. In fact, it only provided cover for policyholders injured in accidents if they were 
in a vehicle or if they were a pedestrian, pedal cyclist or passenger on public transport 
and had an accident with a vehicle. 
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We were unable to accept Mr M‘s allegation that he was led to believe that the policy 
covered any personal accident. Nor did we agree that the policy was unsuitable for his 
needs and was mis-sold to him. He was not entitled to a full premium refund. 
 
Issue 21  October 2002 
 
21/1 
 
household contents – exaggerated claim – whether insurer entitled to reject claim in full 
– whether policyholder pressed to disclaim part of loss. 
 
When Mr J was burgled, he notified the police and put in a claim to the firm. His claim – 
totalling £3,000 – included a DVD player, 14 DVD discs, other audio-visual equipment 
and jewellery. 
 
When the firm questioned Mr J, it emerged that although he initially said that he had 
bought  one  of  the  stolen  items  (a hi-fi)  for  £150,  he  had  actually  bought  it  from his 
brother for £60. 
 
The firm‘s investigator noticed that some of the DVDs he had listed in his claim had not 
yet been released in the UK. Mr J was unable to explain how he had bought them. He 
then admitted he had never owned a DVD player or discs, and he said he wished to 
withdraw that part of his claim. 
 
The firm rejected Mr J‘s claim, citing the policy exclusion that enables it to do this if any 
part of a claim is false or exaggerated. 
 
Mr J‘s solicitor then said that Mr J had been told by the firm‘s investigator that if he said 
that he had never owned a DVD player, the rest of the claim would be paid more quickly. 
The solicitor also said that Mr J had reported the theft of the DVD player to the police 
and this proved it was a valid claim. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
We were unable to reconcile Mr J‘s statement with his solicitor‘s assertions. It was hard 
to believe that, merely to progress payment for the rest of his claim, Mr J was willing to 
admit he had claimed for something he did not own. The only logical explanation was 
that Mr J had deliberately exaggerated his loss. So the firm was entitled to refuse to 
make any payment. 
 
21/2 
 
permanent  health  –  ‗disabled‘  –  evidence  that  policyholder  engaged  in  activities 
inconsistent with his statements – whether insurer justified in ceasing claim payments. 
 
Mr G received monthly benefits  from the firm after  it accepted his disability claim  in 
March 1992. His case was reviewed periodically and his disability was described as a 
‗non-specific‘  problem,  which  caused  him  to  feel  unwell  and  lethargic,  with  aching 
muscles and weakness. His GP confirmed that his condition remained static and that he 
was suffering from ‗psychogenic pain unspecified‘. 
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The firm arranged for another doctor, Dr L, to examine Mr G at home. Mr G told Dr L that 
he spent most of the day either sitting in a chair and staring into space or sitting outside 
in the garden. Mr G also said that he needed help to load shopping into the car and had 
not been able to drive for two to three months. However, Dr L could find nothing wrong 
with him. 
 
The firm‘s investigators filmed Mr G in the weeks before and after Dr L‘s visit. These 
videos showed Mr G getting out of his car, opening the boot without difficulty, pushing a 
supermarket trolley and loading shopping into his car. They also showed him jet-washing 
and drying his car and driving long distances. 
 
The firm concluded that Mr G did not satisfy  the policy definition of ‗disabled‘ and it 
stopped the benefit payments. In response, Mr G presented the firm with a letter from his 
GP saying that his condition had deteriorated. The GP did not appear to have  been 
aware  of  the  video  evidence  of  Mr  G‘s  activity,  or  of  why  the  firm  had  stopped  the 
payments. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
We were satisfied that the firm had acted fairly. We did not think Mr G was medically 
unable to perform his normal occupation. He had been unable to explain either the level 
of activity shown in the videos or the disparity between this activity and his statements to 
Dr L about what he could – and could not – do. 
 
21/3 
 
household contents – fraud – police not informed of full loss – whether sufficient reason 
for rejecting claim. 
 
Mr and Mrs B returned home from an evening out to find they had been burgled. They 
notified the police right away and rang the firm the next morning. The claim form they 
sent the firm listed 63 stolen items, with a total value of over £20,000. 
 
The firm‘s investigator was suspicious about the claim and his enquiries continued for 
the next eleven months. 
 
During the enquiries, the couple‘s insurance came up for renewal. The firm took more 
than two months to consider the matter and then refused to renew. The couple were 
unable to obtain any replacement insurance. 
 
Almost a year after the loss, the firm rejected the claim. It said that when Mr and Mrs B 
reported the loss to the police, they had not mentioned all the items they later claimed 
for.  It  also  said  that  Mr  and  Mrs  B  had  not  provided  all  the  help  and  information  it 
needed. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
Mrs B said that she had still been in shock when she reported the burglary to the police 
and she had only mentioned the most obvious items that were missing. This explanation 
was entirely credible. Theft victims may well not be aware of the full extent of their loss 
within a few minutes of discovering it. In any case, Mrs B had mentioned most of the Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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missing items when she telephoned the firm the morning after the burglary. And the 
couple had receipts for nearly everything. 
 
We  required  the  firm  to  settle  the  claim  and  to  pay  £500  compensation  for  its 
maladministration. We did not think it had handled the claim well, and it had not given Mr 
and Mrs B sufficient notice that it would not renew their insurance. 
 
21/4 
 
motor  –  proof  of  purchase  –  cash  purchase  –  lack  of  substantiation  –  conflicting 
information – whether claim valid. 
 
Miss D insured her campervan in June 2000. A few weeks later, on 12 July, she went on 
holiday  to  Grenada. When  she  returned  on  28  August,  she  reported  the campervan 
missing, presumed stolen. It was never found. 
 
When  the  firm  questioned  her  about  the  claim,  Miss  D  said  she  had  bought  the 
campervan  on  10  May  2000  and  had  paid  £9,700  in  cash.  She  said  it  had  been 
advertised for sale in a newspaper and that she and a friend, Mr W, arranged to meet 
the seller in a pub. She said she had bought the campervan on the spot and had driven 
it home. She later explained that most of the cash for the campervan had come from the 
sale of her previous car for £6,250 some six months earlier. She said she had kept that 
cash in her flat until she bought the campervan. She could not explain how she obtained 
the balance of £3,450. 
 
The firm was unable to contact Mr W, any of his neighbours, or the previous owner of the 
campervan. It discovered that the dealer to whom Miss D claimed to have sold her car 
did not exist. A jeweller had been operating for the last six years from the address she 
gave as the car dealer‘s. The firm also found that the campervan had been written off in 
1990. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
It is not normally the business of a firm to investigate how a policyholder has financed 
the purchase of a vehicle. But it is legitimate for the firm to make enquiries when there is 
doubt about the vehicle‘s ownership. No one else beside Miss D had claimed to own the 
vehicle, but there were many conflicting details in the case and Miss D was unable to 
explain them. The firm was therefore justified in refusing to pay the claim. 
 
Issue 22  November 2002 
 
22/15  
 
motor – valuation – unusually low mileage 
 
Dr M‘s insurer valued her car at £2,040 after it was seriously damaged in an accident. 
She disputed this, saying that she had bought the car new eight years before for £7,500 
and that it was now worth £4,500. The firm increased its offer to £2,500. Dr M refused to 
accept this. She said that the firm had failed to take account of the fact that the car had 
only 6,000 miles on the clock. 
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Complaint rejected 
 
Even considering the unusually low mileage, the firm‘s offer seemed to us to be quite 
generous. It was more than the car‘s ‗market value‘ so there was no reason for the firm 
to increase its valuation. 
 
22/16  
 
motor – valuation – proof of condition 
 
Miss W insured her car in January 2001 and told her insurer that it was worth £10,000. 
After the car was stolen in June that year, the firm offered her £2,600. She objected – 
saying she had paid £9,500 for the car. When the firm looked into the matter further, it 
found that the car‘s previous owner had bought it as a wreck and then sold it to her for 
£1,000. 
 
When challenged about this, she said further work had been done on the car after she 
had bought it, to restore it to ‗pristine‘ condition. Although Miss W was unable to produce 
the car‘s service history and had no purchase or repair receipts to support her statement, 
the  firm  increased  its  offer  to  £4,100.  It  had  referred  to  the  published valuations  for 
‗classic‘ cars, even though she had not taken out ‗classic car‘ insurance. Miss W refused 
the firm‘s offer, saying she was prepared to accept £7,500. But the firm would not budge, 
so she brought her complaint to us. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
The firm was not liable for the £10,000 Miss W had said the car was worth. The firm‘s 
policy documents made it clear that if the car was stolen, the firm would assess and pay 
the car‘s ‗market value‘. This was the amount it would cost to buy a similar vehicle of a 
similar age and condition. In our view, the firm had valued the car properly. In fact, it had 
valued it as if it was in excellent condition, despite its high mileage and the lack of any 
service  history.  There  was  nothing  to  support  Miss  W‘s  claim  that  the  car  was  in 
‗showroom condition‘, so we were satisfied that the offer was very fair. 
 
22/17  
 
motor – valuation – evidence of value – whether purchase price an accurate indicator of 
value 
 
Mr Q‘s car was stolen just over a month after he had bought it. Since he had paid 
£18,495 for the car, he was extremely upset when the firm valued it at just £15,564. 
 
He pointed out that his policy contained a promise that the firm would replace new cars if 
they were stolen or became a ‗total loss‘ within the first 12 months. However, the firm 
said the car had not been ‗new‘. It said the car had been registered in the dealer‘s name 
before Mr Q bought it, and that this affected the car‘s value. 
 
Eventually, the firm agreed to increase its offer to £16,524. Mr Q refused to accept this, 
arguing that the car had only five miles on the clock when he bought it. The firm would 
not change its stance, so Mr Q brought his complaint to us. 
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Complaint upheld 
 
The  firm  had  no  evidence  to  support  its  claim  that  the  registering  of  the  car  in  the 
dealer‘s name, only five weeks before Mr Q bought it, would have affected its value. We 
required the firm to increase its offer to the full amount Mr Q paid for the car, and to add 
interest from the date of the theft. 
 
22/18  
 
motor – valuation – grey import – evidence of value 
 
Mr T bought a new car for £25,000. It was a ‗grey import‘ – in other words, a car that had 
been imported by a supplier who was not authorised by the manufacturer. 
 
Just over two months later, after leaving the car in a public car park, Mr T was arrested 
and taken into custody. The following day, a fixed penalty notice was put on the car, 
which was still in the car park. 
 
Some time later the car was stolen. The theft was eventually reported to the police in 
November by Mr T‘s friend, Mrs C. She subsequently made the insurance claim on Mr 
T‘s behalf in January 2001. 
 
The firm valued the car at £17,950 and agreed to add interest to this amount. Mr T said 
the firm should pay him the full purchase price. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
In making a valuation, the firm had consulted a specialist trade guide for valuing ‗grey 
imports‘. 
 
We were satisfied that the insurer‘s offer reflected the car‘s full market value, particularly 
since there was evidence that the car had suffered some damage before it was stolen. 
We thought the insurer‘s offer to add interest to the amount it paid Mr T was very fair, 
since much of the delay was caused by his being detained after his arrest. 
 
We thought it probable that he had paid more than the car‘s market value when he 
bought it and we recommended that he should accept the firm‘s offer. 
 
Issue 23  December 2002 
 
23/11  
 
household  contents  –  renewal  –  change  of policy  terms  –  whether  sufficient  to  note 
amendment on renewal documents 
 
In 1984, Mr K took out index-linked household buildings and contents insurance. This 
included cover for his personal possessions, which were valued at £9,150 in total. He 
renewed the insurance every year. However, when he was burgled in 2001, the firm 
rejected most of his claim. It said that some of the personal possessions that had been 
stolen were worth more than £500 each and that such items were not covered unless 
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Mr K was very surprised by this. He said he had no reason to think these possessions 
were not covered, as they were items of jewellery that his wife had owned since he first 
took  out  the  insurance  in  1984.  He  pointed  out  that  the  firm‘s  promotional  literature 
stated  ‗New  for  Old  Replacement  means  exactly  that‘  and  that  it  promised 
‗Reimbursement in full at today‘s prices, whatever the original cost‘. The literature also 
said that index-linking ‗automatically takes account of inflation when assessing claims 
and renewal premiums‘. Since none of the stolen items of jewellery had been worth more 
than £500 in 1984, he considered that they should all still be covered. 
 
The firm based its rejection of the claim on the renewal notices that, since 1991, had 
stated, ‗any item worth more than £500 is not insured at all unless specified‘. The firm 
said that Mr K should have noticed this and made sure that each item of expensive 
jewellery was individually specified. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We considered that the firm‘s decision to exclude all personal possessions worth more 
than £500 constituted an unusual and onerous policy term. And such policy terms should 
be clearly drawn to the attention of policyholders. It is not sufficient for firms merely to 
print them on the renewal notice without giving policyholders any explanation or notice of 
the change. Most insurance policies contain a price limit on claims for any single article 
but it is not common for a firm to withdraw all cover for such items. 
 
The firm knew that Mr K had over £10,000 worth of personal possessions and it should 
have made it clear to him that he had to specify any item over £500. We concluded that 
the firm was unreasonable to limit its settlement of Mr K‘s claim on the grounds that the 
claim  did  not  meet  strict  policy  terms  that  the  firm  had  not  made  clear  to  him.  We 
required  it  to  meet  his  claim  in  full,  although  we  said  it  could  deduct  the  additional 
premiums it would have charged for the past five years if Mr K had specified the valuable 
items. 
 
23/12  
 
household buildings – change of policy terms – need for clear notification – swimming 
pool dome – dome specifically excluded from policy – intermediary stating policy covered 
dome – whether insurer entitled to reject claim for storm damage to dome 
 
Before Mr and Mrs A took out household insurance with the firm in 1994, they asked 
their intermediary if the policy would cover the PVC dome over their swimming pool. The 
intermediary wrote to them confirming that the dome would be covered ‗at no extra cost‘ 
so they took out the insurance and renewed it each year. 
 
In October 2001, a storm damaged the dome and Mr and Mrs A made a claim. However, 
the firm told them the policy specifically excluded swimming pool covers. Mr and Mrs A 
disputed this and said that if the policy wording had been amended, the firm should have 
informed them. 
 
The firm argued that swimming pool covers had probably been excluded even in 1994, 
although it could not produce a copy of the original policy to confirm this. It said Mr and 
Mrs  A  should  have  checked  the  policy  terms  at  the  outset  to  see  if  the  policy  was Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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suitable for them. Dissatisfied with this response, the couple brought their complaint to 
us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
Mr and Mrs A had specifically asked whether the policy would include their dome and in 
our view they were entitled to rely on the intermediary‘s letter as confirmation that the 
dome was covered. It was not reasonable of the firm to expect the couple to have then 
checked the policy terms to see if the intermediary‘s statement was true. 
 
The couple had every reason to believe that the dome was covered when they first took 
out the policy. There was nothing to suggest that the firm had subsequently altered the 
policy terms and notified its customers that it had done this, so we did not agree that it 
should have rejected the claim. 
 
The firm agreed to meet the claim, but said it would not cover the swimming pool dome 
against any loss after Mr and Mrs A‘s current insurance expired. 
 
23/13  
 
motor – renewal – firm choosing not to invite renewal – whether policyholder entitled to 
compensation when policy not renewed 
 
Shortly before Mr E renewed his car insurance in February 2002, the firm wrote to tell 
him that it was transferring customers to a subsidiary. It said Mr E would not be able to 
renew his policy. The subsidiary had different underwriting criteria and was not prepared 
to insure him because of the number of claims he had made. 
 
Mr E was upset about this decision, saying it was a ‗one-sided variation‘ of his policy. He 
did not think the subsidiary was reasonable to have counted windscreen damage as a 
‗claim‘. He said he was entitled to £300 for distress and inconvenience and he asked for 
his policy to be reinstated. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
The insurance contract was an annual policy and the firm was entitled to decide not to 
offer renewal. It was also entitled to decide how many claims policyholders could make 
before it would decline to insure them. We did not agree that the firm had exercised its 
discretion unreasonably or that Mr E‘s complaint was justified. 
 
23/14  
 
motor – renewal – automatic renewal – failure to pay premiums – whether policy should 
have been renewed – whether subsequent loss covered 
 
Mr H had insured his car with the same firm since 1994. He renewed his policy every 
year and, from 1997, the firm had renewed the policy for him automatically. 
 
So after he had an accident in October 2001, he was shocked when the firm rejected his 
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April 2001 to say he had decided not to renew. It said it had subsequently written to him 
to confirm his instructions. 
 
Mr H denied this. He said he had no idea that his insurance had lapsed and he had not 
noticed  that  the  monthly  premiums  were  no  longer  being  deducted  from  his  bank 
account. The firm told him he should have realised he did not have a valid policy. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We asked the firm to send us a recording of the telephone conversation in which Mr H 
had said he would not renew his policy. But it could neither do this nor supply any notes 
of the conversation. Nor could it produce a copy of the letter it said it had sent Mr H, 
acknowledging his decision to cancel the policy. 
 
As the monthly premium was small, we were not surprised that Mr H had failed to notice 
that the deductions from his bank account had stopped. We thought he should have 
noticed that he had not received a new certificate, but we accepted his statement that he 
believed the policy had been renewed automatically, as usual. 
 
We put it to the insurer that Mr H had intended to renew his insurance and his failure to 
do so was an innocent oversight. It agreed to reinstate the policy and to reimburse the 
cost of repairs plus interest, subject to his paying the outstanding premiums. 
 
23/15  
 
motor – renewal – non-disclosure – automatic renewal – whether firm made policyholder 
aware of need to disclose change of circumstances 
 
Mr J‘s motor insurance was due for renewal on 30 January 2001. The firm sent him 
renewal papers, including a letter that opened with the line ‗If you want to renew then do 
nothing, it‘s that easy‘. Further on, the letter said, ‗If your details aren‘t the same, then 
please ring us‘. 
 
The letter referred to the premium being based on ‗the details we already have on file for 
you. These are listed for you on the enclosed renewal notice‘. However, the renewal 
notice did not include any information about driving offences or accidents. At the end of 
the letter, there was a checklist that included a request to call the firm if any details such 
as ‗convictions or prosecutions‘ had changed. 
 
Mr J‘s car was stolen in July 2001 and the firm found out that he had been convicted of a 
drink-driving offence on 11 January that year. So it told him that it would not meet the 
claim and that it was cancelling his policy from the date of the renewal. 
 
Mr J said he had been away from home until February 2001, but that he had called the 
firm then and disclosed his conviction. The firm agreed that he had called, but it said he 
had not mentioned his conviction. It said he had only asked about reducing his cover 
from comprehensive to third party, fire and theft. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
Appendix A: O.N. Case Studies  93 
We did not think that the firm‘s renewal invitation made it clear that policyholders had to 
disclose new information to the firm. So we did not think it was entitled to decline to meet 
claims  on  the  grounds  that  a  policyholder  had  failed  to  disclose  routine  information, 
including minor offences. 
 
It was regrettable that the firm did not record its telephone conversations with customers, 
since a recording would have resolved the dispute. In the absence of a recording, we 
had to decide what had occurred on a balance of probabilities. 
 
We  thought  it  highly  improbable  that  any  member  of  the  firm‘s  staff  would  have 
overlooked the significance of Mr J‘s being disqualified from driving. If he had mentioned 
it, we thought the firm would have said it was not prepared to offer him cover on any 
basis. 
 
We also thought that any driver would know their insurer would consider the conviction 
and disqualification highly significant and would realise they had to disclose this when 
renewing  their  insurance.  So  we  decided  that  in  this  particular  case  the  firm  acted 
reasonably in cancelling the insurance from the date of renewal. 
 
Issue 24:  January 2003 
 
24/1 
 
income protection – disability – policyholder disabled from original occupation but not 
disabled from ‗any‘ occupation  – policyholder‘s condition deteriorating  – whether firm 
entitled to terminate benefits 
 
Mr B, an electrician, took out an income protection policy. This would provide him with 
benefit for up to 24 months if he were unable to carry out his normal occupation due to 
disability caused by accident or sickness. The benefit  would, however, stop after 24 
months unless he was medically unable to perform ‗any‘ occupation for which he was 
suited. 
 
In May 1997, Mr B was injured in a road traffic accident. As a result, he suffered severe 
back, neck and arm pain and saw a consultant orthopaedic surgeon, who identified a 
degenerative condition. Mr B made a successful claim under the policy and his benefits 
continued after the initial 24-month period. 
 
However, in January 2001, the firm arranged for Mr B to be examined by a consultant 
neurosurgeon, who concluded that Mr  B might be able to undertake a ‗desk job‘. In 
November  of  that  year,  the  firm  appointed  an  investigator  to  carry  out  some  video 
surveillance of Mr B. This showed him bending, lifting, crouching and driving without any 
apparent restriction. In December 2001, on the strength of this video, the firm terminated 
his benefits. 
 
In response to this, Mr B produced further medical evidence in support of his claim for 
‗total disability‘. Although, as the video showed and his doctor‘s report confirmed, he was 
able to carry out some activities, he said this was only possible at the risk of his health, 
and that undertaking a job would aggravate his condition. 
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We accepted that Mr B‘s condition had continued to deteriorate and that he was now 
incapable  of  any  work. What  we  had  to  decide  was  whether  he had met  the  policy 
definition of ‗total disability‘ in December 2001, when the firm had stopped paying his 
benefit. 
 
The medical evidence that Mr B provided at that time suggested that there were some 
jobs involving only ‗light‘ duties that Mr B could undertake. In order to continue receiving 
benefits after the first 24 months, Mr B needed to meet the policy definition of ‗disabled‘ 
–  ‗unable  to  perform  any  occupation‘.  Since  he  did  not  satisfy  these  criteria,  we 
concluded that the firm had been right to withdraw his benefits. 
 
Although we did not uphold the complaint, the firm agreed to refund the premiums Mr B 
had paid after December 2001. 
 
24/2 
 
income protection – disability – policyholder disabled from original occupation but able to 
undertake part-time work – whether entitled to any benefit – method of calculation of 
benefit 
 
Mr G, a self-employed butcher, developed disabling back pain and claimed under his 
income protection insurance policy. In December 1990, the firm accepted his claim and 
started paying him benefits. 
 
By 1996, Mr G was still unable to work. The firm offered to make final settlement of the 
claim by paying him a lump sum of £167,376. Mr G did not accept the offer and he 
continued to receive monthly payments. 
 
In  1999,  the  firm  required  Mr  G  to  attend  a  ‗functional  capacity‘  examination  by  a 
physiotherapist. She concluded that Mr G had not been exerting himself in the tests to 
his full ability, and that it was impossible to determine whether he was physically capable 
of returning to his former occupation. The firm had also obtained video evidence. On the 
basis of this and the test results, it stopped paying Mr G‘s benefits. 
 
Complaint upheld in part 
 
We appointed an independent consultant orthopaedic surgeon to examine Mr G and to 
consider the video evidence. This showed Mr G playing golf, driving and gardening. The 
consultant concluded that Mr G was not fit to carry out the work of a butcher and was 
unemployable in that capacity. However he might be able to undertake some part-time 
work  in  a  butcher‘s  shop  if  it  only  involved  –  for  example  –  serving  customers  and 
handling cash. 
 
The policy definition of ‗disability‘ was very strict. Taken literally, it might mean that a 
policyholder‘s  ability  to  carry  out  a  minor  administrative  element  of  an  otherwise 
physically  demanding  job  would  justify  a  firm‘s  rejection  of  a  claim.  However,  it  is 
accepted market practice to treat someone as ‗disabled‘ if they are unable to perform the 
‗material and substantial‘ duties of their ordinary occupation. 
 Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
Appendix A: O.N. Case Studies  95 
As a butcher, Mr G‘s main duties involved heavy physical work, with much bending and 
carrying. He spent most of the day on his feet. As well as preparing food, he had to lift 
heavy carcasses and to spend a considerable time standing behind the counter, serving 
customers. 
 
When he first applied for the policy, Mr G had described his normal day‘s work as being 
split equally between ‗jointing‘ and ‗selling/serving‘ and the firm had insured him on this 
basis. The type of part-time work that the consultant had suggested he might be able to 
do was markedly different from this. Any difficulty Mr G might encounter in finding such 
work was not relevant to an assessment of his disability. 
 
We accepted that Mr G was capable of performing some part-time work, but only in a 
limited and lower-skilled role. The duties involved would be materially different from his 
original occupation and less remunerative. 
 
The  policy  did  not  deal  clearly  with  this  type  of  situation,  but  it  did  provide  for  the 
payment of a reduced benefit. We concluded that the firm should reinstate Mr G‘s claim 
and  pay  him  benefits  calculated  at  66%  of  the  full  rate.  It  should  also  make  him 
backdated  payments  at  this  reduced  rate,  plus  interest,  from  the  time  when  it  had 
stopped his benefits. 
 
24/3 
 
critical  illness  – definition  – angioplasty  – whether claim invalid unless meeting strict 
definition of condition 
 
Mr T took out life assurance to cover his £150,000 mortgage. The policy benefit was 
payable if he died or was diagnosed with a ‗critical illness‘. Some weeks after he took out 
the  policy,  he  was  diagnosed  with  atherosclerosis.  He  was  advised  to  have  balloon 
angioplasty to correct the narrowing of his arteries. 
 
After Mr T submitted a claim for the policy benefit, the firm wrote to his consultant asking 
whether the blockage was ‗at least 70% in two or more coronary arteries‘. This was the 
policy definition of ‗angioplasty‘. The consultant confirmed that one artery was 95-99% 
blocked and another was 50% blocked. He said that this was a particularly serious and 
life-threatening condition and would have been fatal if left untreated. 
 
Mr T was dismayed when the firm then wrote to him saying it would not pay the claim 
because it did not meet the terms of the policy. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
Insurers are, of course, entitled to decide what conditions they wish to cover. But they 
are obliged to make the terms of their policies clear to customers. Mr T had taken out a 
policy to cover him for critical illness. By any ordinary definition, he had experienced a 
critical illness that required urgent treatment. If his doctor had not performed balloon 
angioplasty, Mr T would have required bypass surgery, which would also have entitled 
him to claim under this policy. 
 
Assessing the extent to which an artery is blocked is not an exact science. Firms should 
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account, instead, of the overall seriousness of the condition claimed for. Moreover, the 
firm‘s decision to pay benefit only to patients whose arteries were blocked by more than 
a specific percentage constituted an ‗onerous‘ policy condition, so the firm should have 
made this very clear in its literature. 
 
We concluded that Mr T‘s condition was so serious that it was not appropriate for the 
firm to rely on a strict, formulaic interpretation of the policy. We required it to pay the 
maximum we can award, £100,000 plus interest, but we recommended that the firm 
should also pay the balance of the claim. 
 
24/4 
 
income  protection  –  ‗income‘  –  self-employed  policyholder  –  benefit  assessed  on 
earnings – policyholder not informed of restriction – whether assessment of benefit a 
significant restriction – whether insurer liable to assess benefit on turnover not earnings 
 
Mr C, a self-employed catering machine repairer, took out an insurance policy in 1993 
through his bank. This would pay him a monthly income if he became too ill to work. The 
policy said it would provide a weekly income benefit of £90 if he suffered a disability that 
lasted more than 13 weeks. 
 
However, when he submitted a claim in 1999, the insurer turned it down. It said it would 
not pay him anything, because his earnings were not high enough. It explained that the 
benefit payable under the policy was based on the amount of profit he made, not on his 
turnover. So, since Mr C had not made any profit in the previous year, the firm said he 
was not entitled to receive anything. 
 
Mr C was very surprised to hear this. He said that the bank had not properly explained 
how the policy worked and that the examples it had shown him to illustrate the potential 
benefits of the policy had been misleading. The bank denied that its salesman had made 
any error in recommending the policy. And in response to Mr C‘s complaint that the bank 
had not told him that payment of benefit depended on his earnings, it said it was not part 
of the salesman‘s responsibility to go into such matters. 
 
Complaint upheld in part 
 
The bank had plainly failed to ensure that the policy it sold to Mr C was suitable for his 
circumstances. It had also failed to draw his attention to the way in which benefits would 
be calculated. If the policy had been explained properly, he would never have bought it, 
since  he  could  not  have  made  a  successful  claim  unless  his  earnings  increased 
significantly. He could not have obtained a policy that calculated benefits on the basis of 
turnover, so we did not consider the insurer was liable to meet the claim. 
 
However, since he would not have bought the policy if the bank had explained it properly 
to him, we decided that the bank had to: 
 
    * reimburse Mr C the full cost of all the premiums he had paid, plus interest; and 
    * pay him £250 compensation for distress and inconvenience. 
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Issue 25:  February 2003 
 
25/14 
 
motor  –  non-disclosure  –  negligence  –  whether  negligent  non-disclosure  justified 
cancellation of policy – whether proportional settlement fair 
 
Mrs A insured her car through an insurance broker in August 1999. When her car was 
stolen in June 2001, she contacted the firm to make a claim. The firm discovered that 
she had a total of four convictions for speeding. In September 1994, September 1995 
and April 1996 she had been convicted for driving at over 30 mph in a 30 mph area. In 
March 2000 she was convicted for exceeding a 60 mph limit. 
 
The firm refused to meet Mrs A‘s claim because she had not mentioned the convictions. 
It said that both when she first applied for the insurance, and again when she renewed 
the  policy  in  August  2000,  it  had  specifically  asked  whether  she  had  received  any 
convictions in the previous five years. 
 
Mrs A said that the broker had completed the proposal form for her and she had simply 
signed it. She said she had not intentionally concealed any information from the firm. 
However, since her offences were relatively minor, she considered that even if she had 
told the firm about them, it would still have insured her. 
 
Complaint upheld in part 
 
The  question  on  the  proposal  form about  convictions  was clearly  worded.  And  even 
though it was the broker, not Mrs A, who had completed the form, Mrs A should have 
checked the answers carefully before she signed it. However, we considered that her 
failure  to  do  so  was  an  oversight,  rather  than  a  deliberate  attempt  to  conceal  the 
convictions from the firm. 
 
The firm agreed that the convictions were relatively minor. It also agreed that it would still 
have insured her if  it had known about them.  But it said that it  would,  initially, have 
charged her 12% more for her premiums. It would then have charged a further 5% when 
she renewed the policy in 2000. So her failure to disclose her convictions meant that she 
had paid less than she should have done. 
 
In the circumstances, we felt that a fair and reasonable settlement would be for the firm 
to meet the claim on a proportional basis. The firm agreed and paid Mrs A 85% of the 
value of her claim. 
 
25/15 
 
household contents – non-disclosure – clear question – no evidence question asked – 
whether incorrect answer entitled firm to cancel policy 
 
In September 2001, Mr C arranged household contents insurance through an insurance 
broker. Several months later, Mr C was burgled and made a claim under his policy. 
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In the course of the firm‘s enquiries, it discovered that, following a domestic dispute in 
January 2001, Mr C had been convicted of three offences of causing actual bodily harm 
to police officers. 
 
The firm said it would not have issued the policy if it had been aware of these convictions 
and it cancelled the policy. Mr C complained unsuccessfully to the firm and eventually he 
came to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
After  Mr  C  had  visited  the  broker,  the  broker  sent  him  a  printed  statement.  This 
incorporated  the  questions  the  broker  had  asked  and  Mr  C‘s  replies.  The  statement 
included a heading 'Non-motoring convictions (relating to you or any other permanent 
resident)'. The space under this was left blank. 
 
When we asked Mr C why he had not disclosed the convictions when he applied for the 
policy, he said he had told the broker about them. The broker denied this. 
 
We accepted that the existence of the convictions constituted material information that 
the firm needed in order to assess whether it would insure Mr C. We also accepted that 
the firm would not have insured him if it had been aware of his convictions. However, 
there was no evidence that he had deliberately withheld information when he applied for 
the insurance. 
 
There was a space for details of non-motoring convictions on the printed statement that 
the  broker  sent  Mr  C.  But  there  was  no  evidence  that  the  broker  had  asked  about 
convictions during their meeting. 
 
Mr C had not been asked to check the statement, or even to sign and return it. And 
neither the broker nor the firm had asked Mr C to sign a proposal form. We therefore 
considered the sale to have fallen short of good industry practice. 
 
Mr C had not attempted to conceal his convictions from the firm‘s investigator when the 
firm was looking into his claim. We concluded that his failure to tell the firm about the 
convictions when he applied for the insurance was innocent. So we required the firm to 
meet the claim and to pay him £200 for maladministration, since it had cancelled his 
insurance without having any proof that he had failed to answer its questions. 
 
25/16 
 
income  protection  –  non-disclosure  –  duties  of  a  ‗company  director‘  –  whether  firm 
entitled to cancel insurance for non-disclosure of manual duties 
 
When Mr F applied for income protection insurance, he said he was a ‗company director‘ 
and described his work as ‗inspecting construction sites and training workers in health 
and safety awareness‘. Asked whether his job involved ‗manual or outdoor duties‘, he 
answered ‗no‘. 
 
A year later, poor health forced him to stop work and he made a claim on the policy. In 
answer to a question on the claim form about the physical requirements of his work, Mr F 
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carrying heavy items, 5% lifting heavy items, 10% crawling or kneeling and 20% other 
physical activity. The firm cancelled the policy. It already knew that Mr F had a heart 
valve disorder and it said it would never have issued the policy if Mr F had disclosed the 
true extent of his physical activities at work. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
Mr F admitted that he did carry out all of the physical activities he mentioned on the 
claim form. But he said that – on reflection – when he had completed the form, he had 
overestimated the amount of time he spent on these activities. 
 
In our view, the way in which Mr F answered the firm‘s questions when he first applied 
for  the  policy  gave  the  clear  impression  that  he  was not  involved  in  any  outdoor  or 
manual work. Mr F had given minimal information about his work, even though the form 
included a space for applicants to describe their duties fully. 
 
Because of Mr F's medical history, if the firm had known that he was involved in heavy 
manual  duties  on  construction  sites,  it  would  not  have  provided  insurance.  We 
concluded that his answers had misled the firm and that it was justified in cancelling the 
policy from its start date. 
 
25/17 
 
critical  illness  – non-disclosure  – continuing  duty  of  disclosure until  policy  in  force  – 
whether failure to advise firm of medical referral innocent – whether firm took sufficient 
steps to make assured aware of continuing duty 
 
In March 2000, Mr M applied to the firm, through a financial adviser, for life assurance to 
protect his mortgage. He rang the firm on 9 May, as he still had not heard whether his 
application had been successful. He was told there had been a delay as the firm was still 
waiting for his medical records from his GP. 
 
The firm finally wrote to Mr M‘s adviser on 23 May, saying it had accepted the application 
and enclosing a letter of acceptance. This letter reminded Mr M that he had a duty to 
notify the firm if there had been any change in his details since he applied for the policy. 
 
The policy took effect on 12 June 2000. Some nine months later, Mr M contacted the 
firm to say that he had been diagnosed with prostate cancer and that he wished to claim 
under the policy for the full critical illness benefit of £30,000. 
 
When the firm obtained a report from Mr M‘s GP, in connection with the claim, it saw that 
Mr M had consulted his doctor on 3 May 2000 with symptoms for which he was referred 
to a cancer specialist. The firm cancelled Mr M‘s policy. It said that when he received the 
acceptance letter, he should have disclosed the fact that his GP had referred him to a 
specialist. 
 
Mr M said that he had never received an acceptance letter. He also argued that, since 
the firm had not received his GP‘s notes until after the consultation had taken place, he 
had assumed it was aware of the situation. 
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We were satisfied that Mr M had not received the acceptance letter. The adviser had 
failed to forward it to him and it was later found in the adviser‘s files. 
 
The firm insisted that it was irrelevant whether or not the adviser had sent Mr M the 
letter. It said its application form made it clear that anyone applying for insurance had to 
tell the firm of any change of circumstances that arose after they had completed the 
form. We did not agree that the application form made this sufficiently clear. 
 
We also noted that although the firm had told Mr M on 9 May 2000 that it was still waiting 
to receive his records from his GP, it had actually received them in early April, some 
weeks before the consultation in question took place. 
 
We considered that the firm‘s practice of sending the acceptance letter to the customer‘s 
adviser, without requiring the adviser to post it on, was likely to cause confusion and was 
not consistent with good industry practice. 
 
We concluded that Mr M had not deliberately failed to disclose details of his referral to a 
specialist. We required the firm to meet the claim and to pay Mr M £200 compensation 
for distress and inconvenience. 
 
25/18 
 
household buildings – non-disclosure – subsidence – whether policyholder‘s answers 
were to ‗the best of his knowledge‘ 
 
When Mr W took out a new household insurance policy in March 2001, he stated, in 
response  to  a  question  from  the  firm,  that  his  house  had  never  been  affected  by 
movement of any kind, such as subsidence, heave, landslip or settlement. 
 
In August that year, Mr W notified the firm that cracks had developed in the walls of his 
house. The firm‘s loss adjuster concluded that the damage was due to subsidence. The 
firm asked Mr W for a copy of the structural survey he had obtained before he bought the 
house in 1997. The surveyor‘s report concluded 'The property is affected by structural 
movement evident in severe cracking to the gable elevation. This appears significant 
and likely to be progressive.' 
 
During the firm‘s enquiries, it also became aware of a report on the house that had been 
prepared in 1996, shortly before Mr W bought the property. Although this recommended 
repairs to the drains, they had never been carried out. 
 
The firm cancelled the policy, saying it would never have been issued if the firm had 
known about the existing problems. 
 
Mr W said the firm should not have done this, as he had answered the questions on the 
application form correctly, to the best of his knowledge. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
When we inspected the application form, we noted that the firm had asked a very clear 
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Appendix A: O.N. Case Studies  101 
W‘s reply had not fairly represented the true picture and had made no reference to the 
findings of the surveyor he consulted before he bought the house. 
 
We concluded that the firm had acted correctly in cancelling the insurance. 
 
Issue 26:  March 2003 
 
26/12 
 
commercial legal expenses – compensation payable under any settlement – firm entitled 
to approve settlement – whether firm entitled to withhold approval despite legal advice 
 
Ms D put in a claim on behalf of her swimming club under its legal expenses insurance 
when the club‘s coach issued legal proceedings for unfair dismissal. She told the firm 
that as the coach was employed under contract and was not an employee, the club‘s 
legal advisers did not think he had a case for unfair dismissal. 
 
The  firm  accepted  Ms  D‘s  claim  and  instructed  solicitors  to  represent  the  club.  The 
solicitors  obtained  counsel‘s  opinion  that  there  was  a  better  than  50%  chance  of 
defending the coach‘s allegations, so the firm funded the cost of defending the action. 
However, the employment tribunal concluded, as a preliminary issue, that the coach was 
an employee of the club. 
 
Ms D then asked the firm if it would reimburse the club for £5,000 (the cost of settling the 
claim out of court). The solicitors had recommended this as the best course of action. 
However,  the  firm  refused,  saying  the  policy  terms  gave  it  the  right  to  approve  any 
proposed settlement. Ms D then brought the complaint to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
Under the terms of the policy, the firm did not have to meet the cost of settling any claim 
unless it had approved the settlement. However, we expected the firm to exercise its 
discretion  reasonably.  The  settlement  in  this  case  was  agreed  on  the  advice  of  the 
solicitors and, once the tribunal had established that the coach was an employee, it was 
the best outcome possible for the claim. We required the firm to reimburse the club for 
the £5,000, together with interest for the period since the club had made the payment. 
 
Issue 27:  April 2003 
 
27/5 
 
critical  Illness  –  non-disclosure  –  inadvertent  –  whether  proportional  settlement 
appropriate 
 
Mr C‘s wife had suffered from a series of ear infections that resulted in some loss of 
hearing. She wore a hearing aid and had seen a consultant. Both she and the consultant 
viewed her condition as a minor disability. 
 
When Mr C applied, through an intermediary, for a critical illness policy for himself and 
his wife, the form included the following questions. 
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Have you, within the last five years, seen a doctor or been recommended to see a doctor 
for any of the following: a medical or surgical investigation or operation, treatment, test or 
advice?‘ 
 
‗Are you aware of any condition for which you may need to see a doctor?‘ 
 
‗Have you ever suffered from or had investigations for: eye disease, loss of speech, loss 
of hearing or ear trouble, disorder of the brain (including benign brain tumour), disease 
of  the  nervous  system,  anxiety,  depression,  back  or  spinal  trouble,  joint  problems, 
arthritis or any form of paralysis?‘ 
 
The intermediary completed the form on behalf of the couple, answering ‗no‘ to all of 
these questions, and the firm issued the policy. 
 
Just  over  a  year  later,  Mrs  C  was  diagnosed  with  leukaemia  and  she  died  shortly 
afterwards. The firm rejected the substantial claim that Mr C made under the policy. Its 
reason was that when Mr C applied for the policy, he had not disclosed his wife‘s ear 
condition.  The  firm  said  that  if  it  had  known  about  this  it  would  have  imposed  an 
exclusion relating to her hearing. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We concluded that Mr C‘s failure to disclose the ear condition probably resulted from an 
inadvertent oversight. We thought it would be unreasonable and disproportionate for the 
firm to reject the claim. The exclusion would not, in any event, have affected Mrs C‘s 
ability  to  claim  following  the  discovery  of  her  leukaemia.  In  the  circumstances  we 
required the firm to meet the claim in full. 
 
27/6 
 
farm  buildings/machinery/produce  –  fire  damage  claim  –  non-disclosure  of  previous 
losses/claims – whether firm justified in voiding the policy and not accepting the claim 
 
In July 2002, Mr and Mrs J arranged farm insurance cover through an intermediary. In 
answer  to  a  question  on  the  proposal  form  about  previous  losses  or  claims,  they 
disclosed one claim (for losses following a straw fire in 2000). The firm issued the policy. 
 
Only a month later, Mr and Mrs J made a claim when a fire resulted in extensive damage 
to their farm buildings, machinery and produce. 
 
The firm's investigations revealed that Mr and Mrs J had a history of losses and claims in 
recent years. They had made a number of claims during the period from October 1993 to 
February 2001. And they had a total of four substantial losses and claims within the 
previous five years (one being the straw fire in 2000 that they had disclosed). The firm 
viewed the couple‘s failure to provide full disclosure of their losses and claims history as 
a misrepresentation, entitling it to cancel the policy. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
Mr and Mrs J were in dispute with the intermediary about the circumstances in which the 
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determine  that  dispute.  However,  we  did  conclude  that,  in  completing  part  of  the 
proposal form and sending it to the firm, the intermediary was acting for Mr and Mrs J, 
and not as the firm's agent. 
 
We saw no evidence that, at the time of proposal, the firm was made  aware of the 
couple‘s  history  of  losses  and  claims,  other  than  the  one  incident  Mr  and  Mrs  J 
disclosed. 
 
It was Mr and Mrs J‘s responsibility to ensure that they gave complete and accurate 
information in response to the questions in the proposal form. We concluded that their 
failure to provide the full history of their substantial losses and claims within the previous 
five years had induced the firm to provide cover. So the firm was justified in cancelling 
the policy from its start date and rejecting the claim. 
 
Issue 28:  May 2003 
 
28/7 
 
causation – damage to carpet caused accidentally rather than by flood – customer had 
no accidental damage cover under household policy 
 
When a sewer became blocked, effluent threatened to flood Mr B‘s home. He called the 
fire brigade and they managed to stem the flood but, in the process, they soiled Mr B‘s 
carpet. 
 
Mr B put in a claim under his household policy. However, his policy did not include cover 
for accidental damage. The firm said that, strictly speaking, it was not liable to pay him 
anything because the damage was accidental – not caused by an event that he was 
insured against. However, it agreed to pay the claim on an ex gratia basis. 
 
Mr  B  was  dissatisfied  with  this.  He  insisted  that  his  policy  had  covered  him  for  the 
damage and he said that the firm should also pay him compensation for distress and 
inconvenience. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
We concluded that flooding – something that Mr B‘s insurance covered – was not the 
cause  of  the  damage.  The  damage  had  been  caused  accidentally  in  an  emergency 
situation when the fire fighters had failed to remove their soiled footwear or put down 
protective covering before walking over Mr B‘s carpet. 
 
So the flooding was merely the ‗occasion‘ of the damage; the fire fighters would not have 
been in his house if it had not happened. Flooding was not the dominant or effective 
cause of the damage and no water had, in fact, entered the property. We considered 
that the firm had not been obliged to pay the claim and that its ex gratia offer was more 
than reasonable in the circumstances. 
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28/8 
 
causation  – furniture warranty  – whether recliner chair damaged by insured event of 
structural fault or by wear and tear/neglect 
 
When Mr G bought a recliner chair,  it  came with a five-year warranty. Among other 
things, the warranty covered structural faults, which were defined as including ‗breakage 
of metal components, including recliner and sleeper mechanisms‘. 
 
Shortly before the warranty expired, the chair collapsed when Mr G used the recliner 
mechanism. The firm rejected his claim on the basis of a report from its upholsterer. This 
said the chair ‗has obviously had very heavy use and has not been looked after‘. So the 
firm said the cause of the damage was ‗wear and tear and/or neglect, rather than any 
event covered by the warranty‘. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
The warranty contained no exclusion clause for wear and tear – only for neglect, abuse 
or misuse. The chair had simply been used. It had not been misused or abused. And we 
did not consider that there was anything Mr G could reasonably have done to maintain 
or service the internal recliner mechanism in order to prevent its failure. 
 
Given that the warranty expressly defined ‗structural faults‘ as including the breakage of 
recliner mechanisms, we concluded that the firm should pay the claim. 
 
28/9 
 
motor insurance – whether damage to insured car caused by inadequate repairs or by 
some other event 
 
While driving home from work one evening, Mr H was involved in an accident. After he 
put in a claim, the firm‘s approved engineers carried out repairs. 
 
However, nine months later Mr H discovered that the front offside tracking (the area of 
impact in the accident) appeared to be faulty and was causing undue wear to the front 
offside  tyre.  Mr  H  complained  to  the  firm  that  the  approved  repairs  had  been 
unsatisfactory. 
 
The firm rejected the complaint, saying there was no evidence to support his view. It said 
that the damage to the front tyre must have been caused by a separate, ‗intervening‘, 
incident that occurred after the accident. 
 
Dissatisfied  with  the  firm‘s  response,  Mr  H  consulted  an  independent  engineer,  who 
concluded that the damage had happened in the original accident, but had not been 
seen to as part of the approved repairs. The engineer supported his conclusions with 
geometric reports made before and after these repairs. 
 
Following a joint inspection of the car by the independent engineer and an engineer 
appointed by the firm, the firm agreed to pay for the damage to be repaired. However, it 
refused to reimburse Mr H for the cost of the independent engineer‘s report, or to pay Mr 
H any compensation. Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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Complaint upheld 
 
Mr H had produced persuasive expert evidence to support his view that the damage was 
caused by the original accident and/or by the inadequate repairs that followed it. 
 
Following the joint inspection, the firm had already effectively conceded liability. So we 
felt  it  was unreasonable for  it not  to reimburse Mr H for the engineer‘s fee. Despite 
having  no basis  for  disputing  the  cause  of  the  damage,  the  firm  had maintained  its 
allegations long after it was reasonable for it to do so. 
 
Mr H had proven his case on the balance of probabilities. We awarded him the cost of 
obtaining  the  engineer‘s  report  (with  interest)  plus  compensation  for  distress  and 
inconvenience. 
 
28/10 
 
motor trade policy – whether damage to machinery caused by accidental damage or 
whether the damage pre-dated the insured event 
 
Mr N,  who owned a vehicle repair workshop, had a motor trade policy that covered 
accidental damage at his premises. Following a break-in, during which the workshop roof 
was damaged, Mr N put in a claim to the firm. He said that rain had entered through the 
damaged roof and seriously affected two machines. 
 
The firm rejected the claim, saying there was no evidence to show that the machines 
had been damaged accidentally. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
None of the evidence we examined – which included correspondence from the machine 
suppliers, an independent engineer‘s report, and weather reports – supported Mr N‘s 
view  that  the  damage  was caused accidentally,  following  the  actions of  a  burglar  or 
burglars (an ‗insured event‘). 
 
The letters from the suppliers were inconclusive, but the report from the independent 
engineer clearly indicated that the damage had been caused by internal faults, not by 
rainwater entering the machines accidentally. The weather reports did not indicate any 
significant rainfall during the relevant period. 
 
We  concluded  that  the  dominant  cause  of  the  damage  appeared  to  be  mechanical 
failure and/or wear and tear over a long period. These causes were not covered under 
the terms of the policy. 
 
28/11 
 
household buildings policy – whether damage caused by storm or lack of maintenance 
 
Mr K submitted a claim for storm damage to his home after water had leaked in through 
the roof. The firm rejected his claim on the basis that: 
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    * there was no evidence of storm conditions at the relevant time; and 
    *  the  roof  was  in  such  a  poor  state  of  repair  that  water  would  have  entered  the 
property in any event. 
 
However, as a goodwill gesture, the firm offered Mr K 10% towards the cost of replacing 
the roof. He rejected this, saying he was entitled to the full amount. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
We  studied  the  loss  adjuster‘s  report  and  photographs,  together  with  the  estimates 
provided by Mr K‘s contractors. This evidence indicated that the property was in a very 
poor state of repair. No recent maintenance had been carried out to the exterior and 
even Mr K‘s own estimates indicated that the roof needed replacing. 
 
Given the absence of stormy weather on or around the period claimed for, we concluded 
that the dominant or effective cause of the damage was lack of maintenance, rather than 
storm or any other insured event. Even light rainfall would have caused the roof to leak. 
 
We considered that the firm had been correct in rejecting Mr K‘s claim and that its ex 
gratia offer had been very fair. 
 
Issue 29:  July 2003 
 
29/1 
 
curtailment claim – firm rejects on basis of policy‘s general exclusion clause about claims 
arising directly or indirectly from alcohol 
 
Mrs D had to curtail her holiday and fly home when she got news that her father had 
been unexpectedly admitted to hospital. He was suffering from liver disease – the result 
of years of alcohol abuse. 
 
She  put  in  a  claim  under  her  travel  policy  for  the  cost  of  return  flights  and  unused 
accommodation.  However,  the  firm  rejected  her  claim  on  the  basis  of  the  following 
general exclusion clause: 
 
‗[We will not pay for] claims arising from the influence of intoxicating liquor or of a drug or 
drugs unless prescribed by a registered medical practitioner.‘ 
 
The firm said this clause excluded all alcohol-related claims, however they were caused. 
It said it took the view that it would be unreasonable to expect insurers to cover any 
claims arising directly or indirectly from the effect of alcohol or drugs, whether their use 
was long- or short-term. 
 
Dissatisfied with this, Mrs D brought her complaint to us. She said it was unfair of the 
firm to apply the exclusion clause in this case, since her father had not been drinking 
(and was not drunk) when he was admitted to hospital. 
 
Complaint upheld 
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We  did  not  think  there  was  anything  inherently  unreasonable  or  unfair  about  the 
exclusion  clause.  But  we  decided  that  the  firm  had  been  unfair  to  apply  it  in  these 
particular circumstances. 
 
The clause was intended to remove cover where a named individual, covered by the 
policy, bore some culpability for the loss or damage for which they were claiming. We 
interpreted  the  phrase  ‗influence  of  intoxicating  liquor‘  as  indicating  a  state  of 
drunkenness and/or lack of control over one‘s actions. It was designed to exclude claims 
that  arose  from  the  insured  person  being  drunk,  not  from  the  mere  consumption  of 
alcohol. 
 
It appeared that the firm had only cited this clause because its policy made no adequate 
provision for excluding claims that arose from a pre-existing medical condition (which is 
what had really led to the curtailment in this case). 
 
We considered that if the firm‘s interpretation of the clause in question were upheld, the 
exclusion would be unreasonably wide and would exclude all sorts of situations for which 
most people would expect to 
be covered. For example, it would exclude a claim where a drunken driver injured a 
holidaymaker. 
 
We  concluded  that  the  firm  could  not  have  intended  to  exclude  claims  where 
policyholders were merely innocent victims of chance events beyond their control. So it 
should not apply the exclusion clause in cases such as this, where claims arose because 
individuals other than the insured person were ‗under the influence of intoxicating liquor‘. 
 
29/2 
 
cancellation  claim  –  policyholder‘s  father-in-law  committed  suicide  –  whether  claim 
should be excluded 
 
Mr G cancelled his holiday just a week before it was due to begin, when his father-in-law 
committed suicide. The firm rejected his claim for the cost of the holiday. It said that the 
policy contained a general exclusion clause relating to claims that arose from suicide or 
attempted suicide. 
 
Unhappy with the firm‘s decision, Mr G came to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We  thought  the  firm  had  behaved  unfairly  in  applying  the  exclusion  clause  in  these 
circumstances. Mr G‘s father-in-law was not one of the named individuals covered by the 
policy and his suicide was an unexpected event beyond Mr G‘s control. 
 
In our view, it was unreasonable of the firm to interpret the exclusion clause as applying 
to uninsured individuals, including those whose death or serious illness might give rise to 
a legitimate claim, such as close relatives, business associates, travelling companions, 
etc. 
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We were also satisfied that the suicide was a wholly unexpected event so far as Mr G 
was  concerned,  and  that his  late  father-in-law  had  not been suffering  from  any  pre-
existing condition. The firm agreed to pay the claim. 
 
29/3 
 
medical emergency and repatriation – firm rejected claim – exclusion clause related to 
alcohol – medical evidence indicated history of alcohol abuse and causal link with claim 
 
Mr T had to be repatriated to the UK after he collapsed and was taken to hospital as an 
emergency case while he was on holiday in Tenerife. 
 
The firm rejected his claim for medical and associated expenses. It cited an exclusion 
clause in the policy that said it would not meet ‗any claim resulting from being under the 
influence of or in connection with the use of alcohol or drugs‘. 
 
Mr T said the illness had not been caused by alcohol or drugs but by a prawn curry he 
had eaten. He said he had suffered a severe stomach upset and breathing difficulties 
before finally collapsing. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
The medical evidence from the doctors who had treated Mr T in Tenerife indicated that 
his illness had been caused by his severe and chronic alcoholism, and by the fact that 
he had been bingeing on whisky for five days while on holiday. This had led to acute 
alcoholic pancreatitis. We were satisfied that there was a direct causal link between Mr 
T‘s abuse of alcohol and his claim. We rejected his complaint. 
 
29/4 
 
accidental bodily injury claim – whether deep vein thrombosis constituted ‗bodily injury‘ 
under the terms of a travel policy 
 
Mrs W‘s husband collapsed and died shortly after their plane arrived at Heathrow airport, 
on their return from a trip to Australia. The cause of death was determined as ‗deep vein 
thrombosis‘ (DVT). 
 
Mrs W made a claim under her travel policy, which included cover for ‗Accidental Bodily 
Injury‘. The firm rejected the claim on the basis that Mr W‘s death had been ‗caused by a 
naturally occurring condition and was not accidental‘. The policy stated that bodily injury 
‗does not include sickness and disease unless resulting from a mishap, pregnancy or 
childbirth or other naturally occurring condition‘. 
 
Mrs W insisted that her late husband had been in good health before the trip. She said 
his death must therefore have been caused by external factors, such as the cramped 
conditions on the aircraft. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
We acknowledged that, despite the medical debate that continues to cloud this issue, 
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and some instances of DVT. But many people who have not flown recently, or who have 
flown in business or first class, where the conditions are less cramped, also suffer DVT. 
And each year large numbers of people make long-haul flights in economy class without 
developing the condition. 
 
We concluded that Mr W could not be said to have died as a result of ‗accidental bodily 
injury‘, rather than from sickness, disease or some other naturally occurring condition. 
We also had regard to a recent court ruling (in re Deep Vein Thrombosis and Air Travel 
Group Litigation, TLR 17/01/03) in which it was decided that DVT was not an ‗accident 
for the purposes of article 17 of the Warsaw Convention‘. In other words, DVT was not 
an unexpected or unusual event or happening external to the passenger. We therefore 
rejected the complaint. 
 
29/5 
 
cancellation claim – firm rejected due to pre-existing medical condition and/or exclusion 
clause relating to anxiety, depression or psychiatric disorder – whether firm‘s decision 
infringed the policyholder‘s human rights 
 
Mr  B  cancelled  his  holiday  just  a  couple  of  days  before  15  May  –  the  date  it  was 
scheduled to begin. He said that he had become too unwell to travel. The firm rejected 
Mr B‘s cancellation claim, citing 
two clauses in the policy. These were: 
 
    * an exclusion clause relating to claims where the insured person was aware of any 
existing medical condition or set of circumstances that might reasonably be expected to 
give rise to a claim; and 
 
    * an exclusion clause relating to claims arising from anxiety or depression, or from any 
previously diagnosed psychiatric disorder. 
 
Mr B‘s GP had certified that the condition that had given rise to the claim was ‗acute 
stress reaction with anxiety‘ and that this condition had started on 13 April. Mr B had not 
booked the holiday until the end of April. 
 
When the firm rejected Mr B‘s complaint and told him that it would report him to the 
police for his ‗threatening behaviour‘ towards its staff, he said the firm had infringed his 
human rights and he brought his complaint to us. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
We noted a discrepancy between the original medical certificate that the firm had asked 
for when it was considering the claim and the copy that Mr B subsequently sent to us. 
The original clearly showed that Mr B‘s medical condition pre-dated the booking of his 
holiday and the start of the policy. The copy had been altered to show that the illness 
began at a later date. 
 
We decided the firm had been correct in excluding the claim on the grounds that Mr B 
had a previously-diagnosed psychiatric disorder. And since we were satisfied that Mr B 
had been aware of his illness before he took out the insurance, we agreed with the firm‘s 
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We did not consider that there had been any infringement of Mr B‘s human rights, not 
least because the firm was not a ‗public authority‘ within the meaning of the Human 
Rights Act 1998. The firm was a private limited company and therefore not bound by the 
Act. 
 
29/6 
 
medical emergency claim – whether policyholders were using travel policy as private 
medical expenses insurance 
 
Mr and Mrs M were a retired couple who owned a villa in Spain. They had purchased an 
annual multi-trip travel policy that provided cover for up to 31 days per trip from the start 
of each trip. 
 
On 1 March, Mr and Mrs M travelled out to their villa using cheap one-way airline tickets. 
On 24 March, Mr M fell ill and was admitted to hospital as an emergency case. When the 
couple subsequently returned home, they made a claim under their travel policy for Mr 
M‘s emergency medical expenses. 
 
The firm rejected the claim. It noted that Mr M had become ill towards the end of the 31-
day period of cover and that, at that stage, the couple had still not booked their return 
flights. It therefore concluded that the couple had intended staying for a longer period, 
incorrectly using their travel policy as a medical expenses policy. 
 
Mr and Mrs M denied this. They said that although they had still not bought their return 
flights at the time Mr M was taken ill, they had been intending to do so around that date. 
They said they had always planned to return to their home in the UK before the end of 
the month, when the 31-day limit on their travel insurance policy expired. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
It was possible that Mr and Mrs M had effectively been treating their travel policy as a 
medical expenses policy. However, Mr M‘s illness had arisen within the period of valid 
cover and there was no evidence to suggest that the couple were not planning to return 
to the UK before the policy expired. 
 
Cheap flights are widely available these days and people like Mr and Mrs M, who can be 
relatively flexible about dates, sometimes prefer to travel out on a one-way ticket, only 
buying the ticket for their return shortly before they fly home. 
 
We pointed out to Mr and Mrs M that their complaint would not have succeeded if Mr M‘s 
illness had occurred after 31 March (the expiry for the 31-day period of insurance) and 
they had still been in Spain at the time. However, in the circumstances we felt that the 
fair and reasonable solution was for the firm to pay this claim. 
 
29/7 
 
cancellation  claim  –  whether  illness  of  pets  is  covered  –  whether  pets  are  ‗family 
members‘ 
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When four of Mr and Mrs C‘s eight dogs fell ill, shortly before the couple were due to go 
abroad on holiday, Mr and Mrs C cancelled the trip. They put in a claim under their travel 
policy but the firm rejected it, saying the policy did not cover them for cancellation in 
these circumstances. The couple then brought their complaint to us. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
The  policy  provided  cover  for  up  to  £5,000  in  relation  to  the  unrecoverable  cost  of 
unused  accommodation  and  travel  expenses  (plus  up  to  £250  for  unused  kennel  or 
cattery fees). But it only did this if the cancellation was caused by, among other things, 
the ‗serious illness of a relative‘. 
 
The policy did not define the term ‗relative‘ and the couple argued that their pets were 
‗family members‘ so should be covered. The couple noted, too, that although the policy 
expressly excluded cancellation claims arising from the death of a ‗pet or other animal‘, it 
did not expressly exclude claims that arose from a pet‘s illness. 
 
We did not uphold the complaint. Although Mr and Mrs C felt their dogs were ‗family 
members‘, the policy did not refer to ‗family members‘ at all – only to ‗relatives‘. And we 
did not consider that a pet could reasonably be considered a ‗relative‘ of its owner or 
owners. Although the term ‗relative‘ was not defined in the policy, in our view it could 
only properly mean other human beings. 
 
The policy did not provide cover for cancellation caused by the illness of a pet or other 
animal. The fact that the policy did not specifically exclude this occurrence did not imply 
that it would be covered. Insurance policies only cover those ‗perils‘ that are expressly 
set out in the policy and that are not subject to any specific restrictions or exclusions 
(also stated in the policy). 
 
Issue 30:  August 2003 
 
30/1 
 
contents cover only – fire – whether council tenant liable to pay own cost of internal 
redecoration 
 
A fire damaged some of the contents of Mr J‘s flat, together with the wallpaper and 
paintwork.  He  assumed  that  the  council  from  which  he  rented  the  flat  would  be 
responsible  for  redecorating  it  after  the  fire.  However,  the  council  said  this  was  his 
responsibility, so he did the work himself and added the cost of the materials to his claim 
for the damaged contents. 
 
The firm dealt with part of Mr J‘s claim – for the damaged contents. However, it said that 
his contents-only policy did not cover the flat‘s internal decorations. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We pointed out to the firm that its policy defined ‗contents‘ in such a way as to include 
the internal decorations for which Mr J was liable as tenant. We therefore asked it to 
reimburse the money Mr J had spent on redecorating the flat. 
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30/2 
 
buildings  cover  only  –  storm  damage  –  whether  TV  aerial  insured  as  ‗buildings‘  or 
‗contents‘ 
 
Mr W had buildings insurance but had not taken out a policy to cover his household 
contents. After a storm damaged the roof of his house, he put in a claim under his 
buildings policy. 
 
The firm agreed to repair the roof, but told him the policy did not cover his television 
aerial, which was fixed to the roof and had been damaged during the same storm. The 
firm said that aerials were only covered under its ‗contents‘ policy, which Mr W had not 
bought. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We concluded that it was neither fair nor reasonable to treat a permanently fixed aerial, 
such  as  this  one,  as  ‗contents‘,  even  though  (in  keeping  with  widespread  industry 
practice) the policy wording clearly stated that aerials were ‗contents‘. Most people would 
regard such an aerial to be part of the building, because it is permanently fixed and not 
readily removable. Moreover, an external aerial is far more likely to be damaged by the 
type of ‗insured event‘ that affects the structure of the building, such as lightning or a 
storm, than by the type of event that might damage contents. We therefore required the 
firm to meet the claim. 
 
30/3 
 
council tenant - contents policy only – escape of water – whether kitchen units were 
‗fixtures and fittings‘ or personal possessions 
 
Mrs C, a council tenant, bought some new kitchen units and had them fitted at her own 
expense. When the units were damaged by an escape of water, she put in a claim to the 
firm under her ‗contents-only‘ policy. However, the firm told her it could not meet the 
claim. It said the damaged units were not ‗contents‘ but ‗fixtures and fittings‘, so they 
would only be covered under a buildings policy. 
 
Mrs C complained that this was unfair, since the units were her personal possessions, 
not part of the property. When the firm rejected her complaint, she came to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We agreed with Mrs C that the kitchen units, though fitted, could fairly be regarded as 
her personal possessions. They belonged to her, not to the council.  The units could 
easily be removed without substantially affecting the fabric of the building. And Mrs C 
said that if she ever moved house, she would remove the units and take them with her. 
This seemed entirely feasible and we therefore asked the firm to meet the claim. 
 
30/4 
 
laminate wooden floor accidentally damaged – whether floor covering was ‗buildings‘ or 
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After Mr K‘s shower leaked, damaging his laminate wooden flooring, he put in a claim to 
the firm. Mr K had both buildings and contents cover with the firm, but it said it was 
unable  to  meet  his  claim.  It  told  him  the  damage  would  only  be  covered  under  the 
buildings section of his policy if he had taken out ‗extended accidental damage cover‘. 
Mr K only had this for the contents part of his policy. When the firm refused his request 
that it should meet the claim under the contents part of the policy instead, Mr K came to 
us. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
We agreed with the firm that Mr K‘s laminate flooring could not properly be described as 
part of the ‗contents‘. It was glued together and fixed under beading to the skirting board. 
It would be very difficult to lift and relocate the flooring without substantially damaging it. 
In our view, the flooring had effectively become part of the fabric of the building. Mr K did 
not have accidental damage cover in the buildings section of the policy, so the firm was 
not liable to pay the claim. 
 
However, we suggested that Mr K might have a valid claim under the buildings section 
for damage caused by ‗escape of water‘. The firm acknowledged this and subsequently 
settled the claim. 
 
30/5 
 
buildings  policy  only  –  fire  –  carpets  purchased  with  property  –  whether  carpets 
'contents' or 'buildings' 
 
Mr F had buildings insurance, but no cover for the contents of his property. So when a 
fire damaged his carpets, the firm rejected his claim on the basis that carpets were 
‗contents‘. Mr F insisted that the carpets were not ‗contents‘, but ‗fixtures and fittings‘ and 
that they should therefore be covered under his buildings policy. The reason he gave 
was that the carpets were fitted and had been in place (and included in the purchase 
price), when he bought the property. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
We referred to the Court of Appeal‘s judgment in Botham v TSB Ltd, which stated that it 
was doubtful that carpets could ever be regarded as ‗fixtures‘. So we concluded that the 
firm had correctly rejected Mr F‘s claim. He had not bought contents insurance, so the 
carpets were not covered. We did not agree with Mr F that his having ‗paid stamp duty in 
respect of the carpets‘ was relevant to the outcome of his complaint. 
 
30/6 
 
contents  policy  only  –  storm  damage  to  garage  –  whether  flat-packed  conservatory 
‗household goods‘ 
 
Mr and Mrs D put in a claim under their ‗contents-only‘ policy after their garage roof 
collapsed in a storm and damaged a number of items that had been kept in the garage. 
The firm agreed to pay for all the damaged items except for a flat-packed conservatory, 
which the couple had recently bought but not yet assembled. The firm insisted that the Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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conservatory was a ‗building‘ and was therefore only covered by its buildings policy, 
which the couple did not have. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
In  our view,  the  unassembled  conservatory  could  properly  be  said  to  be  part  of  the 
couple‘s ‗household contents‘. It had not yet been erected and comprised a collection of 
separate components, stored in boxes. We therefore required the firm to pay the claim. 
 
Issue 31:  September 2003 
 
31/1 
 
household insurance policy – mistaken cancellation of policy – no cover for theft claim – 
multiple parties – shared liability 
 
Mr I put in a claim to the firm after his home was burgled. He was shocked when the firm 
said it  was unable to pay out, as he no longer had any cover. The firm said  it had 
cancelled his policy six months earlier because he had failed to pay his premiums. It had 
been informed by Mr I‘s bank that he had cancelled the direct debit. 
 
Mr I complained to the firm, saying it should have contacted him to let him know it had 
not  received  his  premiums.  He  also  complained  to  his  bank,  asking  why  it  had 
misinformed the firm about the direct debit. Unhappy with the responses he received, Mr 
I came to us. 
 
Complaint upheld in part 
 
We established that Mr I‘s bank had been responsible for incorrectly cancelling the direct 
debit. And although the insurance firm should have contacted Mr I when it noticed his 
premiums had stopped, there was no evidence that it had done so. 
 
But we thought that – over a period of six months – Mr I should have realised the direct 
debits were not leaving his account. We decided that although the bank and the firm 
were equally to blame for the problem, Mr I‘s failure to notice what was going on made 
him  partly  responsible  too.  We  therefore  apportioned  liability  between  all  concerned: 
40% to the firm, 40% to the bank and 20% to Mr I. 
 
We required the firm to deal with the claim in accordance with its usual policy terms and 
conditions. However, we said that (provided the claim was successful) the firm should 
only pay 40% of it, less an amount equalling the premiums that Mr I had missed. 
 
The bank had already offered £8,000 in ‗full and final settlement‘. Mr I had accepted this 
offer and we were satisfied that it was fair and reasonable. The bank was prepared to 
run the risk that Mr I‘s claim might ultimately be rejected (under the policy‘s terms and 
conditions) or be adjusted down, in which case it would have overpaid him. 
 
31/2 
 
legal expenses – reasonable prospects of success – whether supplier of secateurs liable 
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After Mr B‘s wife accidentally cut off the tip of her finger while she was pruning her rose 
bushes, Mr B decided to take legal action against the shop where they had bought the 
secateurs. He thought that the retailer should have ensured that safety warnings were 
printed on the packaging and he obtained advice that supported this view. 
 
Mr B had assumed that he would be able to claim back the costs of the legal action 
through the legal expenses policy he had with the firm. So he was very disappointed 
when  the  firm  rejected  the  claim,  saying  the  proposed  action  had  no  reasonable 
prospect of success. After complaining unsuccessfully to the firm, Mr and Mrs B brought 
their complaint to us. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
In cases where a firm has said the policyholder‘s proposed legal action has no chance of 
success, it is not for us to try to reach a conclusion on the merits of the proposed action. 
Instead, we need to establish whether the firm gave the claim proper consideration. We 
therefore look at the steps the firm took before it rejected the claim. 
 
Legal expenses insurers are entitled to rely on the professional advice of their  legal 
experts. So if an insurer has obtained independent legal advice from suitably qualified 
lawyers – whether they were panel solicitors, non-panel solicitors or counsel – and has 
acted on that advice, then we will not generally question the advice. 
 
In this instance, the firm sought advice from two firms of solicitors and from counsel 
before it concluded that Mr B‘s proposed action had no reasonable chance of success. 
None of these legal experts considered that a court would hold the retailer liable. 
 
Mr B had, in part, based his decision to take action on the opinion of an ‗accident expert‘ 
who cited the General Product Safety Regulations 1994. These regulations include a 
requirement  that  consumers  should  be  given  relevant  information  to  enable  them  to 
assess the inherent risks in a product. 
 
However, the counsel consulted by the firm pointed out that there was an important 
qualification to this regulation – the requirement only applied ‗where such risks are not 
immediately obvious‘. In the counsel‘s view, ‗it should be immediately obvious that if you 
put your hands too close to cutting blades, you are in danger of injury‘. 
 
We were satisfied that the firm had taken appropriate steps to determine whether the 
proposed  action  had  a  reasonable  prospect  of  success.  We  therefore  rejected  the 
complaint. 
 
31/3 
 
commercial policy – whether appropriate to decide case on ‗fair and reasonable‘ basis 
 
Mr C was a self-employed forest management adviser. In December 1999, a tree on 
land owned by one of his clients, Mr A, fell down and injured a third party, who was 
driving on a nearby main road. The third party made a claim against Mr A. 
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It was nearly 18 months later when Mr C discovered that liability might be passed to him. 
He  notified  his  professional  indemnity  insurer  of  the  situation,  but  the  insurer  said  it 
would not meet the claim. It said Mr C was in breach of contract because he had taken 
so long to inform it that a claim was likely to be made against him. It also said he had 
prejudiced its position. The firm cited several legal cases in support of its stance. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We established that Mr C had been told of the injury caused by the tree almost as soon 
as it happened. And he was told a couple of days later that the third party was taking 
legal action against Mr A. However, there was nothing to suggest that Mr C had any idea 
that he might be held liable until he received a letter to that effect from Mr A‘s solicitors 
on 9 May 2001. 
 
Mr  C‘s  policy  required  him  to  notify  the  firm  as  soon  as  he  became  aware  of  any 
potential action being brought against him. In this particular case, however, we did not 
think it was fair or reasonable to have expected him to know he was potentially liable 
until this was spelt out to him. 
 
We also considered that the firm should have had regard to the Association of British 
Insurers‘  Statement  of  General  Insurance  Practice.  Strictly  speaking,  the  Statement 
applies  only  to  non-commercial  policies.  But since  Mr  C  was a sole  trader,  he  was, 
effectively,  in  the  same  position  as  a  private  individual  with  a  personal  policy.  The 
Statement says that ‗an insurer will not repudiate liability to indemnify a policyholder ... 
on grounds of a breach of warranty or condition where the circumstances of the loss are 
unconnected with the breach unless fraud is involved‘. 
 
We did not accept that the firm had been prejudiced by the length of time that had 
elapsed after the accident before Mr C told it that a claim might be made against him. 
And none of the correspondence that Mr C had entered into regarding the claim had 
constituted an offer, promise or admission of liability. 
 
We therefore required the firm to deal with the claim, subject to the other terms of the 
policy. 
 
31/4 
 
motor policy – car stolen from garage forecourt – whether ‗lady friend‘ was responsible 
for theft – reasonable care – keys in car – theft by deception – multiple reasons given for 
rejecting the claim 
 
Mr K met a young woman in a nightclub and took her back to his place. The following 
morning, he offered to drive her home. He said that – on the way – she gave him some 
money and asked him to buy her some chocolate. 
 
Mr K stopped at a petrol station and left her in the car, with the keys in the ignition, while 
he  went  to  buy  the chocolate. When he  returned,  both  the car  and  the  woman  had 
vanished. The car was later recovered burnt out. 
 
The  firm  rejected  Mr  K‘s  claim  for  the  theft  of  his  car.  Initially,  it  said  that  this  was 
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care‘. After Mr K challenged this, the firm said there was a policy exclusion that meant it 
could not pay out if the keys were left in the car. Finally, after he challenged this, it told 
him that there was a policy exclusion covering ‗theft by deception‘. It considered that this 
applied here because the woman had set out to deceive Mr K in order to steal his car. 
 
Unhappy with the firm‘s stance, Mr K brought his complaint to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
The onus was on the firm to give evidence backing up its reasons for declining the 
policy. It was unable to do this. 
 
We did not consider that Mr K had failed to exercise reasonable care. He had not acted 
recklessly by ‗deliberately courting a risk of which he was aware‘ – see Sofi v Prudential 
Assurance [1993] 2 Lloyd‘ s Rep. 559. On the contrary, the very fact that he had left his 
car and keys in the care and custody of the woman indicated that he trusted her. It never 
occured to him that there was a risk of theft. 
 
The ‗keys in car‘ exclusion could not properly apply because the policy was worded in a 
way that meant the exclusion only applied if the car was left unattended. In other words, 
the case was similar to that in Starfire Diamond Rings Ltd v Angel [1962] 2 Lloyd‘s Rep. 
217 CA, rather than Hayward v Norwich Union Insurance Ltd. The car had not been left 
unattended – there was someone inside it. 
 
And we were not satisfied that there was a ‗theft by deception‘. In order to reject the 
claim on these grounds, the firm would have had to show that when the woman asked 
Mr K to buy her some chocolate, she had already decided to use this as a ruse to enable 
her to steal the car. In fact, there was no evidence that she had stolen the car. For any 
number of reasons she may have abandoned the scene, leaving the car unattended, 
and an unknown third person may then have stolen it. 
 
In the circumstances, we felt that the fair and reasonable solution was for the firm to 
meet Mr K‘s claim. We pointed out that the way in which it had handled the claim, citing 
different reasons in turn for rejecting it, did the firm no credit and suggested that its aim 
was to avoid payment at all cost. 
 
31/5 
 
pet insurance – breach of condition – whether death benefit payable – whether valid 
claim for ‗personal accident‘ to bird 
 
When Mr E‘s prize-winning parrot died, Mr E put in a claim to the firm for accidental 
death benefit of £1,200. He also claimed damages of £12,000 for ‗personal accident‘ to 
the parrot. He said it had accidentally crashed into the toys in its cage and became dizzy 
before it collapsed and died. 
 
The firm rejected the claim. It was a condition of the policy that Mr E should provide a 
vet‘s report, certifying the cause of death, but he had failed to do so. 
 
Complaint rejected 
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We agreed with the firm that in failing to obtain a vet‘s report, Mr E had breached an 
important  and material  condition  of  the policy.  Without  this  information,  the  firm  was 
unable to verify the cause of death and establish whether the accidental death claim was 
valid. 
 
As far as the claim for personal accident was concerned, we pointed out to Mr E that his 
policy did not provide personal accident cover and that this type of insurance was only 
available for human beings. 
 
Issue 32:  October 2003 
 
32/7 
 
jurisdiction decision – group PHI policy – whether complainant eligible 
 
XYZ Ltd held a group personal health insurance policy with the firm and offered health 
insurance to its staff. In July 2001, one of its employees (Mr W) made a claim under this 
policy, but the firm turned it down. When Mr W said he would take his complaint to the 
ombudsman, the firm told him the complaint was outside our jurisdiction. The reason it 
gave was that XYZ Ltd, not Mr W, was the policyholder, and XYZ Ltd had not given 
consent for us to consider the complaint. 
 
Despite this, Mr W decided to refer his complaint to us. 
 
Complaint outside our jurisdiction 
 
While firms do sometimes express a view to customers about whether or not they think a 
complaint is within our jurisdiction, this is ultimately a matter for us to determine. In this 
particular case, we decided that the complaint was indeed outside our jurisdiction. 
 
This was a relevant new complaint – one where: 
 
    * the matter complained about occurred before the Financial Ombudsman  Service 
effectively existed (that is, before 1 December 2001); but 
    * the complaint was not made to us until after 1 December 2001. 
 
Under our rules, we therefore had to look at how the relevant predecessor scheme – in 
this case, the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau (IOB) – would have treated the complaint. 
 
Mr W was complaining about the fact that the firm had turned down his claim. It did this 
in July 2001, which was before the Financial Ombudsman Service effectively existed. 
The  IOB‘s  terms  of  reference  said  it  could  not  consider  a  complaint  unless  the 
complainant was the policyholder, or the policyholder had given express permission. 
 
The policyholder in this case, XYZ Ltd, had not given us permission, so we were unable 
to look at the complaint. 
 
32/8 
 
jurisdiction decision – whether employee was eligible complainant – was key man policy 
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DP Ltd was a company with an annual turnover of over £1million. When Mr A (one of its 
employees) was off sick for some time, DP Ltd made a claim to the insurance firm on his 
behalf. The firm turned down the claim. It told DP Ltd that the complaint could not be 
referred to us. It said the matter would be outside our jurisdiction because the size of DP 
Ltd‘s  turnover  made  it  ineligible  to  complain  to  us.  Mr  A  subsequently  brought  the 
complaint to us himself. 
 
Complaint outside our jurisdiction 
 
The firm had been correct in telling DP Ltd that it was not eligible to complain to us. But 
we needed to establish whether Mr A was an eligible complainant. 
 
When we asked for further information about the policy, we discovered it  was not a 
personal  health  policy  as  we  had  been  led  to  believe.  It  was  a  ‗key  man‘  policy 
(insurance taken out on the life of an individual – in this case, Mr A – whose serious 
illness or death would create a loss of earnings for the company). 
 
The policy was not taken out for Mr A‘s benefit, but for the benefit of DP Ltd. It was not 
designed to pay salary or sick pay to Mr A and there appeared to be no direct or indirect 
link between any payments the firm was liable to make and any payments that Mr A 
might receive. 
 
We therefore concluded that the complaint was outside our jurisdiction. 
 
32/9 
 
jurisdiction decision – commercial policy – whether event pre-dated 1 December 2001 – 
what is the relevant ‗event‘? 
 
Mr D was the owner of a hotel that was badly damaged during an arson attack in August 
2000. A couple of months later, he put in a claim under his commercial policy. The firm 
paid it. However, it turned down a further claim that Mr D made in September 2001 for 
business losses and sundry expenses in connection with the fire. 
 
When the firm rejected Mr D‘s complaint about this, he came to us. 
 
Complaint outside our jurisdiction 
 
The firm argued that Mr D‘s complaint was outside our jurisdiction because the fire had 
occurred in August 2000, before the Financial Ombudsman Service effectively existed. 
 
We came to the conclusion that the complaint was outside our jurisdiction, but not for the 
reasons given by the firm. 
 
This was a relevant new complaint about a commercial policy. It therefore needed to be 
looked at in accordance with the Ombudsman Transitional Order. The relevant date was 
not the one on which the fire had taken place – August 2000 – but the date when the 
firm turned down Mr D‘s claim – over a year later. However, in this particular case, this 
was still before 1 December 2001, so the complaint was outside our jurisdiction. 
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32/10 
 
group  PHI  policy  –  whether  case  within  jurisdiction  –  employer  was  policyholder  – 
whether employee an ‗eligible complainant‘ 
 
Mr H worked at GJ Ltd, a large supermarket that offered private health insurance to its 
staff. After a period of ill health, Mr H put in a claim to the insurance firm. When the firm 
refused to pay, Mr H referred his complaint to us. 
 
Complaint within our jurisdiction 
 
The firm argued that the complaint was not one we could deal with because neither GJ 
Ltd nor Mr H were eligible complainants; GJ Ltd because it was a commercial customer 
with an annual turnover of over £1million, and Mr H because the policyholder was GJ 
Ltd, not him. 
 
We found that the complaint was within our jurisdiction. It was true that, because of its 
size, GJ Ltd was not an eligible complainant. However, Mr H was. Under the rules (DISP 
2.4.12R), we were able to look at this complaint because ‗… the complainant [was] a 
person for whose benefit a contract of insurance was taken out or was intended to be 
taken out‘. 
 
It was clear that the policy was taken out for the benefit of GJ Ltd‘s employees, including 
Mr H. For the complaint to be within our jurisdiction, it was not necessary for Mr H to be 
the only person to benefit from the policy. The fact that the employer also benefited was 
immaterial. 
 
32/11 
 
jurisdiction decision – complainant resident in Jersey – firm based in Jersey – territorial 
scope of our jurisdiction 
 
Mrs S, who lived in Jersey, rang us to ask if we could look into her complaint against a 
financial services firm based in the Channel Islands. 
 
Complaint outside our jurisdiction 
 
Under the rules (DISP 2.7.1), the territorial scope of the Financial Ombudsman Service 
‗covers complaints about the activities of a firm… carried on from an establishment in the 
United Kingdom‘. The Channel Islands are not part of the UK and therefore not subject 
to the regulatory requirements of UK financial services law. 
 
If  the  firm  complained  about  had  a  registered  office  in  England, Wales,  Scotland  or 
Northern Ireland, and the transaction complained about had been carried out there, then 
we might have been able to help. As it was, however, the complaint was outside our 
jurisdiction.  We  suggested  that  Mrs  S  should  contact  the  Jersey  Financial  Services 
Commission to see if it could help with her complaint. 
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Issue 34:  January 2004 
 
34/1 
 
buildings policy  – policyholder claims for fire damage after arson attack  – firm voids 
policy on grounds of misrepresentation – says property was ‗left unoccupied‘ 
 
Mr S, who worked in London, bought a house near his parents‘ home in Cardiff. His 
mortgage lender arranged the buildings insurance and was aware that Mr S had bought 
the house with the intention of renovating it and then letting it out. 
 
Mr S visited the property almost every weekend to work on it, sometimes staying there 
overnight and sometimes sleeping at his parents‘ house. One weekend, he arrived at the 
house to find it had been damaged by fire. He later found this had been a case of arson. 
 
When he put in a claim, the firm refused to pay out. It said it had ‗voided‘ the policy 
(cancelled it from the outset) on the grounds that Mr S had misrepresented the position 
when he took out the insurance. The firm said Mr S had not made it clear that he did not 
intend to live in the property long-term. Mr S then brought his complaint to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
The  firm  agreed  to  reinstate  the  policy  after  we  pointed out  that  there  had  been no 
misrepresentation.  Mr  S  had  made  his  intentions  perfectly  clear  when  he  asked  the 
mortgage lender to arrange the policy. However, the firm still rejected the claim, citing 
the policy exclusion relating to properties that were left ‗unoccupied‘. 
 
We did not consider that the firm had acted fairly or reasonably in rejecting the claim. 
The house had minimal furniture and lacked adequate facilities, such as a lavatory and a 
working kitchen. However, Mr S was able to provide ample evidence to show that he had 
visited it frequently to carry out work and to check up on the property. The house was 
neither abandoned nor neglected and Mr S had not applied for a council tax discount on 
the grounds that it was ‗unoccupied‘. 
 
Because  we  considered  the  wording  of  the  policy  exclusion  to  be  unclear  and 
ambiguous, we interpreted it in favour of Mr S. We concluded that the property had not 
been left ‗unoccupied‘ for more than 30 days, even though it had not been lived in and 
was not yet habitable on a long-term basis. 
 
34/2 
 
buildings policy – firm refuses claim for damage following break-in – considers property 
‗unoccupied‘ 
 
Mr K lived in London but owned a house in Belfast, where he had been a student and 
where his girlfriend lived. His insurer turned down the claim he made after he discovered 
the house in Belfast had been broken into and extensively damaged. He then came to 
us. 
 
Complaint rejected 
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The firm had rejected Mr K‘s claim because of the exclusion clause in his policy that said 
it would not meet claims if the property was ‗left unoccupied‘. 
 
Mr K told us that he visited Belfast periodically to see his girlfriend and to check up on 
the  house.  There  was  a  small  amount  of  evidence  that  he  had  visited  Belfast 
occasionally, but we concluded he had simply been staying with his girlfriend. It was 
doubtful whether he had checked on the property at all. 
 
The house was in such a poor state of repair that it stretched credibility that anyone 
would be able to live there, even for one night. We considered that the firm‘s position 
had been prejudiced by the fact that the house was not lived in. 
 
We did feel that the exclusion clause could have been written more clearly. However, in 
the circumstances of this case, we thought it reasonable for the firm to cite the clause in 
order to reject the claim. 
 
34/3 
 
buildings policy – firm refuses claim for water damage after pipes burst – property left 
unlived in for over a year 
 
Miss Y, an elderly woman, was unexpectedly admitted to hospital and she ended up 
spending more than a year away from her home. During that period, she had made no 
arrangements for anyone to visit or check the property. 
 
She subsequently discovered that her home had been damaged when some water pipes 
had frozen and burst. She put in a claim, but the firm rejected it because she had ‗left 
her house unlived in for more than 30 days‘. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
The property had effectively been abandoned for a very long period and this had led 
directly to the damage. We established that it would have been relatively easy for Miss Y 
to  have  ensured  the  property  was  looked  after  while  she  was  away.  We  therefore 
concluded that the firm had acted reasonably in rejecting her claim. 
 
Issue 35:  February/ March 2004 
 
35/1 
 
customer unable to recover full amount of claim under contents insurance policy – value 
of damaged property exceeded the policy limit – whether firm right to reject customer‘s 
claim for the balance under his purchase protection policy 
 
Mr K accidentally dropped and damaged his new camera one afternoon when he was 
taking pictures of his family at a local carnival. The camera was worth about £4,000 and 
Mr K put  in a claim under his household contents policy. He had paid an additional 
premium on this policy to obtain cover for his personal possessions while they were 
outside the home. 
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Mr K‘s contents insurer accepted the claim. However, it only paid him £1,500, as this 
was the policy limit. Mr K then tried to obtain the balance from his purchase protection 
insurer (firm C). Firm C rejected the claim on the grounds that its policy contained the 
following exclusion: ‗This policy does not cover… loss or damage insured under any 
other  policy  or  which  would  have  been  insured  under  another  policy  but  for  the 
application of a policy excess.‘ Mr K then complained to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
The clause in this particular policy was similar to that found in many types of policy. We 
consider  the  purpose  of  such  clauses  is  to  prevent  policyholders  making  a  ‗double 
recovery‘ (claiming for the full amount of the same claim – from two different insurers). 
We did not consider the clause to be inherently unfair or unreasonable, provided the firm 
applied  it  appropriately,  so  as  not  to  exclude  genuine  losses  that  were  otherwise 
uninsured. 
 
Mr K had recovered only part of his actual loss from the contents insurer. We therefore 
considered that it was fair and reasonable for him to ask firm C to cover the balance – 
and for it to do so, subject to the policy excess and limit. 
 
35/2 
 
whether electricity generator came under policy‘s definition of ‗personal possessions‘ 
 
When Mr J‘s electricity generator was stolen from a local stable, where it was being kept 
temporarily while in use, he made a claim under his household policy. 
 
The firm rejected the claim. It said the generator was not covered when it was outside 
the home. The only ‗personal possessions‘ that the policy covered outside the home 
were ‗Items which you… would wear or carry around for personal use, adornment or 
convenience …‘. Mr J then complained to us. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
We felt that the firm‘s policy definition was worded sufficiently clearly to exclude Mr J‘s 
claim. The firm intended only to cover certain sorts of items – those that were portable. It 
could not reasonably be said that a bulky electricity generator was an item that you 
would carry around for ‗personal use or convenience‘. 
We therefore rejected the claim. 
 
35/3 
 
customer‘s claim for stolen computer – whether firm correct to say computer did not fall 
within policy description of ‗personal belongings‘ 
 
Miss G took her personal computer with her when she went to stay with a friend for a few 
weeks. The computer was a standard desk-top model, not a laptop. There was a break-
in at the friend‘s house shortly after Miss G arrived and the computer was stolen. 
 
Miss G put in a claim under the ‗personal possessions‘ section of her household policy 
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definition of ‗personal belongings‘ which listed ‗Clothing and Personal Effects (including 
clothing,  jewellery,  watches,  furs,  binoculars,  musical,  photographic  and  sports 
equipment)‘. Miss G then complained to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We  decided  that  if  the  firm  intended  only  to  cover  personal  belongings  that  were 
designed to be portable, or that were customarily carried about the person, then it should 
have said so in plain language. 
 
We pointed out that the policy definition included musical instruments. Some musical 
instruments, such as pianos, are not usually considered ‗portable‘. However, the policy 
did not make any distinction between ‗portable‘ and ‗non-portable‘ instruments. So non-
portable  items  could  fall  within  the  policy  definition  of  ‗personal  belongings‘.  The 
computer was a possession that was personally owned by Miss G. Since the policy did 
not specifically exclude computers, we decided the fair and reasonable solution was for 
the firm to pay the claim. 
 
35/4 
 
customer‘s  furniture  destroyed  in  fire  at  ‗storage  facility‘  –  whether  firm  correct  in 
rejecting claim on grounds that items were stored in a ‗furniture depository‘ 
 
Mrs A put her furniture into storage while she was having renovations carried out after 
moving home. Unfortunately, all her furniture was destroyed when the storage facility 
burnt  down.  The  owners  of  the  facility  held  no  insurance  and  had  been  declared 
bankrupt, so Mrs A put in a claim under her household insurance policy for £50,000. 
 
Her policy covered her against loss or damage for ‗personal possessions temporarily 
away from the home‘. However, there was an exclusion that said items were not covered 
while they were stored in a ‗furniture depository‘. The firm cited this exclusion to turn 
down Mrs A‘s claim. 
 
Mrs A argued that the storage facility was not a ‗furniture depository‘, but the firm still 
refused to pay the claim. However, it did offer her a goodwill payment of £5,000. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
We  decided  that  a  ‗storage  facility‘  fell  within  the  ambit  of  the  phrase  ‗furniture 
depository‘. It was a place where furniture was deposited. We did not agree with Mrs A 
that because items other than furniture could be stored there, it could not be defined as 
a ‗furniture depository‘. We concluded that the firm was not liable to meet the claim and 
that its goodwill payment had been very fair. 
 
35/5 
 
bag stolen from parked car when left covered with a coat on front seat – whether firm 
right to dismiss complaint on grounds that bag had not been ‗concealed‘ 
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Mr D and his wife left their car in the car park while they were visiting a stately home one 
afternoon. They returned to the car later in the day to find that a thief had broken into it 
and stolen Mrs D‘s handbag. She had left the bag on the front seat, covered with a coat. 
 
Mr D made a claim under the personal possessions section of his household insurance 
policy. However, the firm said it would not meet the claim because the handbag had not 
been left in ‗a locked and concealed boot, concealed luggage compartment or closed 
glove compartment‘, in accordance with the terms of the policy. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
The policy exclusion had been very clearly stated and it was evident that the bag had not 
been left in a ‗secure concealed compartment‘. The handbag could easily have been left 
in the boot. Even though the bag had been covered with a coat, it would have been 
obvious to an opportunistic thief that the coat could be hiding something worth stealing. 
We decided the firm acted reasonably in turning down this claim and we rejected the 
complaint. 
 
35/6 
 
firm turns down claim for sunglasses stolen from car – whether sunglasses had been 
‗effectively concealed from view‘ 
 
When Mrs M returned to her parked car after a brief shopping trip, she found that a thief 
had broken into her car. The designer sunglasses that she had left in the pocket of the 
door nearest the driver‘s seat had gone. 
 
Mrs M put in a claim under the personal possessions section of her household policy but 
the firm turned it down. It said this was because the sunglasses had not been left in ‗a 
concealed luggage compartment or closed glove compartment‘. Mrs M then complained 
to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We considered that, strictly speaking, Mrs M‘s claim fell foul of the exclusion clause. 
However,  we  felt  the  firm‘s  decision  was  less  than  fair  and  reasonable  because  the 
sunglasses had effectively been concealed from view. They would not have been visible 
to  a  passing  thief  and  the  door  pocket  was,  in  many  ways,  similar  to  a  glove 
compartment. This thief just happened to strike lucky when he broke into the car. We 
therefore decided that the firm should pay the claim. 
 
Issue 36:  April 2004 
 
36/9 
 
travel insurance policy – customer cancels holiday – whether customer breached the 
terms of the policy by not disclosing information 
 
Early in the New Year, Mr C decided to arrange his summer holiday. He booked two 
weeks in Tenerife for that August. At the same time, he took out a travel insurance policy 
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In February, Mr C's mother was diagnosed with cancer. However, it  was only  a few 
weeks before Mr C was due to travel that she was told her illness was terminal. As soon 
as he discovered this, Mr C cancelled his holiday and put in a claim to the firm for the 
cost of the trip. 
 
The firm refused to pay out. It said that Mr C should have got in touch when his mother's 
illness was first diagnosed. Mr C argued that he had not known at that stage that her 
condition was terminal, or that her failing health would mean he had to cancel his trip. 
The firm was insistent that because he had not disclosed this information at the earliest 
possible stage, he had breached the terms of the policy. Mr C then came to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
The firm said the policy imposed an 'ongoing duty of disclosure' on policyholders. In 
other words, it said that policyholders had to inform the firm of any illnesses or other 
‗relevant matters‘ that occurred after they had taken out a policy. If policyholders failed to 
do this, then it could refuse to pay a claim. 
 
We acknowledged the general point the firm made to us that customers should not delay 
in cancelling their holiday if a situation arose where there was clear medical evidence or 
advice that they should not travel. However, that was not what had happened in this 
case. 
 
We felt the firm‘s clause arguably amounted to an unfair contract term. It is acceptable 
for policies to exclude claims from cover if they arise from 'pre-existing conditions'  – 
medical conditions that pre-date the start of the policy. But in this case, the firm excluded 
not only illnesses known about in the three years before the start of the policy, but also 
those that occurred ‗before the trip started‘. 
 
In our view, in turning down a claim because of circumstances that arose between the 
time Mr C took out the policy and the date when his holiday began, the firm was acting 
unfairly. Its clause effectively relieved it of any obligation to pay health-related claims. By 
seeking to remove the element of risk, the policy undermined one of the fundamental 
principles of insurance. We upheld Mr C‘s complaint and told the firm to meet the claim. 
 
36/10 
 
annual travel policy bought online – cover to start from a specified date – customers 
cancel holiday before cover starts – whether firm should pay cancellation costs 
 
Mr and Mrs B bought their annual travel policy online in March, but specified that the 
cover should not begin until 1 June, the day they were due to fly to Malta for a holiday. 
 
At the end of May, Mr B's father died and the couple cancelled their holiday. When they 
put in a claim to the firm, they were dismayed to be told that they were not covered. The 
firm  explained  that  the  policy  had  not  yet  come  into  effect  because  the  couple  had 
chosen 1 June as its start date. 
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As a gesture of goodwill, the firm offered the couple a sum towards the costs of the 
cancelled holiday, although it refused to pay the whole of the claim. Dissatisfied with this, 
the couple complained to us. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
We felt that the firm‘s offer had been more than fair. The online sale process was very 
straightforward, with clear instructions. The firm‘s website explained that if customers 
asked for the cover to begin at a future date, rather than from the time of the sale, the 
customers would not be covered if they cancelled their holiday before the cover began. 
 
This was not a case of the firm varying the terms of the policy after it had come into 
effect. The policy had not been in force when the couple made their claim. We therefore 
rejected their complaint. 
 
36/11 
 
house insurance policy – unoccupied house burns down – whether firm right to reject 
customer‘s claim 
 
Ms G left her home unoccupied while she was working abroad for six months. While she 
was away, her house was broken into and set on fire. The house was so badly burned 
that it was beyond repair. 
 
Ms G was covered for 'malicious damage' to her property and she put in a claim to the 
firm. However, it told her it was not liable in cases where the property had been 'left 
unoccupied' and it said she should have notified it when she moved abroad. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We agreed with the firm that it was not obliged to pay Ms G's claim for any 'malicious 
damage' to her home. The policy clearly defined the term ‗left unoccupied‘ in relation to 
this type of claim, and it did not cover claims for this kind of damage to unoccupied 
properties. However, the primary cause of the damage to Ms G's house was a separate, 
insured event – 'fire and explosion'. There was no general or specific reference to the 
firm not being liable for such an event if the house was unoccupied. 
 
While acknowledging that this was the case, the firm insisted that Ms G should have told 
it when she moved out of her house. The firm said this had changed the 'nature of the 
risk' and that, because she hadn‘t disclosed the fact she had moved out, it was entitled 
to vary the terms of the policy and cancel it. 
 
We disagreed. We did not feel that Ms G had been obliged to disclose this fact to the 
firm, in the way she would have had to do if - say - she had sold the property and bought 
another house. We thought that by attempting to vary the policy after Ms G took out her 
house insurance, the firm had acted unfairly. We upheld Ms G‘s complaint and told the 
firm to meet her claim. 
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36/12 
 
travel insurance – customer disclosed medical condition after taking out policy – whether 
firm right to invalidate policy 
 
In February, Mr and Mrs J took out a travel policy to cover the holiday they had booked 
for May. 
 
Mrs J was unexpectedly admitted to hospital in April for a clot on the lung. Her treatment 
was successful and her consultant said there was no reason for the couple to cancel 
their forthcoming trip. 
 
When  she  was  double-checking  all  the  arrangements  the  day  before  the  holiday,  it 
occurred  to  Mrs  J  that  she  ought  to  ring  the  firm  just  to  update  them  on  what  had 
happened. She was shocked when the firm told her it would have to invalidate the policy 
and refund the premium. 
 
As there wasn‘t time for Mr and Mrs J to arrange any alternative cover, the couple felt 
they had no option but to go on holiday without any insurance. When they returned 
home, they complained to the firm about its actions and about the 'unnecessary distress 
and  inconvenience'  they  had  suffered  as  a  result.  When  the  firm  dismissed  their 
complaint, they 
came to us. 
 
Complaint partially upheld 
 
This was not a case where the policyholders had failed to disclose a material fact. At the 
time the couple took out the policy, Mrs J had not been suffering any ill health. And in 
any event, the firm had never asked the couple any questions at all about their health. 
 
The firm told us it had invalidated the policy because there was a 'continuing duty of 
utmost good faith' that required policyholders to 'notify the firm of any change to the risk' 
after the policy was taken out. 
 
We cited Professor Malcom Clarke's Policies and Perceptions of Insurance, together 
with Ivamy‘s General Principles of Insurance Law, to support our view that – generally – 
there  is  no  duty  on  a  policyholder  to  disclose  'material  facts'  once  the  firm  and 
policyholder have agreed on the contract. 
 
In addition, we noted that there was nothing in the terms of the policy that entitled the 
firm either to 'avoid' it (in other words, to treat it as though it had never existed) or to 
cancel it. Although there was no claim to consider, we required the firm to pay Mr and 
Mrs J modest compensation for the distress and inconvenience they had been caused. 
 
Issue 38:  July 2004 
 
38/5 
 
car stolen from driveway – whether firm was right to reject complaint on the grounds of 
customer‘s ‗carelessness‘ 
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Miss L‘s car was stolen from the driveway of her home while she was inside the house. 
She neither saw nor heard the theft. When she put in a claim to the firm, it asked her to 
send it her car keys. However, she was only able to produce the spare ignition key. 
 
Taking this as evidence that the key had been in (or on) the car when it was stolen, the 
firm  rejected  Miss  L‘s  claim.  It  said  that  by  failing  to  ‗exercise  reasonable  care  in 
safeguarding her car‘ she had breached a general condition of her policy. 
 
Miss L objected to this. She said that the key had definitely not been in the car when it 
was stolen. She had lost the key a month earlier and had been using the spare. She was 
adamant that she had not been ‗careless‘, as the firm had suggested. After the firm 
rejected her complaint, she came to us. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
We agreed with Miss L that she had not been ‗reckless‘. As we noted in our last issue, 
someone is reckless if they recognise a risk, but deliberately ‗court‘ it. Miss L had not 
done this, so the firm was wrong to say that she had breached the ‗reasonable care‘ 
condition. 
 
However, the firm‘s policy also contained a specific (and very comprehensive) clause 
that  excluded  claims  for  cars  stolen  when  the keys  were  left  in  them.  The  firm  had 
specifically highlighted this clause when it sold Miss L the policy. And as we were not 
satisfied with Miss L‘s explanation that she had lost the original car key, we concluded 
on balance that it was likely that she had left the key in, or on, the car. 
 
We were satisfied that the circumstances of this theft did fall within the scope of that 
exclusion. She could be said to have ‗left‘ the keys in the car because she had gone into 
the house, and was too far from the car to be able to prevent it being stolen. In addition, 
the fact that the car was parked so close to the road meant it was relatively vulnerable to 
an opportunistic thief. We therefore rejected the complaint. 
 
38/6 
 
keys left in ignition – firm rejects claim – whether firm had highlighted exclusion clause 
 
Mr A parked his car opposite a letterbox and jumped out to post a letter, leaving the key 
in the ignition. While he was crossing the road to reach the letterbox, someone stole his 
car. 
 
Mr A was horrified when the firm rejected his subsequent claim on the grounds of its 
‗keys  in  car‘  exclusion  clause.  He  said  that  the  firm  had  never  told  him  the  policy 
included such a clause and, eventually, he complained to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
By turning his back on the car and walking away from it, Mr A had fallen foul of the ‗keys 
in car‘ clause in the policy. In legal terms, he had left the car ‗unattended‘ – in other 
words he was not close enough to the car to make prevention of the theft likely, as 
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Lloyd‘s  Law  Reports,  page  217);  and  in  Hayward  v  Norwich  Union  Insurance  Ltd, 
(reported in 2001 in the Road Traffic Reports, page 530). 
 
Mr A accepted that he had left the car unattended. But he claimed that none of the policy 
documents  that  the  firm  had  sent  him  (such  as  the  policy  schedule  and  certificate) 
referred to the ‗keys in car‘ exclusion. The firm had set out the exclusion in the policy 
booklet but had done nothing to draw Mr A‘s attention to it when it sold him the policy, as 
it should have done in accordance with industry guidelines. We therefore felt it was fair 
and reasonable to assume that Mr A had been prejudiced by the firm‘s failure to highlight 
the  clause.  If  the  firm  had  clearly  referred  to  the  clause  on  the  policy  certificate  or 
schedule, Mr A might well have acted differently. 
 
And  we  were  satisfied  that  Mr  A  had  not  acted  ‗recklessly‘.  Applying  the  test  of 
‗recklessness‘  as  set  out  in  Sofi  v  Prudential  Assurance  (1993)  –  he  had  not  even 
recognised that there was a risk, let alone deliberately courted it. We therefore required 
the firm to pay Mr A‘s claim. 
 
38/7 
 
key left in car – theft recorded on CCTV – whether firm right to use ‗key in car‘ exclusion 
to refuse claim 
 
Mr H drove to the council-run tip to get rid of an old carpet. While he was disposing of 
the carpet, someone stole his car. He had left the keys in the ignition and, although he 
hadn‘t walked far from the car, he did not hear or see anything suspicious. He only 
realised that his car was gone when he turned back towards where he had left it. The 
firm turned down Mr H‘s claim because he had left his keys in the car. When it rejected 
his complaint about this, Mr H came to us. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
The firm's decision not to pay the claim was based on CCTV footage that it obtained 
from the council. This showed Mr H walking away from his car with the carpet. It also 
appeared that he had left the car‘s engine running. 
 
We agreed that the firm had been correct in turning down the claim on the grounds of its 
‗keys in car‘ exclusion. Mr H had turned his back on the car after leaving it in a public 
place and he was completely oblivious to the theft until after it had happened. He had 
walked a fair way from his car, so he was unlikely to have been able to prevent the theft. 
 
In this instance, Mr H had no excuse for not being aware of the policy exclusion. The firm 
had highlighted it very clearly on the policy certificate, a document that every motorist is 
required to have by law. We therefore rejected his complaint. 
 
Issue 39:  August 2004 
 
39/1 
 
commercial policy – firm rejects claim for theft from café on grounds that policyholders 
breached warranty 
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Mr K and Mr L were business partners who ran a small café. One morning they arrived 
at the café to find that someone had broken in, stolen some cash and damaged the safe. 
 
They put in a claim under their premises insurance but the firm turned it down. It told 
them this was because they had been in breach of the policy warranty, as they had left 
cash in the till overnight, had not fitted a specified type of lock on the café windows, and 
had not taken adequate security measures in relation to the siting of their safe. 
 
The policyholders said that they had not been aware that their policy required them to 
comply with specific security requirements. They argued that these requirements were 
largely immaterial to the incident in question, since the thieves had entered and left the 
premises by breaking down the front door, not via the windows, and the till had only 
contained a small amount of loose change. 
 
They insisted that they had done all that they reasonably could have done to leave the 
premises secure, and that the firm should therefore accept the claim. When the firm 
refused to reconsider the matter, Mr K and Mr L came to us. 
 
Complaint rejected: principles of the Statement not applied 
 
In our view, the evidence made it clear that, regardless of whether the policyholders had 
complied with the security measures set out in the warranty, the thieves would still have 
gained entry to the premises. However, we thought that the thieves would probably not 
have been able to get into the safe. So although the loss would still have occurred, the 
amount lost would probably have been smaller. 
 
If we applied the principles of the Statement, we might have decided that the firm should 
pay for the part of the loss that would still have occurred even if the policyholders had 
complied with the warranty. 
 
However, we noted that the café employed four full-time staff and was run as a limited 
company. And although Mr K and Mr L told us they had no knowledge of legal and 
insurance matters, they clearly had access to expert advice because they had bought 
their policy through a firm of insurance brokers and that firm had represented them when 
they made a claim for the break-in. 
 
We  concluded  that  the  nature  of  the  business,  and  the  resources  available  to  the 
policyholders,  meant  that  it  would  not  be  appropriate  to  apply  the  principles  of  the 
Statement. We therefore rejected the complaint. 
 
39/2 
 
commercial policy – firm refuses to accept claim arising from a legal action against the 
policyholder, on grounds of breach of warranty 
 
Mr C was a self-employed forestry consultant. While he was working on a large estate, a 
tree fell down and injured a third party. A few days later, Mr C heard that the third party 
was planning to put in a claim to the estate owner for the injuries caused by the fallen 
tree. 
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Nearly 18 months after that, the estate owner‘s insurer told Mr C that it would be passing 
on to him the third party‘s claim for his injuries. Mr C then contacted his insurer right 
away, but was shocked when it told him it would not meet the claim. It said that by 
waiting so long after the accident before contacting it, he had breached the condition in 
his policy that said he must notify it immediately, in writing, of 'any occurrence which may 
give rise to a claim'. 
 
It also argued that its position had been prejudiced by Mr C‘s failure to notify it as soon 
as the accident had occurred. It said the delay meant it had lost the opportunity to obtain 
any evidence from the time of the accident that could have given it a better chance of 
successfully defending the claim. 
 
Complaint upheld: principles of the Statement applied 
 
When  Mr  C  referred  his  complaint  to  us,  we  noted  that  he  was  a  self-employed 
contractor with no employees. His policy did require him to notify his insurer as soon as 
he became aware of any potential action being brought against him. However, we did 
not think it was fair or reasonable to have expected him to know he was potentially liable 
until this was spelt out to him, by the estate owner‘s insurer, nearly 18 months after the 
accident happened. 
 
We concluded that this was a situation where a commercial policyholder was, effectively, 
in the same position as a private individual with a personal policy. It was appropriate to 
apply the principles of the Statement and we therefore upheld his complaint and required 
his insurer to deal with the claim. 
 
Issue 40:  September/ October 2004 
 
40/4 
 
critical illness – ‗any occupation‘ cover – whether firm correct to reject claim solely on the 
basis of video evidence 
 
Mrs T put in a claim under her critical illness policy for permanent total disability resulting 
from  fibromyalgia.  The  insurer  rejected her  claim,  saying  she  was  not disabled  from 
carrying out ‗any occupation‘. It based its view on the video surveillance it had carried 
out. This showed Mrs T walking and moving normally. Mrs T was unhappy with the firm‘s 
decision and she complained to us. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
We did not think it was fair for the insurer to reject the claim solely on the basis of a short 
piece of video footage, so we asked the insurer to show the video to Mrs T‘s doctors. 
 
The doctors agreed that the way in which Mrs T was seen to be moving on the recording 
was  not  consistent  with  the  manner  in  which  they  had  seen  her  moving  during 
consultations. This cast some doubt over Mrs T‘s claim. 
 
The policy covered Mrs T if illness prevented her from performing ‗any occupation‘. We 
were satisfied that, even applying the more generous ‗Sargent‘ interpretation, the weight 
of  the  medical  opinion  established  that  Mrs  T‘s  condition  did  not  prevent  her  from Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
Appendix A: O.N. Case Studies  133 
performing any occupation for which she was suited by reason of her education, training 
or experience. We therefore rejected her complaint. 
 
40/5 
 
personal accident – ‗any occupation‘ cover – whether policyholder ‗unable to carry out 
any occupation whatsoever‘ 
 
Miss G, a professional dancer, suffered a serious injury while performing in a West End 
show. The injury effectively ended her career as a dancer and she put in a claim under 
her ‗any occupation‘ cover. 
 
Although Miss G was receiving state incapacity benefits, the insurer refused to pay her 
disability claim. It said that she did not fulfil the policy definition of disability: ‗unable to 
carry out any occupation whatsoever‘. Miss G then complained to us, arguing that the 
insurer‘s decision was unfair and discriminatory. 
 
Complaint rejected 
We noted that, unlike some policies, this one was written in very clear terms. Indeed, 
because of the nature of her occupation, the firm had required Miss G to sign a specific 
endorsement as part of her application for the policy. This confirmed that ‗benefit will 
only be payable if Miss G is unable to perform any occupation whatsoever.‘ 
 
Having carefully reviewed all the medical evidence and ‗functional capacity‘ reports, we 
concluded  that  Miss  G  was  certainly  so  disabled  that  she  was  unable  to  continue 
working as a dancer. However, she was an educated and intelligent person, and was not 
disabled from any occupation for which she was suited, let alone from any occupation 
whatsoever. 
 
The fact that Miss G was classed as ‗disabled‘ for the purpose of state benefits did not 
necessarily mean that she was also disabled within the terms of the policy. We decided 
that the insurer‘s decision was neither unfair nor unreasonable in all the circumstances. 
There was no evidence to support Miss G‘s allegation that the insurer had contravened 
the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. We therefore rejected the complaint. 
 
40/6 
 
personal accident ‗own occupation‘ insurance – whether insurer‘s actions after receiving 
consultant‘s report were correct 
 
Mr D, a motor mechanic, developed a phobia about germs. He felt compelled to wash 
his hands so frequently during the day that, eventually, he was unable to complete any 
of his tasks and he had to give up work altogether. 
 
He was covered for illness that prevented him from carrying out his ‗own occupation‘, 
and he put in a claim to his insurer. The insurer paid him disability benefits for a few 
months. However, it stopped these payments as soon as it received a report on Mr D‘s 
condition from a consultant psychiatrist. 
 
The  insurer  told  Mr  D  that  it  would  not  pay  him  any  further  benefits  because  the 
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his phobia, it is likely that he will be able to return to work and have a relatively normal 
life within six months of the start of the treatment.‘ 
 
Mr  D  felt  his  benefits  should  continue,  at  least  for  the  time  being,  but  the  insurer 
disagreed, so Mr D complained to us. 
 
Complaint upheld in part 
 
We felt that the insurer‘s interpretation of the medical evidence was rather harsh. We 
were satisfied that, at present, Mr D‘s illness was preventing him from carrying out his 
‗own occupation‘ of motor mechanic. 
 
The psychiatrist had not said that Mr D could now return to work. She had said that it 
was likely he would be able to return to work: 
 
    *  if  certain  conditions  were  satisfied  (about  the  overall  hygiene  standards  of  the 
workplace); and 
    * after he had successfully completed six months of cognitive behavioural treatment. 
 
The  consultant  indicated  that  a  premature  return  to  work  would  probably  cause  a 
recurrence of Mr D‘s underlying depression and anxiety. 
 
We were satisfied that, at present, Mr D‘s illness was preventing him from carrying on 
with  his  occupation  as  a  motor  mechanic.  We  decided  that  the  fair  and  reasonable 
solution was for the firm to reinstate benefits, at least until Mr D had completed the six 
months‘  cognitive  behavioural  treatment.  After  that,  Mr  D  would  have  a  medical 
reassessment. Future benefits would depend on the outcome of that reassessment and 
of the cognitive behavioural treatment. 
 
Issue 42:  December 2004 / January 2005 
 
42/3 
 
policyholder forges documents in the course of making a valid claim – insurers wrongly 
attempt to ‗avoid‘ entire policy 
 
Mr H was a self-employed plumber. In January, his home was burgled and he made a 
claim under his home insurance policy, which the firm duly paid. In May, his van was 
broken into and a number of personal possessions were stolen, including the tools he 
used for his work. He made another claim to the firm under the personal possessions 
section of his home contents policy. 
 
During  the  course  of  its  enquiries,  the  firm‘s  loss  adjusters  insisted  that  Mr  H 
substantiate all his losses with original purchase receipts. Mr H was unable to find all the 
receipts, so he asked a friend to fake one for him. 
 
When the firm discovered the forged receipt, it ‗avoided‘ the policy – in other words, 
cancelled it from the start. The firm not only refused to pay for the items stolen from the 
van, it also tried to recover the money it had previously paid out to Mr H for his earlier 
burglary claim. After complaining unsuccessfully to the firm, Mr H came to us. 
 Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
Appendix A: O.N. Case Studies  135 
Complaint upheld 
 
The firm accepted that the theft from the van was genuine. Mr H had been foolish to 
obtain a forged receipt but he was not dishonestly trying to obtain something to which he 
was not entitled. The loss adjusters had, in fact, been rather overzealous in insisting on 
strict proof of purchase for all the items stolen. 
 
We applied the rationale of ‗The Mercandian Continent‘ case (reported in [2001] Volume 
2 of the Lloyd‘s Law reports at page 563) which concerned the principle of ‗utmost good 
faith‘. Ultimately, the case held that insurers should only be able to ‗avoid‘ a policy for 
fraud where the insurer‘s ultimate liability was affected, or when the fraud was so serious 
it enabled the insurer to repudiate the policy for fundamental breach of contract. 
 
Following this rationale, we concluded that the fair and reasonable solution was for the 
insurer to reinstate the policy and pay the claim. In any event, it was unlikely that the 
firm‘s  ultimate  liability  would  be  affected  by  the  fraud,  as  Mr  H‘s  work  tools  were 
specifically  excluded  from  the  home  policy.  Home  policies  often  exclude  cover  for 
contents or possessions that are for business rather than personal use. 
 
We also pointed out to the firm that even if Mr H had been guilty of fraud, it would only 
have been entitled to ‗forfeit‘ the policy from the date of the current claim, leaving the 
earlier burglary claim intact. It was not entitled to recover previous payments for valid 
claims. 
 
42/4 
 
policyholder supplies misleading and fraudulent documents in the course of making a 
valid claim – insurers able to ‗forfeit‘ policy from the date of the claim 
 
Miss J made a claim under her general household policy for ‗escape of water‘ damage. 
As  the  damage  was  reasonably  limited,  the  firm  simply  asked  her  to  send  in  repair 
estimates. She provided three. The firm discovered that all three estimates — purporting 
to come from different contractors — were fraudulently produced by one contractor who 
had carried out extensive works for Miss J in the past. The firm considered Miss J to be 
guilty of fraud. It cancelled her policy and refused to deal with the claim. Miss J then 
bought her complaint to us. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
Miss J had already admitted supplying false information to the firm, and in an attempt to 
resolve  the  matter,  had  produced  further  –  genuine  –  estimates  from  independent 
contractors. However, these merely served to show the extent to which the prices quoted 
in the fraudulent estimates had been exaggerated. 
 
Once again, we applied the principles of ‗The Mercandian Continent‘ case (see case 
42/3). If the fraud had not been discovered, the firm would have ended up paying more 
in compensation than was properly required of it, and more than Miss J was legally 
entitled  to.  To  this  end,  the  fraud  affected  the  firm‘s  ultimate  liability  and  was  a 
fundamental breach of contract. 
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Having applied that rationale, we decided that the firm had been entitled to ‗forfeit‘ the 
policy from the date of the claim. 
 
42/5 
 
policyholder purposefully gives wrong details of stolen items – insurers able to ‗forfeit‘ 
policy from the date of the claim 
 
Mr G made a claim for goods stolen from his home during a burglary. Among the many 
items he claimed for were some Star Wars DVDs. This alerted the firm‘s loss adjusters 
to the possibility of fraud, since at the time of the burglary the films in question had not 
been released on DVD. The firm rejected the claim and ‗forfeited‘ Mr G‘s policy from the 
date of his claim. Mr G complained to us, arguing that he must have mistakenly claimed 
for pirated copies of the DVDs, and that this mistake did not warrant ‗forfeiture‘ of the 
policy. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
We were satisfied that this was a clear attempt to defraud the firm. There was evidence 
that  showed  ‗beyond  reasonable  doubt‘  –  more  than  the  usual  civil  requirement  of 
‗balance of probabilities‘ – that Mr G was claiming for something that he could never 
have owned. This higher standard of proof indicated that Mr G would still be guilty of 
fraud, even if the pirated DVDs did exist, since he had attempted to claim for legitimate 
copies. 
 
The value of the DVDs was relatively small compared with the overall size of the claim, 
but we did not feel this was a case of ‗innocent and minimal exaggeration‘. Mr G had 
dishonestly claimed for something he was not entitled to. This went to the very root of 
the insurance contract, and was a breach of the policyholder‘s duty to act in ‗utmost 
good faith‘ when submitting a claim. 
 
We also felt that this fraud, and Mr G‘s subsequent attempt to cover it up, cast doubt on 
the  validity  of  the  entire  claim.  The  firm‘s  decision  to  ‗forfeit‘  was  therefore  fair  and 
reasonable. 
 
Issue 44:  March 2005 
 
44/11 
 
Mr T underwent minor surgery to correct a prolapsed disc. The operation appeared to be 
uneventful.  However,  during  recovery  Mr  T  complained  of  tightness  in  his  neck  and 
eventually he was rushed to intensive care, where he died. The coroner concluded that 
the  cause  of  death  was  haemorrhaging  from  a  vertebral  artery.  When  the  insurer 
rejected the personal accident claim brought by Mr T‘s widow, she complained to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
The weight of the medical evidence indicated that the surgeon had negligently torn or cut 
the artery during the surgery. We felt that this was not a natural consequence of the risks 
inherent in surgery. Something had gone wrong and this was not what any of the parties 
to the surgery had anticipated. Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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The injury was not the natural result of the procedure as it was solely and directly caused 
by external, violent and visible means. The injury therefore fell within the scope of the 
policy. When we put this argument to the insurer, it agreed to meet the claim. 
 
44/12 
 
Mrs G had an operation to remove a lump from her neck. During recovery, the wound 
started to bleed profusely, resulting in a massive haemorrhage. As a result of this, Mrs G 
died. 
 
The insurer rejected a claim made by Mrs G‘s husband on their personal accident policy. 
It said that Mrs G‘s death had resulted from the complications of planned surgery – 
rather than from an accident. Mr G then brought his complaint to us. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
There was nothing to suggest that this was an accident. The medical reports and the 
coroner‘s inquest cleared the surgeons of any wrongdoing. No error had occurred during 
the operation. Mrs G was just one of the very few unfortunate patients who react badly to 
this type of surgical intervention. 
 
The bodily injury here was a natural, though tragic, consequence of the surgery. It was 
an anticipated risk which Mrs G had consented to, insofar as the general risks of surgical 
complications had been explained to her. So despite sympathising with Mr G‘s situation, 
we could not agree that the insurer had acted unfairly or unreasonably. 
 
Issue 47:  July 2005 
 
47/7 
 
legal expenses insurance  – insurer‘s panel solicitors obtain out-of-court settlement in 
unfair dismissal case – policyholder thinks she would have received more if insurer had 
taken case to an employment tribunal 
 
After Mrs T  lost her job, she made a claim under the legal expenses section of her 
household policy as she wanted to pursue an action for unfair dismissal against her 
former employer. 
 
The insurer agreed to investigate the claim. It instructed one of its panel solicitors to 
review the evidence and give an opinion on the merits of Mrs T‘s proposed action. The 
solicitors concluded that the case had reasonable prospects of success, so they entered 
into  pre-action  negotiations  with  the  other  side.  These  resulted  in  an  out-of-court 
settlement, which was endorsed by the employment tribunal. 
 
Mrs T felt that she would have received a higher amount if the dispute had been fought 
out  face-to-face  before  the  tribunal.  She  therefore  complained  to  us  that  the  insurer 
and/or its solicitors had prejudiced her case by refusing to provide the further funding 
that would have been needed for this. 
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We  were  satisfied  that  the  insurer  had  acted  on  the  independent  advice  of  legal 
professionals.  There  was  nothing  to  indicate  that  the  advice  was  patently  wrong  or 
based on factual errors. 
 
The solicitors had settled for less than their original estimate, but this was because their 
assessment  of  the prospects  of  success  had  changed  as  the case  proceeded.  New 
evidence  and  arguments  had  become  available  which  had  influenced  the  solicitors‘ 
opinion about the case. Such a change of view is not unusual or improper, given the 
complex and uncertain nature of litigation. 
 
Moreover, although we did not reveal this to Mrs T, the solicitors‘ files indicated real 
concerns  that  she  would  make  a  poor  witness.  In  our  view,  this  was  a  legitimate 
consideration for the solicitors when deciding whether or not to settle out of court. 
 
47/8 
 
legal  expenses  insurance  –  unhappy  with  insurer‘s  rejection  of  claim,  policyholder 
obtains separate and more favourable legal advice, but insurer refuses to reconsider 
 
After injuring herself at work, Miss E made a claim on her legal expenses insurance as 
she wished to pursue a case against her employers for negligence. The insurer‘s panel 
solicitors advised the insurer to reject the claim, on the basis that it had no reasonable 
prospects  of  success.  Miss  E  felt  that  the  insurer‘s  legal  advice  was  flawed.  She 
therefore  instructed  her  own  solicitors,  who  obtained  a  favourable  opinion  from  a 
barrister.  However,  the  insurer  refused  to  consider  the  matter  further,  so  Miss  E 
complained to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
While acknowledging the generally subjective nature of legal opinions, we felt Miss E 
had shown – on the balance of probabilities – that her employers did have a case to 
answer concerning their alleged negligence. 
 
Given  that  the  barrister  was  a  specialist  in  the  field  of  personal  injury  litigation,  we 
considered that her opinion tipped the balance in favour of Miss E. We therefore asked 
the insurer to: 
  reimburse Miss E‘s legal costs to date (with interest); and 
fund the reasonable costs of litigation, in accordance with the usual policy terms 
and conditions. 
 
We also  felt  that  it  would  be  fair  and  reasonable  for  the  insurer  to  allow  Miss  E  to 
continue with her own solicitors (and barrister) even before proceedings were issued. 
This was because the panel solicitors had been shown to be incompetent, in that they 
had  failed  to  consider  all  the  relevant  legal  issues  or  obtain  a  second  opinion  from 
counsel. 
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Issue 48:  August 2005 
 
48/1 
 
life assurance – inadvertent non-disclosure 
 
In December 2002 Mrs D applied to the firm for life assurance cover of £100,000 and for 
£35,000 critical illness cover. Two years later she was diagnosed with breast cancer. 
The firm refused to meet her claim. It said this was because she had not disclosed that 
for most of the early 1990s she had been suffering from, and received treatment for, 
back  pain  following  childbirth.  It  considered  the  fact  that  she  had  not  revealed  this 
information to be reckless non-disclosure. 
 
Mrs D told the firm that she had not thought she needed to disclose this information. She 
had thought the question on the firm‘s application form referred only to illnesses that had 
resulted in her taking time off work during the previous five years. It was more than five 
years since she had suffered from the back pain and she had never needed to take time 
off work because of it. 
 
In response, the firm pointed out that it had asked whether she had ‗ever suffered‘ from 
‗back or spinal trouble‘. Mrs D said she did not believe that back pain due to childbirth 
was ‗back or spinal trouble‘. Unable to reach agreement with the firm, Mrs D came to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
After studying the questions that the firm put to Mrs D when she applied for insurance, 
we noted that – in answer to most of the questions – Mrs D needed to give information 
only about any medical consultations that had occurred during the previous five years. 
 
However, the firm‘s question about ‗back or spinal trouble‘ was not limited to that five-
year period. We felt that the wording of this question was potentially misleading. We 
accepted  that  Mrs  D  had  genuinely  misunderstood  the  question  and  that  any  non-
disclosure was inadvertent. 
 
However, we thought that that a careful reading should have made it clear that the firm 
wanted to know about all back and spinal trouble, regardless of how it occurred or when 
she had sought treatment for it. We took the view that Mrs D had been slightly careless 
in completing the application. 
 
Slightly careless or inadvertent non-disclosure entitles an insurer to rewrite the insurance 
policy. It should do this on the terms that it would have offered originally, if it had been 
fully aware of the applicant‘s medical history. In this case, the firm would have offered full 
cover except for back and spinal problems. 
 
We required the firm to reinstate Mrs D‘s policy – adding the exclusion for back and 
spinal problems – and to deal with the claim on those terms. There was no connection 
between Mrs D‘s breast cancer and the exclusion clause so the firm had to meet her 
claim in full, together with interest. 
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48/2 
 
motor insurance – deliberate non-disclosure 
 
Mrs G took out motor insurance by telephone. In answer to one of the firm‘s questions 
she said that she was the owner and keeper of the car. Mrs G asked for her son, A, to be 
added to the policy as a named driver. 
 
The firm sent Mrs G details of all the information she had given and that it had relied on 
when deciding the terms of her insurance policy, asking her to let it know if anything was 
incorrect. Mrs G did not make any changes. 
 
A few months later, after A was involved in a road traffic accident, the firm discovered 
that the car was registered in his name, not his mother‘s. The firm also found that the 
receipt for the car named A as the purchaser. 
 
When the firm declined to meet the claim, Mrs G insisted that she was indeed the real 
purchaser and owner of the car. She said that the registration documents had been 
issued in her son‘s name by mistake. The firm told her it would not have insured the car 
at all if it had known that A was the owner. Unable to reach an agreement, Mrs G came 
to us. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
In our view, the questions that the firm had asked Mrs G when she applied for insurance 
were clear and unlikely to be misunderstood. And the firm had specifically drawn Mrs G‘s 
attention to the importance of accurate information and records. 
 
Her failure to reveal that the car was registered in A‘s name had induced the firm to offer 
insurance. As it would not have insured the vehicle if  it had been aware of the true 
position, the firm was entitled to avoid the policy (treat it as though it had never existed). 
We rejected the complaint. 
 
48/3 
 
life and critical illness insurance – innocent non-disclosure 
 
In January 2005, Mr E was diagnosed with lung cancer and put in a claim to the firm. 
Over  six  years  earlier,  in  November  1998,  he  had  taken  out  life  and  critical  illness 
insurance cover worth £150,000. 
 
After  carrying  out  enquiries,  the  firm  found  that  in  September  1997  Mr  E‘s  GP  had 
recorded that Mr E was consuming approximately 80 units of alcohol a week (21 units is 
the recommended maximum weekly amount for men). In February 1998 Mr E‘s alcohol 
consumption was up to 84 units a week but by July of the next year it had gone down to 
a more moderate 40+ units a week. 
 
The firm said this differed greatly from the declaration Mr E made when applying for 
insurance. He had said then that his average alcohol consumption was five units a day 
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have increased his premium by 200-300%. It refused to pay the claim and it returned his 
premium, avoiding the policy from its start date. 
 
Mr E was extremely angry with the firm‘s response. He said that when he applied for the 
insurance he had answered all the firm‘s questions accurately. He pointed out that he 
had, at that time, been the sole carer for his newly-born daughter and could not have 
handled his responsibilities if he had been drinking as heavily as before. The firm still 
maintained that he was likely to have been drinking more than he had claimed. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
When the complaint was referred to us we found no evidence concerning Mr E‘s drinking 
habits at the time he applied for the insurance. The amount he had said he was drinking 
(five units a day or 35 units a week) was close to the 40+ units a week that his GP had 
recorded eight months later. Mr E had given a plausible explanation for his answer and 
the firm had no justification for disregarding it. 
 
As there was no evidence of non-disclosure or misrepresentation, we required the firm to 
reinstate the policy and meet the claim. The firm agreed to pay the full sum of £150,000, 
plus interest. 
 
48/4 
 
household insurance – deliberate non-disclosure 
 
Mr A applied for household insurance. After receiving his completed questionnaire, the 
firm  agreed  to  put  the  policy  into  effect  from  28  June  2002.  They  also  sent  him  a 
statement of facts, setting out the information he had given. In response to a question 
asking whether he had any ‗non-motoring convictions‘ he had replied ‗none‘. 
 
The following day, Mr A contacted the firm to say that his house had been burgled. 
However,  the  firm  was  unable  to  get  any  response  when  it  tried  to  arrange  for  its 
investigator to visit him at home. It heard nothing more until January 2003, when it was 
informed that Mr A was in jail. 
 
In the course of the firm‘s subsequent investigations, it discovered that – at the time Mr A 
took out his policy  – he had a criminal record for possession of drugs and resisting 
arrest. After making the burglary claim, Mr A had again been found in possession of 
drugs and was fined for resisting arrest. Finally, three months after the burglary, he was 
remanded in custody on a murder charge. 
 
The firm told Mr A that it would not have insured him if it had been aware of his criminal 
record. It said it would avoid his policy and refund the premium. Mr A complained to the 
firm, saying he had not been asked about his criminal record. When the firm rejected his 
complaint he came to us. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
Unfortunately the firm was unable to produce the questionnaire that Mr A had completed 
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established that the firm was likely to have asked Mr A whether he had any non-motoring 
convictions. 
 
Mr A admitted that he had kept a copy of the application form. However, he would not let 
us see it. 
 
We  concluded  that  although  the  firm  was  remiss  in  not  keeping  all  the  original 
paperwork, it had still been entitled to decide that Mr A had not answered its questions 
accurately, and to avoid his policy for deliberate non-disclosure. 
 
48/5 
 
household insurance – deliberate non-disclosure 
 
Mr M‘s home was broken into in October 2002. The burglars had kicked in a panel in his 
back door and stolen many of his possessions. After accepting his claim for the stolen 
contents, the firm arranged for one of its approved contractors to replace the back door, 
even  though  the  council  owned  the  property  and  was  responsible  for  repairing  the 
damage. 
 
Early the following year, shortly before Mr M‘s policy was due to expire, the firm sent him 
a renewal questionnaire. This asked for details of his current security arrangements. Mr 
M completed the form, confirming that his external doors had ‗a mortise deadlock and 
security bolts or a key-operated locking system‘. 
 
The firm renewed the policy, but  within a month Mr  M‘s property was broken into a 
second  time.  Again,  the  thieves  had  kicked  in  the  rear  door  panel.  When  the  firm 
discovered that the back door did not, in fact, have security bolts or a key-operated 
locking system, it refused to meet Mr M‘s claim. After complaining unsuccessfully to the 
firm, Mr M came to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We  accepted  Mr  M‘s  explanation  that  he  had  assumed  the  firm‘s  contractors  had 
installed a door that met the firm‘s own security requirements. It was careless of him not 
to have double-checked this. However, given that his other answers were accurate, we 
were satisfied that he had not deliberately or recklessly supplied an incorrect answer. 
 
We also took two further factors into account. First, even if Mr M had realised that he 
needed to fit bolts, we did not believe they would have impeded the burglary. This was 
because the burglars had entered the house by kicking in the door panel. Second, even 
if Mr M had answered the question correctly, the firm would still have allowed him a 
reasonable period of time in which to change the locks. The burglary occurred within this 
timescale. 
 
We  upheld  the  claim.  We  did  not  think  Mr  M‘s  failure  to  comply  with  the  security 
condition was connected with the loss and we pointed out to the firm that it was good 
insurance practice to meet claims in such circumstances. 
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48/6 
 
term life assurance and critical illness insurance – reckless non-disclosure 
 
In December 2001, Mr and Mrs W applied for term life assurance and critical illness 
insurance. This included own occupation cover, which paid benefits if either of them was 
unable to continue with their own occupation because of permanent total disablement. 
 
In  response  to  the  firm‘s  questions  they  both  stated  that  they  were  not  ‗currently 
receiving  any  medical  treatment  or  attention  or  awaiting  any  medical  or  surgical 
consultation, test or investigation‘ and had ‗never had any medical or surgical treatment, 
including  investigations,  tests,  scan  or  X-rays  for  any  …  mental  or  nervous  illness 
(including depression) lasting for more than 3 months and/or requiring more than 10 
consecutive days off work‘. 
 
The firm accepted the application on the condition that, since signing the application, Mr 
and Mrs W had not ‗suffered any illness or required any medical attention or changed 
occupation‘. 
 
Two years later, Mrs W submitted a claim for rheumatoid arthritis but the firm refused to 
meet it. It said her medical records showed that she had been consulting a doctor for 
carpal tunnel syndrome and depression for about eight years before the date when she 
applied for the policy. She had not disclosed this. 
 
In addition, she had never disclosed that – after she had submitted her application but a 
few days before it was accepted – she had seen her doctor for pain and swelling in her 
ankle. And she had failed to tell the firm that, before she received the firm‘s offer of 
acceptance, she had changed her occupation. 
 
The firm said that although it was entitled to treat the whole policy as void from the start, 
it  would  not  do  this.  However,  it  would  exclude  claims  for  Mrs  W‘s  previous  health 
problems and would no longer provide the own occupation cover. Unhappy with this, Mr 
and Mrs W referred the complaint to us. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
We did not consider there to be any basis for requiring the firm to pay the sum insured 
for Mrs W‘s rheumatoid arthritis. We accepted that there was no link between her carpal 
tunnel syndrome and depression and the onset of her rheumatoid arthritis. However, this 
did not change the fact that, in response to clear questions, she had failed to disclose 
information about her health. 
 
In our opinion it was fair and reasonable of the firm to offer to rewrite the policy on the 
terms it would have offered originally — if it had been given the correct information. Mr 
and Mrs W appeared to have given very little thought to the accuracy of their answers, 
and their non-disclosure appeared to be at least reckless, which would have entitled the 
firm to void the policy. 
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48/7 
 
commercial insurance – non-disclosure 
 
In January 2001, there was a serious fire at Mrs Y‘s shop, which was insured with the 
firm under a commercial policy. The fire brigade thought the fire might have been caused 
by an electrical fault. 
 
The firm made an interim payment to Mrs Y of £10,000 and appointed loss adjusters. In 
the course of their investigations the loss adjusters discovered that Mrs Y‘s business 
owed its suppliers £70,000. Mrs Y had borrowed almost £100,000 from her bank over 
the previous two years and had made incorrect statements when applying for the bank 
loans. The loss adjusters also discovered that, in her original insurance application, Mrs 
Y had failed to disclose that the ground floor of her shop unit was unoccupied and was 
not properly secured. 
 
The firm told Mrs Y that it was treating her policy as void. This was because she had 
failed to disclose that the building was not secure and that her business was in difficulty, 
even though it had questioned her directly about these matters. The firm also believed 
that Mrs Y had committed a criminal offence in misrepresenting the purpose of the loans. 
Unhappy with the firm‘s actions, Mrs Y referred her complaint to us. 
 
Complaint dismissed 
 
Mrs Y denied that her business was in difficulty. She said the money she had borrowed 
from the bank had originally been intended for home improvements, but she had later 
changed her mind. 
 
We noted that Mrs Y had run her business for several years and claimed to have run a 
previous  business  overseas.  So  the  firm  was  entitled  to  treat  her  as  a  commercial 
customer and not a consumer. This meant that the firm was entitled to rely on the strict 
legal position. In the circumstances of this case and because of the fraud allegations, we 
concluded that the dispute was not suitable for our informal procedures and would better 
be dealt with in a court. 
 
Issue 49:  September/ October 2005 
 
49/1 
 
annual  travel  policy  –  policyholder  discloses  newly-diagnosed  illness  when  renewing 
policy – firm offers right to cancel 
 
In April 2004, Mr A booked a holiday to Cyprus, departing in March the following year. 
His annual travel policy was due to be renewed on 30 December 2004. 
 
In July 2004 he was unexpectedly diagnosed with cancer and began having treatment. 
This was still ongoing when the time came to renew his policy. The prognosis was good, 
however, and he expected to be well enough to travel in time for his holiday. 
 
When  the  firm  sent  Mr  A  his  renewal  documents,  which  clearly  outlined  the 
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Mr A told the firm about his cancer. The firm responded right away, saying that – as from 
the renewal date – his policy would exclude any claims resulting from the cancer. 
 
After Mr A complained to the firm about this, it told him that if he cancelled the holiday it 
would meet his claim for the cancellation costs. Unhappy with this, Mr A brought his 
complaint to us, saying he did not want to cancel his holiday, but was uneasy about 
travelling without full insurance cover. 
 
Complaint dismissed 
 
There had been a material change in Mr A‘s circumstances since his policy had started. 
This meant that the firm was not obliged to offer to renew the policy on the existing 
terms. It is not our practice to interfere with firms‘ legitimate commercial decisions, such 
as the one it faced here regarding the underwriting risks. 
 
The firm had offered Mr A the option of cancelling the holiday without any cost to him. 
We considered this to be fair and reasonable, in the circumstances. Under our rules we 
may dismiss a complaint if the ombudsman is ‗satisfied that the firm has already made 
an offer of compensation which is fair and reasonable in relation to the circumstances 
alleged by the complainant and which is still open for acceptance‘ [DISP 3.3.1(4)]. We 
therefore dismissed the complaint. 
 
49/2 
 
policyholder  with  pre-existing  medical  condition  denied  fair  opportunity  to  make  pre-
emptive cancellation claim at the date of renewal 
 
Miss J was a member of her employer‘s group annual travel policy that was renewed in 
June  each  year.  In  January  2004  she  booked  a  holiday  for  that  September. 
Unfortunately, however, in April she was diagnosed with a minor heart condition. The 
condition was controlled with medication and her doctors were satisfied that she would 
be fit to travel by September. Miss J did not mention the heart condition to the firm when 
the policy came up for renewal, not least because all the renewal documentation was 
processed by her employer. 
 
Shortly  before  her  trip,  Miss  J  suffered  a  heart  attack  and  had  to  cancel.  The  firm 
rejected her claim for the unused cost of travel and accommodation, citing the exclusion 
clause  in  the  policy  that  related  to  pre-existing  medical  conditions.  Miss  J  then 
complained to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
There  was  no  evidence  of  any  bad  faith  on  Miss  J‘s  part  –  or  of  deliberate  non-
disclosure. She had simply not appreciated the nature of her travel insurance: that it was 
an annual, discrete contract. 
 
The renewal documentation that Miss J received did not make it clear that she was 
under any duty to disclose any changes in her medical circumstances. And there was 
nothing that might have alerted her to the possibility that the holiday she had booked 
before her illness was diagnosed might not be covered after the annual renewal date. 
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We asked the firm to pay the full cancellation costs that Miss J incurred, rather than the 
(cheaper) costs she would have incurred if she had cancelled some months earlier, at 
the time the policy was renewed. This was because we were satisfied that the firm had 
breached its duty to inform customers of the need to notify it of material changes of 
circumstance.  Miss  J  had  never  been  given  the  opportunity  to  make  an  informed 
decision about cancelling at an earlier stage, before it was medically necessary. 
 
49/3 
 
policyholder  became  ill  after  booking  holiday  —  firm  should  have  offered  to  pay 
cancellation  costs  under  the  expiring  policy  from  the  date  of  renewal,  even  though 
cancellation was not medically necessary at that date 
 
Mr  G‘s  annual  travel  policy  came  up  for  renewal  each  March.  Towards  the  end  of 
January 2004, just a couple of weeks after he had booked a trip to South Africa for that 
December, he became ill with angina. 
 
When the firm sent Mr G the policy renewal documents he told it about the change in his 
health. As a result, the firm added an exclusion clause to the new policy. This stated that 
the policy would not cover any claims arising directly or indirectly from angina. Unwilling 
to travel without cover for his angina, Mr G thought he had no option but to cancel the 
holiday, which he did (at his own expense) in April 2004. 
 
Unhappy with the situation, Mr G complained to us. He said he resented having being 
‗forced‘ to cancel his holiday and he wanted the firm to re-issue the policy on the same 
terms as before. 
 
Complaint partially upheld 
 
The firm was entitled to impose an exclusion clause for a pre-existing medical condition 
which Mr G had disclosed in accordance with his duty of utmost good faith. That was a 
legitimate underwriting decision. 
 
But we did not think it was fair and reasonable to leave Mr G with no cover at all for the 
holiday  he  had  already  booked.  We  felt  that  the  firm  should  have  given  him  the 
opportunity to cancel the holiday and claim under the expiring policy. Mr G did not have 
to take up this offer, but he would still be aware that his trip would proceed at his own 
risk.  We  therefore  asked  the  firm  to  reimburse  Mr  G  for  the  costs  of  cancelling  his 
holiday. 
 
Issue 52:    April 06 
 
52/1 
 
income protection – calculation of benefit where earnings unaffected by disability 
 
Mr G, a self-employed IT consultant, took out an income protection insurance policy. The 
policy had a limitation of benefit clause restricting the amount of benefit he could be paid 
to 75% of his normal earnings. 
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Several years later Mr G made a claim under the policy, on the grounds that repetitive 
strain injury was affecting his ability to work. 
 
The firm reviewed Mr G‘s business accounts to see whether his medical condition had 
affected his income. It noted that he had not recorded payments he had made to a sub-
contractor.  It  also  found  that  the  accounts  did  not  show  all  of  Mr  G‘s  income  and 
expenditure. So it decided the accounts were unreliable. It did, however, agree to pay 
the claim until it was able to review Mr G‘s audited accounts, when it would re-consider 
the position. 
 
When  it  examined  the  audited  accounts,  the  firm  compared  Mr  G‘s  pre-disability 
earnings with his net income and ‗drawings‘ for the period after he made his claim. It 
concluded  that  he  had  not  suffered  a  loss  of  income  because  of  his  disability,  so  it 
stopped his benefit payments. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
When a self-employed policyholder makes a claim, the firm must be satisfied there was 
an actual loss of income. In this case, Mr G‘s audited accounts did not show a loss. 
Despite his disability, Mr G‘s business remained profitable. Indeed, the business had 
made a significantly higher net profit in the period after his claim than in the year in which 
his illness began. 
 
Mr G disagreed with the firm‘s assessment. He said the accounts showed an artificial 
profit and that he had been forced to borrow money to remain trading. But the turnover 
figures suggested that sales sustained profits, rather than just borrowings. 
 
In any event, under the limitation of benefit provision in his policy, Mr G wasn‘t entitled to 
benefit unless his earnings were less than they had been before his disability. Mr G had 
continued to earn more than he would have been entitled to in benefits. We rejected his 
complaint. 
 
52/2 
 
income protection – calculation of increases in benefit 
 
Mr M took out an income protection policy in October 1991. He selected an option that 
protected him against the effects of inflation by increasing his benefit by 7.5% each year. 
This option was subject to an annual increase in premium. 
 
In 1994, Mr M became disabled and made a claim on his policy. The firm wrote to tell 
him how his benefit would be calculated. The standard policy restricted benefit to two-
thirds  of  the  amount  the  policyholder  was  earning  immediately  before  becoming 
disabled. However, because of the option he selected when he took out the policy, Mr 
M‘s benefit payments were more than this. 
 
For several years, Mr M‘s benefit payments continued to increase at the rate of 7.5% per 
year. But then the firm reviewed its policies. It decided the standard policy condition, 
which limited benefit to two-thirds of the policyholder‘s salary, over-rode the increases 
arising  from  the  inflation-protecting  option.  When  the  firm  rejected  Mr  M‘s  complaint 
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Complaint upheld 
 
It was clear from the policy documents that the option Mr M had selected: 
 
    * was intended to offset the effects of inflation; and 
    * had been sold to Mr M on this basis. 
 
Neither the policy itself, nor any of the associated promotional literature, made it clear 
whether the benefit cap applied to the option. We decided it was reasonable for Mr M to 
have assumed the two-thirds cap would not have applied in his case, since it appeared 
to apply only to the ‗standard‘ policy. 
 
Selecting the option would have been pointless for Mr M if the cap had been applied 
from the outset of the claim, as the firm said it should have been. At the outset of his 
claim, Mr M‘s benefit was already two-thirds of his pre-disability earnings. So despite 
paying higher premiums for the option he could never have benefited from the increase it 
was designed to provide. 
 
The way in which the policy had been sold and/or represented did not make it clear that 
the benefit cap would limit any increase arising from the option. We decided it would be 
unfair of the firm to restrict Mr M‘s claim to the original benefit limit. We told the firm to 
reinstate the increases arising from the option and to backdate any payments owing to 
Mr M, plus interest. 
 
52/3 
 
income protection – calculation of benefit against continuing income 
 
Mr J, a self-employed architect, had been unable to work because he was suffering from 
stress. He made a claim for income replacement benefit under his income protection 
policy. The firm accepted his claim but said he would not be paid any benefit because he 
was continuing to receive earnings from his business. 
 
The firm calculated Mr J‘s entitlement to benefit in accordance with the policy terms, 
which required it to take continuing income into account. Mr J‘s continuing income from 
his  business  was  £55,000.  This  was  more  than  the  maximum  allowable  benefit, 
calculated as 75% of the first £50,000 of his annual earnings immediately before the 
start of his disability. 
 
Mr J said that when he arranged the insurance he had provided the firm with copies of 
his  accounts.  The  firm‘s  adviser  had  not  based  his  calculations  on  Mr  J‘s  annual 
earnings  (including  both  ‗drawings‘  and  share  of  profits)  but  only  on  his  annual 
‗drawings‘. So Mr J said the level of earnings that needed replacing (£50,000) had been 
undervalued at the outset. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
There was no evidence that Mr J had supplied his accounts at the time he took out the 
policy. And the firm‘s adviser had based his calculation of the appropriate level of benefit 
on  Mr  J‘s  gross  earnings,  as  declared  on  the  application  form.  On  this  basis,  we Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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determined  that  the  income  replacement  benefit  provided  was  likely  to  have  been 
appropriate at the time of sale. 
 
Even if this were not the case, the claim was not affected. Mr J had not suffered a 
sufficient  reduction  in  income  to  justify  a  payment  of  benefit,  so  we  rejected  the 
complaint. 
 
Issue 54:    July 06 
 
54/4 
 
cancellation of motor insurance by policyholder – whether firm correct in refusing any 
refund of premiums 
 
Mr A took out the firm‘s standard motor policy in February 2005 and paid the annual 
premium in full. Five months later, he decided to sell his car as he no longer needed it. 
However, when he returned his policy to the firm, it refused his request for a refund of 
some of the premium. 
 
The firm said that if it cancelled a policy, then it would normally make a pro rata refund of 
the amount the customer had paid. However, when a customer cancelled the policy it did 
not refund any premiums if the cancellation was made four or more months after the 
start of the policy. When the firm rejected Mr A‘s complaint about this, he came to us – 
saying he thought the firm was ‗grossly unfair‘. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We asked the firm for a copy of the policy conditions. These included the following: 
 
‗cancellation by us 
 
... If you return your certificate… to us we will refund the part of your premium which 
applies to the period of insurance you have left. If we cancel this insurance because you 
have not paid the full premium, we will work out the refund using the rates shown below. 
We will not give you a refund if anyone has claimed in the current insurance period. 
 
cancellation by you 
 
If you have not made any claims in the current period of insurance, and you are not 
going to make a claim, we will work out a charge for the time you have been covered 
using our short-period rates shown below. We will refund any amount we owe you. 
 
Period of time you      Refund of up to 
have had the cover 
one month         70% 
two months         60% 
three months        50% 
four months         40% 
more than four months     0% 
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Any  refund  made  to  you  for  any  reason  above  will  only  be  provided  if  your  annual 
premium per vehicle exceeds £150.‘ 
 
We asked the firm to explain why it had made these particular conditions. It said its main 
concerns had been to discourage customers from cancelling their policies and to recover 
the costs it incurred if they did so. 
 
We then asked the firm how its costs could be so large as to justify its making no refund 
at all to customers cancelling more than four months after taking out a policy. The firm 
was unable to do this. 
 
We concluded that the policy condition was unfair and contrary to the UTCCR. So we 
told  the  firm  it  should  make  a  pro  rata  refund,  after  deducting  a  reasonable 
administration fee. 
 
54/5 
 
cancellation  of  house  insurance by  policyholder  –  whether  firm  correct  to charge  an 
administration fee 
 
Mr Y insured his house with the firm in June 2005. When he married in December that 
year, he sold the house and cancelled his policy. In accordance with the cancellation 
condition in the policy document, the firm made a pro rata refund of his premiums, less a 
sum of £50 to cover its administration costs. 
 
Mr Y thought it unfair of the firm to levy an administration fee, since he considered that 
administrative costs should already have been built in to the amount he had paid for his 
insurance. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
We agreed with Mr Y that the firm had allowed for administration costs when it calculated 
the price of its policy. However, since the policy had only – in the event – lasted for six 
months, the firm would not have recouped all of these costs; it had only received half the 
annual  premium.  And  we  were  satisfied  that  it  had  also  incurred  additional  and 
unexpected costs in cancelling the policy. We therefore rejected the complaint. 
 
Issue 56    September/October 2006 
 
56/1 
 
travel  insurance  –  whether  cancellation  caused  by  events  outside  the  policyholder's 
control 
 
In mid-April Mr G, an investment banker, visited his local travel agent and booked a 
week's holiday to Moscow, departing three months later, on 16 July. At the same time, 
the travel agent sold him travel insurance to cover the trip. 
 
Five days before the holiday, Mr G realised that he had not yet obtained a visa. He knew 
this shouldn't be a problem because, for an additional fee, the Russian consulate offered 
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As he was very busy at work, Mr G gave the completed visa application to his mother 
and asked her to send it off for him. Unfortunately, Mrs G enclosed the fee for the 3-5 
working day turn-around, not for the 'fast track' service her son needed. 
 
Becoming extremely anxious when – the day before his holiday was due to start – the 
visa had still not arrived, Mr G phoned the Russian consulate and Royal Mail. Neither 
could help him, so he called round to see the travel agent. 
 
The travel agent told Mr G he would be able to claim a 50% refund from the insurer if he 
cancelled the holiday immediately – but would get nothing if he left it any later. Mr G 
cancelled. 
 
Half an hour later he got home to find the visa had arrived. It was too late to reinstate his 
booking. And in due course the travel insurer told him he was not entitled to claim back 
any of the money he had paid for the holiday. The insurer pointed out that Mr G was only 
covered if he was forced to cancel for reasons beyond his control. It did not consider his 
failure to obtain a visa in time to be a matter outside his own control. 
 
Mr G disputed this – saying that the cancellation had been caused by 'an unforeseeable 
mix-up'  between  him  and  his  mother  –  and  that  this  'mix-up'  had  been  outside  his 
control. When the insurer rejected Mr G's complaint, he came to us. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
We looked at the wording of Mr G's policy. Under the heading, 'cancellation cover – what 
you are covered for', it said: 
 
'If  you  have  to  cancel  or  curtail  your  trip  through  your  inability  to  travel  for  reasons 
beyond your control following an event that happened after the commencement date of 
this Certificate we will pay up to the amount shown above in respect of ... travel costs 
which you have paid or are contracted to pay and which you cannot recover from any 
other source ...'. 
 
It was clear that Mr G's reason for cancelling the holiday was not outside his control. He 
had left it until the week before his departure before applying for his visa. And he had 
then chosen to delegate to his mother the task of arranging payment and sending off his 
application. In our view, it was his responsibility to ensure the correct fee was enclosed 
with his application. We rejected the complaint. 
 
56/2 
 
travel insurance – whether insurer should pay curtailment claim when policyholder was 
taken ill but did not return home before scheduled end of the holiday 
 
In April 2003, while on a cruise with his wife to celebrate their silver wedding, Mr B 
tripped on some steps and broke his leg. After his leg had been put in plaster, Mr B was 
prescribed strong painkillers and spent the remainder of the cruise – a total of 11 days – 
in his cabin. 
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When the couple returned home, Mr B submitted a claim under his travel  insurance 
policy for medical expenses and for the curtailment of his and his wife's holiday. The 
insurer settled the medical expenses claim. However, it rejected the curtailment claim in 
its entirety, on the grounds that Mr and Mrs B had not left the ship and returned home 
before the scheduled end of their holiday. 
 
After Mr B disputed this decision, the  insurer agreed to meet half of  the curtailment 
claim. It paid the cost of the final 11 days of the cruise (less the policy excess) – but only 
for Mr B, not for his wife. 
 
Mr B said the insurer should pay for his wife as well, because after his accident she had 
remained in the cabin to look after him. However, the insurer disagreed, so Mr B came to 
us. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
The travel policy provided cancellation cover '... if you are forced to curtail your trip and 
return home after departure as a direct and necessary result of any cause outside your 
control...'. 
 
There had been no medical reason for Mr B to leave the ship and return home before 
the end of the cruise. He and his wife would have preferred to return home, but this was 
not the same as being forced to do so. We were satisfied that the insurer's payment of 
half of Mr B's curtailment claim was fair and reasonable, and we rejected the complaint. 
 
56/3 
 
travel  insurance  –  whether  an  insurer  correctly  relied  on  policy  exclusion  to  refuse 
cancellation claim resulting from policyholder's ill-health 
 
Mr K occasionally suffered from migraines but was otherwise in excellent health. So he 
was somewhat concerned when, for no apparent reason, he collapsed and briefly lost 
consciousness. 
 
He soon recovered but 'just to be on the safe side', as he later told us, he made an 
appointment with his GP. Mr K saw the doctor four days later – on 30 August 2005 – and 
told her he had felt perfectly well until immediately before he passed out. At that point he 
had started to feel dizzy and had then found himself unable to stand. 
 
The doctor told Mr K that his collapse had in all probability been related to a migraine. 
However, the doctor thought it would be a sensible precaution to have a brain scan, just 
to rule out any possibility that Mr K might have had a minor stroke. 
 
In  her  referral  letter  to  the  hospital,  which  we  later  asked  to  see  as  part  of  our 
investigation, the doctor stressed that she did not think Mr K had suffered a stroke. But 
she  said  she  wanted  Mr  K  to  have  the  scan  in  order  to  'completely  rule  out  this 
possibility'. 
 
Mr K's appointment for the scan was on 27 September 2005. A couple of weeks before 
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insurance policy. The holiday was to start on 30 September, a few days after he was due 
to have the scan. 
 
The result of the scan came back on 28 September and revealed that Mr K had suffered 
a minor stroke. His doctor told him he should not fly for at least three months, so Mr K 
cancelled his holiday. 
 
The insurer rejected the claim Mr K made under his travel insurance policy. It pointed out 
that the policy contained an exclusion from cover for: 
 
'... any condition of which the policyholder was aware at commencement of the policy or 
for  which  he  received  advice,  treatment  or  counselling  from  any  registered  medical 
practitioner  during  the  12  months  preceding  the  commencement  date,  whether 
diagnosed or not'. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
There was clear evidence that – at the time Mr K had taken out the policy – both he and 
his doctor had thought that the dizziness and resultant collapse had been caused by a 
fairly minor ailment – not by a stroke. 
 
So we told the insurer that it its reliance on the policy exclusion in order to reject the 
claim  was  neither  fair  nor  reasonable.  And  citing  the  legal  case,  Cook  v  Financial 
Insurance  Co  Ltd  [1998]  1  WLR  1765,  we  told  the  insurer  that  it  had  not  acted  in 
accordance with the law. 
 
We said the insurer should meet Mr K's claim, less any excess, and pay him interest 
from the date of the cancellation. We also said it should compensate him for the distress 
and inconvenience he had been caused. 
 
56/4 
 
travel insurance – whether insurer correct in refusing to pay repatriation expenses for 
policyholder taken seriously ill on holiday 
 
Mr C, a 45-year old landscape gardener, was taken seriously ill while on holiday in West 
Africa. It was clear that he would require major surgery. And it seemed probable that he 
would need a blood transfusion during or after the operation. 
 
The treating doctor thought Mr C should be flown home to the UK for the operation, 
despite the risk that he might suffer further problems while waiting for this to be arranged 
– and during the flight itself. 
 
Mr  C  contacted  his  insurer  to  explain  his  predicament.  He  asked  for  assistance  in 
arranging his flight home but the insurer said it could not help. It insisted that flying was 
too risky for him. 
 
The doctor treating Mr C had provided an oral assurance that Mr C was fit to fly, and had 
explained why repatriation was in his best interests. But the insurer said it would need a 
written report to this effect before it could reconsider the matter. 
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Mr  C  argued,  unsuccessfully,  that  the  insurer's  insistence  on  a  written  report  was 
unreasonable, bearing in mind the urgency of the situation and the doctor's view that it 
was in his best interests to be repatriated. Anxious not to delay matters any longer, Mr C 
arranged and paid for the flight home himself. 
 
Once Mr C had recovered from his operation, he complained to the insurer about its 
handling of the matter. The insurer rejected his complaint, arguing that its representative 
had acted in Mr C's best interests because she genuinely believed he had not been fit to 
fly home. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
In medical cases, the evidence of the treating doctor is normally very persuasive. The 
doctor is generally best placed to assess their patient's situation at the time the problem 
arises. This was such a case, and we agreed with the treating doctor's assessment of 
the risks in flying Mr C home, when set against the risks associated with carrying out his 
operation in West Africa. 
 
The  doctor  who  subsequently  operated  on  Mr  C  in  the  UK  confirmed  that,  in  the 
circumstances, it had been the best course of action for Mr C to return home for surgery. 
Most medical facilities in West Africa are still fairly basic. And the risk of contracting HIV 
as a result of a blood transfusion is much higher there than in countries where there is 
an effective donor-screening programme. 
 
We felt that in this particular case the insurer's insistence on a written report had been 
unreasonable. The Insurance Conduct of Business Rules state that an insurer should 
not reject a claim on the basis that a policy condition (such as having to provide a written 
report) has been breached, unless the circumstances of the breach are connected to the 
loss. In other words, the insurer's position must have been prejudiced as a result of the 
breach. 
 
Since the treating doctor in Africa had given an assurance that repatriation was in Mr C's 
best interests (even though he had not put this in writing), we did not think it a material 
factor that Mr C had not provided the insurer with a written report. 
 
We upheld the complaint and required the insurer to reimburse Mr C for the expenses he 
had incurred in returning to the UK. We also said it should pay him a significant amount 
for the distress and inconvenience he had experienced because of its refusal to assist 
with his repatriation. 
 
56/5 
 
travel insurance – whether insurer right to reject policyholder's cancellation claim after 
her father became ill 
 
In October 2004, Miss J visited a travel agent and booked to go on holiday to Greece in 
June the following year. The travel agent also sold her an insurance policy to cover the 
holiday. 
 
In January 2005, Miss J's father was diagnosed with a heart problem. He responded well 
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weeks before the start of Miss J's holiday – his condition suddenly deteriorated. Miss J 
found she needed to look after him almost full-time. 
 
She tried to arrange some respite care, so that she could get away for her holiday as 
planned. However, it proved impossible to find a suitable carer at such short notice. Miss 
J cancelled the holiday and submitted a claim under her travel insurance policy for the 
full cost of cancellation. 
 
The insurer rejected her claim. It referred to the following provisions: 
 
'Cancellation: 
 
Cover applies if You have booked a Trip to take place within the Period of Insurance, but 
You are forced to cancel Your travel plans because of one of the following changes in 
circumstances, which is beyond Your control, and of which You were unaware at the 
time you booked the Trip … 
 
    * Unforeseen illness, injury or death of a Close Relative as confirmed to Our medical 
staff by the treating doctor, who will deem whether it is necessary for You to cancel or 
curtail Your Trip … 
 
To  declare  a  Pre-existing  Medical  condition  or  a  change  in  Your  state  of  health  or 
prescribed medication, You should contact the Medical Screening Helpline ...'. 
 
The insurer said that Miss J had been aware of her father's illness in January and could 
have cancelled the holiday at that stage for only 15% of the cost. It also said she should 
have contacted its helpline in January (to declare the change in her father's state of 
health),  and  again  in  May  (when  his  condition  worsened  and  she  had  attempted  to 
obtain respite care for him). 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
The medical evidence we obtained confirmed that: 
 
    * Mr J's condition had responded very well to treatment in January and 
    * there had been no reason at that time for Miss J to believe her father's state of 
health would force her to cancel her holiday. 
 
It was the unexpected change in  Mr J's health  in  May, and Miss J's inability to find 
respite care, that meant she had to cancel the holiday. We found that Miss J had acted 
reasonably  and  promptly  in  seeking  respite  care,  and  in  notifying  the  insurer  and 
cancelling the holiday when this proved impossible. 
 
We did not believe the policy imposed a duty on the policyholder to call the insurer's 
medical screening helpline if there was a change in the health of anyone on whom the 
holiday might depend. Any such duty would constitute an 'onerous' term, and would have 
to be made very clear to the customer before the policy was sold. The insurer had made 
no effort to do this through its own policy summary or sales documentation, or through 
the efforts of the travel agent. 
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We upheld the complaint and required the insurer to reimburse Miss J for the full cost of 
cancelling her holiday. 
 
Issue 58:    December 2006/ January 2007 
 
58/1 
 
Whether policyholders are covered for ‗trace and access‘ work and/or pipe repairs 
 
When a maturing insurance policy produced a larger sum than expected, Mr G decided 
to spend part of the money on a cruise. He had recently taken early retirement on ill-
health grounds and his wife thought a trip to the Caribbean over Christmas and New 
Year would boost his spirits. 
 
Before the couple left home, they turned off their central heating. They were anxious to 
save on their gas bill while they were away. 
 
Three weeks later, Mr and Mrs G returned home to find their kitchen flooded with water 
from the bathroom above. The weather had been particularly cold while they were away 
and  the  water  in  the  pipes  had  frozen,  expanding  and  cracking  the  metal.  As  the 
temperature rose, the ice melted and water flooded out of the pipes, causing extensive 
damage to the kitchen ceiling, walls and carpet. 
 
The insurer accepted the claim and arranged to put right the damage caused by the 
flooding.  But  it  would  not  reimburse  Mr  G  for  the  cost of  calling  out  the  emergency 
plumber to find the source of the leak and fix it. After complaining to the insurer about 
this without success, Mr G came to us. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
Details of the cover were set out very clearly in the policy. Mr and Mrs G were covered 
for loss or damage caused by ‗escape of water‘. But they were not covered for ‗trace and 
access‘ – the cost of finding and repairing the source of the damage. 
 
This restriction on the scope of the cover was neither unusual nor significant. So it was 
not something the insurer needed to have highlighted in its policy summary, given to 
customers at the point of sale. 
 
As with most home insurance policies, the ‗trace and access‘ cost and the plumber's 
fees for replacing the damaged pipe were uninsured losses, which had to be borne by 
the policyholder. We rejected the complaint. 
 
58/2 
 
Whether there is cover for ‗escape of water‘ when insured premises are left unoccupied 
 
After a major lottery win, Mr and Mrs W decided to spend some of the money on a three-
month cruise. Before they set off on their trip early in the New Year, they switched off 
their heating and hot water. 
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The couple returned home at the beginning of April to find that burst internal water pipes 
had caused a significant amount of damage to their home. As well as the initial problems 
caused by the flood, the resulting damp had caused the wooden floor to start rotting. 
 
Understandably, Mr and Mrs W were very distressed by what had happened. But they 
were  even  more  upset  when  their  insurer  rejected  their  claim.  The  insurer  said  an 
exclusion clause in the policy meant there was no cover for ‗escape of water‘ if the 
insured property had been left unoccupied for 60 or more consecutive days. 
 
It had never occurred to the couple that they might not be covered for the situation they 
were now faced with. And after complaining unsuccessfully to their insurer, Mr and Mrs 
W came to us. 
 
Complaint substantially upheld 
 
Technically, there had been a breach of the policy conditions, since the couple had left 
their property unoccupied for more than 60 days. However, the insurer‘s own evidence 
had established that the area where Mr and Mrs W lived had suffered particularly cold 
weather in the first 10 days of January. So the flood had almost certainly occurred well 
within the period during which the property was covered, even if it was unoccupied. 
 
That meant that the ‗circumstances of the claim‘ (the burst pipes) were not connected 
with  the  breached policy  condition. We explained  to  the  insurer our  long-established 
approach to such cases, as set out in issue 34 of ombudsman news (January 2004): 
 
‗We  do  not  consider  it  good  practice  for  insurers  to  decline  to  pay  out  where  the 
policyholder‘s breach of a policy condition has been only a technical breach that has not 
prejudiced the firm‘s position in any way...' 
 
We also pointed out that the Insurance: Conduct of Business Rules (which came into 
force on 14 January 2005) state: ‗An insurer must not ... except where there is evidence 
of fraud, refuse to meet a claim by a retail customer on the grounds ... of breach of 
warranty  or  condition,  unless  the  circumstances  of  the claim  are  connected  with  the 
breach.‘ (Rule 7.3.6). 
 
We  said  the  insurer  should  meet  the  claim.  However,  we  accepted  the  insurer‘s 
argument that it should pay only part of the cost of replacing the wooden floor. If Mr and 
Mrs W had not left their home unoccupied for so long, the water damage could have 
been dealt with more quickly and the floor would probably not have started to rot. 
 
58/3 
 
Whether a blocked oil-pipe is covered 
 
Miss J awoke one morning in early February to find her cottage was unusually cold. The 
central heating had failed to come on. She was unable to get it to work, so she called out 
an emergency plumber. 
 
It took the plumber some time to discover the cause of the problem. The outlet pipe from 
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had built up over the years. The plumber eventually managed to unblock the system and 
to get it up and running. But Miss J was left with a bill for almost £1,000. 
 
When she submitted a claim to her insurer for damage to the oil tank and pipes, the 
insurer refused to pay out. It told her this was because there had been no physical 
damage  to  the  tank  or  pipes  and  no  ‗contamination  of  the  surrounding  site‘.  The 
unblocking of the system was simply a matter of maintenance, for which no insurance 
cover was available. 
 
After arguing unsuccessfully against the insurer‘s decision, Miss J brought her complaint 
to us. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
We sympathised with Miss J‘s predicament. However, it was clear that her policy did not 
cover loss or damage caused by blocked pipes; it only covered loss or damage caused 
by escape of oil. Fortunately, there had not been any escape of oil. 
 
In principle (and in certain circumstances) ‗damage‘ can be interpreted to include loss of 
function. However, this was not the case here since the ‗insured peril‘ (escape of oil) had 
not occurred in the first place. 
 
In  any  event,  damage  resulting  from  ‗wear  and  tear‘  or  lack  of  maintenance  was 
specifically excluded from the scope of cover. We therefore rejected the complaint. 
 
58/4 
 
Whether  insurers  should  pay  for  replacing  a  bathroom suite  and  wall  tiles,  removed 
when plumber traced the source of a leak 
 
Mr C‘s sitting room was badly damaged when water leaked through the ceiling from his 
bathroom. He called a plumber, who located the source of the leak and fixed it. In so 
doing, the plumber apparently had to rip out the entire bathroom suite, including the wall 
and floor tiles. 
 
The insurer accepted Mr C‘s claim for ‗escape of water‘ and it paid the cost of repairing 
the water damage to the sitting room and replacing the bathroom floor tiles. But it would 
not cover the cost of replacing the bathroom suite and the wall tiles. It told Mr C it did not 
think it had been necessary for the plumber to remove these items in order to ‗trace and 
access‘ the burst pipe. 
 
Unhappy with the insurer‘s response, Mr C brought his complaint to us. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
We  were  satisfied  that  the  insurer‘s  offer  had  been  fair  and  reasonable  in  the 
circumstances. It was a clearly-stated condition of the policy that policyholders should: 
 
    * notify the insurer immediately of any situation that was likely to give rise to a claim 
and 
    * preserve relevant information and evidence. Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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Mr C had not contacted his insurer to report the damage until after the plumber had 
ripped out and disposed of the bathroom suite and wall tiles. 
 
We accepted the evidence provided by the insurer that it had not been necessary to 
remove the entire bathroom suite and all the wall tiles in order to locate a pipe beneath 
the floor. In the circumstances, we thought the insurer‘s offer to pay for Mr C‘s actual, 
proven, losses was fair and reasonable. We rejected the complaint. 
 
58/5 
 
Whether insurers should pay for new kitchen units, following flood damage 
 
When a mains pipe burst underneath Ms K‘s kitchen sink, water flooded everywhere. 
There was a great deal of damage, particularly to the kitchen units. 
 
Ms K‘s insurer accepted the claim, but offered her only 50% of the cost of replacing the 
kitchen  units.  It  pointed  out  that  the  units  were  quite  old  and  had  probably  already 
suffered a fair degree of wear and tear before the flood damage occurred. 
 
Ms K said this was unfair, as she could not afford to replace her kitchen units for the 
amount the insurer had offered. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
When we looked into Ms K's complaint, we felt the insurer had not handled the claim 
fairly and reasonably. Like most home policies, this provided ‗new for old‘ cover. The 
policy did not contain any exclusion for items that had already suffered some degree of 
‗wear and tear‘. And there was no doubt that Ms J‘s units had been damaged as a result 
of a genuine incident. 
 
‗Indemnity‘ policies simply require the insurer to put the policyholder back to their pre-
incident position (so far as reasonably possible). But as this was a ‗new for old‘ policy, 
the insurer was required to replace the damaged items with new ones, or to give the 
policyholder enough money to cover the cost of buying new items. 
 
The insurer pointed out that the terms of the policy gave it the discretion to arrange 
repair  rather  than  replacement  in  certain  circumstances.  However,  expert  evidence, 
together  with  photographs  of  the  units,  convinced  us  that  repair  would  not  be  a 
reasonable solution in this case. 
 
Regardless  of  their  previous  condition,  all  but  one  of  the  units  had  been  severely 
damaged by the escape of water. So we said it was fair and reasonable for the insurer to 
meet the cost of a complete set of new units. 
 
Issue 59:     January/ February 2007 
 
59/8 
 
Insurer denies liability for subsidence damage on the grounds that it occurred before its 
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Mr K complained to us when his insurer rejected his claim for subsidence damage. The 
insurer thought Mr K's house had been exhibiting cracks and distortions for many years, 
long before its own policy came into force. So it did not consider it had any liability for the 
claim. 
 
Following our usual approach in such situations, we set about trying to establish whether 
the damage continued to occur after the start of the policy under which the claim was 
now being made. The evidence was that the movement (and damage) was progressive. 
That meant that the property had been damaged by an insured event during the period 
when Mr K was insured. As is the case under most policies, this triggered the insurer's 
liability. 
 
Strictly, under most policies, the insurer's liability is to repair (or pay for the repair of) 
damage that occurred after the start of its policy. This does not include any damage that 
pre-dates the policy. If the insurer is able to distinguish between the two sets of damage, 
it is entitled to do that. However, it is often impossible to distinguish the two sets of 
damage. That was the situation here. 
 
If stabilisation is necessary to stop a property moving, then we believe it is needed just 
as much to repair damage that occurred during the insured period as it is to repair earlier 
damage. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We said that in order to meet its liability for the damage that had occurred since it had 
started to cover the property, the  insurer would have to pay for the repair of  all the 
damage. This would include the cost of stabilisation if necessary. 
 
59/9 
 
Insurer says it  is not liable for subsidence damage that occurred before it took over 
responsibility for insuring the property 
 
When  Mr  and  Mrs  E  bought  their  terraced  house  in  1988,  they  took  out  buildings 
insurance through the bank that provided their mortgage. Ten years later, a different 
insurer took over the provision of insurance. The following year (1999), Mr and Mrs E 
made a claim for subsidence. 
 
The insurer thought that most of the damage had happened before it started providing 
insurance  for  the  property.  It  said  that  settlement/subsidence  had  been  affecting  the 
terrace as a whole for some years. This had caused long-term distortion and fracturing to 
the  couple's  house.  And  while  there  was  some  slight  general  continuing  movement, 
subsidence  movement  of  the  floor  had  occurred  before  it  had  started  to  insure  the 
property. 
 
The insurer said it was liable only for damage that had occurred when its own policy was 
in force. So the schedule of repairs prepared by its engineers was restricted to damage 
thought to have occurred after 1998, and omitted general significant distortion to the 
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recent subsidence. It said the fact that 'corrections' had been made in the past confirmed 
this. 
 
Mr  and  Mrs  E  said  that  substantial  movement  had  occurred  since  they  bought  the 
property, and it had caused considerable distortion. They said that cosmetic repairs and 
decorations  had  been  carried  out  from  time  to  time,  when  damage  and  distortions 
became visible. They were aware that floorboards and joists had been replaced in 1980, 
before they bought the house – but they understood that this work had been carried out 
because of woodworm and rot. 
 
The insurer did not consider the ABI's Domestic Subsidence Agreement to be relevant in 
this case, because it excluded damage that had 'occurred before an insurer took on an 
insured risk'. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We  established  that  there  was  no  relevant  period  when  the  property  had  not  been 
covered  by  buildings  insurance.  While  some  of  the  distortion  was  thought  to  have 
occurred after 1998 – when the insurer changed – it seemed likely that much of it had 
occurred before 1998, but after Mr and Mrs D first moved in and took out insurance. 
 
We therefore said that the ABI's Agreement was relevant in this case. The property had 
been continuously insured, so we said the insurer should deal with the entire claim and 
could not exclude damage that pre-dated its own policy. 
 
59/10 
 
Insurer refuses to pay for stabilisation because it says it is not liable for any preventative 
work 
 
The insurer agreed that subsidence was the cause of the damage Mr C claimed for 
under his buildings policy. However, it refused to pay for any stabilisation work. Mr C felt 
this work was essential to put matters right and prevent future problems. 
 
The  report  prepared  by  the  insurer's  engineers  stated  that  minor  movement  would 
probably continue unless the foundations of the house were stabilised. The insurer said 
it would pay for any superstructure repairs and redecoration that might be necessary, as 
and when further movement occurred. But it argued that stabilisation was not strictly part 
of  its  liability,  since  its  policy  only  covered  the  cost  of  repairs  and  it  considered 
stabilisation to be 'preventative, not restorative'. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
After complaining unsuccessfully to the firm, Mr C referred the matter to us. Following 
our usual approach, we considered the insurer's contractual obligation under the terms 
of its policy. As is usual in buildings policies, the insurer was obliged to repair (or pay the 
cost of repairing) the subsidence damage. 
 
In our view, the proper repair of a building requires something more long-lasting than a 
temporary  patch-up.  Filling  cracks  and  repainting  cannot  properly  be  regarded  as 
repairing subsidence damage if, within a relatively short time, those same cracks are Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
Appendix A: O.N. Case Studies  162 
likely  to  reappear.  The  expert  evidence  had  indicated  that,  without  stabilisation,  the 
movement that had caused the damage would continue. So we said the insurer should 
meet the cost of stabilisation. 
 
59/11 
 
Difficulties  in dealing with subsidence claim from owner of a semi-detached house  – 
when the entire house is affected, but the owner of the other half refuses to cooperate 
with remedial work 
 
Mrs B, who lived in a semi-detached house, put in a claim for structural damage. Her 
insurer confirmed that subsidence was the cause of the damage – and that it affected 
the entire property, not just her half of it. 
 
Mrs B's insurer did not cover the other half, owned by a Mr J. And Mrs B was unable to 
persuade Mr J even to discuss the situation with her. 
 
After obtaining expert advice, the insurer decided to proceed with the normal remedy in 
cases where both sides of a semi-detached property are affected. This involves carrying 
out work to the foundations of both parts of the property. 
 
If the insurer treated only half of the house, then any future movement between the two 
parts might result in a recurrence of the damage to Mrs B's property. Future movement 
might also create new damage to her property  – or indeed damage her neighbour's 
property, leaving open the possibility that he would then hold her responsible. 
 
The insurer spent a number of months trying to persuade Mr J to cooperate with the 
planned  works.  It  even  threatened  him  with  legal  action.  Meanwhile,  frustrated  that 
nothing was being done to remedy the problems in her own part of the property, Mrs B 
complained – first to her insurer and then to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
This was a difficult situation all round. Persuading Mr J to co-operate represented the 
best  hope  for  a  solution  that  was  both  structurally  sound  and  likely  to  maintain 
neighbourly relations. But there seemed little likelihood of obtaining Mr J's agreement. 
 
Mrs B was contractually entitled to have the damage to her property repaired properly. 
The insurer had insisted that its proposed course of action was the only viable solution. 
However,  the  expert  evidence  that  we  obtained  confirmed  there  was  an  alternative 
approach. This would not require access to Mr J's property. And it would stabilise the 
building – in a way that would probably prevent the subsidence causing further damage. 
 
This alternative approach was technically much more difficult than the insurer's preferred 
solution. It was also very much more expensive. However, we told the insurer that, in the 
circumstances, it was the only reasonable and realistic way to settle the matter. 
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Issue 61:     April/May 2007 
 
61/1 
 
life and critical illness insurance – back and neck problems – inadvertent non-disclosure 
 
Mr  F  took  out  life  and  critical  illness  cover  in  June  2002.  Just  five  months  later,  in 
November 2002, he suffered a heart attack and submitted a claim to the insurer. 
 
However, the insurer refused to meet the claim, on the grounds that Mr F had been 
reckless in failing to disclose basic information on the application form. It said that after 
reviewing his medical records, it had discovered that Mr F failed to disclose recurrent 
problems with his back and neck. He had also failed to disclose that he had made a 
previous application for similar cover, from a different insurer. That application had never 
gone ahead but had been deferred, as the insurer had asked for further information 
which Mr F had never provided. 
 
Mr F complained that the insurer's stance was unreasonable. He said he had simply 
forgotten that he had made the earlier application. And he had forgotten to mention that 
he had been referred to an orthopaedic consultant two years earlier for back and neck 
problems.  He  pointed  out  that  he  had mentioned  on  the  form  that  he  suffered  from 
depression. He had also disclosed that his mother had heart problems. And he added 
that, at the time he had applied for the policy, he had been going through a particularly 
traumatic period caring for his wife and son, both of whom had been seriously ill. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We established that Mr F's back and neck trouble had arisen after his wife had become 
quadriplegic, following an accident, and he had started having to lift her. And around the 
same time that Mr F had been referred to an orthopaedic consultant for his neck and 
back  problems,  he  had  been  having  to  accompany  his  young  son  (who  had  a  rare 
disease) on a number of hospital appointments. 
 
Mr F had only the one consultation with the orthopaedic consultant, who had advised 
him to continue for a time with physiotherapy and medication. We accepted that, in the 
circumstances, Mr F had simply forgotten to mention the consultation on his application 
form. And we thought it understandable that Mr F had not thought he had needed to 
mention these back and neck problems when answering a question on the form about 
'back, spine or recurrent joint disorder'. So we accepted that his failure to disclose this 
information had been inadvertent. 
 
Mr F did not dispute that he had failed to disclose the earlier insurance application. He 
said he had simply overlooked this. At the time of this earlier application (1998), he had 
been fully occupied caring for his wife and family. He had not had time to follow up the 
insurer's queries and to provide the clarification it needed before it could proceed with 
his application. 
 
In support of his case, Mr F provided a letter from his cardiologist. This said that if Mr F 
had been asked to undergo a medical examination when he applied for his current policy 
in 2002, it was unlikely that this would have led to a diagnosis of coronary heart disease. 
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We  decided  that  Mr  F  had  not  shown  a  reckless  disregard  for  his  answers  –  his 
oversights had been inadvertent. In the circumstances, the insurer needed to make a 
proportionate response. In other words, it should rewrite the policy on the terms it would 
have offered Mr F if it had known the full facts at the outset. In this particular instance, it 
would have excluded spinal conditions from the disability benefits provided under the 
policy. It would not have excluded heart attacks or refused to cover Mr F at all. 
 
So  we  said  the  insurer  should  reinstate  Mr  F's  policy  –  adding  the  spinal  condition 
exclusion – and deal with the claim. Since no exclusion applied to Mr F's heart attack, 
the firm had to pay the claim in full (less any premium refund), with interest. 
 
61/2 
 
income protection insurance – non-disclosure after application had been made 
 
In  April  2002,  Mr  J  applied  for  income  protection  insurance.  He  answered  'no'  in 
response  to  a  question  on  the  application  form  about  whether  he  had  received  any 
medical treatment or had any medical consultations in the previous two years. He gave 
the same answer when the question was put to him during the medical examination that 
the insurer arranged for him in June 2002. 
 
The application form contained a warning, reminding him he had a duty to inform the 
insurer immediately if – as a result of anything that happened before the start of the 
policy – he needed to change any of his answers. 
 
In August 2002 Mr J developed a serious condition  which he had not suffered from 
before.  He  had  a  number  of  consultations  about  it  with  his  doctor,  who  prescribed 
treatment in September 2002 and certified Mr J as unfit to work for the next two months. 
 
The insurer said it sent Mr J a letter in October 2002, confirming its acceptance of his 
application and asking him if there had been any change in his medical condition since 
he completed the application form. The policy started a week later. 
 
Just over a year later, Mr J developed leukaemia. The insurer rejected his claim, saying 
he  had  been  reckless  in  failing  to  disclose  the  medical  condition  that  had  arisen  in 
August 2002. The insurer said it would not have been prepared to cover him if it had 
known about this condition. 
 
Mr J said he never received the insurer's letter in October 2002. And he said that, in any 
event, the medical condition that had arisen in August 2002 had nothing to do with his 
claim  for  leukaemia.  Unable  to  reach  agreement  with  the  insurer,  Mr  J  referred  his 
complaint to us. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
We thought it probable that the insurer had sent the letter in October 2002, even though 
Mr J could not recall receiving it. So we considered that by sending this letter, and by 
including  the  warning  on  its  application  form,  the  insurer  had  given  Mr  J  adequate 
warning of the need to disclose any changes to his health since he had applied for the 
insurance. However, we noted that the insurer had not sent him a copy of his original Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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application form with this letter, so that he could assess what changes were relevant to 
the insurer. 
 
We decided that Mr J had not intended to mislead the insurer. We took into account how 
close – in time – the emergence of the new medical condition in August 2002 and the 
outcome of the consultations were to: 
 
    * the date when he applied for the insurance 
    * the acceptance letter and 
    * the start date of the policy. 
 
Although,  in  the  light  of  the  warning  letter,  he  should  have  understood  the  need  to 
disclose his new condition, we recognised that a duty to disclose information after an 
application has been accepted is a particularly onerous requirement that few consumers 
anticipate. 
 
In  this  case  we  considered  that,  despite  the  insurer's  warnings,  Mr  J  had  not  fully 
understood the need to inform the insurer of any changes to his health. So his non-
disclosure had been inadvertent rather than the result of a reckless disregard for the 
truth of his answers. 
 
The usual remedy for inadvertent non-disclosure is to allow the insurer to rewrite the 
policy on the terms it would have imposed, had it known the full facts. In this case we 
were persuaded by the insurer's evidence that it would not have offered Mr J any cover 
at all, had it known about his new medical condition. So we concluded that it was fair for 
the insurer to: 
 
    * refuse to consider the claim 
    * cancel the policy from the outset and 
    * refund the premiums that Mr J had paid. 
 
61/3 
 
life and critical illness insurance – asthma – inadvertent non-disclosure 
 
Mrs  B  applied  for  life  and  critical  illness  cover  in  March  2000  during  a  face-to-face 
meeting with a representative of the insurer, who completed the application for her. 
 
Several years later, after Mrs B developed breast cancer, the insurer declined her claim 
on the grounds of reckless non-disclosure. And it avoided the policy (in other words, 
treated it as if it had never existed). 
 
The insurer said this was an instance of reckless non-disclosure because Mrs B had 
failed to mention that she suffered from asthma, even though several of the questions on 
the application form should have prompted her to disclose this. It said that if it had it 
known about her asthma, it would have increased the premium. 
 
Mrs B challenged the insurer's decision. She said she had informed the representative 
about her asthma at the time she applied for the policy. He had said the insurer was not 
interested in such 'run of the mill' matters. He had told her there was no need to mention 
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a nebuliser or go into hospital because of it. The insurer disputed this – and said it had a 
statement from the representative confirming that he would never have suggested that 
an applicant omitted details of any health matter, however trivial. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We found that Mrs B had disclosed her asthma on a separate application she'd made to 
the insurer a few months later, through a different representative. It was clear from her 
medical records that Mrs B's asthma was well-controlled, and she had never needed to 
use a nebuliser or go into hospital because of it. 
 
We  also  noticed  that  the  application  form,  which  the  insurer's  representative  had 
completed for Mrs B, contained several mistakes. These included the fact that he had 
ticked the box indicating that Mrs B was a non-smoker but had also stated that she 
smoked an average of five cigarettes a day. 
 
Mrs B had disclosed her asthma in a subsequent application to the same insurer, so we 
accepted that she had not intended to keep quiet about the condition. And in view of the 
mildness of her asthma, it was plausible to believe that the representative might have 
told her there was no need to mention it. 
 
We could not be certain what had happened during the meeting between Mrs B and the 
insurer's representative. It was clear that the representative had guided her through the 
application.  The  mistakes  on  the  form  suggested  that  he  might  not  have  captured 
accurately  all  the  information  that  she  gave  him.  However,  he  insisted  that  he  had 
followed  the  correct  procedure.  We  thought  it  likely  that  there  had  been  a 
misunderstanding about what information needed to be disclosed on the form. 
 
Mrs B had signed the declaration stating that the information on the form was true, to the 
best of her knowledge and belief. We were persuaded by the evidence that  she had 
assumed the representative had recorded her answers correctly, so she had not thought 
she had any reason not to sign it. In any event, she had not been given a copy of the 
answers to check before signing. 
 
In the circumstances, we were unable to conclude that Mrs B had been reckless in her 
approach  to  the  application.  There  was  nothing  to  suggest  that  she  had  not  cared 
whether her answers were true or false. So we concluded that any non-disclosure was 
likely to have been inadvertent. 
 
We required the insurer to meet the claim on a proportionate basis. In this case, that 
meant the insurer should calculate the premium that Mrs B would have been charged, if 
her asthma had been disclosed on her application form. It should then pay a proportion 
of her claim, equivalent to the proportion of this premium that she had actually been 
charged. It should also pay her interest on this amount. 
 
61/4 
 
life and critical illness insurance – smoking – monitoring of blood pressure – no non-
disclosure 
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When Mr L applied for life assurance in July 2005 he stated that he had not smoked 
within the previous 12 months. Asked about any medical consultations, he said he had 
sought advice about a hernia that had subsequently required surgery. He also disclosed 
that there was a history of hypertension in his family. 
 
Five months later he submitted a claim for oesophageal cancer. The insurer rejected the 
claim, on the grounds of reckless non-disclosure, and it avoided the policy. It said that 
when looking into his claim it discovered that he had previously been a heavy smoker. It 
accepted  that  he  had  now  stopped  smoking.  However,  there  was  a  record  of  his 
regularly having smoked one cigar a day at the start of the 12-month period in question. 
The insurer said Mr L should also have disclosed that his blood pressure had been 
monitored in the period between 8 June and 18 July 2005. 
 
Mr L said he had only smoked cigars very occasionally since giving up heavy smoking in 
1994. And he insisted that he had accurately stated on the application form that he had 
not smoked at all in the previous 12 months. He did not deny that his blood pressure had 
been monitored for a few weeks. But he said this had only been done in advance of – 
and in connection with – the hernia operation. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
On his application form, Mr L had provided clear details of his impending hernia surgery 
and also the family history of hypertension. He had obviously given some attention to the 
application form and taken it seriously in this respect. The insurer had not sought any 
additional information about these matters, either on the form or subsequently. 
 
The blood pressure monitoring had clearly been simply a preparatory step before the 
surgery for his hernia. It had been considered a necessary precaution because of the 
family history of hypertension. Mr L had disclosed both the surgery and the history of 
hypertension, so we did not consider that he had also been obliged to disclose the blood 
pressure monitoring. There was no separate question that would have required specific 
disclosure  of  it,  and  in  any  event  the  results  of  the  monitoring  had  not  merited  any 
medical follow-up. 
 
Mr L submitted evidence from his GP, who said he could not recall his conversation with 
Mr L and accepted that he might have misunderstood Mr L's history. The GP also said 
that the computer system on which he entered details of patients' tobacco consumption 
was unable to record a minimum consumption of less than one cigar or cigarette per 
day. We were satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that Mr L had told the truth when 
he stated that he had not smoked in the 12 months before July 2005. So we concluded 
there  had  not  been  any  non-disclosure  in  relation  to  his  smoking.  We  required  the 
insurer to meet Mr L's claim in full. 
 
61/5 
 
life assurance – alcoholic counselling – reckless non-disclosure 
 
Mrs M took out two life assurance policies in November 2002. One was in her sole name 
and the other was a joint policy with her husband. Both application forms contained the 
questions: 
 Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
Appendix A: O.N. Case Studies  168 
'Do you consume alcoholic drinks?' 
 
'Are you currently receiving any medical treatment or attention?' 
 
'Have  you  ever  sought  or  been  given  medical  advice  to  reduce  the  level  of  your 
drinking?' 
 
Mrs M answered 'No' to each question. 
 
Several years later Mrs M died. The insurer would not meet Mr M's claim because it said 
Mrs M had failed to disclose that, since 2000, she had been receiving treatment from a 
consultant  psychiatrist  in  relation  to  'cessation  of  drinking'.  She  had  also  failed  to 
disclose  that  she  had  been  attending  Alcoholics  Anonymous  meetings.  The  insurer 
regarded Mrs M's non-disclosure as deliberate or reckless, and it avoided both policies. 
 
Mrs M's representatives argued that she had stopped drinking in 2002. The consultant 
psychiatrist  stated  that  he  had  been  monitoring  Mrs  M's  abstinence  and  not  giving 
'medical advice' about reducing her drinking. He also said that he had advised Mrs M 
that  her  alcohol  dependency  should  not  be  considered  as  an  illness.  However,  the 
insurer contended that Mrs M should have realised that her history of drink problems 
was relevant to the insurance. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
We  decided  that  Mrs  M  had  been  entitled  to  answer  'No'  to  the  question,  'Do  you 
consume alcoholic drinks?' She was not consuming alcohol at that time. On the question 
'Are you currently receiving any medical treatment or attention?' we were satisfied that 
she had been receiving medical treatment or attention from her consultant psychiatrist in 
relation  to  drinking.  However,  we  recognised  that  her  consultant's  approach  was  to 
minimise any suggestions that his role was medical, and we accepted that her incorrect 
answer to the question had probably been made innocently or inadvertently. 
 
We accepted that Mrs M had stopped drinking before 2002, but it was clear that she had 
continued to seek regular advice to support her decision to eliminate alcohol. So we 
thought her answer to the question, 'Have you ever sought or been given medical advice 
to  reduce  the  level  of  your  drinking'  was  incorrect.  We  did  not  agree  with  her 
representatives that advice on maintaining her abstinence was not advice 'to reduce the 
level  of  her  drinking'.  We  concluded  that  there  was  no  evidence  that  Mrs  M  had 
deliberately given the wrong answer to this question. But neither was it likely that her 
answer had been innocent or inadvertent. 
 
In our view, she could not have stopped to properly consider the question or her answer. 
Had she done so, we thought it unlikely that she would have given the answer that she 
did; the question would have raised  issues that were fresh in her mind, and that we 
believed she knew were important to the insurer. We therefore regarded Mrs M's answer 
as reckless non-disclosure. 
 
We accepted that the insurer would not have issued either policy if it had been aware of 
the true facts. Its decision to decline the claim and avoid both policies had therefore 
been justified. 
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61/6 
 
life assurance – incorrect height and weight given – deliberate non-disclosure 
 
When Mr K took out life assurance, he stated that he was 6 feet tall and weighed 16 
stone. Following his death from a blood clot at the age of 37, just five months after taking 
out the policy, the insurer discovered that Mr K's actual height was 5'9‖ and his weight 
was over 21 stone. Mr K had also failed to inform the insurer about his kidney stone and 
gout.  The  insurer  said  that  if  it  had  known  the  full  facts,  it  would  have  loaded  the 
premium  by  275%.  It  considered  that  his  answers  amounted  to  either  reckless  or 
deliberate non-disclosure and it avoided the policy. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
We  had  no  reason  to  suppose  that  Mr  K  had  not  understood  the  form  he  was 
completing. We noted that, in response to clear questions about his health, he had failed 
to provide relevant information. As far as the information about his height and weight 
was concerned, the evidence suggested that he was aware that he was obese. We 
established that his weight had been recorded as 25 stone in May 1999, 24 stone in 
September 1999 and 21.2 stone at the post-mortem, less than five months after he had 
stated on the form that his weight was 16 stone. 
 
We  were  satisfied,  on  a  balance  of  probabilities,  that  at  the  time  Mr  K  signed  the 
application form he could not have believed his weight was only 16 stone. Nor could he 
have believed he was 6 feet tall. The disparity between his actual weight and height and 
the information he gave on the form was so great that it was difficult to accept that he 
had been unaware of it. We decided that the insurer was entitled to avoid the policy on 
the grounds that Mr K's non-disclosure had been deliberate. 
 
Issue 62:     June/July 2007 
 
62/5 
 
whether bank followed correct process in selling payment protection insurance to cover 
customer‘s loan repayments 
 
Mr F took out a loan from his bank to consolidate his debts, which included an existing 
loan with the bank. The bank also offered him payment protection insurance to cover his 
monthly  loan  repayments  if  he  became  unemployed  or  incapacitated.  The  insurance 
premium was payable as a lump sum of £1,700. The bank added this to his loan for 
£7,800, which was to be repaid – with interest – over 60 months. 
 
Mr F‘s financial situation improved over the next year and he asked the bank if he could 
pay off the entire amount outstanding on his loan. The bank agreed, but told him he 
would not be entitled to any pro-rata refund of the amount he had paid for the insurance. 
 
He later told us that it was only as a result of this conversation that he realised just how 
much  the  insurance  had  cost  him.  And  he  said  it  was  only  at  this  stage  that  he 
discovered the insurance had been optional, as the bank had told him he could only 
have the loan if he also took the insurance. 
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The bank rejected Mr F‘s complaint about its sale of the policy and its refusal to give him 
a pro-rata refund, so he referred the matter to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
The bank denied there had been anything wrong with the way in which it had sold the 
policy. And it said it had been correct to refuse Mr F a pro-rata refund of his premium. 
This  was  because  the  policy  contained  a  valid  and  enforceable  term  saying  that 
customers were not entitled to a pro-rata refund if they cancelled their policy before the 
end of the term. 
 
The bank could not produce any record of the meeting at which Mr F claimed he had 
been  told  that  taking  the  insurance  was  a  necessary  condition  of  getting  the  loan. 
However, the bank said it never insisted on a customer taking out payment protection 
insurance with a loan. The representative concerned no longer worked for the bank and 
was not available to comment. 
 
The  bank  could  not  find  a  signed  copy  of  its  agreement  with  Mr  F,  detailing  his 
acceptance of the loan and the payment protection policy. It did, however, produce a 
copy of the standard agreement that it said Mr F would have been asked to sign, as part 
of its normal procedure. 
 
In our view,  in selling  the payment protection insurance, the bank was acting as an 
insurance intermediary. It therefore had a responsibility to ensure Mr F was able to make 
an  informed  choice  about  whether  or  not  to  take  out  the  policy.  It  also  had  a 
responsibility to draw his attention to significant features of the policy. We thought that in 
this instance it should have stressed that: 
 
    * the policy was to be paid by a single lump sum premium covering the whole of the 
policy term 
    * no pro-rata refund was payable if the policy was no longer needed and 
    * the cost of the lump sum premium was to be funded by means of a loan, on which 
interest would be payable. 
 
We saw no evidence that these features had been specifically drawn to Mr F‘s attention, 
either during the sales process or in any of the documents he was given. The bank said 
that Mr F had taken payment protection insurance on the two previous occasions when it 
had given him a loan, so he must already have been fully aware of how these policies 
operated. However, it was clear to us from Mr F‘s response to our questions that he had 
no understanding of how the policies worked. 
 
We accepted Mr F‘s evidence that he had wanted the loan in order to consolidate his 
debts and reduce his outgoings, and would not have added to the overall cost of his loan 
by taking the insurance if he had realised it was optional. 
 
We decided that the bank‘s sales process in this case had been flawed, and that the 
bank had failed to bring significant features of the policy to Mr F‘s attention. We upheld 
the complaint and required the bank to refund the full amount of the premium, plus all 
the interest that Mr F had paid on this amount. 
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62/6 
 
whether lender mis-sold payment protection insurance in connection with a loan 
 
Some eight months after he had taken out a loan, together with payment protection 
insurance, Mr M asked the lender to clarify details of the policy benefits and restrictions. 
As a result of what he was told, he asked the lender to cancel the policy and refund all 
the money he had paid for it. 
 
Mr M had concluded that the policy was unlikely to be of any value to him. He was 66 
years old and the loan ran until he was 71. Although the policy offered cover for death, 
temporary total disability and hospitalisation, any pre-existing medical conditions were 
excluded from cover and the death benefit only covered policyholders up to the age of 
70. 
 
The lender was only prepared to offer Mr M a refund equivalent to 75% of the cost of the 
policy. He insisted that he should have a 100% refund and eventually he referred the 
dispute to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
Mr M had arranged the loan over the telephone. He said he had thought the insurance 
was compulsory, as the cost of the premium had been automatically  included in the 
details quoted to him over the phone. He had not been asked any questions about his 
health and had not been told that the policy would not cover him for any pre-existing 
medical conditions. 
 
The lender said it had no record of the specific telephone call during which the loan was 
arranged. However, it sent us a copy of the script that it said its representative would 
have  followed.  We  considered  the  exclusion  from  cover  for  a  pre-existing  medical 
condition  to  be  a  significant  feature  of  the  policy.  It  therefore  needed  to  be  drawn 
specifically to consumers‘ attention. However, the script made only a passing reference 
to the fact that ‗entitlement to benefit could be affected‘ if the consumer suffered from a 
pre-existing medical condition. This was not given any particular prominence. 
 
We noted that Mr M had asked the lender to cancel the policy as soon as he realised the 
implications of the exclusion for pre-existing medical conditions. So we accepted that he 
was unlikely to have taken the policy if he had fully understood the significance of the 
exclusion at the time of the sale. 
 
The  script  did  mention  that  the  insurance  was  not  compulsory.  However,  it  did  not 
highlight that: 
 
    * the cost of the premium was payable up-front and was added to the loan, 
    * policyholders were not entitled to a pro-rata refund if they cancelled the policy after 
the initial 30 days; and 
    * the death benefit applied only until the policyholder reached the age of 70. 
 
In the circumstances, we decided that the policy had been mis-sold. We required the 
lender  to  refund  the  whole  of  the  insurance  premium,  together  with  all  the  interest 
charged on the premium from the outset of the policy. Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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62/7 
 
insurer  rejects  claim  for  sickness  benefit  made  under  a  payment  protection  policy 
because the policyholder‘s incapacity related to a pre-existing condition 
 
Mr  J  arranged  a  personal  loan  from  his  building  society  and  took  out  a  payment 
protection policy to cover his repayments for periods of sickness or unemployment. 
 
Six months later he had an accident at work and put in a claim under his policy for 
sickness benefit. However, the insurer refused to meet it. It said the accident was related 
to a pre-existing medical condition and that such conditions were not covered by the 
policy. Mr B then referred his complaint to us. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
The insurer said Mr J‘s medical records showed that on several occasions before he had 
taken out the policy he had received treatment for his knee. It was this same knee that 
Mr J injured in the accident that gave rise to his claim. After making further enquiries, we 
were able to confirm that this was indeed the case. 
 
Mr J did not think the insurer‘s stance was fair. He accepted that the building society had 
told him there was a policy exclusion for pre-existing medical conditions. However, he 
said that since the building society had not asked him any details about his health, he 
had not understood how the exclusion would affect his own particular circumstances. 
 
We explained that we do not consider it necessary for consumers to be asked about 
their  medical  history  when  they  apply  for  a policy  that  excludes  pre-existing medical 
conditions.  It  is  enough  that  they  are  made  aware  that  the  policy  contains  such  an 
exclusion – and are given clear information about how it will operate. We accepted that 
Mr J had acted in good faith. However, we felt that in the circumstances it was fair and 
reasonable for the firm to refuse the claim. We rejected the complaint. 
 
62/8 
 
whether bank mis-sold payment protection policy in connection with a loan 
 
Ms B applied for a bank loan in order to consolidate her existing debts and reduce her 
monthly outgoings. The bank agreed to lend her the sum she needed. It also arranged 
payment  protection  insurance  to  cover  her  monthly  loan  repayments  if  she  became 
unemployed or incapacitated. 
 
There was a one-off premium for the payment protection policy, amounting to just under 
£3,000. This sum was added to the underlying loan of just over £11,000, which was to 
be repaid – with interest – in 84 monthly instalments. 
 
Two years later Ms B asked her father‘s advice on cutting her expenditure, as she was 
still experiencing financial difficulties. She later told us that it was only at this stage, after 
her father had looked closely at her loan arrangement, that she realised how much she 
had been paying in total for the insurance. It was also at this stage that she discovered 
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When the bank refused her request to cancel the policy and give her a pro-rata refund of 
the premium, Ms B brought her complaint to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
Ms B insisted that she would never have agreed to take the insurance if she had known 
how expensive it was. She said the bank had been aware she had only taken the loan 
because she was anxious to try and manage her existing debts. So she did not think it 
should have made her add to her outgoings by taking the insurance. 
 
The bank was unable to provide evidence that the adviser who sold the policy had told 
Ms B the insurance was optional. However, it said the adviser would have followed its 
normal sales process, which included an explanation of the implications of opting for the 
insurance cover. 
 
The bank pointed out that Ms B had signed a loan agreement which included a full 
breakdown of the figures. She had also been given 30 days in which to study the details 
of the policy and cancel it without penalty if she was not happy with it. 
 
After reviewing the evidence, we came to the view that there was nothing in the bank‘s 
sales process that drew consumers‘ attention to significant features of the policy. These 
features included the onerous cancellation conditions and the fact that payment for the 
policy had to be made up-front by means of a single premium, funded out of a loan on 
which interest would be charged. 
 
It was evident that Ms B had no experience or knowledge of how insurance worked. 
There was nothing in the bank‘s documented sales process that explained  – in basic 
terms – how the policy operated. And the sales process did not allow for any response to 
situations such as this, where the consumer had expressed a particular need to reduce 
her outgoings as far as possible. 
 
In the circumstances, we took the view that the policy had been mis-sold and that Ms B 
was entitled to a refund of the full amount she had paid for the  insurance, plus the 
interest she had paid on this amount. 
 
62/9 
 
insurer  refuses  to  pay  claim  made  on  a  payment  protection  policy  as  it  says 
unemployment benefit is payable only in cases of redundancy 
 
When Ms G took out a loan to buy a new car, she also bought a payment protection 
policy to cover her repayments in the event of her unemployment, disability or death. 
 
Some three years later, after losing her job, Ms G put in a claim under the policy for 
unemployment benefit. However, the insurer refused to pay out. It said the policy only 
provided cover for unemployment that was the result of redundancy. Ms G had not been 
made redundant but had been dismissed from her job for under-performance. 
 
Ms G said that the possibility of unemployment had been a particular concern when she 
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that her mortgage payment protection insurance covered her in case she lost her job. 
She had wanted similar cover when she took out a loan to buy her car and had thought 
the  policy  she  was  offered covered  any  period  of  unemployment,  irrespective  of  the 
cause. 
 
In  the  circumstances,  the  insurer  offered  to  refund  the  insurance  premium  in  full. 
However Ms G objected strongly to this. She said the insurer should instead pay her the 
unemployment  benefit.  Unable  to  reach  agreement  with  her  insurer  over  this,  Ms  G 
brought the dispute to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
The insurer pointed out that it had sent Ms G a copy of the full terms and conditions as 
soon as she had said she would take the policy. This document stated clearly that the 
policy only provided unemployment cover for instances of redundancy. 
 
Ms G admitted that she had not read the full policy terms and conditions. She said she 
had relied solely on what she had been told when she was sold the insurance, and she 
had  not  been  told  there  were  any  restrictions  on  the  circumstances  in  which  the 
unemployment cover was provided. 
 
After  reviewing  the  evidence,  we  accepted  Ms  G‘s  argument  that  she  had  been 
specifically seeking cover for unemployment before agreeing to borrow the money to buy 
the car. 
 
We noted that the insurer‘s summary of the policy terms, which had been shown to Ms G 
at  the  time  of  the  sale,  referred  several  times  to  the  fact  that  the  policy  covered 
unemployment.  However,  the  summary  did  not  mention  that  this  cover  was  only 
available for unemployment resulting from redundancy. We thought this was misleading. 
 
The document that Ms G was sent after the sale, containing the full policy terms and 
conditions, only mentioned once that unemployment cover was limited to instances of 
redundancy. And it did not give this information any prominence. 
 
We upheld Ms G‘s complaint and required the insurer to pay her the  full amount of 
benefit she would have received under the policy if her unemployment had been caused 
by redundancy. 
 
Issue 63:     July/ August 2007 
 
63/7 
 
commercial motor insurance policy – keys left in the vehicle – whether the policyholder 
had taken reasonable care 
 
Soon after starting work as a trainee electrician, Mr A bought a second-hand van. When 
he returned from work each evening, he parked outside the house where he lived with 
his mother. Even though this was in a residential area with a relatively low crime rate, he 
was always careful not to leave his tools in the van overnight, but to move them into his 
mother‘s garage. 
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Unfortunately for Mr A, his van was stolen one evening while he was unloading it. There 
was subsequently some confusion about the exact sequence of events. However, it was 
generally accepted by both Mr A and the insurer that Mr A had left the keys in the van 
while he was moving the tools into the garage. While he was in the garage he suddenly 
heard the van being driven away. 
 
The insurer rejected Mr A‘s claim for the stolen van, saying he had not complied with the 
policy condition to ‗take all precautions to reduce or remove the risk of loss of the insured 
vehicle‘. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
In rejecting the claim, the insurer was relying on a ‗reasonable care‘ condition in the 
policy, rather than on a specific exclusion of cover that said the vehicle would not be 
covered if the keys were left in it. 
 
Our approach in dealing with the complaint closely followed the line taken in the Court of 
Appeal  case  of  Sofi  v  Prudential  Assurance  (1993)(  2  Lloyds  Rep.559).  The  test 
established  in  this  case  is  relatively  simple  –  in  order  to  show  there  was  a  lack  of 
reasonable care, you must first demonstrate ‗recklessness‘. This is generally defined as 
recognising that a risk exists, but deciding to take it anyway. So we believed that in order 
to exclude Mr A‘s cover, the insurer would need to show he had deliberately courted the 
risk of having his van stolen. 
 
We accept that the recklessness test is subjective, and that some people might consider 
Mr A‘s actions to be foolhardy. Mr A told us it had not crossed his mind that he was 
taking a risk, and we were satisfied that this was the case. He had been fully engaged in 
unloading the tools and happened to leave the van unattended for longer than he had 
anticipated. We had no reason to believe that Mr A had acted recklessly and we required 
the insurer to meet the claim in full, adding interest calculated at our normal rate. 
 
63/8 
 
travel  insurance  policy  –  theft  of  personal  possessions  from  a  camper  van  while 
travelling 
 
During her gap year, Miss H went travelling across New Zealand. She had been there for 
three months when a number of her possessions were stolen from her camper van. She 
had been careful to take out full travel insurance before she left the UK, so she was very 
surprised when her claim was refused. 
 
The insurer told her there was an exclusion in her policy that said claims for theft of 
property  would  only  be  covered  if  the  stolen  items  had  been  kept  in  ‗locked 
accommodation‘  or  in  ‗a  locked  and  covered  luggage  compartment/boot  of  a  motor 
vehicle‘. 
 
Miss  H  challenged  the  insurer‘s  decision.  She  said  her  camper  van  was  her 
accommodation – and as it had been locked at the time of the theft, she should be 
covered by the policy. She also said that the insurer was treating her unfairly because 
camper vans do not have separate, lockable luggage areas. 
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After  the  dispute  had  been  referred  to  us,  Miss  H  told  us  that  she  had  kept  the 
possessions in question in nine padlocked storage boxes in the back of the camper van. 
This was a significant departure from her original statement on the claim form, where 
she  had  said  the  items  had  been  ‗all  over  the  place‘.  It  also  differed  from  another 
statement she had made, in which she had said that she kept the items in a box under 
the bed in the van. 
 
Complaint not upheld 
 
We accepted that Miss H had been sleeping in the camper van and that it was partly 
designed  for  this  purpose.  But  we  had  to  consider  whether  it  could  reasonably  be 
classified as ‗accommodation‘. We concluded that the most reasonable and appropriate 
definition of a camper van was as a 'motor vehicle'  – and this would apply over and 
above any other definition. 
 
In this situation, we were satisfied that the  accommodation exclusion applied, so her 
possessions should have been placed in a locked boot or locked and covered luggage 
compartment in order to comply with the policy. 
 
In our view, securing the items out of sight within the camper van could possibly be 
enough to satisfy a valid claim. However, when the claim had first been presented to us, 
Miss  H  said  that  the  items  had  been  ‗all  over  the  place…‘  within  the  camper  van. 
Although she later changed her story, we thought it reasonable to conclude that the first 
report was the most believable. We concluded that, in the circumstances, it was fair and 
reasonable for the insurer not to accept the claim. 
 
63/9 
 
motor insurance policy – daughter was ‗named driver‘ on parents‘ car 
 
Mr  J  and  his  wife  bought  a second  family  car  soon  after  their  daughter  passed  her 
driving test. He arranged the car insurance over the phone and – as is standard practice 
for many insurers – the call was recorded. 
 
When asked if he was the ‗owner and keeper‘ of the vehicle, Mr J said that he was. He 
also confirmed that he was the principal driver of the car. The insurer then pointed out 
that Mr J was the principal driver of another vehicle it insured. Mr J said he had been 
mistaken and that it was his wife who would be the principal driver of the new car. He 
asked to add his daughter to the policy as a ‗named driver‘. 
 
While driving the new car a couple of months later, Mr J‘s daughter had a minor road 
traffic accident, which meant that the car needed some small repairs. Mr J submitted a 
claim to his insurer but it was rejected because the insurer believed this was an instance 
of  ‗fronting‘.  In  other  words,  it  thought  the  car  had  been  insured  in  the  name of  an 
experienced driver – Mr J's wife – because it would be too expensive to insure in the 
name of the real principal driver – his daughter. 
 
The insurer reached this conclusion after Miss J had given the insurer a statement in 
which  she  said,  'It‘s  insured  in  mum‘s  name  I  think.  Dad  did  it  because  it  was  too 
expensive to have me named as the main driver…' 
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Mr J did not dispute that his daughter had made this statement. The insurer therefore 
‗avoided‘ the policy (treated it as if it had never existed) and declined to deal with the 
claim. Mr J then referred the matter to us. 
 
Complaint not upheld 
 
We considered this to be a prime example of 'fronting'. Mr J had misrepresented the risk 
when he took out the policy – as his daughter later confirmed. 
 
As the information on which the insurer had agreed to provide the policy was incorrect, 
the insurer was entitled to 'avoid' the policy from the beginning – and to decline to pay 
any benefit that would otherwise have been due under the policy. 
 
Issue 64:     September/October 2007 
 
64/6 
 
ongoing travel insurance – insurer rejects claim because policyholder failed to disclose a 
change of health 
 
Mr K had an ongoing travel policy that his bank had provided, free of charge, as one of 
the benefits of his current account. Under the terms of the insurance, the cover remained 
in operation as long as he retained the account. 
 
In October 2006, Mr K and his wife booked to go on a cruise, departing early in the New 
Year. A few weeks after making the booking, Mr K suffered a temporary loss of vision 
and was referred to a specialist. Mr K‘s vision had returned to normal by the time of his 
consultation  with  the  specialist,  but  she  suspected  that  he  might  have  had  a  minor 
stroke. 
 
She therefore made a small adjustment to the medication he had been taking since he 
had suffered a blocked artery and heart attack four years earlier. 
 
Mr K had no further problems with his vision and appeared to be in good health when he 
and his wife set off on the cruise towards the end of January. However, several days 
before the end of their holiday, Mr K had a heart attack. 
 
Once he had returned home and his condition had stabilised, his wife submitted a claim 
under their travel policy for the expenses they had incurred while away – as a result of 
his illness. To the couple‘s dismay, the insurer said it was unable to accept the claim. It 
pointed out that the policy contained a condition requiring policyholders to report any 
changes in their health. Mr K had not reported the loss of vision he had experienced 
after booking the cruise. 
 
The couple disputed the insurer‘s decision. They considered that they had complied with 
the policy condition requiring them to declare health changes. This was because they 
had sent the insurer full details shortly after Mr K had suffered his first heart attack in 
2001. They said that since Mr K had very quickly recovered from the temporary loss of 
vision, they had not thought it sufficiently significant to be worth mentioning. 
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We looked closely at the policy condition cited by the insurer when it rejected the claim. 
We  also  examined  the  overall  effect  of  the  way  in  which  the  insurer  applied  this 
condition. The insurer told us it required policyholders to report all changes of health. 
Depending on the individual case, it would then consider whether or not to withdraw 
cover for any claims arising from that new medical condition. 
 
The insurer said that because many apparently minor ailments or problems could be 
symptoms  of  a  serious  condition,  it  was  impractical  to  provide  policyholders  with 
guidance about how significant a change in health needed to be before it should be 
reported. 
 
In  our view,  this  approach meant  that  the  policy  condition  was  a very  onerous  one. 
Requiring policyholders to contact their insurer every time they suffered any kind of ill-
health  placed  a  heavy  responsibility  on  them.  It  also  meant  that  policyholders  could 
never  be  certain  exactly  what  cover  was  available  under  the  policy.  If,  each  time  a 
policyholder experienced any change in their health, the insurer could simply withdraw 
cover, it was difficult to see how a claim for ill-health could ever be made, unless the 
illness arose entirely without warning or as a result of an accident. 
 
We noted that the insurer had agreed at the outset to offer cover against the risk of ill-
health affecting a policyholder‘s travel plans. So Mr K was relying on the policy for the 
peace of mind of knowing he was covered for any financial loss he might incur if he was 
taken ill after booking a holiday. 
 
We do not consider it fair for an insurer to use a policy condition to achieve an effect that 
would  not  be  apparent  to  a  reasonable  policyholder,  and  that  would  place  onerous 
demands on them. 
 
If  claims  resulting  from  a  change  in  health  are  not  covered,  then  the  benefit  of  the 
cancellation cover is severely limited. So we did not consider in this case that the insurer 
was entitled to rely on its policy condition to reject Mr K‘s medical expenses claim. We 
upheld the complaint. 
 
64/7 
 
annual travel policy – insurer rejects claim because policyholder fails to disclose change 
of health 
 
When she applied to buy an annual travel insurance policy, Mrs C told the insurer that 
she suffered from angina. It agreed to cover her for this condition. 
 
Several months later, her GP made a small alteration to the medication she took for her 
angina,  as  she  had  begun  to  experience  some  minor  side  effects  with  the  original 
dosage. 
 
Mrs C had no further health problems until six months later, when she was admitted to 
hospital while on holiday in Florida. She was suffering from chest pains, linked to her 
angina. 
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Fortunately, Mrs C recovered fairly quickly and was soon able to return home. It had 
never  crossed  her mind  that  there  would  be  any  difficulty  in  claiming  back  from  her 
insurer the medical expenses she had incurred while on holiday. However, the insurer 
refused  to  meet  her  claim.  It  said  she  had  failed  to  comply  with  its  policy  condition 
requiring her to inform it of any changes in her health. After complaining unsuccessfully 
to the insurer, Mrs C contacted us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We  noted  that  the  policy  condition  in  question  was  not  stated  clearly  in  the  policy 
document.  And  it  had  not  been specifically  pointed  out  to her  when  she bought  the 
insurance. Moreover, the policy gave no explanation of what it meant by a ‗change in 
health‘. There was nothing to indicate that policyholders should tell the insurer about any 
change in medication. 
 
We were satisfied that if the position had been clearly explained to Mrs C at the outset, 
she would have told the insurer that her medication had changed. If the insurer had then 
said  it  could  no  longer  provide  cover  for  this  condition,  she  would  have  arranged 
alternative cover. In the circumstances, we did not think it was fair for the insurer to 
reject the claim. We upheld the complaint. 
 
64/8 
 
annual travel policy – insurer refuses to provide cover for medical condition that arose 
after the policyholder booked a holiday 
 
Three months after Mr G had taken out an annual travel insurance policy he booked a 
trip to the Bahamas, departing in January 2006. He and his partner, Miss K, planned to 
get married during the trip. 
 
Unfortunately, only a few weeks after booking the holiday, Mr G was diagnosed with 
cancer and underwent urgent surgery, followed by radiotherapy. It was not until three 
days before he was due to travel that he was well enough for his doctor to declare him fit 
for travel. He called his insurer straight away to check that he would be covered if he 
experienced any problems linked to his cancer while he was away. 
 
The insurer promised to get back to him urgently. However, it was not until the afternoon 
before he was due to set off that the insurer contacted Mr G. It told him it would not 
cover  any  claims  resulting  from  his  cancer.  The  insurer  did  offer  to  meet  Mr  G‘s 
cancellation  claim  if  he  decided  to  cancel  the  holiday  at  this  point.  Understandably, 
however,  Mr  G  did  not  want  to  cancel  his  wedding.  Instead  he  spent several  hours 
ringing round other insurers until he was eventually able to arrange a new policy that 
gave him the cover he needed. 
 
On  his  return  from  holiday,  Mr  G  complained  to  the  original  insurer  and  asked  for 
compensation  for  the  distress  and  inconvenience  it  had  caused  him.  He  had  found 
himself effectively uninsured, less than 24 hours before he was due to depart. When the 
insurer rejected his complaint, Mr G came to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
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When rejecting Mr G‘s claim, the insurer had cited a clause in the policy that gave it the 
right  to  alter  the  policy  terms  if  the  policyholder‘s  health  changed  before  a  holiday 
started, but after it had been booked. As in case 64/06, we did not consider this to be 
fair. Policyholders could not ever be certain exactly what cover was available under their 
policy. 
 
It had clearly been distressing for Mr G to be told so close to his departure that his policy 
would  not  provide  the  cover  he  needed.  And  he  had  been  put  to  considerable 
inconvenience – and some additional expense – in arranging the new policy. So we said 
the  insurer  should  reimburse  the  cost  of  the  new  policy  and  pay  Mr  G  £200  in 
compensation. 
 
64/9 
 
ongoing travel policy – insurer refuses to meet a claim when the policyholder ignores a 
reminder about the need to declare any new medical condition 
 
Mr G had an ongoing travel policy, provided by his bank as part of a package of benefits 
attached  to  his  current  account.  Every  year,  the  insurer  sent  policyholders  a  letter 
reminding them to report any changes in their health that had arisen over the past year. 
The  policy  excluded  any  claims  relating  to  such  changes  unless,  before  booking  a 
holiday,  the  policyholder  contacted  the  insurer  and  the  insurer  specifically  agreed  to 
cover the new medical condition. 
 
Mr G failed to tell the insurer that he had been diagnosed with a heart murmur, shortly 
before he had booked a trip to Greece. He had also failed to check with his doctor that 
he was fit to travel and there seemed to be real uncertainty about that. 
 
Unfortunately,  while  he  was  in  Greece  Mr  G  suffered  a  heart  attack.  When  he 
subsequently claimed for the medical expenses incurred while he was on holiday, the 
insurer refused to pay up. 
 
It said he should have provided details of the heart murmur before he went ahead and 
booked the holiday. If he had done this, the insurer would have excluded cover for any 
heart conditions. Mr G considered this unfair and referred his complaint to us. 
 
Complaint not upheld 
 
We were satisfied that the insurer had stated clearly – in its policy summary – the need 
for policyholders to declare any changes in their health. It had also made it clear what it 
meant by ‗changes in health‘. 
 
And it sent policyholders a clearly-worded reminder each year, pointing out the need to 
inform it of any changes in health that had arisen over the previous twelve months. We 
noted that the insurer did not send policyholders any details of the health information 
they had provided in earlier years. We thought that in some instances this could make it 
difficult for policyholders to distinguish between ‗new‘ medical conditions and those they 
had already told the insurer about. 
 
In this particular case, however, we did not think Mr G should have had any difficulty in 
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he had disclosed that he had been diagnosed with a heart murmur, the insurer was 
entitled – under the policy conditions – to exclude cover for heart conditions that affected 
any travel plans he made after disclosing this health problem. 
 
Mr G had gone ahead and booked his holiday without telling the insurer that he had 
been diagnosed with a new and serious heart condition. He had also failed to check 
whether he was ‗fit to travel‘. We felt that in the circumstances of this particular case, it 
was fair and reasonable for the insurer to reject the complaint. 
 
Issue 65:     October/November 2007 
 
65/1 
 
pet insurance – incorrect date of diagnosis on claim form results in insurer refusing claim 
 
Mrs F had been worried about her dog, Herbie, for some time. In early July 2005, after a 
number of visits to the vet, Herbie was diagnosed with arthritis. Mrs F submitted her pet 
insurance  claim  immediately,  and  it  was  accepted  under  the  terms  of  the  insurer‘s 
‗premium policy‘. This was the cover Mrs F held at the time, and it provided a maximum 
benefit of £4,000 (less any excess). 
 
In July 2006 the vet gave Mrs F a continuation claim form to send to the insurer – for 
Herbie‘s long-term treatment. This said the condition had first been treated in November 
2004. 
 
The insurer refused to pay the claim. It said that in November 2004 Mrs F had only a 
basic insurance policy in place (with a maximum benefit of just £1,500). The insurer had 
already paid out more than this, so it said it could not make any further payments for 
Herbie‘s  arthritis  treatment  –  and  that  any  future  arthritis-related  claims  would  be 
excluded from the policy. 
 
Mrs F was unhappy with this. She said Herbie‘s condition had not been diagnosed until 
July 2005. By then, she was covered by the premium policy, so she thought the insurer 
should continue to cover Herbie‘s arthritis. 
 
She backed up her complaint with a detailed letter from the vet, confirming that Herbie 
had not been diagnosed with arthritis until 22 July 2005. 
 
The insurer still insisted the claim should be dealt with under its basic policy. It said it 
would not ask for the ‗over-payments‘ it had already made to be returned, but it refused 
to make any further payments or to meet any further claims for the cost of the arthritis 
treatment. Mrs F then brought her complaint to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
When we investigated the case, we found that the second claim form  – sent to the 
insurer in July 2006 – had been completed by the head veterinary nurse, not by the vet 
who had actually treated Herbie and who had completed the earlier forms. Mrs F said 
the nurse had clearly made a mistake when giving the date of the diagnosis. 
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The  evidence  suggested  that  although  Herbie  was  indeed  first  seen  by  the  vet  in 
November 2004, no diagnosis had been confirmed at that stage. It was not until the 
return visit in July 2005 that further investigation led to the diagnosis of arthritis. 
 
Having considered all the evidence, including correspondence from the vet, we believed 
that Herbie had been diagnosed with arthritis  in July 2005. We asked the insurer to 
review Mrs F‘s claim under the terms of its premium policy and to pay her any amount it 
owed her under the terms of that policy. 
 
65/2 
 
pet insurer refuses claim on grounds that policyholder ‗failed to take reasonable care‘ 
 
Mrs D was a keen fund-raiser for a local charity, and often took her horse to various 
outdoor fund-raising events for children to ride. Unfortunately, on the morning of the 
town‘s summer fair, Mrs D‘s horse-box overturned after becoming detached from the 
vehicle towing it. The horse was seriously injured, and after it had been examined by two 
vets it had to be put down. 
 
Mrs D later submitted a claim for the veterinary fees she had incurred – and for the value 
of her horse. Initially, the insurer made an offer which would only cover the veterinary 
fees. However, when it received its loss adjuster‘s report, the insurer discovered that the 
horse had injured his leg in a similar accident two years earlier. 
 
The insurer then withdrew the offer (which had not yet been formally accepted). It said it 
doubted Ms D‘s trailer had been roadworthy and it believed she was in breach of the 
policy condition ‗to take reasonable precautions to prevent accidents, illness, loss or 
damage‘. It also stated that she should have disclosed the first accident at the time she 
renewed her policy. 
 
Mrs D was unhappy that the insurer had withdrawn its offer. She thought it should meet 
her claim for both the veterinary fees and the value of her horse, so she brought her 
complaint to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We had to consider whether Mrs D had breached the policy condition that required her to 
take ‗reasonable care‘. In order to reject the claim on these grounds, the insurer had to 
demonstrate that Mrs D had been ‗reckless‘. It had to show that she had realised there 
was a risk involved in transporting her horse but had either taken no steps to avert it, or 
taken steps she knew were inadequate. 
 
We found no evidence that she had been aware of the problem – that the tow-bar was 
corroded. Showing the trailer to be unroadworthy would not be sufficient to demonstrate 
Mrs D‘s recklessness. The terms of the insurance policy did not require her to keep the 
vehicle in good condition. And in any event, she had borrowed the vehicle – it was not 
hers. We accepted that Mrs D had not appreciated the trailer was in a poor state of 
repair. 
 
We noted that when Mrs D renewed the policy, the insurer had asked her to disclose 
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that it had never occurred to her to disclose it. In our view, her failure to disclose the 
injury had been inadvertent, rather than reckless. 
 
We told the insurer it should meet Mrs D‘s claim for both the veterinary fees and the 
value of her horse. 
 
65/3 
 
pet insurer refuses to meet hydrotherapy claim because treatment not carried out by a 
vet or registered member of a relevant association 
 
Mr  and  Mrs  J‘s  dog,  Ruby,  was very  fit  and active  until  November 2003,  when  she 
suffered  a  prolapsed  disc.  Her  veterinary  surgeon  recommended  a  course  of 
hydrotherapy.  This  would  help  Ruby  to  regain  the  use  of  her  hind  legs  as  well  as 
assisting with her rehabilitation in general. 
 
Mr J told us that he had checked the proposed treatment with the insurer and was told it 
would be covered. Ruby responded very well to the hydrotherapy. However, when Mr 
and Mrs J submitted the claim, the insurer refused to meet it. 
 
It said that – unless the treatment was carried out by a vet or a member of the Canine 
Hydrotherapy Association (HCA) or other relevant association  – the policy specifically 
excluded ‗the cost of hiring a swimming pool, hydrotherapy pool or any other pool or 
hydrotherapy equipment‘. The insurer said that although it had previously paid similar 
claims, it would not do so in this case as neither the hydrotherapist nor the veterinary 
nurse were members of the HCA. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We  understood  why  the  insurer  did  not  routinely  approve  all  hydrotherapy  claims. 
However,  we  noted  that  Ruby‘s  treatment  had  been  recommended  by  a  qualified 
veterinary  surgeon.  The  clinical  evidence  made  it  clear  that  the  hydrotherapy  had 
contributed to her recovery and that she had derived significant benefit from it. We also 
noted that the therapy had been administered by an experienced veterinary nurse – the 
only  qualified  hydrotherapist  within  some  hours  travelling  time  from  Mr  and  Mrs  J‘s 
home. 
 
It was true that the veterinary nurse was not a member of the HCA. However, we were 
satisfied  that  she  was  sufficiently  well  qualified  and  experienced  to  provide  an 
appropriate level of treatment. 
 
We believed that the fair and reasonable outcome in this case was for the insurer to act 
as if the treatment had been carried out by a member of the HCA. So we instructed the 
insurer to meet Mr and Mrs J‘s claim. 
 
65/4 
 
pet insurance – claim rejected because it related to a pre-existing condition 
 
After  visiting  a  friend  whose  cat  had  recently  had  kittens,  Mr  and  Mrs  W  became 
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of their vet – decided to keep her. Mr and Mrs W named the kitten ‗Pepper‘ and insured 
her straight away. 
 
Pepper had suffered from serious health problems since her birth and eventually had to 
be  put  down.  When  Mr  and  Mrs  W  later  came  to  claim  £2,000  for  the  cost  of  her 
treatment, their insurer refused to pay. It said that the policy they had taken out excluded 
any pre-existing conditions. 
 
Mr and Mrs W argued that Pepper‘s initial problems had been fully dealt with while she 
still lived with their friend. They indicated that they had phoned the insurer before taking 
Pepper to an animal hospital after she had become seriously ill. And they suggested that 
the insurer had said it would meet all veterinary and hospital charges. 
 
The couple said these were expenses which they would not otherwise have incurred, as 
they would have had the kitten put down immediately rather than getting her treated at 
the hospital. 
 
The insurer did not accept that it had agreed to cover all the costs. However, it said that 
as there might have been some misunderstanding about this, it would pay 50% of the 
veterinary costs as a goodwill gesture. 
 
Complaint not upheld 
 
The vet‘s notes showed clearly that Mr and Mrs W had been aware, when they were first 
offered the kitten, that she had serious unresolved health problems. There was no doubt 
that the exclusion for pre-existing medical conditions applied. 
 
The evidence did not support Mr and Mrs W‘s claim that the insurer had said it would 
cover all the fees. They had made only a very brief call to the insurer before taking the 
kitten into hospital. This call was not long enough for them to have raised any significant 
issues. They had a more detailed conversation with the insurer four days after the kitten 
went into hospital – by which point most of the costs had already been incurred. 
 
Mr and Mrs W were told by the insurer that the claim would be covered if it was an 
‗ongoing problem which had previously been met‘. We thought it possible that the couple 
had  simply  misunderstood  the  position.  In  the  circumstances,  we  considered  the 
insurer‘s offer to pay 50% of the charges was both fair and reasonable, and we advised 
Mr and Mrs W to accept it. 
 
65/5 
 
pet insurance – claim rejected because policy limited cover for treatment of any one 
condition to a 12-month period 
 
Mrs G‘s three-year old beagle, Jasper, was diagnosed with a condition where his rear 
kneecaps were constantly dislocating or slipping out of position. This was very painful 
and Jasper suffered to the extent that he had difficulty walking. Surgery was needed and 
Jasper‘s rear right leg was operated on in December 2001. 
 
The vet recommended that Jasper‘s rear left leg should also be operated on, ideally in 
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until  September  2005.  When  she  then  submitted  a  claim  for  the  cost  of  the  final 
operation, the insurer rejected it. It pointed out that Jasper‘s treatment had begun in 
2001 – when his condition was first identified. The policy terms clearly stated that any 
condition would only be covered for 12 months after the initial treatment began. Unhappy 
about the insurer‘s decision, Mrs G brought her complaint to us. 
Complaint upheld 
 
The insurer told us that, at the time of the initial claim, it would have made it clear that 
there was a 12-month limitation on the treatment of any one condition. Unfortunately, the 
insurer was unable to produce any evidence to support this. 
 
Mrs G insisted that the limitation had not been brought to her attention. She said if she 
had been told she needed to have all Jasper‘s treatment carried out within 12 months, 
she would have done this. The only reason she had waited so long was that Jasper was 
still very young and the leg did not appear to require immediate treatment. 
 
We decided that the policy limitation was a significant term that the insurer should have 
brought to Mrs G‘s attention. However, we could not be sure that this had happened. 
 
Mrs G‘s decision to postpone the treatment had not prejudiced the insurer. Mrs G had 
renewed her policy each year, and was not attempting to claim for more than she would 
have originally been entitled to. So we instructed the insurer to reimburse Mrs G for the 
cost of Jasper‘s surgery – although we did agree to it applying a limit to the claim, based 
on what the treatment would have cost in 2002. 
 
65/6 
 
pet  insurance  –  administrative  error  prevents  policyholder  renewing  policy  before  it 
lapses 
 
Mr T‘s pet insurance policy gave comprehensive cover for his expensive pair of breeding 
cockatiels, Rosie and Jim. The insurer who arranged the policy did not itself offer this 
sort of specialist cover and instead acted as an intermediary for the actual underwriter. 
 
Towards the end of 2005, the underwriter notified the intermediary of  its  intention to 
terminate  the  pet  insurance  scheme.  The  intermediary  arranged,  at  short  notice,  to 
contact all policyholders and advise them of the situation. 
 
Cover had already been arranged with a second underwriter, and the intermediary told 
existing customers that while most of them would be covered by the new policy, some 
would not be eligible. These customers would continue to be covered under the existing 
arrangements with the original underwriter. 
 
At  the  time  Mr  T‘s  policy  was  due  for  renewal  –  in  December  2005  –  one  of  his 
cockatiels, Jim, was undergoing long-term treatment for a skin condition. Because of that 
ongoing claim, Rosie and Jim were not eligible for cover under the new scheme and 
would  continue  to  be covered  by  the original  policy.  Unfortunately,  an  administrative 
error meant that the renewal letter that contained this information was not sent to Mr T. 
By the time the error came to light, Mr T‘s renewal date had passed and the policy had 
lapsed. 
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Following negotiations with the underwriter, the original insurer offered to accept liability 
for the continuation of Jim‘s treatment. This would apply from the date Mr T‘s policy 
lapsed until the treatment was completed, or the policy limit for that claim was reached. 
 
The insurer also offered Mr T £100 for the distress and inconvenience he had been 
caused. Mr T was unhappy with the situation. He wanted to receive indefinite cover for 
Jim‘s treatment on the same terms he had enjoyed previously. 
 
Complaint not upheld 
 
When we considered the case, it was evident that even if Mr T‘s policy had not lapsed, 
he would only – at best – have been able to secure the continued benefit of cover for a 
further twelve months – and up to any applicable policy limit. We noted that Jim had 
been in the middle of treatment for his skin condition when the policy was nearing the 
end of its annual contract. This meant that if the policy had been renewed on the same 
terms, cover for his treatment would have continued either until its completion or until the 
relevant policy limit had been reached. 
 
The original insurer would not have been obliged to continue to provide the same level of 
cover at the next policy renewal. Equally, no other pet insurer would have been under 
any obligation to offer the same terms as those held under the original policy. In the 
circumstances, we told Mr T that we were not able to require the intermediary – or either 
of the insurers – to provide indefinite cover for the treatment of Jim‘s skin condition. 
 
65/7 
 
marine insurance – whether explosion and resulting damage caused by policyholder‘s 
‗recklessness‘ while installing gas heater in cabin of his boat 
 
Mr  A  was  devastated  when  he  had  a  phone  call  to  say  his  boat  had  been  badly 
damaged by an explosion in the cabin. Since buying the boat a year earlier he had put a 
great deal of money and effort into renovating it and had spent almost every weekend – 
and most of his annual leave – on the boat. 
 
After inspecting the damage, Mr A put in a claim under his marine insurance policy. 
However, the insurer refused to pay out. It said that, in installing a gas heater in the 
cabin, Mr A had ‗knowingly taken insufficient measures to avert the risk of a faulty and 
dangerous  installation‘.  The  insurer  said  that  this  constituted  ‗recklessness‘  and  was 
therefore a breach of a policy condition. 
 
The insurer based its view on a report prepared by the marine surveyor it had appointed 
to inspect the damage. The surveyor concluded that the cause of the explosion was the 
gas heater Mr A had installed in the cabin. 
 
Mr A disputed the surveyor‘s conclusions. He was not convinced that the heater had 
caused the explosion and he put forward several alternative theories. He strenuously 
denied  that  he  had  acted  recklessly  in  installing  the  heater,  and  said  that  he  had 
considerable  experience  in  installing  such  appliances  correctly  and  had  taken 
appropriate care. 
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When  the  insurer  insisted  that  the  circumstances  of  the  case meant  that  it  was  not 
obliged to meet Mr A‘s claim, he brought his complaint to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
To  decide  whether  the  insurance  company  was  entitled  to  refuse  Mr  A‘s  claim,  we 
needed  to  consider  whether  Mr  A  had  been  reckless  when  he  installed  the  gas 
appliance. In other words, we had to try and establish whether he failed to take adequate 
measures to avert the risk of a faulty and dangerous installation. 
 
In reaching its conclusions on the case, the insurer had relied heavily on the advice of 
the  marine  surveyor.  So  we  reviewed  the  surveyor‘s  report  and  his  subsequent 
correspondence with the insurer. 
 
We were concerned by some of the surveyor‘s findings. For example, he had noted that 
the  heater  was  not  of  a  type  intended  for  use  ‗in  a  marine  situation‘.  However,  our 
investigations showed that this was not the case. 
 
We also noted that in response to a written query by the insurer, the surveyor had said 
that he did not feel Mr A had been ‗reckless‘ when installing the heater, merely that he 
had ‗probably been unaware of the perils involved.‘ 
 
In the light of the available evidence, we concluded that Mr A had understood the risks 
and had taken appropriate steps to ensure the heater was installed safely. 
 
He had not, therefore, acted ‗recklessly‘. We told the insurer it should deal with the claim, 
in accordance with the terms of the policy. 
 
65/12 
 
contractors‘ all-risks commercial insurance policy – liabilities to third parties – claim for 
serious  fire  damage  during  renovation  work  –  whether  claim  can  be  dismissed  on 
grounds of contractor‘s carelessness and breach of policy condition 
 
Mr K bought a large house that needed major restoration. It was while this work was 
taking place that there was a serious fire, thought to have been caused by a blowtorch 
used by one of the builders. The estimate for repairing the damage looked like totalling 
at least £750,000 and the building contractor, Mr B, put in a claim under his contractors‘ 
all-risks commercial insurance policy for liabilities to third parties. 
 
Mr  B  was  extremely  surprised  when  the  insurer  rejected  the  claim.  It  said  he  had 
breached a specific policy condition regarding the preparations necessary during the use 
of heat in building works. The insurer said that it could also dismiss the claim on the 
grounds of the builder's carelessness. 
 
Mr B complained to the insurer that the specific policy condition it said he had breached 
had not been part of his insurance contract, so he could not be bound by it. The insurer 
disagreed. After a lengthy dispute about which of several slightly different versions of the 
policy condition applied in this case, and about the precise legal interpretation of these 
different versions, Mr B referred the complaint to us. 
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Complaint upheld 
 
We concluded that the policy condition could properly be considered a part of Mr B‘s 
insurance contract. The differences in the wording of the various versions of the policy 
condition  were  immaterial  as  far  as  this  specific  dispute  was  concerned.  That  was 
because none of the versions explained exactly what policyholders were expected to do 
– over and above taking standard fire-prevention precautions – in order to comply with 
the policy condition. We were satisfied from the evidence that Mr B had ensured his staff 
had taken all standard precautions. There was nothing to substantiate the insurer‘s view 
that it could also reject the claim on the grounds of the contractor‘s carelessness. So we 
said the insurer should deal with the claim. It agreed to our recommendation that that it 
should pay the full amount due, even if this came to more than £100,000 – the maximum 
award we have the power to insist on in any individual case. 
 
Issue 66:     December 2007/ January 2008 
 
66/1 
 
motor vehicle insurance – dispute over insurer‘s valuation 
 
After Mr W‘s 1989 Saab saloon was badly damaged in a road traffic accident, the insurer 
offered  him  £700,  which  it  said  was  the  car‘s  pre-accident  value.  The  insurer  had 
calculated that repairing the car would cost considerably more than the car‘s market 
value. 
 
Mr  W  was  far  from  happy  with  the  insurer‘s  offer.  He  thought  it  was  based  on  an 
inaccurate valuation and failed to take the car‘s particular features into account. He sent 
the insurer details of these features and suggested that £2,600 was a more realistic 
figure. 
 
The  insurer  subsequently  increased  its  offer  to  £1,040.  Mr  W  still  thought  this  was 
inadequate. He complained to us about both the valuation and the poor service he felt 
he had received from the insurer. To support his view of the car‘s value he sent us 
copies of a number of newspaper and magazine advertisements for the sale of similar 
vehicles. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
The  advertisements  Mr  W  had  sent  us  were  not  particularly  persuasive.  Apart  from 
anything else, they  featured many different models  –  including convertible and  turbo 
Saabs. We pointed out to Mr W that a number of apparently minor details – for example 
in the model type or mileage – can significantly affect value. And sellers usually inflate 
the price they state in such advertisements, to allow for a degree of negotiation. So 
advertisements rarely provide sufficient detail for an accurate ‗like for like‘ comparison, 
such as that needed to provide a proper valuation. 
 
We explained to Mr W that our usual approach when assessing the value of vehicles is 
to consult the major motor-vehicle trade-guides. These guides are published regularly 
and provide detailed information on the market valuation of most makes and models. 
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In  this  particular  instance,  we  noted  that  the  trade guides  showed a value  that  was 
significantly higher than the £1,040 that the insurer had offered Mr W. However it was 
less than the £2,600 Mr W felt the vehicle was worth. 
 
We had been surprised by the amounts the insurer had originally offered Mr W, as we 
could not see that they had any reasonable basis. 
 
We told the insurer to offer what we considered to be a fair amount, based on the trade 
guides we had used. We said it should also pay Mr W £150 to compensate him for the 
distress and inconvenience it had caused him. 
 
66/2 
 
motor vehicle insurance – dispute over insurer‘s valuation 
 
Mrs B paid £7,995 for a second-hand 2006 Vauxhall Corsa which had a specialist sports 
body. Ten days after she bought the car, it was badly damaged in an accident. The 
insurer declared the car to be a total loss, as the estimated cost of repairs exceeded 
£7,000. So it offered Mrs B £6,900, which it said was the fair pre-accident retail value of 
the car. 
 
After Mrs B rejected this offer, insisting that the insurer had not taken the car‘s special 
features into account, the insurer offered her £7,175. Mrs B felt this was still not a fair 
offer, so she brought her complaint to us. 
 
Complaint upheld. 
 
Because Mrs B‘s car had fairly unusual features, it was not as quick and easy as is 
usually the case with more standard models to just check in the trade guides for a guide 
retail price. 
 
However, we told the insurer that if it had contacted the compilers of these guides and 
made some further enquiries, it should have been able to obtain an accurate guide price 
for Mrs B‘s exact model. 
 
The insurer then made the enquiries we said it should have undertaken when Mrs B first 
made her claim. As a result, it established that the guide price was higher than either of 
the amounts it had offered Mrs B. We said it should settle the complaint by paying Mrs B 
the correct guide price. 
 
66/3 
 
motor vehicle insurance – dispute over insurer‘s valuation and its sale of car for salvage 
 
Mr G‘s 1999 Daewoo was damaged in an accident in July 2006. When he contacted the 
insurer to make a claim, he stressed that even though the car was badly damaged, he 
wanted the insurer to return it to him in due course, so he could get it repaired. 
 
However, after deciding that the car was a total loss, the insurer immediately sold it on 
for salvage. The insurer then offered Mr G £2,125 – representing what it said was the 
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Mr G was extremely unhappy to discover that the insurer had disposed of his car, even 
though he had specifically asked it not to do this. He also complained that the amount he 
was offered did not accurately reflect the car‘s value. 
 
The insurer refused to comment on its sale of the car, and it would not reconsider its 
offer, so Mr G referred the complaint to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
Mr  G  pointed  out  that  the  car  had  benefited  from  the  liquid  petroleum  gas  (LPG) 
conversion he had carried out just over two years earlier, at a cost of £2,000. He was 
firmly of the view that the car could have been repaired, allowing him to retain the benefit 
of  the  LPG  conversion.  He  said  that  the  insurer  had  not  only  prevented  him  from 
attempting a repair, it had also failed to take the LPG conversion into account when it 
valued the car. 
 
We agreed with Mr G that the insurer had not valued the car correctly. And the insurer 
did not dispute that Mr G had made it very clear, when he reported the accident, that he 
wished to have the car repaired. 
 
The car had been regarded as a Category ‗C‘ in the ‗Code of Practice for the disposal of 
motor vehicle Salvage‘. This meant that although it was uneconomical for the insurer to 
repair the car, the car was repairable. 
 
We said that the insurer had clearly acted incorrectly. Mr G was still the owner of the car 
at the time the insurer disposed of it. And he had asked the insurer to return the car to 
him, so that he could arrange a repair. 
 
We told the insurer it should pay Mr G £4,125. This was £2,000 more than the amount it 
had offered him, and would enable him to buy a car with LPG conversion, to replace the 
vehicle the insurer had disposed of. We said the insurer should also pay Mr G £400 for 
the distress and inconvenience it had caused him. 
 
66/4 
 
motor  vehicle  insurance  –  dispute  over  insurer‘s  valuation  –  classic  car  insured  on 
‗agreed value‘ basis 
 
When Mr H bought a classic car, he took out a motor insurance policy on an ‗agreed 
value‘ basis rather than on the more usual ‗market value‘ basis. 
 
Such policies are generally taken out only by owners of classic or particularly valuable 
cars, where the value is unlikely to depreciate substantially – if at all. 
 
The value of the vehicle is agreed in advance and insurer is then obliged to pay that 
amount if the car is lost or damaged beyond reasonable repair. However, the insurer is 
not obliged to pay for the replacement cost of the vehicle. 
 
Mr H agreed the value of his classic car under this policy was £2,500. Unfortunately, the 
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view  that  it  would  cost  more  than  £2,500  to  remedy  the  damage,  so  it  offered  him 
£2,500, in settlement of the claim. 
 
Mr H thought that this figure was far too low. He told the insurer that, bearing in mind the 
good condition of the car before the accident, it would cost between £4,000 and £5,000 
to replace. He therefore wanted the insurer to pay that amount. 
 
Complaint not upheld 
 
We noted that Mr H had renewed his annual policy twice – on the 'agreed value' basis – 
before the claim in question. The policy terms, which had been clearly stated in the 
policy documents, said that Mr H was entitled to receive the ‗agreed value‘ of the car – 
not the cost of replacing it. So we told him we could not uphold his complaint. 
 
Issue 68:     March/April 2008 
 
68/7 
 
whether insurer responsible for cost of remedying faults in building work carried out as 
part of a claim for flood damage 
 
Mrs C lived in an old mill house which was badly damaged by winter floods, following 
prolonged rain and storms. She was insured by the same firm for both buildings and 
contents and she submitted claims under both policies. 
 
The  insurer  accepted  liability  and  appointed  contractors  to  carry  out  repairs  to  the 
property. After a few weeks, however, Mrs C concluded that the contractors were making 
unreasonably slow progress. She discussed the situation with the insurer and said she 
would  like to appoint a local surveyor to represent her and supervise the work. The 
insurer agreed to her proposal and confirmed that it would pay the surveyor‘s fee. 
 
During  the  course  of  the  subsequent  works,  Mrs  C‘s  surveyor  replaced  the  existing 
contractors with a new firm of builders. And Mrs C asked for some additional work to be 
carried out, at her own expense. 
 
As time went on, Mrs C became increasingly dissatisfied – both with the surveyor and 
with the standard of the building work. When all the work was eventually completed, she 
hired a different surveyor to prepare a report on what had been done. He identified a 
number of faults in the building work and estimated that it would cost just under £50,000 
to remedy matters. 
 
Mrs C sent the report to the insurer, together with a claim for the cost of putting things 
right. However, the insurer refused to meet the claim. It said that as Mrs C had appointed 
a surveyor to oversee the work, responsibility for any faults lay with him. Mrs C then 
brought her complaint to us. 
 
Complaint upheld in part 
 
It was clear that there were a number of problems with the building work. Some of the 
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to carry out. We agreed with the insurer that it was not responsible for putting right any 
defects in this additional work. 
 
However,  we  said  that  the  repair  work  relating  to  the  flood  damage  was  a  different 
matter. The insurer had authorised and paid for the work. And it remained responsible 
for ensuring that the work was completed satisfactorily, regardless of the fact that – with 
its agreement – Mrs C had appointed a surveyor to oversee the builders. 
 
We  said  the  insurer  should  pay  Mrs  C  £20,000  to  cover  the  cost  of  remedying  the 
defects in the work carried out to repair the flood damage. 
 
68/8 
 
whether uneven concrete flooring resulted from subsidence or poor construction 
 
Mr and Mrs B contacted their insurer when they first suspected that their flat had been 
affected by subsidence. The insurer appointed a firm of surveyors to inspect and monitor 
the situation. 
 
It  became  clear  that  subsidence  was  affecting  the  entire  block  of  flats  and  that  a 
significant amount of work would be needed to remedy matters. The insurer paid for Mr 
and Mrs B to move into alternative accommodation for eight months, while work was 
carried out on their flat. 
 
In the event, it was over nine months before the work was finished. And when Mr and 
Mrs B visited the flat, they concluded that it was still not in a fit state for them to return to. 
They told the insurer that the uneven state of the concrete floor was unacceptable. They 
also submitted a long list of ‗snagging‘ items that they said needed to be fixed before 
they could move back home. 
 
The  surveyors  said  that  the  poor  state  of  the  floors  was  nothing  to  do  with  the 
subsidence or the repair works. It was attributable to the age of the property and the 
poor  quality  of  its  original  construction.  The  surveyors  did,  however,  agree  that  the 
‗snagging‘ items needed attention. 
 
The  insurer  agreed  to  pay  for  Mr  and  Mrs  B  to  continue  living  in  alternative 
accommodation for a further three months. At the end of that time, the couple returned 
home. However, they remained unhappy about the state of the floors. Unable to get any 
further with the insurer on this matter, they referred the dispute to us. 
 
Complaint upheld in part 
 
In  our  view,  the  insurer  had  acted  reasonably  in  carrying  out  the  repairs  and  then 
extending  the  period  during  which  it  paid  for  the  couple  to  stay  in  alternative 
accommodation. We accepted the surveyors‘ evidence that the poor state of the floors 
did not result from subsidence, the repair works, or any other insured ‗event‘. So we 
agreed with the insurer that it was not responsible for any work that  was needed to 
restore or improve the state of the floors. 
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We  did,  however,  conclude  that  Mr  and  Mrs  B  had  been  caused  additional  and 
significant  inconvenience and distress by the need to extend their stay in alternative 
accommodation. We therefore required the firm to pay them £1,000 for this. 
 
68/9 
 
claim for flooding and damp in basement after exceptional rainfall – whether policy also 
covered cost of repairing damaged damp-proofing in walls 
 
After a period of exceptional rainfall, Mr and Mrs D discovered that the basement of their 
house  had  suffered  flooding  and  damp.  They  put  in  a  claim  under  their  household 
insurance policy. 
 
After sending an engineer to inspect the basement, the insurer agreed to pay the cost of 
repairing the flood damage. However, it said it would not meet the cost of making the 
walls  of  the  basement  watertight.  The  engineer  had  reported  that  the  damp-proof 
membrane protecting the walls was in a poor condition and that this had contributed to 
the problems in the basement. 
 
The couple thought it unreasonable of the insurer not to pay for all the repairs. However, 
the  insurer  insisted  that  it  was  not  liable  for  the  cost  of  repairing  the  damp-proof 
membrane or providing an alternative solution to keep the basement water-proof and 
damp-proof. It said the damage to the membrane must have been caused by defective 
design or poor workmanship or by very gradual movement in the surrounding earth. 
 
The insurer pointed out that the policy did not cover such matters. Mr and Mrs D then 
brought their complaint to us. 
 
Complaint upheld in part 
 
The evidence from the engineers suggested that the damage was likely to have been 
caused by ground movement rather than by any defect in workmanship or design. The 
insurer  said  that  this  type  of  ground  movement  constituted  a  ‗gradually-operating 
process‘ – something that was not covered by the policy. 
 
After reviewing the evidence, we concluded that the ground movement that had, in all 
likelihood, caused the damage was covered by the policy. 
 
We therefore required the insurer to pay for the cost of installing a new system to replace 
the damaged membrane and protect the basement. 
 
Mr and Mrs D had also asked to be compensated for the insurer‘s ‗undue delay‘  in 
dealing with the claim. We did not agree that it was appropriate in this case for the 
insurer  to  make  such  a  payment.  In  view  of  the  technically  complex  nature  of  the 
problem, the insurer had been entitled to appoint a firm of engineers to inspect and 
report on the damage. The insurer had acted promptly, both in appointing the engineers 
and then in completing its consideration of the claim, once the report was ready. 
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68/10 
 
insurer refuses to pay claim for storm damage when it discovers that policyholder is 
serving a prison sentence 
 
Mr and Mrs T put in a claim under their buildings insurance policy after their small, sea-
front house was badly damaged in a storm involving wind speeds of up to 100mph and 
exceptionally high tides. 
 
While it was looking into the claim, the insurer discovered that Mr T was serving a prison 
sentence. It told the couple it would not have offered them any cover at all if it had been 
aware  of  Mr  T‘s  conviction.  It  said  that  it  would  not  pay  the  claim  and  that  it  was 
‗avoiding‘ the policy (treating it as if it had never existed). 
 
Mr and Mrs T insisted that they had told the insurer about the conviction. However, the 
insurer refused to reconsider the matter so the couple brought their complaint to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
Mr and Mrs T had been sold the policy by their bank and regarded the bank as their 
insurer.  There  was  clear  evidence  that  the  bank  had  been  fully  aware  of  Mr  T‘s 
circumstances. In fact it had written to him at his prison address. However, it had not 
passed on any information about his conviction to the insurer. 
 
The bank admitted that it had received a letter from Mr T in which he had given details of 
his prison sentence and asked about some concerns regarding both his mortgage and 
his household insurance. However, it said that  Mr T had addressed his letter  to the 
bank‘s mortgage department – and the correspondence had all been dealt with within 
that department, not in the insurance part of its business. It said that it was not fair to 
imply that the one part of the business would automatically be aware of what went on in 
other departments. 
 
In our view, the staff in the mortgage department of the bank should have realised that 
they needed to pass on to the insurer the information that Mr T had provided about his 
conviction and imprisonment. 
 
We noted that a few weeks after the bank‘s mortgage department had replied to Mr T, 
the bank had sent him the standard questionnaire it sent all policyholders when their 
insurance was due for renewal. When he completed the questionnaire, Mr T referred to 
his  recent  correspondence  with  the  bank  about  his  ‗changed  circumstances  and 
conviction‘. However, it appeared that no one at the bank had passed on to the insurer 
what Mr T had written on the questionnaire. 
 
We  did  not  think  it  likely  that  Mr  T,  or  his  wife,  would  have  been  unable  to  obtain 
insurance cover – either from the same insurer or from a different one – if the details of 
his conviction had been known. However, the couple would probably have had to pay an 
additional premium because of the conviction. 
 
We upheld the complaint.  We said the bank should pay the couple the same amount 
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that  it  could  deduct  the  cost  of  the  additional  premium  that  the  insurer  would  have 
charged, if it had been aware of the conviction. 
 
68/11 
 
whether problem with floorboards was caused by a relatively recent flood or by rot that 
had been spreading for some years 
 
While  Mr H  was visiting his elderly mother he became aware of a problem with the 
flooring. After removing the carpet, he discovered that the wooden floorboards and joists 
were suffering from extensive rot. Acting on his mother‘s behalf, Mr H then put in a claim 
under her buildings insurance policy for the cost of replacing the wooden timbers and 
floorboards. 
 
After investigating the claim, the insurer refused to pay out. It cited an exclusion in the 
policy that meant it did not cover ‗loss or damage … resulting in wet or dry rot‘. 
 
Mr H complained to the insurer about its decision. He said that the damage must have 
been caused by a leak at the property four years earlier that had led to the installation of 
a new water meter and stopcock. As the policy had been in force since that time, and it 
covered liability for ‗escape of water and flooding‘, he said the insurer should pay up. 
 
Complaint rejected 
 
We examined all the evidence, including the independent reports that both the insurer 
and Mr H had commissioned. We concluded, from the scale and extent of the rot, that it 
was unlikely to have been caused by a single leak, four years earlier. It appeared to 
have developed and spread over a number of years. 
 
So we said that the insurer was justified in rejecting the claim. 
 
Issue 69:     April/May 2008 
 
69/1 
 
damp-proofing treatment covered by extended warranty – whether insurer can decline 
claim when policyholder unable to produce original versions of relevant documents 
 
When Mr M discovered that his house was affected by damp, he arranged treatment to 
overcome the existing problem and prevent any recurrence. The company that carried 
out the work for him provided a guarantee. It also offered him a certificate of insurance, 
described as a 'backup guarantee'. He was told he would be able to rely on the backup 
guarantee if the building company failed to carry out its obligations to make good any 
faults in the damp-proofing work. 
 
Some  nine  years  later,  Mr  M  put  his  property  on  the market after  deciding  to move 
abroad. A survey commissioned by a prospective buyer revealed that his house suffered 
from recurring damp. 
 Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
Appendix A: O.N. Case Studies  196 
Mr  M  tried  to  contact  the  company  that  had  carried  out  the  damp-proofing  work. 
However, it had long since gone out of business. He therefore put in a claim to the 
insurer that provided the backup guarantee.  
 
The insurer refused to pay the claim. It said it was a condition of the policy that certain 
documents  were  submitted  with  a  claim.  These  included  the  original  of  the  building 
company's  initial  report  on  the  work  required,  its  quotation  for  the  work  and  the 
guarantee it had offered. Mr M had only supplied copies of these documents – not the 
originals.  
 
After complaining unsuccessfully to the insurer about its refusal to pay his claim, Mr M 
referred the matter to us. He said he had never been given the original versions of the 
documents in question and had submitted the only versions he had. He noted that the 
paperwork  the  insurer  sent  him  referred  to  its  requirement  that  policyholders  should 
submit the documents in question and said, 'If you do not have them, obtain copies from 
your contractor now, (they may make a small charge to cover administration)'.  
 
In Mr M's view, this reference to obtaining copies indicated that the insurer was not able 
to insist on his providing originals. However, the insurer said it would only accept copies 
if they were authenticated by the original builder. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We found that the actual policy document contained no information about the procedure 
for making a claim or the need to supply original documents. This information was in a 
separate 'registration form' sent to policyholders after they had taken out the policy. 
 
We agreed with Mr M that if the insurer intended to insist on policyholders supplying 
originals or authenticated copies of the documents in question, then it should have made 
this very much clearer. But in any event, we considered it would be unfair of the insurer 
to demand that Mr M should produce original or authenticated copies of the documents, 
when there was no real doubt that Mr M was entitled to the benefit of the policy. 
 
We required the insurer to pay the cost of putting right the damage caused by the failure 
of the damp-proofing work. We said it should also reimburse Mr M for the administrative 
fee it had charged him when dealing with, and declining, his claim. 
 
69/2 
 
leather  sofa  covered  by  extended  warranty  –  whether  insurer  can  refuse  claim  for 
damage caused by policyholder‘s children 
 
When Mrs D bought a new leather sofa she took out a five-year warranty that covered it 
against  accidental  damage.  Just  under  two  years  later  she  made  a  claim  under  the 
warranty, because a hole had developed in the leather upholstery. 
 
The insurer sent a technician to inspect the sofa. In his report, the technician noted that 
Mrs D told him the hole had appeared after her teenage sons had been picking at a 
weak spot in the upholstery. The technician identified this spot as a scar in the leather 
and he recommended that repair work should be carried out under the policy. 
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However, the insurer rejected the claim on the basis of the following exclusion in the 
policy: 'The insurer will not pay for costs attributable to or arising from … any damage, 
soiling or staining caused … deliberately by any person, including children'. 
 
Mrs D then brought her complaint to us. She admitted that she had caught her teenage 
sons picking at the hole in the sofa. However, she said that she had tried to stop them. 
In her view, the damage was accidental and the insurer should repair it. 
 
Complaint not upheld 
 
We  noted  that  the  technician‘s  report  suggested  that  the  nature  and  extent  of  the 
damage  was  consistent  with  'interference  of  a  nature  scar  by  fingers'.  We  then 
considered whether the apparently deliberate acts of Mrs D's teenage children should be 
treated as accidents, or whether they fell within the policy exclusion that the insurer had 
cited in rejecting the claim. 
 
We concluded that the policy wording and layout gave such prominence to the relevant 
exclusion that Mrs D could not reasonably have been unaware of it when she bought the 
policy. In light of this, the technician‘s report, and Mrs D's own admission that her sons 
had caused the damage, we agreed with the insurer that the claim should not be upheld. 
 
69/3 
 
insurer declines to pay claim on car covered by extended warranty  
 
When Mr J bought a new car he took out a policy offering a motor vehicle breakdown 
warranty. This came into effect when the manufacturer's guarantee expired – 12 months 
after the purchase date. It provided cover for four years. 
 
Around 18 months after the start of the warranty, Mr J's car broke down. He put in a 
claim,  which  the  insurer paid.  A  few months  later  he put  in  a  further  claim,  totalling 
£4,000, for repairs and replacement parts. However, the insurer refused to pay up. It 
said Mr J had 'failed to satisfy a policy requirement to ensure the vehicle was serviced by 
a  manufacturer-approved  repairer,  in  accordance  with  the  manufacturer‘s 
recommendations'.  
 
Under the terms of the policy, a service was required every 24 months or every 12,000 
miles. Mr J had arranged his car‘s second service just 17 months after the first service. 
However – by the time of the second service, the car had covered an additional 13,377 
miles.  
 
The insurer also noted that the manufacturer had accepted responsibility for replacing 
one of the parts. In the insurer‘s view, this indicated that the replacement had become 
necessary because of a 'latent manufacturing failure'. The policy specifically excluded 
claims made as a result of such problems. Unhappy with the situation, Mr J brought his 
complaint to us. 
 
We looked into the details of the repairs that had been carried out, and why they had 
become necessary. We accepted that the car's second service had been carried out 
later than the manufacturer‘s recommendation. However, we were unable to see any 
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noted that the insurer had been aware of the timing of the second service when Mr J had 
made the first claim, some months earlier.    
 
The insurer accepted our point that there was no connection between the timing of the 
second service and the nature of the repairs. We asked why it had not objected to the 
timing of the second service when the first claim was submitted. The insurer said that at 
the time of the first claim, the policy had been administered on its behalf by a different 
company, and that company had not checked the service details. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We said that by accepting the first of Mr J‘s claims, the insurer had waived its right to 
reject the claims solely because of his failure to have his car serviced within a certain 
timescale. And in any event, we did not consider that there had been a significant delay 
in getting the car serviced. Mr J had exceeded the permitted mileage by something over 
10%, but had remained within the 24 months timescale. 
 
We noted that the manufacturer had contributed towards the cost of one of the items that 
required repair. However, we did not believe that this amounted to confirmation that 
there had been a 'latent manufacturing defect', so it did not entitle the insurer to refuse to 
pay the balance of the cost of this item. 
 
In all the circumstances of the case, we decided it was appropriate for the insurer to 
reimburse Mr J for the cost of all the repairs that had been carried out. 
 
69/4 
 
insurer declines claim made under extended warranty for damaged leather sofa 
 
When Mr and Mrs C bought a new leather three-piece suite, they took out an extended 
warranty. The suite was covered by the manufacturer‘s warranty for the first 12 months. 
After that time, the extended warranty provided cover for four years for any accidental 
damage to the leather upholstery caused by 'rips, tears, burns, punctures and pets' as 
well as for 'structural damage' caused by a number of features including 'broken zips'. 
 
Less than a year after they had bought the suite, Mr and Mrs C discovered that the 
leather  upholstery  on  the sofa  had been  damaged  where  a metal  component of  the 
recliner mechanism had rubbed against it. The manufacturer repaired this free of charge 
under its own warranty.   
 
Unfortunately, eight months later Mr and Mrs C had further problems with the sofa. By 
then, it was no longer covered by the manufacturer‘s warranty, so the couple made a 
claim under the extended warranty. They reported that further damage had occurred 
since the initial repairs had been carried out. They noted that the frame of the sofa 
needed  repair,  the  leather  was  badly  marked  and  the  zips  on  the  arm  pads  were 
damaged. 
 
The insurer rejected the claim. It said the damage had come about because of the poor 
standard of the repairs carried out by the manufacturer. The extended warranty did not 
cover the manufacturer‘s 'negligent failure'. Mr and Mrs C then referred their complaint to 
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Complaint upheld 
 
After looking closely at the terms of the policy for the extended warranty, we concluded 
that the wording was very poor. There was considerable uncertainty about exactly what 
the insurer intended to cover and about how it could invoke various exclusions. 
 
Applying the normal legal test in such situations, we said that since the insurer‘s policy 
wording  was  ambiguous  and  unclear,  it  should  be  interpreted  in  the  manner  most 
favourable to the policyholders, and with their reasonable expectations in mind.  
 
We examined the detailed report prepared by the insurer‘s technician. This said there 
was  no  evidence  of  any  structural  damage  to  the  frame  of  the  sofa.  The  report 
suggested that some of the decline in the quality of the leather had arisen 'as a result of 
a gradual process through use of the furniture over time' and was therefore not covered 
by the policy. However, the technician thought that the more serious tears and markings 
were covered by the policy. 
 
We concluded  that  the  insurer should  pay  the  cost  of  repairing  all  of  the  accidental 
damage to the leather suite, including rips, punctures, broken zips and everything arising 
from the manufacturer‘s failure to carry out previous repair works properly. 
 
69/5 
 
whether  trade  federation  warranty  covered  faulty  guttering  installed  with  new 
conservatory 
 
When Mr and Mrs B had a conservatory fitted to the side of their house, the company 
that  installed  it  offered  them  a  trade  federation  warranty.  This  supplemented  the 
supplier‘s warranty, which only covered the first year.  The trade federation warranty 
provided cover for faulty workmanship by the conservatory installation company and any 
'failure  of  PVC-U  windows,  doorframes  or  conservatory  roof  sections  to  operate  in 
accordance with the manufacturer‘s specification'.  
 
Around  eighteen  months  after  the  conservatory  had  been  fitted,  Mr  and  Mrs  B 
discovered some damage to the side of their house. This had been caused by overflows 
from the gutter that had been installed with the conservatory – and that ran between the 
conservatory and the main wall of the house. The couple put in a claim under the trade 
federation warranty. 
 
The insurer rejected the claim on the basis that the damage had arisen because of a 
fault in the way the gutter had been assembled. The insurer said the policy excluded any 
loss or damage due to defective design of any part of the conservatory other than the 
'conservatory roof sections'. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We reviewed the terms of the policy, together with the details of the problem with the 
guttering  and  the  resulting  damage.  The  gutter  was  clearly  failing  to  operate  in 
accordance  with  the  manufacturer‘s  specification.  We  concluded  that  this  was  partly 
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However, the problem had occurred mainly because the gutter had not been installed 
correctly. 
 
We decided that the insurer should pay the claim, on the basis both that the gutter 
assembly  was  itself  a  'conservatory  roof  section'  and  also  that  its  malfunction  had 
resulted, at least in part, because it had not been installed properly. 
 
So we said the insurer should pay all reasonable costs for putting right the problems with 
the gutter and the resulting damage to the property. We said the insurer should also pay 
Mr and Mrs B £100 to compensate them for the distress and inconvenience they had 
been caused. 
 
Issue 71:     August 2008 
 
71/1 
 
customer says he was never told that a payment protection policy was optional when he 
took out a credit card 
 
A  trainee  chef,  Mr  A,  complained  about  the  way  in  which  he  was  sold  a  payment 
protection policy when he applied for a credit card. He said he had understood he was 
being insured, but had not been told that the policy was optional. 
 
He said he was not given any information about the cost or benefits of the policy. And he 
stated  that  a  representative  of  the  credit  card  company  had  simply  filled  in  the 
application form for him, written a small ‗x‘ at the bottom of the form, and then asked him 
to sign his name next to the ‗x‘. 
 
The credit card company rejected his complaint. It said it was clear from the application 
form that the insurance policy was optional and that Mr A had chosen to take it. The 
company also said that the insurance premiums were itemised on Mr A‘s credit card 
statement  each  month,  so  he  must  have  been  aware  that  he  was  paying  for  an 
additional – optional – product. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We asked the credit card company to send us Mr A‘s application form. We noted that on 
the final page, close to the space for the customer‘s signature, there was a ‗tick box‘ next 
to a statement that the customer wanted payment protection insurance. This had been 
ticked. 
 
The tick in the box, the written details entered on the form, and the small ‗ x‘ placed next 
to the signature all appeared to have been written in the same handwriting, using a 
ballpoint  pen.  However,  the  signature  itself  looked  markedly  different  and  had  been 
written with a thick, felt-tipped pen. This tended to support Mr A‘s account of events. 
 
We also noted that Mr A had been 19 years of age at the time of the sale. This was the 
first time he had applied for any financial product or service other than a basic bank 
account. 
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We did not agree with the credit card company that it was clear from the application form 
that the insurance cover was optional. Nor did we agree that, by signing the form, Mr A 
had clearly indicated his wish to buy the policy. There was no evidence that he had been 
told anything about the cover at the time of the sale. And the fact that Mr A‘s statement 
showed that the premium was collected monthly did not mean he must have been aware 
the insurance was optional. 
 
We upheld the complaint and told the company to return to Mr A all the premiums he had 
paid to date, plus interest. 
 
71/2 
 
couple in financial difficulties take out a succession of loans and are sold a new single-
premium payment protection policy each time, adding to their outstanding debt 
 
Mr  and  Mrs  J  had  been  experiencing  financial  difficulties  for  some  while  and  their 
situation worsened in early 2005, after Mrs J gave up work to look after their children. 
Finding  it  difficult  to  meet  the monthly  repayments on  their  loan,  they  approached a 
different lender to see if it could help. 
 
The lender offered them a new loan of £18,000. This allowed them not only to settle their 
existing loan (for around £11,000) but also to clear the overdraft on their current account 
and settle several credit card debts and sizeable bills. In order to keep their monthly 
repayments as low as possible, the couple chose to take the new loan over 10 years. 
 
Unfortunately, Mr and Mrs J‘s financial problems did not resolve themselves and within 
18 months they again approached the lender for help. It agreed a new and higher loan. 
This was spread over 15 years and was secured by a second mortgage on the couple‘s 
home. 
 
Some time later, a friend pointed out to them that each time they had obtained a new 
loan they had also been sold a new payment protection policy. So they asked the lender 
if  it  would  refund  their  insurance  premiums,  as  part  of  a  wider  settlement  of  their 
continuing debt problems. The lender said it would arrange a small, partial refund if the 
couple cancelled their policy. Unhappy with this, the couple referred their dispute to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We noted that each time Mr and Mrs J had taken out a loan they had been asked to pay 
for the insurance by means of a single premium. This was added to the underlying loan 
and repaid (plus interest) over the entire length of the loan, even though – in each case 
– the policy itself only provided cover for 5 years. 
 
There  was  nothing  to  suggest  that  the  lender  had  explained  to  Mr  and  Mrs  J  the 
significance of this arrangement – particularly the fact that that they would still be paying 
for the policy for some time after the cover had ended. 
 
Although  the  lender  told  us  it  did  not  offer  advice,  it  was  clear  that  it  had  actively 
encouraged  the  couple  to  buy  the  policies.  In  view  of  the  couple‘s  financial 
circumstances, we did not consider the sale of these policies to have been appropriate. 
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Flexibility was an important consideration, as it seemed likely the couple would need to 
restructure the loan at a later date. They would not wish to incur significant costs in doing 
this. 
 
However, the policies they were sold lacked flexibility and, because of the limitations on 
the refund of premiums, were particularly costly if they were cancelled after a relatively 
short period. 
 
In our view, the lender should not have encouraged the couple to buy these policies, and 
the couple would not have wanted the policies if the business had explained matters 
more fully. 
 
We said the lender should re-calculate the amount outstanding on the couple‘s loan 
account, putting them in the position they would have been in if they had not bought the 
policies. We said the business should also pay the couple back the amount they had 
paid for the policies, plus interest on these amounts. 
 
We had some concerns about the way in which the lender had dealt with Mr and Mrs J, 
given their overall financial difficulties. We therefore suggested it should look at ways of 
assisting  them with a wider settlement of the debt, including waiving the fees it had 
levied in recent months in connection with several overdue loan repayments. 
 
71/3 
 
consumer  says  he  was  not  told  his  payment  protection  policy  offered  only  limited 
benefits to the self-employed 
 
Mr  D  had  a  small  shop  specialising  in  interior  design.  His  complaint  concerned  the 
single-premium payment protection policy he had been sold when he took out a personal 
loan. He thought the business concerned should have realised the policy was unsuitable 
for  him,  as he  was  self-employed  and  therefore entitled  to  only  a  limited  number  of 
benefits under the policy. 
 
When the business refused to refund all the premiums he had paid, plus interest, Mr D 
brought his complaint to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We noted that the benefits available to self-employed policyholders were more limited 
than  those  available  to  employees.  In  particular,  the  redundancy  benefit  was  only 
available to policyholders if their employer had ceased trading or had been declared 
insolvent. We accepted Mr D‘s view that these terms were likely to make the policy less 
attractive to someone who was self-employed. 
 
In this particular case, although the business clearly knew that Mr D was self-employed, 
it had not mentioned that this would limit the benefits he could get under the policy. The 
business had given him a written summary of the policy benefits. However, we did not 
consider that this leaflet adequately highlighted the limited cover he would get from the 
policy. 
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We concluded that the business had not given Mr D sufficient information to enable him 
to make an informed choice. 
 
We upheld the complaint. We told the business to put the loan back where it would have 
been if he had not taken the policy, and to refund all of his payments for the policy, with 
interest. 
 
71/4 
 
consumer in financial difficulties complains about sale of a payment protection policy that 
she considered unsuitable for her needs and too expensive 
 
Miss A did not earn a great deal from her job in a local bookshop and as well as having a 
large overdraft, she was close to her spending limit on several credit cards. Despite this, 
she felt she had been managing her finances reasonably well. 
 
After  she  split  up  with  her  partner,  however,  she  realised  that  she  had  become 
increasingly reliant on his help to meet the household bills and other expenses. 
 
Alarmed by the extent of her financial difficulties, she applied to the business for a loan. 
It  agreed  a  sum  of  £20,000,  to  be  repaid  over  15  years  and  secured  by  a  second 
mortgage on Miss A‘s flat. The business also sold her a payment protection policy. 
 
Some  time  later,  Miss  A  complained about  the sale  of  this policy,  saying  it  was  too 
expensive and she had never been told that it was optional. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We  had  significant  doubts  about  the  sales  practices  of  the  business  concerned. 
However, we accepted that the business might reasonably have believed Miss A had a 
need for a payment protection policy. And we thought Miss A should have been aware, 
from the written information she was given, that the policy was optional. However, the 
business only offered its loan customers one type of payment protection policy – and we 
did not think that particular policy was suitable in this case. 
 
Moreover, despite being well aware that Miss A needed to reduce her outgoings, the 
business had effectively understated the true cost of the policy. It had not explained 
exactly how much she would pay for it, but had simply told her that the premiums would 
‗increase the monthly payments by only £47 a month‘. The policy offered cover for five 
years and had a single premium of over £5,000. 
 
This  sum  was  added  to  the  loan  and  spread  over  the  loan‘s  15-year  lifetime,  plus 
interest. Miss A was therefore paying a total of nearly £8,500 for the policy. 
 
We  looked  at  the  restrictions  placed  on  the  sickness  and  unemployment  benefits 
available under the policy. If a policyholder made a successful claim, their loan payments 
would be covered for up to 12 months. But the policyholder would then need to have 
returned to work for a minimum of three months before they could make any subsequent 
claim. 
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We calculated that in order to recoup the total amount she was paying for the policy, 
Miss A would need to make three separate claims, each for 12 months‘ worth of benefits, 
during the five years that the policy was in operation. 
 
The  business  disputed  our  calculations,  pointing  out  that  there  was  no  limit  on  the 
number of claims that could be made. It also noted that we had not taken account of the 
death benefit, which would pay off the loan in full if Miss A died while the policy was in 
force. 
 
However, we said the policy was expensive and inflexible and we remained unconvinced 
that  it  had  been  suitable  for  Miss  A.  If  she  had  needed  life  cover,  she  could  have 
obtained it at a very modest cost. 
 
We thought it unlikely that, in practice, the value of any benefit payments she received 
from the policy would exceed the amount she was paying. We told the business to put 
Miss A‘s loan back as it would have been without the payment protection policy. We said 
it  should  refund  all  the  payments  she  had  made  for  the  borrowing  on  the  policy 
premiums – and pay her a modest sum for distress and inconvenience. 
 
71/5 
 
consumer complains about sale of payment protection policy  after he repays his loan 
early and gets only a partial refund of the amount he paid for the policy 
 
Mr K applied to the business for a loan so that he could buy a car for his daughter, who 
had just started at university. His finances were under some pressure at the time. Not 
only was he committed to paying part of his daughter‘s course fees, but the firm he 
worked for had recently made significant cut-backs in its bonus payments. For some 
while, Mr K had relied on these payments as a very welcome supplement to his income. 
 
The business arranged to lend him the sum he needed, over 30 months. It also offered 
him a payment protection policy, covering the same period as the loan. Mr K paid for the 
policy with a single premium and the cost was added to the loan. 
 
Unfortunately, Mr K‘s daughter found it difficult to settle at university and after six months 
she gave up her course and took a temporary job abroad. So Mr K asked the business if 
he could settle his loan early and cancel the policy. 
 
Surprised to learn that only a very small proportion of the premium he had paid would be 
refunded to him, Mr K complained to the business. He said it should not have sold him 
an expensive policy that he did not need  – and that represented very poor value for 
money. 
 
Complaint not upheld 
 
The evidence suggested that Mr K had been given adequate opportunity at the time of 
the  sale  to  consider  the  details  of  the  policy.  The  literature  set  out  the  policy‘s  key 
features – and its costs – very clearly. 
 
We did not think the literature explained the conditions regarding the refund of premiums 
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we thought that however clearly these conditions had been stated, Mr K would still have 
bought the policy. He had a clear need for insurance to cover his loan repayments. The 
loan  was  for  a  modest  amount  and  for  a  relatively  short  period.  And  Mr  K  had  no 
particular need at the time to ensure the loan arrangement was flexible. We did not 
uphold the complaint. 
 
71/6 
 
insurer suspends payment of unemployment benefit under payment protection policy, 
saying there was insufficient proof he was looking for work 
 
Mr B was made redundant from his engineering job at a local factory. He took some 
comfort from the fact that a year earlier, when he had taken a loan to buy a car, he had 
also taken a payment protection policy. 
 
For five months Mr B received unemployment benefit under the policy, to cover his loan 
repayments. But the insurer then suspended his benefit. It expressed some surprise that 
he had not yet obtained employment, and said it needed proof that he was still actively 
looking for work before it could reinstate his payments. 
 
Mr B complained to the insurer, saying that he attended the jobcentre every week and 
had  also  registered  his  details  with  an  internet  employment  agency.  He  thought  it 
unreasonable  of  the  insurer  to  expect  him  to  send  written  evidence  of  every  job 
application  he  had  made.  It  was  rare  for  companies  to  acknowledge  receipt  of  an 
application or to write to tell him if he was thought unsuitable. 
 
The  insurer  then  said  it  would  be  prepared  to  accept  instead  a  letter  from  Mr  B‘s 
jobcentre, confirming that he was actively seeking work. But when he provided this, the 
insurer wrote to tell him it was unable to pay him any further unemployment benefit, as 
there  was  insufficient  proof  that  he  was  looking  for  work.  Mr  B  then  referred  his 
complaint to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We were not surprised that Mr B had been unable to obtain a new job immediately. His 
job had been fairly specialised and his skills were not readily transferable to other areas 
of work. 
 
Neither  were  we  surprised  that  Mr  B  had  been  unable  to  produce  many  letters 
acknowledging – or rejecting – his applications for particular jobs. It is relatively common 
these days for companies to contact only those job applicants who are shortlisted for an 
interview. 
 
The  insurer  did  not  dispute  that  it  had  originally  agreed  to  reinstate  Mr  B‘s  benefit 
payments if he provided a letter from his jobcentre confirming that he was still looking for 
work. It was unable to explain why it had then gone back on its word. And we could see 
nothing in the terms and conditions of the policy that might justify its refusal to pay the 
unemployment benefit in this case. 
 
We looked at the dates on the few letters of acknowledgment or rejection that Mr B had 
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jobcentre.  We  concluded  that  Mr  B  had  been  looking  for  work  for  a  period  of  eight 
months from the date when the insurer had stopped paying him any benefits. 
 
We said it should pay him the amount he had been entitled to under his policy during 
that period. We said it should also make a small additional payment in recognition of the 
inconvenience and distress it had caused. 
 
Issue 72:     Sept/ Oct 2008 
 
72/1 
 
motor insurer declines claim for theft of car – on grounds that car could not have been 
taken without the use of the programmed key 
 
Mrs D‘s teenage son arrived home one afternoon and said her car was missing from the 
spot where she always left it, just outside her house. Not long afterwards the car was 
discovered just a short distance away. It was badly damaged and appeared to have 
been driven off the road and to have caught fire. 
 
The insurer turned down Mrs D‘s claim. It said its loss adjusters had noted that the car 
could only have been operated by someone using an ‗intelligent‘ (programmed) key. The 
key had not been left in the car and Mrs D had not reported that either of her two keys 
had been lost or stolen. When asked to produce the keys, she had at first been able to 
find only one of them, although she later found the other key. 
 
Mrs D challenged the insurer‗s insistence that the car could only have been taken by 
someone who had the programmed key. In response, the insurer cited a report from 
motor vehicle security experts, which it said supported its view. 
 
The insurer also suggested that the only other way in which the car could have been 
moved was by means of a transporter or tow-truck. Either of these would have caused 
the car‘s alarm to sound, alerting Mrs D to the theft. But in any case, as far as the insurer 
was concerned, the fact that the car had been driven off the road immediately before the 
fire indicated that a key must have been used. 
 
Complaint not upheld 
 
Mrs D then referred her complaint to us. She said she had been extremely distressed by 
the firm‘s stance and by its implication that she – or someone in her family – had taken 
the car and caused the accident. She produced evidence from the original dealer to 
support her argument that the car‘s security could be by-passed, and that the car could 
be operated without the use of the programmed key. 
 
It was clear that the incident had caused Mrs D much distress and we did not doubt her 
honesty.  However,  we  did  not  uphold  the  complaint.  We  noted  that  the  technical 
evidence Mrs D produced, supplied by the original dealer, was of a very general nature. 
It did not make any specific reference to the make and model of Mrs D‘s car. By contrast, 
the technical evidence produced by the insurer referred very specifically to the exact 
make and model that Mrs D had owned. 
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We  also  took  account  of  the  particular  circumstances  of  the  case  and  the  possible 
alternative  explanations  for  what  had  happened.  We  concluded,  on  a  balance  of 
probabilities, that the firm had sufficient reasons to refuse to pay the claim. 
 
72/2 
 
motor  insurance  –  theft  claim  turned  down  because  policyholder  failed  to  disclose 
relevant information 
 
Mr G referred his complaint to us after his claim for the theft of his car was turned down. 
The insurer said Mr G failed to disclose relevant information when he applied for his 
policy. He had not mentioned a claim he made three years earlier for car theft. He had 
also failed to disclose an earlier accident claim, made the year before he took out this 
particular policy. 
 
The insurer said that if he had provided all relevant information, the premium would have 
been approximately £1,000 higher than the amount he had been charged. 
 
Complaint upheld in part 
 
Mr G did not dispute that he had failed to provide the information in question. He said the 
earlier theft had simply slipped his mind when he was filling in the application form, and 
he had ‗not particularly concentrated on the issue of past claims‘ when he was seeking a 
quote. 
 
He argued that his claim should be paid in full, as he did not consider he had done 
anything wrong. He said he would have been happy to pay the additional £1,000 if he 
had been asked to do so, and he suggested the firm should deduct this sum from his 
current claim. 
 
After seeking clarification from both parties, we concluded that Mr G‘s failure to disclose 
relevant  information  was  unlikely  to  have  been  an  ‗accidental‘  or  ‗casual‘  oversight, 
which might in some circumstances have meant that the insurer should still meet the 
claim. 
 
Equally, we could find no evidence to suggest that Mr G had been dishonest in failing to 
provide the required information. But he did appear to have been very careless and we 
said the insurer was entitled to turn down the claim, even though there was no reason to 
doubt the car had been stolen. 
 
However, we did not agree that the insurer had acted correctly when, after deciding not 
to meet the claim, it retained Mr G‘s insurance premium. We said it should return this 
sum to him, together with interest. 
 
72/3 
 
motor insurer declines claim for theft of car – saying car could not have been driven 
away without use of its programmed key 
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As he left the house on his way to work one morning, Mr F discovered that his car was 
missing from the spot where he always parked it overnight. He immediately reported the 
theft to his insurer and to the police. 
 
The insurer subsequently refused to pay his claim. It said the car could only have been 
driven  away  by  someone  using  one  of  the  car‘s  programmed  keys.  And  it  provided 
expert evidence illustrating just how difficult it was to start the ignition on that particular 
make and model of car without one of the original keys. 
 
Mr F had only been able to produce one of his two keys when it had asked him to hand 
them over. In the insurer‘s view, this cast serious doubts over his story. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
Mr F referred the dispute to us. He said he had not had a working second key for some 
time. He had intended to buy a new one. However, the age of his car meant it was no 
longer serviced by the main dealer and he had not got round to finding an alternative 
supplier. As he was the only driver, he had not felt there was any urgency about the 
matter. 
 
Mr  F  stressed  that  he  had  reported  the  loss  of  his  car  very  promptly.  He  had  also 
provided evidence that he had been at home the evening before he had found the car 
missing. 
 
After reviewing all the evidence, we found nothing to indicate that it would have been 
impossible to start the car without one of the programmed keys, even though the firm‘s 
technical evidence indicated that this would clearly have been difficult. 
 
More importantly, however, we noted that Mr F had very recently had some remedial 
work  done  on  the  car  at a  local  garage.  He had  previously  had  the  car  serviced  at 
several other garages in the area. All of these garages had access to the key – which 
could be replicated with the appropriate technology. 
 
We noted that Mr F provided strong evidence that he had not left his house at all on the 
evening immediately before he had reported the car missing. And the insurer accepted 
that the police report did not indicate anything untoward. On the balance of probabilities, 
we  decided  the  evidence  pointed  towards  the  car  having  been  stolen.  We  said  the 
insurer should pay Mr F‘s claim, reimbursing him for the value of the car. 
 
72/4 
 
Several months after repair of accidental damage to his car, policyholder notifies insurer 
of damage apparently overlooked during the repair 
 
After Mr B‘s car was damaged in a road traffic accident, his insurer accepted his claim 
under  his  comprehensive  motor  insurance  policy.  One  of  the  insurer‘s  approved 
repairers  carried  out  the  necessary  remedial  work  and  Mr  B  signed  off  the  work  as 
having been satisfactorily completed. 
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Four months later, Mr B was involved in another road traffic accident. He later said that 
as there was only minor damage to his car, he had not contacted his insurer but had 
simply gone ahead and arranged the repairs. 
 
Mr B said that, while repairing the car, the garage had spotted some damage to the boot 
that did not seem to have been caused by the most recent accident. So he told the 
insurer the original repairers must have failed to complete the job properly. 
 
The insurer arranged for a different garage to inspect the reported damage. It also asked 
the engineer who had inspected the car after the first accident to review his report and 
the photographs taken at the time. 
 
As a result of its findings, the insurer refused Mr B‘s request that it should pay for the 
repair of the boot as part of the original claim. It said there was nothing to connect this 
damage to the original accident. Mr B then brought his complaint to us. 
 
Complaint not upheld 
 
After looking at all the evidence, we found nothing to support Mr B‘s view that his car‘s 
boot had been damaged in the original accident. And we did not agree that there had 
been any ‗negligent act or omission‘ on the part of the repairers who had carried out the 
remedial work after the first accident. 
 
The  insurer  had  not  been  required  to  disprove  Mr  B‘s  allegations.  However,  by 
instructing  independent  experts  and  seeking  clarification  from  the  original  inspecting 
engineer, it had gone to some lengths to try to establish whether it was  liable for the 
damaged boot. 
 
Although it had declined to consider the damaged boot as an outstanding issue from the 
original claim, the insurer had offered to deal with it as a new claim, subject to a new 
policy excess. We said we thought this was a fair and reasonable offer and we did not 
uphold the complaint. 
 
Issue 73:     October/ November 2008 
 
73/6 
 
household  contents  insurer  refuses  claim  for  theft  of  ‗minimoto‘  from  policyholder‘s 
garage 
 
Mr W was very surprised when his insurer said it would only pay part of his claim, after 
several items were stolen from his house and garage. The insurer refused to pay for the 
replacement of his young son‘s ‗minimoto‘ (a very small powered bike), that had been 
kept in the garage. The reason given was that Mr W‘s contents and personal belongings 
policy  excluded  ‗Motor  vehicles,  electrically,  mechanically  or  power-assisted  vehicles 
(other than domestic gardening equipment)‘. 
 
Mr W argued that the minimoto was not a ‗motor vehicle‘ as described in the policy but a 
child‘s toy. He said its engine was tiny, it had a top speed of less than 20 mph and it was 
incapable of being used to transport people from A to B. It could not be used on roads 
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The insurer disagreed. It said the powered bike did fall within the policy definition. It was 
a  power-assisted vehicle  and even  with  the  limited  engine  in  the model  in  question, 
could reach speeds of up to 35 mph. The insurer added that if minimotos were toys, they 
would be readily available from toyshops. However, this was not the case and they could 
usually only be obtained from specialist dealers. 
 
Unhappy with the insurer‘s stance, Mr W brought his complaint to us. 
 
Complaint not upheld 
 
We took account of evidence provided by Mr W that some minimotos were sold as toys 
and were available from toy shops and toy websites. 
 
However, Mr W acknowledged that his son‘s minimoto could travel at speeds of over 20 
mph. It was therefore difficult to accept his claim that it should be classed as a child‘s 
toy. No adult could effectively supervise a child using it. And while we accepted Mr W‘s 
point that it was not a means of transport, it was capable of being used for sporting 
purposes. It was also considerably faster than other powered toys used by children, such 
as mini cars and go-karts intended for domestic use. 
 
We concluded that in the particular circumstances of this case, the insurer had acted 
correctly in declining the claim for the theft of the minimoto. 
 
73/7 
 
insurer tells policyholder that ‗accidental damage‘ cover does not apply to his damaged 
lawnmower 
 
Mr M was very annoyed when his insurer refused to pay for the expensive repair work 
his lawnmower needed, after it was damaged in an accident. He had been confident that 
his claim would be met, as he had paid an additional premium for ‗accidental damage‘ 
cover when he took out his household contents insurance policy. 
 
The insurer turned down the claim, saying the lawnmower was covered only for specified 
events, including fire, flood and theft. 
 
Mr M then referred the complaint to us, saying he thought the insurer was attempting to 
‗hide behind the small print‘ so that it would not have to pay out on what he considered a 
‗perfectly straightforward and valid claim‘. 
 
Complaint not upheld 
 
We examined the policy documents that Mr M had been given when he took out the 
insurance.  Like  most  household  policies,  it  provided  cover  against  certain  specified 
events including fire, flood and theft. 
 
The terms of the accidental damage cover that Mr M had selected as an ‗add-on‘ to his 
policy were set out very clearly and referred specifically to: 
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    * ‗Accidental damage to TV, video, hifi, computer or telecommunications equipment; 
and 
    * accidental breakage of glass and furniture and fixed kitchen appliances.‘ 
 
We found nothing to indicate that the accidental damage cover had been described to 
Mr  M  in an inaccurate or misleading way. So while  we sympathised with his honest 
misunderstanding about the nature of the cover he had bought, we did not uphold his 
complaint. 
 
73/8 
 
insurer rejects claim for collapse of garden wall and resulting damage 
 
The  retaining  wall  at  the  end  of  Mrs  K‘s  garden  collapsed  after  a  short  period  of 
exceptionally heavy rainfall, causing extensive damage to her garden, garden shed and 
garden furniture. 
 
However, her insurer turned down her claim. It said that the wall (which was over 140 
years old) had collapsed because of its poor construction and its age. Mrs K‘s policy only 
provided for specific perils and events, such as storm or flooding. The insurer said there 
was no evidence of storm conditions or flooding in the period leading up to the collapse 
of the wall, so there were no grounds on which Mrs K could claim under her policy. 
 
Extremely  unhappy  with  this  response,  Mrs  K  instructed  a  surveyor  to  inspect  the 
collapsed wall and produce a report about it, which she then sent to the insurer. 
 
The surveyor said the wall had been in a good state of repair. Its collapse had not come 
about because of its poor construction or its age, but because a substantial amount of 
water had built up behind it. In the surveyor‘s view, the wall‘s age was relevant only in so 
far  as  it  meant  the  wall  lacked  features  such  as  ‗weep  holes‘  that  a  more  recently-
constructed wall would have had – and that might have helped it to withstand the water 
pressure. 
 
The surveyor‘s report included weather records showing that in each of the three months 
before the wall collapsed, the rainfall in that part of the country had been considerably 
above the regional average. In the month immediately before the wall collapsed, the 
rainfall was the highest ever recorded in that area for a single month. 
 
The insurer did not respond to Mrs K for some considerable time after receiving this 
report. When it did eventually contact her, it simply confirmed that its position had not 
altered and it did not consider there were any grounds for paying her claim. Mrs K then 
came to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We had little sympathy with the insurer‘s argument that the faulty construction of the wall 
was to blame for its collapse. Modern construction methods are not the same as those in 
use 140 years ago, and insurance cannot be offered on the basis that old structures 
must conform to more recent building standards. 
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The more difficult issue to decide was whether the damage to the wall had been caused 
by ‗flood‘. The insurer had been correct in saying no flooding had taken place in the 
area.  However,  the  problem  had  not  arisen  as  a  result  of  rising  surface  water  but 
because of the very rapid build-up of water behind the wall. We concluded that this 
could, in itself, constitute a ‗flood‘. We said the incident was therefore covered under the 
terms of the policy and that the insurer should pay Mrs K‘s claim. 
 
We said it should also pay her £750 in recognition of the distress and inconvenience she 
had suffered as a result of its excessive delay in progressing her complaint and dealing 
with her queries about it. 
 
73/9 
 
insurer rejects claim for quantity of metal stolen from policyholder‘s garden 
 
Mr T put in a claim under his household contents policy after thieves removed a large 
quantity of copper, brass, lead and aluminium from his back garden. The insurer rejected 
the claim on the grounds that the policy did not cover ‗scrap metal‘. 
 
Mr T then complained to us, saying the insurer had acted unfairly and that the claim 
should be met. He said he had only been keeping the metal in his garden temporarily, 
until he had time to use it. He had bought some of it in order to repair his front porch and 
he intended to use the rest to make garden furniture. 
 
Complaint not upheld 
 
We examined the terms of the policy and noted that cover was provided for ‗household 
goods,  valuables,  personal  money,  deeds  and  documents,  business  equipment  and 
personal belongings‘. 
 
The insurer said that this clearly did not include scrap metal or raw materials used in the 
course of construction work. 
 
We accepted Mr T‘s evidence that he had been keeping the lead in his garden with the 
specific intention of repairing the roof of his front porch, and that he had indeed made 
garden furniture out of the remaining materials in the past. After discussing the complaint 
with us, the insurer said it was prepared to cover the loss of the lead that Mr T had 
intended to use for the repair of the front porch. However, it would not pay the remainder 
of the claim. 
 
We told Mr T that the insurer‘s offer was a fair one in the circumstances and we advised 
him to accept it. We did not believe he had been misled about what the policy covered. 
The lead was intended for household repairs, so it was reasonable for it to be covered 
under the terms of the household contents policy. However we retained some doubt as 
to  the  intended  use  of  the  remaining  materials.  Mr  T  told  us  he  would  accept  the 
insurer‘s offer. 
 
 
 
 
 Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
Appendix A: O.N. Case Studies  213 
Issue 74:     Dec 2008/ Jan 2009 
 
74/7 
 
annual  travel  insurance  –  retired  couple  cancel  holiday  at  their  own  expense  after 
disclosing an illness that occurred after they booked the trip 
 
In September 2007, Mr and Mrs K booked a trip to the Seychelles for early in the New 
Year, to celebrate Mr K‘s retirement. Unfortunately, Mr K suffered a stroke a few weeks 
after making the booking. This appeared to be relatively minor and the couple had every 
expectation that he would be well enough to travel by the time of their trip. 
 
At the beginning of November, the couple received the renewal notice for their annual 
travel insurance policy. This asked for details of any changes in their health since the 
policy was last renewed. Mr K provided information about his recent stroke. The insurer 
then said it would add an exclusion clause to the new policy, stating that he would not be 
covered for any claims arising ‗directly or indirectly from that stroke‘. 
 
Mr and Mrs K told the insurer this was unfair. They said they felt uneasy about travelling 
without cover for any health problems related to the stroke. And they said the insurer 
was punishing them for being honest. 
 
In its response, the insurer stressed that it was important for all policyholders to provide 
accurate information in answer to its questions about their health. Failure to do this could 
lead to claims being refused. It said it had been entitled to add the exclusion clause to 
Mr and Mrs K‘s policy, and that it would only continue to provide them with cover on that 
basis. 
 
Mr and Mrs K were unhappy about the situation they found themselves in. And they felt 
they had no option but to cancel their trip, at their own expense, when their doctor said 
that in view of Mr K‘s stroke, this might not be the best time to travel. The couple then 
complained to us. They said the insurer had acted unreasonably in adding the exclusion 
clause to the policy and forcing them into the position where they felt obliged to cancel 
their holiday. 
 
Complaint upheld in part 
 
We said the insurer had made a legitimate commercial decision in excluding cover for Mr 
K, in relation to his change in health. But in the circumstances of this case, we thought it 
should have given the couple the opportunity to cancel the trip and claim under their 
existing policy, which did not include the exclusion. We therefore said that the insurer 
should reimburse Mr and Mrs K for the costs of cancelling their holiday. 
 
74/8 
 
owner of small business disputes insurer‘s rejection of his claim for business interruption 
and damage to shop contents 
 
Mr L had a small business selling office supplies. Within the space of 14 days he made 
two  claims  on  the  insurance  policy  that  covered  his  shop  for  ‗trade  contents  and 
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The first claim related to a leak of water through his ceiling from the flat above, as a 
result of a faulty washing machine. This damaged some of his stock and other contents. 
 
The incident that led to the second claim happened after a couple of days of severe 
weather and localised flooding. A large amount of rainwater fell through the flat felt roof 
that covered part of his premises. The water damaged contents in a part of the shop that 
had not been affected by the first incident. 
 
Mr L claimed for these contents and also for 16 days‘ loss of trade. He said he had been 
advised to close his premises for health and safety reasons after the second incident. 
 
The insurer agreed to meet Mr L‘s first claim, but not the second one. It argued that there 
had been a problem with the flat roof for some years – certainly since before Mr L had 
taken out the policy. 
 
In its view, it was a defect in the roof – rather than the bad weather – that had caused 
the rainwater to come through into Mr L‘s shop. The insurer also told Mr L that it did not 
consider the water damage would have been serious enough to necessitate his closing 
the premises. Unhappy with this outcome, Mr L brought his complaint to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
The insurer had cited a policy exclusion that enabled it to turn down claims where the 
insured premises were suffering from ‗inherent vice‘ or ‗latent defect‘. In other words, 
where the damage had come about because the premises had a structural weakness. 
 
Our investigation revealed that there had been some structural problems with the roof 
before the date when Mr L took out his policy. However, there was evidence that repairs 
had been carried out well before the period of severe weather that had led to the claim. 
There was no evidence that those repairs had been faulty in any way, and there was 
insufficient evidence to back up the insurer‘s opinion that the roof had an inherent flaw. 
 
We concluded that it was the severe weather that caused the incident leading to the 
claim for damaged contents. The policy exclusion did not apply in these circumstances, 
so we said the insurer should meet this part of Mr L‘s second claim. 
 
We then looked at the part of the claim relating to Mr L‘s loss of business. He supplied 
detailed evidence about the work that had been carried out after the rainwater came in 
through the flat roof. This showed that the electricity had been turned off at the mains for 
several days. Several large industrial dehumidifiers had then been required to help dry 
out the premises before the cleaning up and remedial work could begin. 
 
We concluded, from the evidence, that Mr L had no alternative but to close his premises 
during that period. We therefore told the insurer that it should meet his claim for business 
interruption. 
 
74/9 
 
insurer rejects claim for theft and damage after thieves break into premises of a small 
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Mrs  A  ran  a  small  graphic  design  business  from  premises  above  a  retail  unit.  One 
evening, after locking up the premises and going home, she realised she had left some 
important paperwork behind. She decided to have a meal and then return to pick up the 
paperwork, as she needed it early the next morning for a meeting with a client. 
 
When she arrived back at her business premises at around 10.00pm, Mrs A discovered 
that thieves had broken in, stealing computer equipment and causing significant damage 
in the process. 
 
In due course she put in a claim to her insurer. To her great surprise, this was turned 
down. Mrs A‘s policy contained a ‗condition precedent‘, stipulating that claims of this 
nature would only be paid if specific security devices were installed and in use, and all 
the doors of the insured premises were made of solid wood. 
 
The insurer acknowledged that the correct security devices had been in place. However, 
it said it was unable to meet the claim because some of the doors (including the one 
used by the intruders to gain entry to the premises) were not ‗of the correct construction‘. 
 
Mrs A did not agree that the doors of her business premises failed to meet the criteria 
set out in her policy, and when the insurer refused to reconsider the matter she brought 
her complaint to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
It  is  generally  accepted  within  the  insurance  industry  that  claims  brought  by  some 
smaller businesses should be handled in the same way as if they had been brought by a 
consumer. 
 
We take the view that it is fair and reasonable to judge complaints from large businesses 
–  and  from  those  with  a  more  sophisticated  knowledge  of  insurance  –  by  legal 
standards. However, if we think it should have been clear to the insurer or intermediary 
that the business was an unsophisticated buyer of insurance, we are likely to judge the 
complaint as if it had been made by a consumer. 
 
Mrs A‘s business turnover was modest and she had only two part-time employees. So 
we  thought  the  insurer  should  have  treated  her  claim  as  if  it  had  been  made  by  a 
consumer – not a business. 
 
In such circumstances, if a claim would otherwise be unsuccessful only because of the 
policyholder‘s failure to meet a ‗condition precedent‘, the insurer can consider whether 
this failure was actually connected to the loss. Where it is not, the claim should be paid. 
 
In this case, we noted that the thieves gained entry to Mrs A‘s premises by forcing the 
front door off its hinges. So we concluded that they would have got in to the premises 
regardless of the precise construction of the door. We therefore told the insurer to meet 
the claim. 
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74/10 
 
insurer cites policy exclusion when owner of a small groundworks business makes a 
claim on his commercial insurance policy 
 
Mr G, who ran his own small groundworks business, was sub-contracted to carry out 
some work at an RAF base. While he was drilling on a runway at the base he struck a 
fuel-line. As well as resulting in a loss of fuel, this caused substantial damage to the 
surrounding area, including contamination of a local watercourse. 
 
Later that same day Mr G learned from the main contractor that he would be held liable 
for any damage. He therefore contacted his insurer to say he would be claiming on his 
commercial policy. 
 
The insurer told Mr G that it would not meet any claim in relation to this incident. It 
considered the RAF base to be an airport, and his policy specifically excluded cover for 
any works carried out ‗on or at airports‘. 
 
Dismayed by this news, Mr G contacted the insurer again a few days later. He said he 
had studied the wording of his policy very carefully and did not agree that the exclusion 
applied  in  this  case.  In  his  view,  the  RAF  base  was  not  an  ‗airport‘.  He  said  that 
dictionary  definitions  of  the  word  all  related  to  civil  aircraft  and  the  large-scale 
transportation of the public – not to the specialised functions of an RAF base. 
 
However, the insurer refused to reconsider its position. It said that the statutory definition 
of an airport would include the RAF base. But regardless of the exact definition, the 
policy exclusion was intended to cover high-risk locations and the work Mr G had carried 
out at the RAF base clearly fell into that category. 
 
Mr G then referred the dispute to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
When considering disputes involving the precise wording of a policy, we look at whether 
the insurer has provided a clear definition. If  it has not, then we apply the ordinary, 
everyday meaning to the word in question, rather than a statutory definition. 
 
Following this general approach, we concluded in this case that a reasonable person 
would be unlikely to think of an RAF base as an airport. 
 
We noted that in the section of the policy that listed exclusions, the insurer had listed the 
word  ‗airport‘  next  to  ‗railway‘.  We  thought  this  significant,  as  it  suggested  these 
exclusions had a common theme of public transport, rather than of high-risk locations, as 
the insurer had suggested. 
 
We  concluded  that  the  ordinary  meaning  of  ‗airport‘  was  a  narrow  one  that  did  not 
include an RAF base. So we said the insurer could not reasonably decline Mr G‘s claim 
by using an exclusion that applied to airports. 
 
We had already established, at an early stage of our investigation, that any claim would 
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make. So before we had finished investigating the complaint, we contacted both Mr G 
and the insurer. We explained that if  we upheld the complaint,  we had no power to 
require  the  insurer  to  pay  any  sum  over  that  £100,000  limit,  although  we  could 
recommend that it should do so. The insurer confirmed that it would pay any claim in full, 
and it did that when we subsequently upheld Mr G‘s complaint. 
 
Issue 75:     Jan/Feb 2009 
 
75/6 
 
when  part  of  a  matching  bathroom  suite  is  damaged  –  policyholder  asks  insurer  to 
contribute to cost of an entire new suite 
 
The basin in Mrs N‘s bathroom was accidentally damaged, so she rang her insurer to 
check she was covered for the cost of replacing it. The basin was part of a matching 
suite and she was worried she might not find a new basin that looked the same as the 
rest of the suite. 
 
The insurer later told us it outlined what its normal approach would be where a matching 
item could not be obtained. It said it explained to Mrs N that it would meet the full cost of 
replacing the damaged item. It would probably also make a contribution towards the cost 
of replacing the undamaged items in the bathroom suite. Its contribution was likely to be 
about 50% of the cost. This approach is the one we would usually expect an insurer to 
take in such circumstances. 
 
Mrs N said the insurer had told her it was ‗highly unlikely‘ an exact replacement could be 
obtained for her basin. She should therefore get a quotation for a new bathroom suite. 
 
A few days after phoning the insurer, Mrs N visited a bathroom supplier and obtained a 
quotation.  Meanwhile,  the  insurer‘s  representative  arranged  to  inspect  the  damaged 
basin. He told Mrs N he would establish whether or not an identical replacement could 
be sourced, and he would then report back to the insurer. 
 
Before the representative had submitted his report, and without contacting the insurer 
again, Mrs N went ahead and bought a new bathroom suite. She then put in a claim for 
the full cost of the new basin and for half the cost of the rest of the suite. 
 
The insurer told her it would only meet the part of her claim that related to the basin. It 
said its representative had managed to find an identical replacement for the damaged 
basin. There had therefore been no need for her to replace the whole suite. 
 
Mrs  N  complained  that  the  insurer  was  being  unreasonable,  and  in  due course  she 
referred the matter to us. 
 
Complaint not upheld 
 
Mrs  N  was  adamant  that  the  insurer  had  said  it  was  ‗highly  unlikely‘  that  an  exact 
replacement could be found. She said it was only because the insurer was so certain 
about this that she had bought the new bathroom suite. 
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We listened to the insurer‘s tape recording of its conversations with Mrs N. The insurer 
had said it was unlikely that a new basin could be found that matched the remaining 
items in the suite. However, the insurer had also stressed that its representative would 
look  into  this  for  her.  The  insurer  made  it  very  clear  that  she  should  wait  for  the 
representative to report back. She should then contact the insurer again before taking 
things any further. 
 
We looked at the length of time the insurer and its representative had taken to progress 
matters. We did not think this was at all unreasonable. And there was nothing to suggest 
that the insurer had misled Mrs M in any way, either about what the policy covered or 
about how it would deal with her claim. 
 
We said the insurer had not acted unreasonably, in the circumstances, and we did not 
uphold the complaint. 
 
75/7 
 
policyholder  replaces  entire  bathroom  suite  when  insurer  fails  to  let  her  know  if  a 
matching replacement can be obtained for her damaged bath 
 
Miss A contacted her insurer after her bath was badly damaged. The insurer said its 
representative  would  inspect  the  bath.  He  would  then  find  out  if  it  was  possible  to 
replace it with a new bath that matched the rest of her bathroom suite. 
 
The insurer‘s representative failed to turn up on the day he had agreed to visit Miss A at 
home. The insurer apologised and arranged a new appointment for a couple of weeks 
later. Unfortunately, the representative again failed to turn up. 
 
By this time, Miss A was getting very annoyed at the insurer‘s apparent lack of progress 
with her claim. She visited a number of suppliers to try and find a suitable bath herself. 
However,  she  concluded  that  nothing  was  available  that  was  even  an  approximate 
match to the rest of her bathroom suite. She therefore ordered and paid for an entirely 
new suite and put in a claim for the total cost. 
 
The insurer told her that, under the terms of her policy, she was only entitled to the cost 
of replacing her bath. It refused to pay for more than that and it dismissed her complaint 
that she had been unfairly treated. Miss A then came to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
The insurer maintained that it had made a fair offer in the circumstances. It said that 
Miss A had not given it the opportunity to establish whether it could obtain a new bath 
that matched the rest of her bathroom suite. If that was possible, then there would be no 
need for her to replace the entire suite. 
 
We noted that the insurer‘s representative had twice failed to keep an appointment to 
inspect the damaged bath. And on neither of these occasions had anyone contacted 
Miss A to let her know the appointment was cancelled. 
 
We listened to the insurer‘s tape recordings of its conversations with Miss A. These 
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representative to visit her. She was certainly not given any clear explanation of how her 
claim would be progressed. 
 
We  said  the  insurer  should  pay  Miss  A  an  amount  equal  to  the  full  value  of  the 
replacement bath. It should also pay 50% of the value of the other items in the new 
bathroom suite. We explained that this was in line with what is generally regarded as 
good practice in such cases, and Miss A was happy to accept. 
 
75/8 
 
insurer refuses claim for a lost designer watch because policyholder cannot provide any 
proof of ownership 
 
Mr B made a claim under his contents policy for the cost of replacing his designer watch. 
He said he lost the watch while on a mountain-walking trip one weekend. As soon as he 
got home he reported the loss to the police and obtained a crime reference number. 
 
His policy covered personal belongings in and away from his home. He told the insurer 
that the watch had been worth over £1,800. However, he was aware that his policy had 
a  limit  of  £1,500  for  single  items.  He  had  therefore  managed  to  find  and  buy  a 
replacement that was similar in style to the watch he had lost, but that only cost £1,450. 
 
The insurer said it needed to establish his ownership of the lost watch before it could 
consider the claim. It asked to see the original receipt. Mr B said he did not have a 
receipt because the watch had been a gift. He thought it highly unlikely that the friend 
who gave him the watch would still have the receipt. In any event, he did not feel he 
could ask her about it. 
 
When the insurer said it was unable to take matters further without the receipt, Mr B 
complained to us. 
 
We looked in detail at the contents policy. Like many such policies, it included a section 
about the need for policyholders to provide proof of ownership when making a claim. 
 
We  reminded  the  insurer  that  possession  of  a  receipt  was  not  the  only  means  of 
establishing ownership. If Mr B was unable to ask his friend for the receipt – or for a copy 
of her credit card statement showing the purchase of the watch – he might be able to 
produce  the  guarantee  or  the  box  the  watch  had  come  in.  Or  he  might  have  a 
photograph that clearly showed him wearing the watch. 
 
We contacted Mr B and asked if he could provide any such evidence. A few days later 
he wrote to tell us he was withdrawing his complaint and no longer wished to pursue the 
matter. 
 
75/9 
 
after claiming for a damaged carpet, policyholder questions insurer‘s assessment of its 
replacement value and the offer of a reduced cash settlement 
 
Mr and Mrs K‘s living room carpet was badly damaged after a substantial amount of 
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supplied the carpet and obtaining a quotation for replacing it, they rang their contents 
insurer. 
 
The  insurer  arranged  for  a  loss  assessor  to  inspect  the  damaged  carpet.  The  loss 
assessor  agreed  that  the  carpet  would  have  to  be  replaced.  However,  he  said  the 
quotation the couple had obtained was too high. 
 
Under the terms of the policy, the insurer could decide whether to make a cash payment 
to the policyholder or to source the replacement item itself. In this case, the insurer 
decided to source the replacement itself. It sent Mr and Mrs K a letter authorising them 
to visit a specific supplier and select a new carpet. The insurer would then settle the bill 
direct with the supplier. 
 
The couple visited the supplier in question and looked at the carpets that were available. 
They were concerned that the insurer had set them an overall price limit that was much 
lower  than  they  thought  it  should  have been.  But  in  any  event,  the  supplier  had  no 
carpets of a similar colour to the one that had been damaged. 
 
Mr and Mrs K then contacted the insurer. They said the supplier they had visited had 
nothing suitable for them. The retailer who supplied their original carpet had assured 
them  it  was  of  a  particularly  good  quality  because  of  the  density  of  the  pile.  They 
therefore  said  the  insurer  should  increase  the  amount  it  was  prepared  to  pay  for  a 
replacement.  They  asked  the  insurer  to  pay  this  amount  direct  to  them,  as  a  cash 
settlement.  They  would  then  find  a  suitable  replacement  themselves,  from  their  own 
choice of supplier. 
 
The  insurer  said  the  replacement  value  of  the  carpet  was  based  on  what  the  loss 
assessor considered appropriate. He had examined the damaged carpet carefully and 
had  not  found  it  to  be  of  an  especially  high  quality.  The  insurer  was  therefore  not 
prepared to offer more than the amount it had already stated. And it said that any cash 
settlement would be 25% less than that amount. This was because it would have been 
able to obtain the carpet at a reduced cost if the couple had used its preferred supplier. 
 
Unable to reach agreement with the insurer, Mr and Mrs K brought their complaint to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
When we looked into the case in detail, we found that the quality of Mr and Mrs K‘s 
carpet was not as high as their supplier had led them to believe. They were naturally 
very disappointed to learn this, as it suggested they had received a poor deal when they 
bought it. However, we considered that the replacement value they were offered was 
reasonable. 
 
Taking  into  account  all  the  circumstances  of  this  dispute,  including  the  couple‘s 
increasingly difficult relations with the insurer, we said the insurer should make a cash 
settlement. The amount should be sufficient for Mr and Mrs K to obtain, from a supplier 
of their own choice, a new carpet of the same quality as the one that was damaged. The 
insurer could not deduct the 25% reduction it would have got from its own supplier. 
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75/10 
 
policyholder told by insurer to replace stolen antique jewellery by selecting new items 
from a limited list of high-street retailers 
 
Mrs W returned home from work one evening to find that someone had broken in and 
stolen some of her possessions, including several small items of antique jewellery. 
 
When she rang her insurer, it confirmed that it would meet her claim. She told the insurer 
that  she  was  particularly  distressed  over  the  loss  of  the  antique  jewellery.  She  was 
aware that the individual items were not especially valuable in  themselves. However, 
they were unusual pieces that had been passed down in her family over four or five 
generations. 
 
A few days later the insurer wrote to Mrs W about her claim. She was very upset when 
she  read  the  letter,  which  listed  a  couple  of  well-known  high-street  jewellers  and  a 
department store. The insurer told her to obtain replacements for the stolen jewellery at 
any of the shops on the list. 
 
Mrs W told the insurer that its response to her claim was unacceptable. She said it was 
‗ludicrous‘ to suggest that the retailers it had listed could supply suitable replacements 
for her antique jewellery. 
 
Initially,  the  insurer  refused  to  change  its  stance.  Mrs  W  said  she  wanted  a  cash 
settlement, so that she could choose where to shop. She said this was the only way she 
would have any chance of finding jewellery of a similar style and quality to the stolen 
items. 
 
Eventually, the insurer agreed to her request. However, it said the amount would be 20% 
less than the amount it had already agreed her claim was worth. This was because its 
initial offer reflected the preferential terms it could obtain from the suppliers on its list. 
Mrs W then referred her complaint to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We told the insurer we were surprised to learn of the approach it had taken in this case. 
Our views on what is reasonable – where an insurer has to decide whether to repair or 
replace  an  item,  or  offer  a  cash  settlement  –  are  well-established.  Indeed  this  topic 
featured in an ombudsman news article as long ago as October 2001 (issue 10). 
 
We upheld Mrs W's complaint. We told the insurer to pay her a cash settlement equal to 
the full cost of replacing the jewellery. We said it should not deduct the 20% discount 
that it could get from its preferred suppliers. We said it should also pay Mrs W a modest 
sum to reflect the distress and inconvenience she had been caused by its poor handling 
of her claim. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
Appendix A: O.N. Case Studies  222 
Issue 76:     March/April 2009 
 
76/08 
 
travel insurer refused to pay cancellation claim on grounds that consumer had not been 
eligible for cover under the policy 
 
To celebrate her retirement, Mrs G booked a holiday cruise to the Baltic States and 
asked her friend, Mrs M, to accompany her. The two women had worked together for 
many years until Mrs M had moved away from the UK some eighteen months earlier to 
live with her family in Spain. 
 
Sadly, two weeks before the start of the cruise, Mrs G received a phone call from Mrs 
M‘s son, telling her his mother had suffered a fatal heart attack. Mrs G then cancelled the 
holiday. 
 
When she booked the cruise at the travel agent she had also arranged travel insurance 
for  herself  and  Mrs  M.  So  in  due course  she put  in  a  claim  to  cover  the  costs  she 
incurred in cancelling the trip. She also passed on the policy details to Mrs M‘s son, Mr 
M, so he could claim on behalf of his late mother. 
 
However, the insurer refused to meet Mr M‘s claim. It said Mrs M had not been eligible 
for cover as she had been living outside the UK for more than 12 months at the time the 
policy was taken out. 
 
The insurer said it did not provide cover for people who lived outside the UK, as they 
might use the travel policy as a cheap means of obtaining medical insurance, rather than 
as cover for any emergencies that might arise in relation to a holiday. 
 
When  the  insurer  rejected  Mr  M‘s  complaint  about  its  refusal  to  meet  the  claim,  he 
referred it to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
At the time the policy was sold, travel agents did not fall within the scope of statutory 
financial  services  regulation.  However,  it  was  generally  accepted  as  good  industry 
practice  that  when  travel  agents  acted  on  behalf  of  an  insurer,  the  insurer  was 
responsible for the way in which travel agents marketed and sold insurance policies. 
 
In this instance, when the travel agent completed the application form for Mrs G, he 
entered her name as ‗the lead passenger‘ – and gave her address. The only information 
entered on the form about Mrs M was her name. We found no evidence that either the 
travel  agent  or  the  insurer  had  asked  for  her  address  or  checked  whether  she  was 
eligible for cover under the policy. 
 
We were satisfied that Mrs M had genuinely been seeking insurance to cover a holiday. 
There was nothing to suggest she had been intending to use the policy to obtain medical 
cover more cheaply than she would have been able to get it (as a Spanish resident) if 
she had applied for a medical insurance policy. We upheld the complaint and said that – 
in the circumstances – the fair and reasonable outcome was for the insurer to pay the 
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76/09 
 
travel insurer turns down claim for cost of cancellation as policy did not come into force 
before the holiday began 
 
In mid-October Miss W booked a holiday to Tenerife, due to depart a month later on 17 
November. She was planning several other foreign trips over the following 12 months, so 
she told the travel agent she would not take the single-trip insurance policy it offered. 
 
Instead, she contacted an insurer direct and bought an annual travel policy. This was set 
up to come into effect from 17 November – the date of her departure to Tenerife. Like 
most travel policies, the benefits it provided included cover against cancellation. 
 
On 1 November, Miss W visited her doctor as she was feeling very unwell. The doctor 
diagnosed a ‗cardiac arrhythmia‘. When Miss W mentioned her forthcoming holiday, the 
doctor told her that, in the circumstances, it might not be wise to travel abroad. Miss W 
therefore cancelled the holiday and put in a claim under her travel policy. 
 
The insurer told her it could not meet the claim, as her policy  had not yet come into 
force. Miss W was very upset to learn this and she complained that it was on the advice 
of the insurer itself that she had agreed the start date for the policy. 
 
She said that the insurer knew the date of her forthcoming holiday, so it should have 
explained that there was a risk in having a policy that did not come into force until the 
day that holiday began. If it had done so, she would have insisted on an earlier start 
date. 
 
The insurer would not discuss the matter further with her  but simply repeated that it 
would not pay the claim. Miss W then referred the matter to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
In order to decide this case we had to establish whether the insurer had made Miss W 
sufficiently aware that, by buying a policy that did not start until the actual day of her 
holiday, she would not be covered if she had to cancel her trip. 
 
We obtained a tape recording of Miss W‘s initial phone conversation with the insurer, 
when the policy had been arranged. It was clear from this that she had told the insurer 
she was going to Tenerife on 17 November – and that the representative had suggested 
that would be a suitable start date for the policy. 
 
While it could not be said that the representative had actually ‗advised‘ Miss W to have a 
policy that started on that date, he had not made any attempt to explain the implications 
of not having insurance in place before then. 
 
When we raised this with the insurer, it said the policy documents made it clear that the 
policyholder would not be covered if the holiday was cancelled before the policy came 
into force. 
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However, in our view the insurer had not done enough to highlight to Miss W the risk that 
she was taking. We thought it unlikely that she would have agreed to the start date 
suggested by the insurer if she had understood this risk. 
 
We told the insurer to treat the claim as if the policy had been in force on the date when 
Miss W cancelled her holiday. We said it should add interest to any payment due under 
the policy. 
 
76/10 
 
travel insurer refuses to pay claim for cancellation of holiday on ill-health grounds 
 
On 10 September, three weeks before he was due to go on holiday to Greece, Mr C 
phoned an insurer to arrange some travel insurance. 
 
During that call, the insurer read out a list of medical conditions and asked Mr C if he had 
ever suffered from any of them. It also asked if he was aware of ‗any condition that could 
reasonably  be  expected  to affect  your health  during  the  period  of  the policy?‘  Mr  C 
answered ‗no‘ to both questions and the insurer issued him with a travel policy. 
 
Unfortunately, a week before his holiday was due to begin, Mr C had to cancel it. He did 
this on the advice of his GP – as he had developed a severe chest infection. 
 
However, the insurer rejected Mr C‘s claim. It said he must have been aware he had the 
illness that led to the cancellation at the time he applied for the policy – but he had failed 
to disclose it. 
 
Mr C thought the insurer was being unreasonable. At the time he bought the policy, he 
had a mild cough. This was not one of the medical conditions in the list that the insurer 
had read out to him over the phone. And he did not agree that he should have known – 
at the time of his call – that it might develop into a more serious condition that would 
affect his holiday. 
 
When the insurer refused to reconsider its position, Mr C came to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We established that Mr C‘s cough began a day or two before he phoned the insurer to 
arrange his travel policy. However, it had not at that time seemed to him to be anything 
worth worrying about. 
 
It was only around a week later – on 17 September – that Mr C decided to see his GP, 
as his cough was not getting any better. The GP prescribed medication and said he 
expected Mr C‘s condition would start to improve within a few days. 
 
However, on 26 September Mr C went back to his doctor and reported that he was still 
feeling far from well. The doctor prescribed stronger antibiotics and arranged for Mr C to 
have a chest x-ray. He also suggested that it might not be a good idea for Mr C to travel. 
Mr C cancelled his trip later that day. 
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In our view, there was no reason why – at the time he applied for the policy – Mr C 
should have told the insurer about his cough. He would only have needed to mention it if 
he knew there was a realistic possibility that the cough would develop into something 
serious enough to threaten his holiday plans. The evidence did not suggest that this was 
the case. 
 
We also questioned whether it would have made any difference to the cover the insurer 
provided if Mr C had mentioned his cough when he applied for the policy. We thought 
this unlikely, as there had been nothing at that stage to indicate that Mr C was suffering 
from anything more than a minor seasonal ailment. 
 
We  therefore upheld  the  complaint  and  told  the  insurer  to  deal  with  Mr  C‘s  claim  – 
adding interest to any payment it made. 
 
76/11 
 
travel insurer accepted premium intended to provide cover for pre-existing conditions but 
failed to ensure the policy was properly in force 
 
Mr and Mrs K were given a ‗free‘ annual travel insurance policy as one of the benefits of 
their  bank  account.  However,  when  they  checked  through  the  policy‘s  terms  and 
conditions before booking a holiday, they found that they were not covered for their ‗pre-
existing‘ medical conditions. 
 
Anxious to ensure that they had adequate insurance in place before their trip, Mrs K 
contacted a different insurer. She was quoted just over £200 to cover their pre-existing 
conditions and she paid this amount over the phone, using her debit card. 
 
Unfortunately, while the couple were on holiday, Mrs K was taken seriously ill and had to 
spend several  days  in  hospital. When she  returned home  she  put  in  a  claim  to  the 
insurer, backed up by a medical certificate that showed her illness had been connected 
to one of the pre-existing conditions for which she had sought cover. 
 
However, the insurer turned down the claim. It said the cover for pre-existing conditions 
did  not  operate  as  an  independent  policy  but  was  only  available  as  an  ‗add-on‘  for 
customers who also bought the insurer‘s ‗base‘ travel insurance. As the couple had not 
bought the ‗base‘ cover, they did not have a valid policy under which they could make a 
claim. 
 
Mrs K complained that the insurer had failed to make it clear that she needed to buy the 
‗base‘ cover. She pointed out that she would hardly have spent ‗so much money‘ to 
cover the pre-existing conditions if she had realised this cover was ‗worthless‘ on its 
own.  The  insurer  then offered  to  refund  the premium  she had  paid.  However,  it  still 
refused to meet the claim, so Mrs K came to us. 
 
Complaint upheld 
 
We asked the insurer to let us have its tape recording of the phone conversation during 
which Mrs K arranged the cover for pre-existing medical conditions. We noted from this 
that the insurer‘s representative had mentioned the ‗base‘ cover. However, he had not Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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made it clear that the cover for pre-existing conditions only operated in conjunction with 
that ‗base‘ cover. 
 
The insurer maintained that it had explained this point over the phone. It also said that it 
had sent Mr and Mrs K a letter which ‗clearly explained‘ that they needed to buy the 
‗base‘ cover. We asked for a copy of the letter in question, but did not agree that it was 
clear. Overall, we were not at all surprised that Mr and Mrs K had thought they had 
adequate cover in place. 
 
We told the insurer that we did not consider it had done enough to make Mr and Mrs K 
aware that the cover for pre-existing conditions only came into force if they also bought 
the ‗base‘ policy. We said that, in any event, the insurer should not have put itself in a 
position where it might be accepting premiums without providing any valid cover. 
 
We said the insurer should accept and pay Mr and Mrs K‘s claim – subject to the policy 
terms and conditions and taking account of the premium the couple would have paid for 
the ‗base‘ policy, if they had realised they had to do this. 
 
76/12 
 
consumer obtains a ‗free‘ travel policy when she applies for a credit card  – and later 
complains that extent of the insurance cover was not clearly explained 
 
When Mrs J applied successfully to her bank for a credit card, she was also given a ‗free‘ 
annual  travel  insurance  policy.  The  policy  provided  cover  for  Mrs  J  and  –  as  a 
concession – it also covered ‗a spouse or partner‘ when that person was travelling with 
her. 
 
Eighteen months  later,  while  travelling  in  South  Africa  on  his  own,  Mrs  J‘s  husband 
suffered  a heart  attack  and  incurred  substantial  medical  expenses.  He  subsequently 
made a claim on his wife‘s annual travel policy. This was turned down on the grounds 
that he was only covered when he and his wife were travelling together. 
 
Mrs J then complained to her bank. She said that when she had obtained the credit card, 
she  had  been  led  to  believe  that  her  husband  would  benefit  from  the  ‗free‘  travel 
insurance, even when he was travelling on his own. 
 
The bank rejected this complaint. It insisted that it had not misinformed her in any way 
her about the nature of the travel policy and the cover it provided. Mrs J then referred her 
complaint to us. 
 
Complaint not upheld 
 
When we discussed the complaint with her, Mrs J admitted that neither she nor her 
husband  had  been  entirely  sure  if  he  was  covered  by  the  policy  when  travelling  by 
himself. However, she insisted that the bank should have explained the position more 
clearly when it offered her the policy. 
 
In our view, the policy documents and all the accompanying literature made it perfectly 
clear that the card-holder‘s spouse or partner was covered only when travelling with the 
card-holder. Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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It was not at all unusual for a policy of this type to extend limited cover to a spouse or 
partner, so this was not a feature that needed to be specially highlighted. We concluded 
that the bank had not misled Mrs J about the extent of the cover and we did not uphold 
the complaint. 
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APPENDIX B: FOS STATISTICS 2005-2010 
 
 
  2005/6  2006/7  2007/8  2008/9  
(forecast in Jan 2009) 
2009/2010 
Budget 
No of complaints           
           
Front line enquiries and complaints  673,000  627,814
1  794,648  780,000
2  975,000 
Of which total cases referred to adjudicators  113,000
3 
ie 1 in 6 
94,392 
ie 1 in 6 
123,089 
ie 1 in 6 
120,000  150,000 
Of which total were insurance related  14,270  15,730  27,283
4  45,000
5  50,000
6 
Insurance cases reaching the Ombudsman  1,400 
ie 1 in 10 
c.950 
ie 6% 
est. 2,700 
ie 1 in 10 
   
Complaints resolved by the companies 
themselves (excluding mortgage 
endowment) 
95-98%         
Technical advice desk  20,000  18,213  18,000     
No of cases worth more than £100,000  3%         
           
Resolution time (excl mortgage 
endowment) 
         
           
within 6 months  74%  81%  83%  60%
7  65% 
within 1 year  89%  92%  96%  90%
8  90% 
                                                         
1 Decrease due to trend in getting information from the website.  
2 Although as expected the mortgage endowment complaints reduced sharply, there was an unexpected increase in overall number of claims due to the financial 
market turmoil, and a wave of claims relating to payment protection insurance, unauthorised overdraft charges and credit card default charges. 
3 This is the peak in the number of complaints as a result of 69,000 new mortgage endowment complaints referred to an adjudicator, compared to 46,000 in the 
following year, and 13,800 in 2007/8. 
4 Increase due mainly to increased payment protection insurance claims towards the end of the year, fuelled by the media.  In 2007/8, these made up 39% of the 
new insurance claims referred to adjudicators. 
5 Of which PPI insurance complaints will account for about 25,000, (compared to 10,652 in 2007/8) and car/motor complaints will account for 7,000 (compared 
to 6009 in 2007/8).  
6 Of which PPI insurance complaints will account for about 22,000 and car/motor complaints about 17,000. 
7 The unexpected increase in cases has led to delays in case resolution, although some work has been out-sourced and new staff have been recruited. Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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  2005/6  2006/7  2007/8  2008/9  
(forecast in Jan 2009) 
2009/2010 
Budget 
           
Resolution           
           
Total  120,000
9  111,673  99,699  115,000  165,000 
Of which resolved by adjudicator    104,831  91,739     
And of which resolved by an ombudsman    6,842  7,960     
Ombudsman decisions resolved in favour of 
insured wholly or partly 
⅓ to ½  40%  41% 
(insurance) 
   
           
Case fees
10           
           
Standard fee   £360 after 
the first 2 
£360 after the 
first 2 
£450 after 
the first 3 
£450 after the first 3  £500 after the 
first 3 
How many firms covered by the FOS paid a 
case fee 
7%  6.5%  3.5%     
How many firms accounted for half all the 
case fees 
12  10 (half no of 
total 
complaints, 
not case fees) 
6 firms = just 
over half total 
no of cases 
   
How many firms had no complaint referred to 
the FOS 
81.5%  82%  >95%     
           
Satisfaction           
           
Customers who won and were satisfied with 
FOS handling 
96%  88%  86%     
Customers who lost and were satisfied with 
FOS handling 
64%  48%  47%     
Customers who neither won nor lost and 
were satisfied 
92%         
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
8 Excluding the 15,000 unauthorised overdraft charges cases on hold pending a high court decision. 
9 This was the highest on record since the FOS began. 
10 Case fees represent 75% of FOS total income. Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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  2005/6  2006/7  2007/8  2008/9  
(forecast in Jan 2009) 
2009/2010 
Budget 
Firms responding, who thought that the FOS 
provides a good independent dispute 
resolution service 
75%  62%  67%     
           
Independent Assessor           
           
Who  Michael 
Barnes 
Michael 
Barnes 
Michael 
Barnes 
   
No of referrals  322  326  281     
of which investigated  186 
(incl 13 
from firms, 
of which 6 
upheld) 
206 
(incl a small no 
from firms, of 
which 6 
upheld) 
170 
(incl 13 from 
firms, most 
not upheld.)
11 
   
of which upheld wholly or in part  76 
ie about 
40% 
88  80     
of which D&I awarded  68 
average 
award was 
£200-400 
82 
(half £250-
500, most of 
rest < £200) 
77 
(most £250 – 
450) 
   
           
Income  £52m  £53.1m  £55.5m  £64.4m  £92.8m 
Operating costs  £52.6m  £55m  £52.9m  £62.5m  £92.3m 
Unit cost
12  £433  £484  £529
13  £544
14  £559 
Staff  1,015  956  825  1,083  1,170 
           
                                                         
11 Mostly relating to the case fee levy. 
12 Unit cost is calculated by dividing total FOS costs (before financing charges and any bad debt charge) by the number of cases the FOS completes. 
13 The FOS lost the significant economies of scale it had achieved in handling large volumes of mortgage endowment work, because there were significantly 
fewer of these complaints, and because out of those there were, more went to the ombudsman, which involves a costlier and timelier system. 
14 In 2001/2 the unit cost was £684, and that would be £900 in 2008/9 if that figure had increased in line with inflation. Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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APPENDIX C: ICOBS (RELEVANT EXTRACTS) 
 
ICOBS 2.1 Client categorisation 
 
Introduction 
ICOBS 2.1.1 Guidance 
 
Different provisions in this sourcebook may apply depending on the type of person with 
whom a firm is dealing: 
 
(1)  A policyholder includes anyone who, upon the occurrence of the contingency insured 
against, is entitled to make a claim directly to the insurance undertaking. 
 
(2)  Only a policyholder or a prospective policyholder who makes the arrangements 
preparatory to him concluding a contract of insurance (directly or through an agent) is a 
customer. In this sourcebook, customers are either consumers or commercial 
customers. 
 
(3)  A consumer is any natural person who is acting for purposes which are outside his 
trade or profession. 
 
(4)  A commercial customer is a customer who is not a consumer. 
 
Customer to be treated as consumer when status uncertain 
ICOBS 2.1.2 Rule 
 
If it is not clear in a particular case whether a customer is a consumer or a commercial 
customer, a firm must treat the customer as a consumer. 
 
Customer covered in both a private and business capacity 
ICOBS 2.1.3 Guidance 
 
If a customer is acting in the capacity of both a consumer and a commercial customer in 
relation to a particular contract of insurance, the customer is a commercial customer. 
 
Customer classification examples 
ICOBS 2.1.4 Guidance 
 
In practice, private individuals may act in a number of capacities. The following table sets 
out a number of examples of how an individual acting in certain capacities should, in the 
FSA's view, be categorised. 
 
Customer classification examples 
Capacity               Classification 
 
Personal representatives, including executors,  
unless they are acting in a professional capacity,  
for example, a solicitor acting as executor.       Consumer 
 
Private individuals acting in personal or other family  
circumstances, for example, as trustee of a family trust.   Consumer Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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Trustee of a trust such as a housing or NHS trust.     Commercial customer 
 
Member of the governing body of a club or other  
unincorporated association such as a trade body  
and a student union.             Commercial customer 
 
Pension trustee.             Commercial customer 
 
Person taking out a policy covering property bought 
under a buy-to-let mortgage.          Commercial customer 
 
Partner in a partnership when taking out insurance  
for purposes related to his profession.       Commercial customer 
 
ICOBS 6.1 General 
 
Responsibilities of insurers and insurance intermediaries 
ICOBS 6.1.1 Rule 
 
An insurer is responsible for producing, and an insurance intermediary for providing to a 
customer, the information required by this chapter and by the distance communication 
rules (see ICOBS 3.1). However, an insurer is responsible for providing information 
required on mid-term changes, and an insurance intermediary is responsible for 
producing price information if it agrees this with an insurer. 
 
ICOBS 6.1.2 Rule 
 
If there is no insurance intermediary, the insurer is responsible for producing and 
providing the information. 
 
ICOBS 6.1.3 Rule 
 
An insurer must produce information in good time to enable the insurance intermediary 
to comply with the rules in this chapter, or promptly on an insurance intermediary's 
request. 
 
ICOBS 6.1.4 Rule 
 
These general rules on the responsibilities of insurers and insurance intermediaries are 
modified by ICOBS 6 Annex 1 R if one of the firms is not based in the United Kingdom, 
and in certain other situations. 
 
Ensuring customers can make an informed decision 
ICOBS 6.1.5 Rule 
 
A firm must take reasonable steps to ensure a customer is given appropriate information 
about a policy in good time and in a comprehensible form so that the customer can make 
an informed decision about the arrangements proposed. 
 
 Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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ICOBS 6.1.6 Guidance 
 
The appropriate information rule applies pre-conclusion and post-conclusion, and so 
includes matters such as mid-term changes and renewals. It also applies to the price of 
the policy. 
 
ICOBS 6.1.7 Guidance 
 
The level of information required will vary according to matters such as: 
 
(1) the knowledge, experience and ability of a typical customer for the policy; 
 
(2) the policy terms, including its main benefits, exclusions, limitations, conditions and its 
duration; 
 
(3) the policy's overall complexity; 
 
(4) whether the policy is bought in connection with other goods and services; 
 
(5) distance communication information requirements (for example, under the distance 
communication rules less information can be given during certain telephone sales than in 
a sale made purely by written correspondence (see ICOBS 3.1.14 R)); and 
 
(6) whether the same information has been provided to the customer previously and, if 
so, when. 
 
ICOBS 6.1.8 Guidance 
 
In determining what is "in good time", a firm should consider the importance of the 
information to the customer's decision-making process and the point at which the 
information may be most useful. Distance communication timing requirements are also 
relevant (for example, the distance communication rules enable certain information to be 
provided post-conclusion in telephone and certain other sales (see ICOBS 3.1.14 R and 
ICOBS 3.1.15 R)). 
 
ICOBS 6.1.9 Guidance 
 
Cancellation rights do not affect what information it is appropriate to give to a customer 
in order to enable him to make an informed purchasing decision. 
 
ICOBS 6.1.10 Guidance 
 
A firm dealing with a consumer may wish to provide information in a policy summary or 
as a key features document (see ICOBS 6 Annex 2). 
 
Providing evidence of cover 
ICOBS 6.1.11 Guidance 
 
Under Principle 7 a firm should provide evidence of cover promptly after inception of a 
policy. Firms will need to take into account the type of customer and the effect of other Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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information requirements, for example those under the distance communication rules 
(ICOBS 3.1). 
 
Group policies 
ICOBS 6.1.12 Guidance 
 
Under Principle 7, a firm that sells a group policy should provide appropriate information 
to the customer to pass on to other policyholders. It should tell the customer that he 
should give the information to each policyholder. 
 
Price disclosure: connected goods or services 
ICOBS 6.1.13 Rule 
 
(1) If a policy is bought by a consumer in connection with other goods or services a firm 
must, before conclusion of the contract, disclose its premium separately from any other 
prices and whether buying the policy is compulsory. 
 
(2) In the case of a distance contract, disclosure of whether buying the policy is 
compulsory may be made in accordance with the timing requirements under the distance 
communication rules (see ICOBS 3.1.8 R, ICOBS 3.1.14 R and ICOBS 3.1.15 R). 
 
Exception to the timing rules: distance contracts and voice telephony communications 
ICOBS 6.1.14 Rule 
 
Where a rule in this chapter requires information to be provided in writing or another 
durable medium before conclusion of a contract, a firm may instead provide that 
information in accordance with the distance communication timing requirements (see 
ICOBS 3.1.14 R and ICOBS 3.1.15 R). 
 
ICOBS 8.1 Insurers: general 
 
ICOBS 8.1.1 Rule 
 
An insurer must: 
 
(1) handle claims promptly and fairly; 
 
(2) provide reasonable guidance to help a policyholder make a claim and appropriate 
information on its progress; 
 
(3) not unreasonably reject a claim (including by terminating or avoiding a policy); and 
 
(4) settle claims promptly once settlement terms are agreed. 
 
ICOBS 8.1.2 Rule 
 
A rejection of a consumer policyholder's claim is unreasonable, except where there is 
evidence of fraud, if it is for: 
 
(1) non-disclosure of a fact material to the risk which the policyholder could not 
reasonably be expected to have disclosed; or Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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(2) non-negligent misrepresentation of a fact material to the risk; or 
 
(3) breach of warranty or condition unless the circumstances of the claim are connected 
to the breach and unless (for a pure protection contract): 
 
(a)  under a 'life of another' contract, the warranty relates to a statement of fact 
concerning the life to be assured and, if the statement had been made by the life to be 
assured under an 'own life' contract, the insurer could have rejected the claim under this 
rule; or 
 
(b)  the warranty is material to the risk and was drawn to the customer's attention before 
the conclusion of the contract. 
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APPENDIX D: DISP as updated (RELEVANT EXTRACTS) 
 
DISP 1.2 Consumer awareness rules 
 
DISP 1.2.1 Rule 
 
To aid consumer awareness of the protections offered by the provisions in this chapter, 
respondents must: 
 
(1) publish appropriate summary details of their internal process for dealing with 
complaints promptly and fairly; 
 
(2) refer eligible complainants in writing, to the availability of these summary details, at, 
or immediately after, the point of sale; and 
 
(3) provide such summary details in writing to eligible complainants: 
 
(a) on request; and 
 
(b) when acknowledging a complaint. 
 
DISP 1.2.2 Rule 
 
Where the activity does not involve a sale, the obligation in DISP 1.2.1 R (2) shall apply 
at, or immediately after, the point when contact is first made with an eligible complainant. 
 
DISP 1.2.3 Guidance 
 
These summary details should cover at least: 
 
(1) how the respondent fulfils its obligation to handle and seek to resolve relevant 
complaints; and 
 
(2) that, if the complaint is not resolved, the complainant may be entitled to refer it to the 
Financial Ombudsman Service. 
 
DISP 1.2.4 Guidance 
 
The summary details may be set out in a leaflet, and their availability may be referred to 
in contractual documentation. 
 
DISP 1.2.5 Guidance 
 
Respondents may also display or reproduce the Financial Ombudsman Service logo 
(under licence) in: 
 
(1) branches and sales offices to which eligible complainants have access; or 
 
(2) marketing literature or correspondence directed at eligible complainants; 
  
provided it is done in a way which is not misleading. Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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DISP 1.4 Complaints resolution rules 
 
DISP 1.4.1 Rule 
 
Once a complaint has been received by a respondent, it must: 
 
(1) investigate the complaint competently, diligently and impartially; 
 
(2) assess fairly, consistently and promptly: 
 
(a) the subject matter of the complaint; 
 
(b) whether the complaint should be upheld; 
 
(c) what remedial action or redress (or both) may be appropriate; 
 
(d) if appropriate, whether it has reasonable grounds to be satisfied that another 
respondent may be solely or jointly responsible for the matter alleged in the complaint; 
 
taking into account all relevant factors; 
 
(3) offer redress or remedial action when it decides this is appropriate; 
 
(4) explain to the complainant promptly and, in a way that is fair, clear and not 
misleading, its assessment of the complaint, its decision on it, and any offer of remedial 
action or redress; and 
 
(5) comply promptly with any offer of remedial action or redress accepted by the 
complainant. 
 
DISP 1.4.2 Guidance 
 
Factors that may be relevant in the assessment of a complaint under DISP 1.4.1 R (2), 
include the following: 
 
(1) all the evidence available and the particular circumstances of the complaint; 
 
(2) similarities with other complaints received by the respondent; 
 
(3) relevant guidance published by the FSA, other relevant regulators, the Financial 
Ombudsman Service or former schemes; and 
 
(4) appropriate analysis of decisions by the Financial Ombudsman Service concerning 
similar complaints received by the respondent. 
 
DISP 1.4.3 Guidance 
 
The respondent should aim to resolve complaints at the earliest possible opportunity, 
minimising the number of unresolved complaints which need to be referred to the 
Financial Ombudsman Service.  
 Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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DISP 1.4.4 Rule 
 
Where a complaint against a respondent is referred to the Financial Ombudsman 
Service, the respondent must cooperate fully with the Financial Ombudsman Service 
and comply promptly with any settlements or awards made by it. 
 
DISP 1.4.5 Guidance 
 
DISP App 1 contains guidance to respondents on the approach to assessing financial 
loss and appropriate redress where a respondent upholds a complaint concerning the 
sale of an endowment policy for the purposes of repaying a mortgage.  
 
DISP 1.6 Complaints time limit rules 
 
Keeping the complainant informed 
DISP 1.6.1 Rule 
 
On receipt of a complaint, a respondent must: 
 
(1) send the complainant a prompt written acknowledgement providing early 
reassurance that it has received the complaint and is dealing with it; and 
 
(2) ensure the complainant is kept informed thereafter of the progress of the measures 
being taken for the complaint's resolution. 
 
Final or other response within eight weeks 
DISP 1.6.2 Rule 
 
The respondent must, by the end of eight weeks after its receipt of the complaint, send 
the complainant: 
 
(1) a final response; or 
 
(2) a written response which: 
 
(a) explains why it is not in a position to make a final response and indicates when it 
expects to be able to provide one; 
 
(b) informs the complainant that he may now refer the complaint to the Financial 
Ombudsman Service; and 
 
(c) encloses a copy of the Financial Ombudsman Service standard explanatory leaflet. 
 
DISP 1.6.3 Guidance 
 
Respondents are not obliged to comply with the requirements in DISP 1.6.2 R where 
they are able to rely on any of the following rules: 
 
(1) the complainant's written acceptance rule (DISP 1.6.4 R); 
 
(2) the rules for respondents with two-stage complaints procedures (DISP 1.6.5 R); or Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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(3) the complaints forwarding rules (DISP 1.7). 
 
Complainant's written acceptance 
DISP 1.6.4 Rule 
 
DISP 1.6.2 R does not apply if the complainant has already indicated in writing 
acceptance of a response by the respondent, provided that the response: 
 
(1) informed the complainant how to pursue his complaint with the respondent if he 
remains dissatisfied; and 
 
(2) referred to the ultimate availability of the Financial Ombudsman Service if he remains 
dissatisfied with the respondent's response. 
 
Respondents with two-stage complaints procedures 
DISP 1.6.5 Rule 
 
If, within eight weeks of receiving a complaint, the respondent sends the complainant a 
written response which: 
 
(1) offers redress or remedial action (whether or not it accepts the complaint) or rejects 
the complaint and gives reasons for doing so; 
 
(2) informs the complainant how to pursue his complaint with the respondent if he 
remains dissatisfied; 
 
(3) refers to the ultimate availability of the Financial Ombudsman Service if he remains 
dissatisfied with the respondent's response; and 
 
(4) indicates it will regard the complaint as closed if it does not receive a reply within 
eight weeks; 
 
the respondent is not obliged to continue to comply with DISP 1.6.2 R unless the 
complainant indicates that he remains dissatisfied, in which case, the obligation to 
comply with DISP 1.6.2 R resumes. 
 
DISP 1.6.6 Rule 
 
If the complainant takes more than a week to reply to a written response of the kind 
described in DISP 1.6.5 R, the additional time in excess of a week will not count for the 
purposes of the time limits in DISP 1.6.2 R or the complaints reporting rules. 
 
DISP 1.6.6A Guidance 
 
The information regarding the Financial Ombudsman Service required to be provided in 
responses sent under the complaints time limit rules (DISP 1.6.2 R, DISP 1.6.4 R and 
DISP 1.6.5 R) should be set out prominently within the text of those responses. 
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Speed and quality of response 
DISP 1.6.7 Guidance 
 
It is expected that within eight weeks of their receipt, almost all complaints to a 
respondent will have been substantively addressed by it through a final response or 
response as described in DISP 1.6.4 R or DISP 1.6.5 R. 
 
DISP 1.6.8 Guidance 
 
When assessing a respondent's response to a complaint, the FSA may have regard to a 
number of factors, including, the quality of response, as against the complaints 
resolution rules, as well as the speed with which it was made. 
 
DISP 1.8 Complaints time barring rule 
 
DISP 1.8.1 Rule 
 
If a respondent receives a complaint which is outside the time limits for referral to the 
Financial  Ombudsman  Service  (see  DISP  2.82,)  it  may  reject  the  complaint  without 
considering the merits, but must explain this to the complainant in a final response in 
accordance with DISP 1.6.2 R and indicate that the Ombudsman may waive the time 
limits in exceptional circumstances. 
 
DISP 2.6 What is the territorial scope of the relevant jurisdiction? 
 
Compulsory Jurisdiction 
DISP 2.6.1 Rule 
 
The  Compulsory  Jurisdiction  covers  only  complaints  about  the  activities  of  a  firm 
(including its appointed representatives) carried on from an establishment in the United 
Kingdom. 
 
DISP 2.6.2 Guidance 
 
This: 
 
(1) includes incoming EEA firms and incoming Treaty firms; but 
 
(2) excludes complaints about business conducted in the United Kingdom on a services 
basis from an establishment outside the United Kingdom. 
 
Consumer Credit Jurisdiction 
DISP 2.6.3 Rule 
 
The  Consumer  Credit  Jurisdiction  covers  only  complaints  about  the  activities  of  a 
licensee carried on from an establishment in the United Kingdom. 
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Voluntary Jurisdiction 
DISP 2.6.4 Rule 
 
The Voluntary Jurisdiction covers only complaints about the activities of a VJ participant 
carried on from an establishment: 
 
(1) in the United Kingdom; or 
 
(2) elsewhere in the EEA if the following conditions are met: 
 
(a) the activity is directed wholly or partly at the United Kingdom (or part of it); 
 
(b) contracts governing the activity are (or, in the case of a potential customer, would 
have been) made under the law of England and Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland; 
and 
 
(c) the VJ participant has notified appropriate regulators in its Home State of its intention 
to participate in the Voluntary Jurisdiction. 
 
Location of the complainant 
DISP 2.6.5 Guidance 
 
A complaint can be dealt with under the Financial Ombudsman Service whether or not 
the complainant lives or is based in the United Kingdom.  
 
DISP 2.7 Is the complainant eligible? 
 
DISP 2.7.1 Rule 
 
A  complaint  may  only  be  dealt  with  under  the Financial  Ombudsman  Service  if  it  is 
brought by or on behalf of an eligible complainant. 
 
DISP 2.7.2 Rule 
 
A complaint may be brought on behalf of an eligible complainant (or a deceased person 
who would have been an eligible complainant) by a person authorised by the eligible 
complainant or authorised by law. It is immaterial whether the person authorised to act 
on behalf of an eligible complainant is himself an eligible complainant.  
 
Eligible complainants 
DISP 2.7.3 Rule 
 
An eligible complainant must be a person that is: 
 
(1) a private individual; 
 
(2) a business, which has a group annual turnover of less than £1 million at the time the 
complainant refers the complaint to the respondent; 
 
(3)  a  charity  which  has  an  annual  income  of  less  than  £1  million  at  the  time  the 
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(4) a trustee of a trust which has a net asset value of less than £1 million at the time the 
complainant refers the complaint to the respondent. 
 
DISP 2.7.4 Guidance 
 
A business includes a sole trader, a company, an unincorporated body and a partnership 
carrying on any trade or profession. A subsidiary of a corporate group will be eligible only 
where the corporate group as a whole meets the turnover test. 
 
DISP 2.7.5 Guidance 
 
If a respondent is in doubt about the eligibility of a business, charity or trust, it should 
treat the complainant as if it were eligible. If the complaint is referred to the Financial 
Ombudsman  Service,  the  Ombudsman  will  determine  eligibility  by  reference  to 
appropriate evidence, such as audited accounts or VAT returns. 
 
DISP 2.7.6 Rule 
 
To be an eligible complainant a person must also have a complaint which arises from 
matters relevant to one or more of the following relationships with the respondent: 
 
(1) the complainant is (or was) a customer of the respondent; 
 
(2) the complainant is (or was) a potential customer of the respondent; 
 
(3)  the  complainant  is  the  holder,  or  the  beneficial  owner,  of  units  in  a  collective 
investment scheme and the respondent is the operator or depositary of the scheme; 
 
(4) the complainant is a beneficiary of, or has a beneficial interest in, a personal pension 
scheme or stakeholder pension scheme; 
 
(5) the complainant is a person for whose benefit a contract of insurance was taken out 
or was intended to be taken out with or through the respondent; 
 
(6) the complainant is a person on whom the legal right to benefit from a claim against 
the  respondent  under  a  contract  of  insurance  has  been  devolved  by  contract, 
assignment, subrogation or legislation (save the European Community (Rights against 
Insurers) Regulations 2002); 
 
(7) the complainant relied in the course of his business on a cheque guarantee card 
issued by the respondent; 
 
(8) the complainant is the true owner or the person entitled to immediate possession of a 
cheque  or  other  bill  of  exchange,  or  of  the  funds  it  represents,  collected  by  the 
respondent for someone else's account; 
 
(9) the complainant is the recipient of a banker's reference given by the respondent; 
 
(10) the complainant gave the respondent a guarantee or security for: 
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(a) a mortgage; 
 
(b) a loan; 
 
(c) an actual or prospective regulated consumer credit agreement; 
 
(d) an actual or prospective regulated consumer hire agreement; or 
 
(e) any linked transaction as defined in the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended); 
 
(11)  the  complainant  is  a  person  about  whom  information  relevant  to  his  financial 
standing is or was held by the respondent in operating a credit reference agency as 
defined by section 145(8) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as amended); 
 
(12) the complainant is a person: 
 
(a)  from  whom  the  respondent  has  sought  to  recover  payment  under  a  regulated 
consumer credit agreement or regulated consumer hire agreement in carrying on debt-
collecting as defined by section 145(7) of the Consumer Credit Act (1974) (as amended); 
or 
 
(b)  in  relation  to  whom  the  respondent has  sought  to perform duties,  or  exercise or 
enforce rights, on behalf of the creditor or owner, under a regulated consumer credit 
agreement or regulated consumer hire agreement in carrying on debt administration as 
defined by section 145(7A) of the Consumer Credit Act (1974) (as amended); 
 
(13) the complainant is a beneficiary under a trust or estate of which the respondent is 
trustee or personal representative. 
 
DISP 2.7.7 Guidance 
 
DISP 2.7.6 R (5)and DISP 2.7.6R (6) include, for example, employees  covered by a 
group  permanent  health  policy  taken  out  by  an  employer,  which  provides  in  the 
insurance contract that the policy was taken out for the benefit of the employee. 
 
DISP 2.7.8 Guidance 
 
In  the  Compulsory  Jurisdiction,  under  the  Ombudsman  Transitional  Order  and  the 
Mortgages and General Insurance Complaints Transitional Order, where a complainant: 
 
(1) wishes to have a relevant new complaint or a relevant transitional complaint dealt 
with by the Ombudsman; and 
 
(2) is not otherwise eligible; but 
 
(3) would have been entitled to refer an equivalent complaint to the former scheme in 
question immediately before the relevant transitional order came into effect; 
 
if the Ombudsman considers it appropriate, he may treat the complainant as an eligible 
complainant. 
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Exceptions 
DISP 2.7.9 Rule 
 
The following are not eligible complainants: 
 
(1) (in all jurisdictions) a firm, licensee or VJ participant whose complaint relates in any 
way to an activity which: 
 
(a) the firm itself has permission to carry on; or 
 
(b) the licensee or VJ participant itself conducts; 
 
and which is subject to the Compulsory Jurisdiction, the Consumer Credit Jurisdiction or 
the Voluntary Jurisdiction; 
 
(2) (in the Compulsory Jurisdiction) a complainant, other than a trustee of a pension 
scheme trust, who was: 
 
(a) a professional client; or 
 
(b) an eligible counterparty; 
 
in relation to the firm and activity in question at the time of the act or omission which is 
the subject of the complaint; and 
 
(3) (in the Consumer Credit Jurisdiction): 
 
(a) a body corporate; 
 
(b) a partnership consisting of more than three persons; 
 
(c) a partnership all of whose members are bodies corporate; or 
 
(d) an unincorporated body which consists entirely of bodies corporate. 
 
DISP 2.7.10 Guidance 
 
In  the  Compulsory  Jurisdiction,  in  relation  to  relevant  new  complaints  under  the 
Ombudsman  Transitional  Order  and  relevant  transitional  complaints  under  the 
Mortgages and General Insurance Complaints Transitional Order: 
 
(1)  where  the  former  scheme  in  question  is  the  Insurance  Ombudsman  Scheme,  a 
complainant is not to be treated as an eligible complainant unless: 
 
(a) he is an individual; and 
 
(b)  the  relevant  new  complaint  does  not  concern  aspects  of  a  policy  relating  to  a 
business or trade carried on by him; 
 
(2) where the former scheme in question is the GISC facility, a complainant is not to be 
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(a) he is an individual; and 
 
(b) he is acting otherwise than solely for the purposes of his business; and 
 
(3) where the former scheme in question is the MCAS scheme, a complainant is not to 
be treated as an eligible complainant if: 
 
(a) the relevant transitional complaint does not relate to a breach of the Mortgage Code 
published by the Council of Mortgage Lenders; 
 
(b) the complaint concerns physical injury, illness, nervous shock or their consequences; 
or 
 
(c) the complainant is claiming a sum of money that exceeds £100,000. 
 
DISP 2.8 Was the complaint referred to the Financial Ombudsman Service in time? 
 
DISP 2.8.1 Rule 
 
The Ombudsman can only consider a complaint if: 
 
(1) the respondent has already sent the complainant its final response; or 
 
(2) eight weeks have elapsed since the respondent received the complaint. 
 
DISP 2.8.2 Rule 
 
The Ombudsman cannot consider a complaint if the complainant refers it to the Financial 
Ombudsman Service: 
 
(1) more than six months after the date on which the respondent sent the complainant its 
final response; or 
 
(2) more than: 
 
(a) six years after the event complained of; or (if later) 
 
(b)  three  years  from  the  date  on  which  the  complainant  became  aware  (or  ought 
reasonably to have become aware) that he had cause for complaint; 
 
unless the complainant referred the complaint to the respondent or to the Ombudsman 
within  that  period  and  has  a  written  acknowledgement  or  some  other  record  of  the 
complaint having been received; unless: 
 
(3) in the view of the Ombudsman, the failure to comply with the time limits in DISP 
2.8.2R or DISP 2.8.7 R was as a result of exceptional circumstances; or 
 
(4) the Ombudsman is required to do so by the Ombudsman Transitional Order; or 
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(5) the respondent has not objected, on the grounds that the time limits in DISP 2.8.2 R 
or DISP 2.8.7 R have been exceeded, to the Ombudsman considering the complaint. 
 
DISP 2.8.3 Guidance 
 
The six-month time limit is only triggered by a response which is a final response. A final 
response must tell the complainant about the six-month time limit that the complainant 
has to refer a complaint to the Financial Ombudsman Service. 
 
DISP 2.8.4 Guidance 
 
An example of exceptional circumstances might be where the complainant has been or 
is incapacitated. 
 
Reviews of past business 
DISP 2.8.5 Rule 
 
The six-year and the three-year time limits do not apply where: 
 
(1)  the  time  limit  has  been  extended  under  a  scheme  for  review  of  past  business 
approved by the Treasury under section 404 of the Act (Schemes for reviewing past 
business); or 
 
(2) the complaint concerns a contract or policy which is the subject of a review directly or 
indirectly under: 
 
(a) the terms of the Statement of Policy on 'Pension transfers and Opt-outs' issued by 
the FSA on 25 October 1994; or 
 
(b) the terms of the policy statement for the review of specific categories of FSAVC 
business issued by the FSA on 28 February 2000. 
 
Mortgage endowment complaints 
DISP 2.8.6 Guidance 
 
If a complaint relates to the sale of an endowment policy for the purpose of achieving 
capital repayment of a mortgage, the receipt by the complainant of a letter which states 
that there is a risk (rather than a high risk) that the policy would not, at maturity, produce 
a sum large enough to repay the target amount is not, itself, sufficient to cause the three 
year time period in DISP 2.8.2 R (2) to start to run. 
 
DISP 2.8.7 Rule 
 
(1) If a complaint relates to the sale of an endowment policy for the purpose of achieving 
capital repayment of a mortgage and the complainant receives a letter from a firm or a 
VJ  participant  warning  that  there  is  a  high  risk  that  the  policy  will  not,  at  maturity, 
produce a sum large enough to repay the target amount then, subject to (2), (3), (4) and 
(5): 
 
(a) time for referring a complaint to the Financial Ombudsman Service starts to run from 
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(b) ends three years from that date ("the final date"). 
 
(2) Paragraph (1)(b) applies only if the complainant also receives within the three year 
period mentioned in (1)(b) and at least six months before the final date an explanation 
that the complainant's time to refer such a complaint would expire at the final date. 
 
(3) If an explanation is given but is sent outside the period referred to in (2), time for 
referring a complaint will run until a date specified in such an explanation which must not 
be less than six months after the date on which the notice is sent. 
 
(4) A complainant will be taken to have complied with the time limits in (1) to (3) above if 
in any case he refers the complaint to the firm or VJ participant within those limits and 
has  a  written  acknowledgement  or  some  other  record  of  the  complaint  having  been 
received. 
 
(5)  Paragraph  (1)  does  not  apply  if  the  Ombudsman  is  of  the  opinion  that,  in  the 
circumstances of the case, it is appropriate for DISP 2.8.2 R (2) to apply. 
 
DISP 3.2 Jurisdiction 
 
DISP 3.2.1 Rule 
 
The Ombudsman will have regard to whether a complaint is out of jurisdiction. 
  
DISP 3.2.2 Rule 
 
Unless the respondent has already had eight weeks to consider the complaint or issued 
a final response, the Ombudsman will refer the complaint to the respondent. 
 
DISP 3.2.3 Rule 
 
Where the respondent alleges that the complaint is out of jurisdiction, the Ombudsman 
will give both parties an opportunity to make representations before he decides. 
 
DISP 3.2.4 Rule 
 
Where the Ombudsman considers that the complaint may be out of jurisdiction, he will 
give the complainant an opportunity to make representations before he decides. 
 
DISP 3.2.5 Rule 
 
Where the Ombudsman then decides that the complaint is out of jurisdiction, he will give 
reasons for that decision to the complainant and inform the respondent. 
 
DISP 3.2.6 Rule 
 
Where the Ombudsman then decides that the complaint is not out of jurisdiction, he will 
inform the complainant and give reasons for that decision to the respondent. 
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DISP 3.3 Dismissal without consideration of the merits and test cases 
 
DISP 3.3.1 Rule 
 
Where  the  Ombudsman  considers  that  the  complaint  may  be  one  which  should  be 
dismissed without consideration of the merits, he will give the complainant an opportunity 
to make representations before he decides. 
 
DISP 3.3.2 Rule 
 
Where the Ombudsman then decides that the complaint should be dismissed without 
consideration of the merits, he will give reasons to the complainant for that decision and 
inform the respondent. 
 
DISP 3.3.3 Guidance 
 
Under  the  Ombudsman  Transitional  Order  and  the  Mortgage and  General  Insurance 
Complaints  Transitional  Order,  where  the  Ombudsman  is  dealing  with  a  relevant 
complaint, he must take into account whether an equivalent complaint would have been 
dismissed without consideration of its merits under the former scheme in question, as it 
had effect immediately before the relevant transitional order came into effect.  
 
Grounds for dismissal 
DISP 3.3.4 Rule 
 
The Ombudsman may dismiss a complaint without considering its merits if he considers 
that: 
 
(1)  the  complainant  has  not  suffered  (or  is  unlikely  to  suffer)  financial  loss,  material 
distress or material inconvenience; or 
 
(2) the complaint is frivolous or vexatious; or 
 
(3) the complaint clearly does not have any reasonable prospect of success; or 
 
(4) the respondent has already made an offer of compensation (or a goodwill payment) 
which is: 
 
(a)  fair and reasonable in relation to the circumstances alleged by the complainant; and 
 
(b)  still open for acceptance; or 
 
(5) the respondent has reviewed the subject matter of the complaint in accordance with: 
 
(a)  the regulatory standards for the review of such transactions prevailing at the time of 
the review; or 
 
(b)  the terms of a scheme order under section 404 of the Act (Schemes for reviewing 
past business); or 
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(c)  any formal regulatory requirement, standard or guidance published by the FSA or 
other regulator in respect of that type of complaint; 
 
(including,  if  appropriate,  making  an  offer  of  redress  to  the  complainant),  unless  he 
considers that they did not address the particular circumstances of the case; or 
 
(6)  the  subject  matter  of  the  complaint  has  previously  been  considered  or  excluded 
under  the  Financial  Ombudsman  Service,  or  a  former  scheme  (unless  material  new 
evidence which the Ombudsman considers likely to affect the outcome has subsequently 
become available to the complainant); or 
 
(7) the subject matter of the complaint has been dealt with, or is being dealt with, by a 
comparable independent complaints scheme or dispute-resolution process; or 
 
(8) the subject matter of the complaint has been the subject of court proceedings where 
there has been a decision on the merits; or 
 
(9) the subject matter of the complaint is the subject of current court proceedings, unless 
proceedings are stayed or sisted (by agreement of all parties, or order of the court) in 
order that the matter may be considered under the Financial Ombudsman Service; or 
 
(10) it would be more suitable for the subject matter of the complaint to be dealt with by a 
court, arbitration or another complaints scheme; or 
 
(11)  it  is  a  complaint  about  the  legitimate  exercise  of  a  respondent's  commercial 
judgment; or 
 
(12) it is a complaint about employment matters from an employee or employees of a 
respondent; or 
 
(13) it is a complaint about investment performance; or 
 
(14) it is a complaint about a respondent's decision when exercising a discretion under a 
will or private trust; or 
 
(15)  it  is  a  complaint  about  a  respondent's  failure  to  consult  beneficiaries  before 
exercising a discretion under a will or private trust, where there is no legal obligation to 
consult; or 
 
(16) it is a complaint which: 
 
(a)  involves (or might involve) more than one eligible complainant; and 
 
(b)  has been referred without the consent of the other complainant or complainants; 
 
and the Ombudsman considers that it would be inappropriate to deal with the complaint 
without that consent; or 
 
(17) there are other compelling reasons why it is inappropriate for the complaint to be 
dealt with under the Financial Ombudsman Service. 
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Test cases 
DISP 3.3.5 Rule 
 
The Ombudsman may dismiss a complaint without considering its merits, so that a court 
may consider it as a test case, if: 
 
(1) before he has made a determination, he has received in writing from the respondent: 
 
(a)  a detailed statement of how and why, in the respondent's opinion, the complaint 
raises an important or novel point of law with significant consequences; and 
 
(b)    an  undertaking  in  favour  of  the  complainant  that,  if  the  complainant  or  the 
respondent commences court proceedings against the other in respect of the complaint 
in any court in the United Kingdom within six months of the complaint being dismissed, 
the respondent will: pay the complainant's reasonable costs and disbursements (to be 
assessed if not agreed on an indemnity basis) in connection with the proceedings at first 
instance and any subsequent appeal proceedings brought by the respondent; and make 
interim payments on account of such costs if and to the extent that it appears reasonable 
to do so; and 
 
(2) the Ombudsman considers that the complaint: 
 
(a)  raises an important or novel point of law, which has important consequences; and 
 
(b)  would more suitably be dealt with by a court as a test case. 
 
DISP 3.3.6 Guidance 
 
Factors  the  Ombudsman may  take  into  account  in considering  whether  to  dismiss a 
complaint so that it may be the subject of a test case in court include (but are not limited 
to): 
 
(1) whether the point of law is central to the outcome of the dispute; 
 
(2) how important or novel the point of law is in the context of the dispute; 
 
(3)  the  significance  of  the  consequences  of  the  dispute  for  the  business  of  the 
respondent (or respondents in that sector) or for its (or their) customers; 
 
(4) the amount at stake in the dispute; 
 
(5) the remedies that a court could impose; 
 
(6) any representations made by the respondent or the complainant; and 
 
(7) the stage already reached in consideration of the dispute. 
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DISP 3.5  Resolution of complaints by the Ombudsman 
 
DISP 3.5.1 Rule 
 
The Ombudsman will attempt to resolve complaints at the earliest possible stage and by 
whatever  means  appear  to  him  to  be  most  appropriate,  including  mediation  or 
investigation. 
 
DISP 3.5.2 Guidance 
 
The Ombudsman may inform the complainant that it might be appropriate to complain 
against some other respondent. 
 
DISP 3.5.3 Guidance 
 
Where two or more complaints from one complainant relate to connected circumstances, 
the  Ombudsman  may  investigate  them  together,  but  will  issue  separate  provisional 
assessments and determinations in respect of each respondent. 
 
DISP 3.5.4 Rule 
 
If the Ombudsman decides that an investigation is necessary, he will then: 
 
(1) ensure both parties have been given an opportunity of making representations; 
 
(2) send both parties a provisional assessment, setting out his reasons and a time limit 
within which either party must respond; and 
 
(3) if either party indicates disagreement with the provisional assessment within that time 
limit, proceed to determination. 
 
Hearings 
DISP 3.5.5 Rule 
 
If  the  Ombudsman  considers  that  the  complaint  can  be  fairly  determined  without 
convening a hearing, he will determine the complaint. If not, he will invite the parties to 
take part in a hearing. A hearing may be held by any means which the Ombudsman 
considers appropriate in the circumstances, including by telephone. No hearing will be 
held after the Ombudsman has determined the complaint. 
 
DISP 3.5.6 Rule 
 
A party who wishes to request a hearing must do so in writing, setting out: 
 
(1) the issues he wishes to raise; and 
 
(2) (if appropriate) any reasons why he considers the hearing should be in private; 
 
so that the Ombudsman may consider whether: 
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(4) a hearing should take place; and 
 
(5) any hearing should be held in public or private. 
 
DISP 3.5.7 Guidance 
 
In deciding whether there should be a hearing and, if so, whether it should be in public or 
private, the Ombudsman will have regard to the provisions of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. 
 
Evidence 
DISP 3.5.8 Rule 
 
The Ombudsman may give directions as to: 
 
(1) the issues on which evidence is required; 
 
(2) the extent to which evidence should be oral or written; and 
 
(3) the way in which evidence should be presented. 
 
DISP 3.5.9 Rule 
 
The Ombudsman may: 
 
(1) exclude evidence that would otherwise be admissible in a court or include evidence 
that would not be admissible in a court; 
 
(2)  accept  information  in  confidence  (so  that  only  an  edited  version,  summary  or 
description is disclosed to the other party) where he considers it appropriate; 
 
(3) reach a decision on the basis of what has been supplied and take account of the 
failure by a party to provide information requested; and 
 
(4) dismiss a complaint if a complainant fails to supply requested information. 
 
DISP 3.5.10 Guidance 
 
Evidence  which  the  Ombudsman  may  accept  in  confidence  includes  confidential 
evidence about third parties and security information.  
 
DISP 3.5.11 Guidance 
 
The Ombudsman has the power to require a party to provide evidence. Failure to comply 
with the request can be dealt with by the court. 
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DISP 3.5.12 Guidance 
 
The Ombudsman may take into account evidence from third parties, including (but not 
limited to) the FSA, other regulators, experts in industry matters and experts in consumer 
matters. 
 
Procedural time limits 
DISP 3.5.13 Rule 
 
The Ombudsman may fix (and extend) time limits for any aspect of the consideration of a 
complaint by the Financial Ombudsman Service. 
 
DISP 3.5.14 Rule 
 
If a respondent fails to comply with a time limit, the Ombudsman may: 
 
(1) proceed with consideration of the complaint; and 
 
(2) include provision for any material distress or material inconvenience caused by that 
failure in any award which he decides to make. 
 
DISP 3.5.15 Rule 
 
If a complainant fails to comply with a time limit, the Ombudsman may: 
 
(1) proceed with consideration of the complaint; or 
 
(2) dismiss the complaint. 
 
DISP 3.6 Determination by the Ombudsman 
 
Fair and reasonable 
DISP 3.6.1 Rule 
 
The Ombudsman will determine a complaint by reference to what is, in his opinion, fair 
and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case. 
 
DISP 3.6.2 Guidance 
 
Section 228 of the Act sets the 'fair and reasonable' test for the Compulsory Jurisdiction 
and  the  Consumer  Credit  Jurisdiction  and  DISP  3.6.1  R  extends  it  to  the  Voluntary 
Jurisdiction. 
 
DISP 3.6.3 Guidance 
 
Where a complainant makes complaints against more than one respondent in respect of 
connected circumstances, the Ombudsman may determine that the respondents must 
contribute towards the overall award in the proportion that the Ombudsman considers 
appropriate. 
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DISP 3.6.4 Rule 
 
In  considering  what  is  fair  and  reasonable  in  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  the 
Ombudsman will take into account: 
 
(1) relevant: 
 
(a)  law and regulations; 
 
(b)  regulators' rules, guidance and standards; 
 
(c)  codes of practice; and 
 
(2) (where appropriate) what he considers to have been good industry practice at the 
relevant time. 
 
DISP 3.6.5 Guidance 
 
Where  the  Ombudsman  is  determining  what  is  fair  and  reasonable  in  all  the 
circumstances  of  a  relevant  new  complaint  or  a  relevant  transitional  complaint,  the 
Ombudsman Transitional Order and the Mortgage and General Insurance Complaints 
Transitional  Order  require  him  to  take  into  account  what  determination  the  former 
Ombudsman might have been expected to reach in relation to an equivalent complaint 
dealt  with  under  the  former  scheme  in  question  immediately  before  the  relevant 
transitional order came into effect. 
 
The Ombudsman's determination 
DISP 3.6.6 Rule 
 
When the Ombudsman has determined a complaint: 
 
(1)  the  Ombudsman  will  give  both  parties  a  signed  written  statement  of  the 
determination, giving the reasons for it; 
 
(2) the statement will require the complainant to notify the Ombudsman in writing, before 
the date specified in the statement, whether he accepts or rejects the determination; 
 
(3) if the complainant notifies the Ombudsman that he accepts the determination within 
that time limit, it is final and binding on both parties; 
 
(4) if the complainant does not notify the Ombudsman that he accepts the determination 
within  that  time  limit,  the  complainant  will  be  treated  as  having  rejected  the 
determination, and neither party will be bound by it; and 
 
(5) the Ombudsman will notify the respondent of the outcome. 
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DISP 3.7 Awards by the Ombudsman 
 
DISP 3.7.1 Rule 
 
Where  a  complaint  is  determined  in  favour  of  the  complainant,  the  Ombudsman's 
determination may include one or more of the following: 
 
(1) a money award against the respondent; or 
 
(2) an interest award against the respondent; or 
 
(3) a costs award against the respondent; or 
 
(4) a direction to the respondent. 
 
Money awards 
DISP 3.7.2 Rule 
 
A  money  award  may  be  such  amount  as  the  Ombudsman  considers  to  be  fair 
compensation for one or more of the following: 
 
(1) financial loss (including consequential or prospective loss); or 
 
(2) pain and suffering; or 
 
(3) damage to reputation; or 
 
(4) distress or inconvenience; 
 
whether or not a court would award compensation. 
 
DISP 3.7.3 Guidance 
 
Where  the  Ombudsman  is  determining  what  amount  (if  any)  constitutes  fair 
compensation as a money award in relation to a relevant new complaint or a relevant 
transitional  complaint,  the  Ombudsman  Transitional  Order  and  the  Mortgages  and 
General Insurance Complaints Transitional Order require him to take into account what 
amount (if any) might have been expected to be awarded by way of compensation in 
relation  to  an  equivalent  complaint  dealt  with  under  the  former  scheme  in  question 
immediately before the relevant transitional order came into effect. 
 
DISP 3.7.4 Rule 
 
The maximum money award which the Ombudsman may make is £100,000. 
 
DISP 3.7.5 Guidance 
 
For the purpose of calculating the maximum money award, the following are excluded: 
 
(1) any interest awarded on the amount payable under a money award; 
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(2) any costs awarded; and 
 
(3) any interest awarded on costs. 
 
DISP 3.7.6 Guidance 
 
If  the  Ombudsman  considers  that  fair  compensation  requires  payment  of  a  larger 
amount, he may recommend that the respondent pays the complainant the balance. 
 
DISP 3.7.7 Rule 
 
The Ombudsman will maintain a register of each money award. 
 
Interest awards 
DISP 3.7.8 Rule 
 
An interest award may provide for the amount payable under the money award to bear 
interest at a rate and as from a date specified in the award. 
 
Costs awards 
DISP 3.7.9 Rule 
 
A costs award may: 
 
(1) be such amount as the Ombudsman considers to be fair, to cover some or all of the 
costs which were reasonably incurred by the complainant in respect of the complaint; 
and 
 
(2) include interest on that amount at a rate and as from a date specified in the award. 
 
DISP 3.7.10 Guidance 
 
In  most  cases  complainants  should  not  need  to  have  professional  advisers  to  bring 
complaints to the Financial Ombudsman Service, so awards of costs are unlikely to be 
common. 
 
Directions 
DISP 3.7.11 Rule 
 
A direction may require the respondent to take such steps in relation to the complainant 
as the Ombudsman considers just and appropriate (whether or not a court could order 
those steps to be taken). 
 
Complying with awards and settlements 
DISP 3.7.12 Rule 
 
A respondent must comply promptly with: 
 
(1) any award or direction made by the Ombudsman; and 
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DISP 3.7.13 Guidance 
 
Under the Act, a complainant can enforce through the courts a money award registered 
by the Ombudsman or a direction made by the Ombudsman. 
 
DISP 3.8 Dealing with information 
 
DISP 3.8.1 Rule 
 
In dealing with information received in relation to the consideration of a complaint, the 
Financial Ombudsman Service will have regard to the parties' rights of privacy. 
 
DISP 3.8.2B Rule 
 
This does not prevent the Ombudsman disclosing information: 
 
(1) to the extent that he is required or authorised to do so by law; or 
 
(2) to the parties to the complaint; or 
 
(3) in his determination; or 
 
(4) at a hearing in connection with the complaint. 
 
DISP 3.8.3 Rule 
 
So long as he has regard to the parties' rights of privacy, the Ombudsman may disclose 
information to the FSA or any other body exercising regulatory or statutory functions for 
the purpose of assisting that body or the Financial Ombudsman Service to discharge its 
functions. 
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APPENDIX E: FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS ACT 2000 (relevant extracts) 
 
 
s. 66 Disciplinary powers 
 
(1)     The Authority may take action against a person under this section if— 
 
(a)     it appears to the Authority that he is guilty of misconduct; and 
 
(b)     the Authority is satisfied that it is appropriate in all the circumstances to take action 
against him. 
 
(2)     A person is guilty of misconduct if, while an approved person— 
 
(a)     he has failed to comply with a statement of principle issued under section 64; or 
 
(b)    he has been knowingly concerned in a contravention by the relevant authorised 
person of a requirement imposed on that authorised person by or under this Act [or by 
any  directly  applicable  Community  regulation  made  under  the  markets  in  financial 
instruments directive]. 
 
(3)    If the Authority is entitled to take action under this section against a person, it 
may— 
 
(a)     impose a penalty on him of such amount as it considers appropriate; or 
 
(b)     publish a statement of his misconduct. 
 
(4)     The Authority may not take action under this section after the end of the period of 
two years beginning with the first day on which the Authority knew of the misconduct, 
unless proceedings in respect of it against the person concerned were begun before the 
end of that period. 
 
(5)     For the purposes of subsection (4)— 
 
(a)     the Authority is to be treated as knowing of misconduct if it has information from 
which the misconduct can reasonably be inferred; and 
 
(b)     proceedings against a person in respect of misconduct are to be treated as begun 
when a warning notice is given to him under section 67(1). 
 
(6)     ―Approved person‖ has the same meaning as in section 64. 
 
(7)     ―Relevant authorised person‖, in relation to an approved person, means the person 
on whose application approval under section 59 was given. 
 
[Amendment: 
Sub-s (2): in para (b) words from ―or by any‖ to ―financial instruments directive‖ in square 
brackets inserted by SI 2007/126, reg 3(5), Sch 5, paras 1, 5. 
 
Date in force (for certain purposes): 1 April 2007: see SI 2007/126, reg 1(2). Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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Date in force (for remaining purposes): 1 November 2007: see SI 2007/126, reg 1(2). 
 
See Further 
 
See further, in relation to the application of this section, with modifications, in respect of 
the Authority's functions under the Payment Services Regulations 2009, SI 2009/209: 
the Payment Services Regulations 2009, SI 2009/209, reg 95, Sch 5, Pt 1, para 1.] 
  
s. 150 Actions for damages 
 
(1)     A contravention by an authorised person of a rule is actionable at the suit of a 
private person who suffers loss as a result of the contravention, subject to the defences 
and other incidents applying to actions for breach of statutory duty. 
 
(2)     If rules so provide, subsection (1) does not apply to contravention of a specified 
provision of those rules. 
 
(3)     In prescribed cases, a contravention of a rule which would be actionable at the suit 
of a private person is actionable at the suit of a person who is not a private person, 
subject to the defences and other incidents applying to actions for breach of statutory 
duty. 
 
(4)     In subsections (1) and (3) ―rule‖ does not include— 
 
(a)     [Part 6 rules]; or 
 
(b)     a rule requiring an authorised person to have or maintain financial resources. 
 
(5)     ―Private person‖ has such meaning as may be prescribed. 
 
[Amendment 
 
Sub-s (4): in para (a) words ―Part 6 rules‖ in square brackets substituted by SI 2005/381, 
reg 6. 
 
Date in force: 1 July 2005: see SI 2005/381, reg 1(2).] 
 
s. 225 The scheme and the scheme operator 
 
(1)     This Part provides for a scheme under which certain disputes may be resolved 
quickly and with minimum formality by an independent person. 
 
(2)     The scheme is to be administered by a body corporate (―the scheme operator‖). 
 
(3)     The scheme is to be operated under a name chosen by the scheme operator but is 
referred to in this Act as ―the ombudsman scheme‖. 
 
(4)     Schedule 17 makes provision in connection with the ombudsman scheme and the 
scheme operator. 
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s. 228 Determination under the compulsory jurisdiction 
 
(1)     This section applies only in relation to the compulsory jurisdiction [and to the 
consumer credit jurisdiction]. 
 
(2)     A complaint is to be determined by reference to what is, in the opinion of the 
ombudsman, fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case. 
 
(3)          When  the  ombudsman  has  determined  a  complaint  he  must  give  a  written 
statement of his determination to the respondent and to the complainant. 
 
(4)     The statement must— 
 
(a)     give the ombudsman's reasons for his determination; 
 
(b)     be signed by him; and 
 
(c)     require the complainant to notify him in writing, before a date specified in the 
statement, whether he accepts or rejects the determination. 
 
(5)     If the complainant notifies the ombudsman that he accepts the determination, it is 
binding on the respondent and the complainant and final. 
 
(6)     If, by the specified date, the complainant has not notified the ombudsman of his 
acceptance or rejection of the determination he is to be treated as having rejected it. 
 
(7)     The ombudsman must notify the respondent of the outcome. 
 
(8)          A  copy  of  the  determination  on  which  appears  a  certificate  signed  by  an 
ombudsman is evidence (or in Scotland sufficient evidence) that the determination was 
made under the scheme. 
 
(9)     Such a certificate purporting to be signed by an ombudsman is to be taken to have 
been duly signed unless the contrary is shown. 
 
[Amendment 
 
Sub-s (1): words ―and to the consumer credit jurisdiction‖ in square brackets inserted by 
the Consumer Credit Act 2006, s 61(3). 
 
Date in force: 16 June 2006: see SI 2006/1508, art 3(1), Sch 1.] 
 
s. 229 Awards 
 
(1)     This section applies only in relation to the compulsory jurisdiction [and to the 
consumer credit jurisdiction]. 
 
(2)     If a complaint which has been dealt with under the scheme is determined in favour 
of the complainant, the determination may include— 
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(a)     an award against the respondent of such amount as the ombudsman considers fair 
compensation for loss or damage (of a kind falling within subsection (3)) suffered by the 
complainant (―a money award‖); 
 
(b)     a direction that the respondent take such steps in relation to the complainant as 
the ombudsman considers just and appropriate (whether or not a court could order those 
steps to be taken). 
 
(3)     A money award may compensate for— 
 
(a)     financial loss; or 
 
(b)     any other loss, or any damage, of a specified kind. 
 
(4)     The Authority may specify [for the purposes of the compulsory jurisdiction] the 
maximum amount which may be regarded as fair compensation for a particular kind of 
loss or damage specified under subsection (3)(b). 
 
[(4A)     The scheme operator may specify for the purposes of the consumer credit 
jurisdiction the maximum amount which may be regarded as fair compensation for a 
particular kind of loss or damage specified under subsection (3)(b).] 
 
(5)     A money award may not exceed the monetary limit; but the ombudsman may, if he 
considers that fair compensation requires payment of a larger amount, recommend that 
the respondent pay the complainant the balance. 
 
(6)     The monetary limit is such amount as may be specified. 
 
(7)     Different amounts may be specified in relation to different kinds of complaint. 
 
(8)     A money award— 
 
(a)     may provide for the amount payable under the award to bear interest at a rate and 
as from a date specified in the award; and 
 
(b)     is enforceable by the complainant in accordance with Part III of Schedule 17 [or 
(as the case may be) Part 3A of that Schedule]. 
 
(9)     Compliance with a direction under subsection (2)(b)— 
 
(a)     is enforceable by an injunction; or 
 
(b)     in Scotland, is enforceable by an order under section 45 of the Court of Session 
Act 1988. 
 
(10)     Only the complainant may bring proceedings for an injunction or proceedings for 
an order. 
 
[(11)     ―Specified‖ means— 
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(a)     for the purposes of the compulsory jurisdiction, specified in compulsory jurisdiction 
rules; 
 
(b)     for the purposes of the consumer credit jurisdiction, specified in consumer credit 
rules. 
 
(12)          Consumer  credit  rules  under  this  section  may  make  different  provision  for 
different cases.] 
 
[Amendment 
 
Sub-s (1): words ―and to the consumer credit jurisdiction‖ in square brackets inserted by 
the Consumer Credit Act 2006, s 61(3). 
 
Date in force: 16 June 2006: see SI 2006/1508, art 3(1), Sch 1. 
 
Sub-s (4): words ―for the purposes of the compulsory jurisdiction‖ in square brackets 
inserted by the Consumer Credit Act 2006, s 61(4). 
 
Date in force: 16 June 2006: see SI 2006/1508, art 3(1), Sch 1. 
 
Sub-s (4A): inserted by the Consumer Credit Act 2006, s 61(5). 
 
Date in force: 16 June 2006: see SI 2006/1508, art 3(1), Sch 1. 
 
Sub-s (8): in para (b) words ―or (as the case may be) Part 3A of that Schedule‖ in square 
brackets inserted by the Consumer Credit Act 2006, s 61(6). 
 
Date in force: 16 June 2006: see SI 2006/1508, art 3(1), Sch 1. 
 
Sub-ss (11), (12): substituted, for sub-s (11) as originally enacted, by the Consumer 
Credit Act 2006, s 61(7). 
 
Date in force: 16 June 2006: see SI 2006/1508, art 3(1), Sch 1.] 
 
s. 230 Costs 
 
(1)     The scheme operator may by rules (―costs rules‖) provide for an ombudsman to 
have  power,  on  determining  a  complaint  under  the  compulsory  jurisdiction  [or  the 
consumer credit jurisdiction], to award costs in accordance with the provisions of the 
rules. 
 
(2)     Costs rules require the approval of the Authority. 
 
(3)     Costs rules may not provide for the making of an award against the complainant in 
respect of the respondent's costs. 
 
(4)     But they may provide for the making of an award against the complainant in favour 
of  the  scheme  operator,  for  the  purpose  of  providing  a  contribution  to  resources 
deployed in dealing with the complaint, if in the opinion of the ombudsman— 
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(a)     the complainant's conduct was improper or unreasonable; or 
 
(b)     the complainant was responsible for an unreasonable delay. 
 
(5)     Costs rules may authorise an ombudsman making an award in accordance with 
the rules to order that the amount payable under the award bears interest at a rate and 
as from a date specified in the order. 
 
(6)          An  amount  due  under  an  award  made  in  favour  of  the  scheme  operator  is 
recoverable as a debt due to the scheme operator. 
 
(7)     Any other award made against the respondent is to be treated as a money award 
for the purposes of paragraph 16 of Schedule 17 [or (as the case may be) paragraph 
16D of that Schedule]. 
 
[Amendment 
 
Sub-s (1): words ―or the consumer credit jurisdiction‖ in square brackets inserted by the 
Consumer Credit Act 2006, s 61(8)(a). 
 
Date in force: 16 June 2006: see SI 2006/1508, art 3(1), Sch 1. 
 
Sub-s (7): words ―or (as the case may be) paragraph 16D of that Schedule‖ in square 
brackets inserted by the Consumer Credit Act 2006, s 61(8)(b). 
 
Date in force: 16 June 2006: see SI 2006/1508, art 3(1), Sch 1.] 
 
s. 231 Ombudsman's power to require information 
 
(1)     An ombudsman may, by notice in writing given to a party to a complaint, require 
that party— 
 
(a)     to provide specified information or information of a specified description; or 
 
(b)     to produce specified documents or documents of a specified description. 
 
(2)     The information or documents must be provided or produced— 
 
(a)     before the end of such reasonable period as may be specified; and 
 
(b)     in the case of information, in such manner or form as may be specified. 
 
(3)     This section applies only to information and documents the production of which the 
ombudsman considers necessary for the determination of the complaint. 
 
(4)       If a document is produced in response to a requirement imposed under this 
section, the ombudsman may— 
 
(a)     take copies or extracts from the document; or 
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(b)          require  the  person  producing  the  document  to  provide  an  explanation of  the 
document. 
 
(5)     If a person who is required under this section to produce a document fails to do so, 
the ombudsman may require him to state, to the best of his knowledge and belief, where 
the document is. 
 
(6)     If a person claims a lien on a document, its production under this Part does not 
affect the lien. 
 
(7)     ―Specified‖ means specified in the notice given under subsection (1). 
 
s. 232 Powers of court where information required 
 
(1)     If a person (―the defaulter‖) fails to comply with a requirement imposed under 
section 231, the ombudsman may certify that fact in writing to the court and the court 
may enquire into the case. 
 
(2)     If the court is satisfied that the defaulter failed without reasonable excuse to 
comply with the requirement, it may deal with the defaulter (and, in the case of a body 
corporate, any director or officer) as if he were in contempt[; and ―officer‖, in relation to a 
limited liability partnership, means a member of the limited liability partnership]. 
 
(3)     ―Court‖ means— 
 
(a)     the High Court; 
 
(b)     in Scotland, the Court of Session. 
 
[Amendment 
 
Sub-s (2): words ―; and ―officer‖, in relation to a limited liability partnership, means a 
member of the limited liability partnership‖ in square brackets inserted by SI 2001/1090, 
reg 9(1), Sch 5, para 21. 
 
Date in force: 6 April 2001: see SI 2001/1090, reg 1. 
Modification 
 
The Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000 provides for the creation of Limited Liability 
Partnerships (LLPs). The Limited Liability Partnerships Regulations 2001, SI 2001/1090, 
regulate  LLPs  by  applying  to  them,  with  appropriate  modifications,  the  appropriate 
provisions of this Act: see SI 2001/1090, regs 6, 10.] 
  
s. 404 Schemes for reviewing past business 
 
(1)          Subsection  (2)  applies  if  the  Treasury  are  satisfied  that  there  is  evidence 
suggesting— 
 
(a)     that there has been a widespread or regular failure on the part of authorised 
persons to comply with rules relating to a particular kind of activity; and 
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(b)     that, as a result, private persons have suffered (or will suffer) loss in respect of 
which  authorised  persons  are  (or  will  be)  liable  to  make  payments  (―compensation 
payments‖). 
 
(2)     The Treasury may by order (―a scheme order‖) authorise the Authority to establish 
and operate a scheme for— 
 
(a)     determining the nature and extent of the failure; 
 
(b)     establishing the liability of authorised persons to make compensation payments; 
and 
 
(c)     determining the amounts payable by way of compensation payments. 
 
(3)     An authorised scheme must be made so as to comply with specified requirements. 
 
(4)     A scheme order may be made only if— 
 
(a)     the Authority has given the Treasury a report about the alleged failure and asked 
them to make a scheme order; 
 
(b)     the report contains details of the scheme which the Authority propose to make; and 
 
(c)     the Treasury are satisfied that the proposed scheme is an appropriate way of 
dealing with the failure. 
 
(5)     A scheme order may provide for specified provisions of or made under this Act to 
apply  in  relation  to  any  provision  of,  or  determination  made  under,  the  resulting 
authorised scheme subject to such modifications (if any) as may be specified. 
 
(6)     For the purposes of this Act, failure on the part of an authorised person to comply 
with any provision of an authorised scheme is to be treated (subject to any provision 
made by the scheme order concerned) as a failure on his part to comply with rules. 
 
(7)     The Treasury may prescribe circumstances in which loss suffered by a person 
(―A‖) acting in a fiduciary or other prescribed capacity is to be treated, for the purposes of 
an authorised scheme, as suffered by a private person in relation to whom A was acting 
in that capacity. 
 
(8)     This section applies whenever the failure in question occurred. 
 
(9)     ―Authorised scheme‖ means a scheme authorised by a scheme order. 
 
(10)     ―Private person‖ has such meaning as may be prescribed. 
 
(11)     ―Specified‖ means specified in a scheme order. 
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Part IIIThe Compulsory Jurisdiction 
Introduction 
 
12 
 
This Part of this Schedule applies only in relation to the compulsory jurisdiction. 
Authority's procedural rules 
 
13 
 
(1)     The Authority must make rules providing that a complaint is not to be entertained 
unless  the  complainant  has  referred  it  under  the  ombudsman  scheme  before  the 
applicable time limit (determined in accordance with the rules) has expired. 
 
(2)     The rules may provide that an ombudsman may extend that time limit in specified 
circumstances. 
 
(3)     The Authority may make rules providing that a complaint is not to be entertained 
(except in specified circumstances) if the complainant has not previously communicated 
its substance to the respondent and given him a reasonable opportunity to deal with it. 
 
(4)     The Authority may make rules requiring an authorised person[, or a payment 
service provider within the meaning of the Payment Services Regulations 2009,] who 
may become subject to the compulsory jurisdiction as a respondent to establish such 
procedures  as  the  Authority  considers  appropriate  for  the  resolution  of  complaints 
which— 
 
(a)     may be referred to the scheme; and 
 
(b)     arise out of activity to which the Authority's powers under Part X do not apply. 
The scheme operator's rules 
 
14 
 
(1)     The scheme operator must make rules, to be known as ―scheme rules‖, which are 
to  set  out  the  procedure  for  reference  of  complaints  and  for  their  investigation, 
consideration and determination by an ombudsman. 
 
(2)     Scheme rules may, among other things— 
 
(a)     specify matters which are to be taken into account in determining whether an act 
or omission was fair and reasonable; 
 
(b)     provide that a complaint may, in specified circumstances, be dismissed without 
consideration of its merits; 
 
(c)     provide for the reference of a complaint, in specified circumstances and with the 
consent of the complainant, to another body with a view to its being determined by that 
body instead of by an ombudsman; 
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(d)     make provision as to the evidence which may be required or admitted, the extent 
to  which  it  should  be  oral  or  written  and  the  consequences  of  a  person's  failure  to 
produce any information or document which he has been required (under section 231 or 
otherwise) to produce; 
 
(e)     allow an ombudsman to fix time limits for any aspect of the proceedings and to 
extend a time limit; 
 
(f)     provide for certain things in relation to the reference, investigation or consideration 
(but not determination) of a complaint to be done by a member of the scheme operator's 
staff instead of by an ombudsman; 
 
(g)     make different provision in relation to different kinds of complaint. 
 
(3)          The  circumstances  specified  under  sub-paragraph  (2)(b)  may  include  the 
following— 
 
(a)     the ombudsman considers the complaint frivolous or vexatious; 
 
(b)          legal  proceedings  have  been  brought  concerning  the  subject-matter  of  the 
complaint and the ombudsman considers that the complaint is best dealt with in those 
proceedings; or 
 
(c)     the ombudsman is satisfied that there are other compelling reasons why it is 
inappropriate for the complaint to be dealt with under the ombudsman scheme. 
 
(4)     If the scheme operator proposes to make any scheme rules it must publish a draft 
of the proposed rules in the way appearing to it to be best calculated to bring them to the 
attention of persons appearing to it to be likely to be affected. 
 
(5)     The draft must be accompanied by a statement that representations about the 
proposals may be made to the scheme operator within a time specified in the statement. 
 
(6)     Before making the proposed scheme rules, the scheme operator must have regard 
to any representations made to it under sub-paragraph (5). 
 
(7)     The consent of the Authority is required before any scheme rules may be made. 
Fees 
 
15 
 
(1)     Scheme rules may require a respondent to pay to the scheme operator such fees 
as may be specified in the rules. 
 
(2)     The rules may, among other things— 
 
(a)     provide for the scheme operator to reduce or waive a fee in a particular case; 
 
(b)     set different fees for different stages of the proceedings on a complaint; 
 
(c)     provide for fees to be refunded in specified circumstances; Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
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(d)     make different provision for different kinds of complaint. 
Enforcement of money awards 
 
16 
 
A  money  award,  including  interest,  which  has  been  registered  in  accordance  with 
scheme rules may— 
 
(a)     if a county court so orders in England and Wales, be recovered by execution 
issued  from  the  county  court  [under  section  85  of  the  County  Courts  Act  1984]  (or 
otherwise) as if it were payable under an order of that court; 
 
(b)          be enforced  in  Northern  Ireland  as a money  judgment under  the  Judgments 
Enforcement (Northern Ireland) Order 1981; 
 
(c)     be enforced in Scotland by the sheriff, as if it were a judgment or order of the 
sheriff and whether or not the sheriff could himself have granted such judgment or order. 
 
[Amendment 
 
Para 13: in sub-para (4) words ―, or a payment service provider within the meaning of the 
Payment Services Regulations 2009,‖ in square brackets inserted by SI 2009/209, reg 
126, Sch 6, Pt 1, para 1(2). 
 
Date in force: 2 March 2009: see SI 2009/209, reg 1(2)(a). 
 
Para 16: in sub-para (a) words ―by execution issued from the county court‖ in italics 
repealed and subsequent words in square brackets substituted by the Tribunals, Courts 
and Enforcement Act 2007, s 62(3), Sch 13, para 134. 
 
Date in force: to be appointed: see the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, s 
148(5).] 
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APPENDIX F: Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 
 
 
S.I. 1999 No 2083 
 
Whereas the Secretary of State is a Minister designated for the purposes of section 2(2) 
of the European Communities Act 1972 in relation to measures relating to consumer 
protection: 
 
Now, the Secretary of State, in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by section 
2(2) of that Act, hereby makes the following Regulations:— 
 
1 Citation and commencement 
 
These  Regulations  may  be  cited  as  the  Unfair  Terms  in  Consumer  Contracts 
Regulations 1999 and shall come into force on 1st October 1999. 
 
2 Revocation 
 
The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994 are hereby revoked. 
 
3 Interpretation 
 
(1)     In these Regulations— 
 
―the Community‖ means the European Community; 
 
―consumer‖ means any natural person who, in contracts covered by these Regulations, 
is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business or profession; 
 
―court‖ in relation to England and Wales and Northern Ireland means a county court or 
the High Court, and in relation to Scotland, the Sheriff or the Court of Session; 
 
―[OFT]‖ means [the Office of Fair Trading]; 
 
―EEA  Agreement‖ means  the  Agreement  on  the  European  Economic  Area  signed at 
Oporto on 2nd May 1992 as adjusted by the protocol signed at Brussels on 17th March 
1993; 
 
―Member State‖ means a State which is a contracting party to the EEA Agreement; 
 
―notified‖ means notified in writing; 
 
―qualifying body‖ means a person specified in Schedule 1; 
 
―seller or supplier‖ means any natural or legal person who, in contracts covered by these 
Regulations, is acting for purposes relating to his trade, business or profession, whether 
publicly owned or privately owned; 
 
―unfair terms‖ means the contractual terms referred to in regulation 5. 
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[(1A)     The references— 
 
(a)     in regulation 4(1) to a seller or a supplier, and 
 
(b)     in regulation 8(1) to a seller or supplier, 
 
include references to a distance supplier and to an intermediary. 
 
(1B)     In paragraph (1A) and regulation 5(6)— 
 
―distance supplier‖ means— 
 
(a)     a supplier under a distance contract within the meaning of the Financial Services 
(Distance Marketing) Regulations 2004, or 
 
(b)          a  supplier  of  unsolicited  financial  services  within  regulation  15  of  those 
Regulations; and 
 
―intermediary‖ has the same meaning as in those Regulations.] 
 
(2)     In the application of these Regulations to Scotland for references to an ―injunction‖ 
or an ―interim injunction‖ there shall be substituted references to an ―interdict‖ or ―interim 
interdict‖ respectively. 
 
[Amendment 
 
Para (1): in definition ―OFT‖ reference to ―OFT‖ in square brackets substituted, for word 
―Director‖ as originally enacted, by virtue of the Enterprise Act 2002, s 2. 
 
Date  in  force:  1  April  2003:  see  SI  2003/766,  art  2,  Schedule;  for  transitional  and 
transitory provisions and savings see the Enterprise Act 2002, s 276, Sch 24, paras 2–6. 
 
Para (1): in definition ―OFT‖ (definition ―Director‖ as originally enacted) words ―the Office 
of Fair Trading‖ in square brackets substituted by virtue of the Enterprise Act 2002, s 2. 
 
Date  in  force:  1  April  2003:  see  SI  2003/766,  art  2,  Schedule;  for  transitional  and 
transitory provisions and savings see the Enterprise Act 2002, s 276, Sch 24, paras 2–6. 
 
Paras (1A), (1B): inserted by SI 2004/2095, reg 24(1), (2). 
 
Date in force: 31 October 2004: see SI 2004/2095, reg 1.] 
 
4 Terms to which these Regulations apply 
 
(1)     These Regulations apply in relation to unfair terms in contracts concluded between 
a seller or a supplier and a consumer. 
 
(2)     These Regulations do not apply to contractual terms which reflect— 
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(a)     mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions (including such provisions under the 
law  of  any  Member  State  or  in  Community  legislation  having  effect  in  the  United 
Kingdom without further enactment); 
 
(b)     the provisions or principles of international conventions to which the Member 
States or the Community are party. 
 
5 Unfair Terms 
 
(1)     A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as 
unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the 
parties'  rights  and  obligations  arising  under  the  contract,  to  the  detriment  of  the 
consumer. 
 
(2)     A term shall always be regarded as not having been individually negotiated where 
it  has  been  drafted  in  advance  and  the  consumer  has  therefore  not  been  able  to 
influence the substance of the term. 
 
(3)     Notwithstanding that a specific term or certain aspects of it in a contract has been 
individually  negotiated,  these  Regulations  shall  apply  to  the  rest  of  a  contract  if  an 
overall assessment of it indicates that it is a pre-formulated standard contract. 
 
(4)          It  shall  be  for  any  seller  or  supplier  who  claims  that  a  term  was  individually 
negotiated to show that it was. 
 
(5)     Schedule 2 to these Regulations contains an indicative and non-exhaustive list of 
the terms which may be regarded as unfair. 
 
[(6)     Any contractual term providing that a consumer bears the burden of proof in 
respect of showing whether a distance supplier or an intermediary complied with any or 
all  of  the  obligations  placed  upon  him  resulting  from  the  Directive  and  any  rule  or 
enactment implementing it shall always be regarded as unfair. 
 
(7)     In paragraph (6)— 
 
―the  Directive‖  means  Directive  2002/65/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 
Council of 23 September 2002 concerning the distance marketing of consumer financial 
services  and  amending  Council  Directive  90/619/EEC  and  Directives  97/7/EC  and 
98/27/EC; and 
 
―rule‖  means  a  rule  made  by  the  Financial  Services  Authority  under  the  Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 or by a designated professional body within the meaning 
of section 326(2) of that Act.] 
 
[Amendment 
 
Paras (6), (7): inserted by SI 2004/2095, reg 24(1), (3). 
 
Date in force: 31 October 2004: see SI 2004/2095, reg 1.] 
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6 Assessment of unfair terms 
 
(1)     Without prejudice to regulation 12, the unfairness of a contractual term shall be 
assessed, taking into account the nature of the goods or services for which the contract 
was  concluded  and  by  referring,  at  the  time  of conclusion  of  the  contract,  to all  the 
circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract and to all the other terms of the 
contract or of another contract on which it is dependent. 
 
(2)     In so far as it is in plain intelligible language, the assessment of fairness of a term 
shall not relate— 
 
(a)     to the definition of the main subject matter of the contract, or 
 
(b)     to the adequacy of the price or remuneration, as against the goods or services 
supplied in exchange. 
 
7 Written contracts 
 
(1)     A seller or supplier shall ensure that any written term of a contract is expressed in 
plain, intelligible language. 
 
(2)     If there is doubt about the meaning of a written term, the interpretation which is 
most favourable to the consumer shall prevail but this rule shall not apply in proceedings 
brought under regulation 12. 
 
8 Effect of unfair term 
 
(1)     An unfair term in a contract concluded with a consumer by a seller or supplier shall 
not be binding on the consumer. 
 
(2)     The contract shall continue to bind the parties if it is capable of continuing in 
existence without the unfair term. 
 
9 Choice of law clauses 
 
These  Regulations  shall  apply  notwithstanding  any  contract  term  which  applies  or 
purports to apply the law of a non-Member State, if the contract has a close connection 
with the territory of the Member States. 
 
10 Complaints—consideration by [OFT] 
 
(1)     It shall be the duty of the [OFT] to consider any complaint made to [it] that any 
contract term drawn up for general use is unfair, unless— 
 
(a)     the complaint appears to the [OFT] to be frivolous or vexatious; or 
 
(b)     a qualifying body has notified the [OFT] that it agrees to consider the complaint. 
 
(2)     The [OFT] shall give reasons for [its] decision to apply or not to apply, as the case 
may be, for an injunction under regulation 12 in relation to any complaint which these 
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(3)     In deciding whether or not to apply for an injunction in respect of a term which the 
[OFT] considers to be unfair, [it] may, if [it] considers it appropriate to do so, have regard 
to any undertakings given to [it] by or on behalf of any person as to the continued use of 
such a term in contracts concluded with consumers. 
[Amendment 
 
Provision heading: reference to ―OFT‖ in square brackets substituted by virtue of the 
Enterprise Act 2002, s 2. 
 
Date  in  force:  1  April  2003:  see  SI  2003/766,  art  2,  Schedule;  for  transitional  and 
transitory provisions and savings see the Enterprise Act 2002, s 276, Sch 24, paras 2–6. 
 
Para (1): reference to ―OFT‖ in square brackets in each place it occurs substituted by 
virtue of the Enterprise Act 2002, s 2. 
 
Date  in  force:  1  April  2003:  see  SI  2003/766,  art  2,  Schedule;  for  transitional  and 
transitory provisions and savings see the Enterprise Act 2002, s 276, Sch 24, paras 2–6. 
 
Para (1): word ―it‖ in square brackets substituted by virtue of the Enterprise Act 2002, s 
2. 
 
Date  in  force:  1  April  2003:  see  SI  2003/766,  art  2,  Schedule;  for  transitional  and 
transitory provisions and savings see the Enterprise Act 2002, s 276, Sch 24, paras 2–6. 
 
Para (2): reference to ―OFT‖ in square brackets substituted by virtue of the Enterprise 
Act 2002, s 2. 
 
Date  in  force:  1  April  2003:  see  SI  2003/766,  art  2,  Schedule;  for  transitional  and 
transitory provisions and savings see the Enterprise Act 2002, s 276, Sch 24, paras 2–6. 
 
Para (2): word ―its‖ in square brackets substituted by virtue of the Enterprise Act 2002, s 
2. 
 
Date  in  force:  1  April  2003:  see  SI  2003/766,  art  2,  Schedule;  for  transitional  and 
transitory provisions and savings see the Enterprise Act 2002, s 276, Sch 24, paras 2–6. 
 
Para (2): word ―it‖ in square brackets substituted by virtue of the Enterprise Act 2002, s 
2. 
 
Date  in  force:  1  April  2003:  see  SI  2003/766,  art  2,  Schedule;  for  transitional  and 
transitory provisions and savings see the Enterprise Act 2002, s 276, Sch 24, paras 2–6. 
 
Para (3): reference to ―OFT‖ in square brackets substituted by virtue of the Enterprise 
Act 2002, s 2. 
 
Date  in  force:  1  April  2003:  see  SI  2003/766,  art  2,  Schedule;  for  transitional  and 
transitory provisions and savings see the Enterprise Act 2002, s 276, Sch 24, paras 2–6. 
 
Para (3): word ―it‖ in square brackets in the first and second places it occurs substituted 
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Date  in  force:  1  April  2003:  see  SI  2003/766,  art  2,  Schedule;  for  transitional  and 
transitory provisions and savings see the Enterprise Act 2002, s 276, Sch 24, paras 2–6. 
 
Para (3): word ―it‖ in square brackets in the final place it occurs substituted by virtue of 
the Enterprise Act 2002, s 2. 
 
Date  in  force:  1  April  2003:  see  SI  2003/766,  art  2,  Schedule;  for  transitional  and 
transitory provisions and savings see the Enterprise Act 2002, s 276, Sch 24, paras 2–
6.] 
 
11 Complaints—consideration by qualifying bodies 
 
(1)     If a qualifying body specified in Part One of Schedule 1 notifies the [OFT] that it 
agrees to consider a complaint that any contract term drawn up for general use is unfair, 
it shall be under a duty to consider that complaint. 
 
(2)     Regulation 10(2) and (3) shall apply to a qualifying body which is under a duty to 
consider a complaint as they apply to the [OFT]. 
 
[Amendment 
 
Para (1): reference to ―OFT‖ in square brackets substituted by virtue of the Enterprise 
Act 2002, s 2. 
 
Date  in  force:  1  April  2003:  see  SI  2003/766,  art  2,  Schedule;  for  transitional  and 
transitory provisions and savings see the Enterprise Act 2002, s 276, Sch 24, paras 2–6. 
 
Para (2): reference to ―OFT‖ in square brackets substituted by virtue of the Enterprise 
Act 2002, s 2. 
 
Date  in  force:  1  April  2003:  see  SI  2003/766,  art  2,  Schedule;  for  transitional  and 
transitory provisions and savings see the Enterprise Act 2002, s 276, Sch 24, paras 2–
6.] 
 
12 Injunctions to prevent continued use of unfair terms 
 
(1)     The [OFT] or, subject to paragraph (2), any qualifying body may apply for an 
injunction (including an interim injunction) against any person appearing to the [OFT] or 
that body to be using, or recommending use of, an unfair term drawn up for general use 
in contracts concluded with consumers. 
 
(2)     A qualifying body may apply for an injunction only where— 
 
(a)     it has notified the [OFT] of its intention to apply at least fourteen days before the 
date on which the application is made, beginning with the date on which the notification 
was given; or 
 
(b)     the [OFT] consents to the application being made within a shorter period. 
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(3)     The court on an application under this regulation may grant an injunction on such 
terms as it thinks fit. 
 
(4)     An injunction may relate not only to use of a particular contract term drawn up for 
general use but to any similar term, or a term having like effect, used or recommended 
for use by any person. 
 
[Amendment 
 
Para (1): reference to ―OFT‖ in square brackets in both places it occurs substituted by 
virtue of the Enterprise Act 2002, s 2. 
 
Date  in  force:  1  April  2003:  see  SI  2003/766,  art  2,  Schedule;  for  transitional  and 
transitory provisions and savings see the Enterprise Act 2002, s 276, Sch 24, paras 2–6. 
 
Para (2): reference to ―OFT‖ in square brackets in both places it occurs substituted by 
virtue of the Enterprise Act 2002, s 2. 
 
Date  in  force:  1  April  2003:  see  SI  2003/766,  art  2,  Schedule;  for  transitional  and 
transitory provisions and savings see the Enterprise Act 2002, s 276, Sch 24, paras 2–
6.] 
 
13  Powers  of  the  [OFT]  and  qualifying  bodies  to  obtain  documents  and 
information 
 
(1)     The [OFT] may exercise the power conferred by this regulation for the purpose 
of— 
 
(a)     facilitating [its] consideration of a complaint that a contract term drawn up for 
general use is unfair; or 
 
(b)     ascertaining whether a person has complied with an undertaking or court order as 
to the continued use, or recommendation for use, of a term in contracts concluded with 
consumers. 
 
(2)     A qualifying body specified in Part One of Schedule 1 may exercise the power 
conferred by this regulation for the purpose of— 
 
(a)         facilitating  its  consideration  of  a  complaint  that  a  contract  term  drawn up  for 
general use is unfair; or 
 
(b)     ascertaining whether a person has complied with— 
 
(i)     an undertaking given to it or to the court following an application by that body, or 
 
(ii)     a court order made on an application by that body, 
 
as to the continued use, or recommendation for use, of a term in contracts concluded 
with consumers. 
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(3)     The [OFT] may require any person to supply to [it], and a qualifying body specified 
in Part One of Schedule 1 may require any person to supply to it— 
 
(a)     a copy of any document which that person has used or recommended for use, at 
the  time  the  notice  referred  to  in  paragraph  (4)  below  is  given,  as  a  pre-formulated 
standard contract in dealings with consumers; 
 
(b)     information about the use, or recommendation for use, by that person of that 
document or any other such document in dealings with consumers. 
 
(4)     The power conferred by this regulation is to be exercised by a notice in writing 
which may— 
 
(a)     specify the way in which and the time within which it is to be complied with; and 
 
(b)     be varied or revoked by a subsequent notice. 
 
(5)     Nothing in this regulation compels a person to supply any document or information 
which he would be entitled to refuse to produce or give in civil proceedings before the 
court. 
 
(6)     If a person makes default in complying with a notice under this regulation, the court 
may, on the application of the [OFT] or of the qualifying body, make such order as the 
court  thinks  fit  for  requiring  the  default  to  be  made  good,  and  any  such  order  may 
provide that all the costs or expenses of and incidental to the application shall be borne 
by the person in default or by any officers of a company or other association who are 
responsible for its default. 
 
[Amendment 
 
Provision heading: reference to ―OFT‖ in square brackets substituted by virtue of the 
Enterprise Act 2002, s 2. 
 
Date  in  force:  1  April  2003:  see  SI  2003/766,  art  2,  Schedule;  for  transitional  and 
transitory provisions and savings see the Enterprise Act 2002, s 276, Sch 24, paras 2–6. 
 
Para (1): reference to ―OFT‖ in square brackets substituted by virtue of the Enterprise 
Act 2002, s 2. 
 
Date  in  force:  1  April  2003:  see  SI  2003/766,  art  2,  Schedule;  for  transitional  and 
transitory provisions and savings see the Enterprise Act 2002, s 276, Sch 24, paras 2–6. 
 
Para  (1):  in  sub-para  (a)  word  ―its‖  in  square  brackets  substituted  by  virtue  of  the 
Enterprise Act 2002, s 2. 
 
Date  in  force:  1  April  2003:  see  SI  2003/766,  art  2,  Schedule;  for  transitional  and 
transitory provisions and savings see the Enterprise Act 2002, s 276, Sch 24, paras 2–6. 
 
Para (3): reference to ―OFT‖ in square brackets substituted by virtue of the Enterprise 
Act 2002, s 2. 
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Date  in  force:  1  April  2003:  see  SI  2003/766,  art  2,  Schedule;  for  transitional  and 
transitory provisions and savings see the Enterprise Act 2002, s 276, Sch 24, paras 2–6. 
 
Para (3): word ―it‖ in square brackets substituted by virtue of the Enterprise Act 2002, s 
2. 
 
Date  in  force:  1  April  2003:  see  SI  2003/766,  art  2,  Schedule;  for  transitional  and 
transitory provisions and savings see the Enterprise Act 2002, s 276, Sch 24, paras 2–6. 
 
Para (6): reference to ―OFT‖ in square brackets substituted by virtue of the Enterprise 
Act 2002, s 2. 
 
Date  in  force:  1  April  2003:  see  SI  2003/766,  art  2,  Schedule;  for  transitional  and 
transitory provisions and savings see the Enterprise Act 2002, s 276, Sch 24, paras 2–
6.] 
 
14 Notification of undertakings and orders to [OFT] 
 
A qualifying body shall notify the [OFT]— 
 
(a)     of any undertaking given to it by or on behalf of any person as to the continued use 
of a term which that body considers to be unfair in contracts concluded with consumers; 
 
(b)     of the outcome of any application made by it under regulation 12, and of the terms 
of any undertaking given to, or order made by, the court; 
 
(c)     of the outcome of any application made by it to enforce a previous order of the 
court. 
 
[Amendment 
 
Provision heading: reference to ―OFT‖ in square brackets substituted by virtue of the 
Enterprise Act 2002, s 2. 
 
Date  in  force:  1  April  2003:  see  SI  2003/766,  art  2,  Schedule;  for  transitional  and 
transitory provisions and savings see the Enterprise Act 2002, s 276, Sch 24, paras 2–6. 
 
Reference to ―OFT‖ in square brackets substituted by virtue of the Enterprise Act 2002, s 
2. 
 
Date  in  force:  1  April  2003:  see  SI  2003/766,  art  2,  Schedule;  for  transitional  and 
transitory provisions and savings see the Enterprise Act 2002, s 276, Sch 24, paras 2–
6.] 
 
15 Publication, information and advice 
 
(1)          The  [OFT]  shall  arrange  for  the  publication  in  such  form and manner as  [it] 
considers appropriate, of— 
 
(a)     details of any undertaking or order notified to [it] under regulation 14; 
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(b)     details of any undertaking given to [it] by or on behalf of any person as to the 
continued use of a term which the [OFT] considers to be unfair in contracts concluded 
with consumers; 
 
(c)     details of any application made by [it] under regulation 12, and of the terms of any 
undertaking given to, or order made by, the court; 
 
(d)     details of any application made by the [OFT] to enforce a previous order of the 
court. 
 
(2)     The [OFT] shall inform any person on request whether a particular term to which 
these Regulations apply has been— 
 
(a)     the subject of an undertaking given to the [OFT] or notified to [it] by a qualifying 
body; or 
 
(b)     the subject of an order of the court made upon application by [it] or notified to [it] by 
a qualifying body; 
 
and shall give that person details of the undertaking or a copy of the order, as the case 
may  be,  together  with  a  copy  of  any  amendments  which  the  person  giving  the 
undertaking has agreed to make to the term in question. 
 
(3)     The [OFT] may arrange for the dissemination in such form and manner as [it] 
considers appropriate of such information and advice concerning the operation of these 
Regulations as may appear to [it] to be expedient to give to the public and to all persons 
likely to be affected by these Regulations. 
 
[Amendment 
 
Para (1): reference to ―OFT‖ in square brackets in each place it occurs substituted by 
virtue of the Enterprise Act 2002, s 2. 
 
Date  in  force:  1  April  2003:  see  SI  2003/766,  art  2,  Schedule;  for  transitional  and 
transitory provisions and savings see the Enterprise Act 2002, s 276, Sch 24, paras 2–6. 
 
Para (1): word ―it‖ in square brackets in the first place it occurs substituted by virtue of 
the Enterprise Act 2002, s 2. 
 
Date  in  force:  1  April  2003:  see  SI  2003/766,  art  2,  Schedule;  for  transitional  and 
transitory provisions and savings see the Enterprise Act 2002, s 276, Sch 24, paras 2–6. 
 
Para  (1):  word  ―it‖  in  square  brackets  in  the  second,  third  and  final  places  it  occurs 
substituted by virtue of the Enterprise Act 2002, s 2. 
 
Date  in  force:  1  April  2003:  see  SI  2003/766,  art  2,  Schedule;  for  transitional  and 
transitory provisions and savings see the Enterprise Act 2002, s 276, Sch 24, paras 2–6. 
 
Para (2): reference to ―OFT‖ in square brackets in both places it occurs substituted by 
virtue of the Enterprise Act 2002, s 2. 
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Date  in  force:  1  April  2003:  see  SI  2003/766,  art  2,  Schedule;  for  transitional  and 
transitory provisions and savings see the Enterprise Act 2002, s 276, Sch 24, paras 2–6. 
 
Para (2): word ―it‖ in square brackets in each place it occurs substituted by virtue of the 
Enterprise Act 2002, s 2. 
 
Date  in  force:  1  April  2003:  see  SI  2003/766,  art  2,  Schedule;  for  transitional  and 
transitory provisions and savings see the Enterprise Act 2002, s 276, Sch 24, paras 2–6. 
 
Para (3): reference to ―OFT‖ in square brackets substituted by virtue of the Enterprise 
Act 2002, s 2. 
 
Date  in  force:  1  April  2003:  see  SI  2003/766,  art  2,  Schedule;  for  transitional  and 
transitory provisions and savings see the Enterprise Act 2002, s 276, Sch 24, paras 2–6. 
 
Para (3): word ―it‖ in square brackets in the first place it occurs substituted by virtue of 
the Enterprise Act 2002, s 2. 
 
Date  in  force:  1  April  2003:  see  SI  2003/766,  art  2,  Schedule;  for  transitional  and 
transitory provisions and savings see the Enterprise Act 2002, s 276, Sch 24, paras 2–6. 
 
Para (3): word ―it‖ in square brackets in the final place it occurs substituted by virtue of 
the Enterprise Act 2002, s 2. 
 
Date  in  force:  1  April  2003:  see  SI  2003/766,  art  2,  Schedule;  for  transitional  and 
transitory provisions and savings see the Enterprise Act 2002, s 276, Sch 24, paras 2–
6.] 
 
[16 The functions of the Financial Services Authority] 
 
[The  functions  of  the  Financial  Services  Authority  under  these  Regulations  shall  be 
treated as functions of the Financial Services Authority under the [Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000].] 
 
[Amendment 
 
Inserted by SI 2001/1186, reg 2(a). 
 
Date in force: 1 May 2001: see SI 2001/1186, reg 1. 
 
Words ―Financial Services and Markets Act 2000‖ in square brackets substituted by SI 
2001/3649, art 583. 
 
Date in force: 1 December 2001: see SI 2001/3649, art 1.] 
 
SCHEDULE 1: Qualifying Bodies 
 
Regulation 3 
 
Part One 
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[1 The Information Commissioner. 
 
2 The Gas and Electricity Markets Authority. 
 
3 The Director General of Electricity Supply for Northern Ireland. 
 
4 The Director General of Gas for Northern Ireland. 
 
5 [The Office of Communications]. 
 
6 [The Water Services Regulation Authority]. 
 
7 [The Office of Rail Regulation]. 
 
8 Every weights and measures authority in Great Britain. 
 
9 The Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment in Northern Ireland. 
 
10 The Financial Services Authority.] 
 
[Amendment 
 
Substituted by SI 2001/1186, reg 2(b). 
 
Date in force: 1 May 2001: see SI 2001/1186, reg 1. 
 
Entry 5: words ―The Office of Communications‖ in square brackets substituted by SI 
2003/3182, art 2. 
 
Date in force: 29 December 2003: see SI 2003/3182, art 1. 
 
Entry 6: words ―The Water Services Regulation Authority‖ in square brackets substituted 
by SI 2006/523, reg 2. 
 
Date in force: 1 April 2006: see SI 2006/523, reg 1(2); for transitional provisions see reg 
3 thereof. 
 
Entry 7: words ―The Office of Rail Regulation‖ in square brackets substituted by virtue of 
the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003, s 16(4), (5), Sch 3, para 4. 
 
Date in force: 5 July 2004: see SI 2004/827, art 4(b), (h); for savings see the Railways 
and Transport Safety Act 2003, s 16, Sch 3. 
See Further 
 
Reference to the ―Director General of Water Services‖ and other related expressions 
revoked by virtue of the Water Act 2003, s 34(3).] 
 
Part Two 
 
11     Consumers' Association 
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SCHEDULE  2  Indicative  and  Non-Exhaustive  List  of  Terms  which  may  be 
Regarded as Unfair 
 
Regulation 5(5) 
 
1 
 
Terms which have the object or effect of— 
 
(a)     excluding or limiting the legal liability of a seller or supplier in the event of the death 
of a consumer or personal injury to the latter resulting from an act or omission of that 
seller or supplier; 
 
(b)     inappropriately excluding or limiting the legal rights of the consumer vis-à-vis the 
seller or supplier or another party in the event of total or partial non-performance or 
inadequate performance by the seller or supplier of any of the contractual obligations, 
including the option of offsetting a debt owed to the seller or supplier against any claim 
which the consumer may have against him; 
 
(c)     making an agreement binding on the consumer whereas provision of services by 
the seller or supplier is subject to a condition whose realisation depends on his own will 
alone; 
 
(d)     permitting the seller or supplier to retain sums paid by the consumer where the 
latter decides not to conclude or perform the contract, without providing for the consumer 
to receive compensation of an equivalent amount from the seller or supplier where the 
latter is the party cancelling the contract; 
 
(e)     requiring any consumer who fails to fulfil his obligation to pay a disproportionately 
high sum in compensation; 
 
(f)     authorising the seller or supplier to dissolve the contract on a discretionary basis 
where  the  same  facility  is  not  granted  to  the  consumer,  or  permitting  the  seller  or 
supplier to retain the sums paid for services not yet supplied by him where it is the seller 
or supplier himself who dissolves the contract; 
 
(g)     enabling the seller or supplier to terminate a contract of indeterminate duration 
without reasonable notice except where there are serious grounds for doing so; 
 
(h)     automatically extending a contract of fixed duration where the consumer does not 
indicate otherwise, when the deadline fixed for the consumer to express his desire not to 
extend the contract is unreasonably early; 
 
(i)     irrevocably binding the consumer to terms with which he had no real opportunity of 
becoming acquainted before the conclusion of the contract; 
 
(j)     enabling the seller or supplier to alter the terms of the contract unilaterally without a 
valid reason which is specified in the contract; 
 
(k)      enabling the seller or supplier to alter unilaterally  without a valid reason any 
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(l)     providing for the price of goods to be determined at the time of delivery or allowing 
a seller of goods or supplier of services to increase their price without in both cases 
giving the consumer the corresponding right to cancel the contract if the final price is too 
high in relation to the price agreed when the contract was concluded; 
 
(m)     giving the seller or supplier the right to determine whether the goods or services 
supplied are in conformity with the contract, or giving him the exclusive right to interpret 
any term of the contract; 
 
(n)     limiting the seller's or supplier's obligation to respect commitments undertaken by 
his agents or making his commitments subject to compliance with a particular formality; 
 
(o)     obliging the consumer to fulfil all his obligations where the seller or supplier does 
not perform his; 
 
(p)     giving the seller or supplier the possibility of transferring his rights and obligations 
under the contract, where this may serve to reduce the guarantees for the consumer, 
without the latter's agreement; 
 
(q)     excluding or hindering the consumer's right to take legal action or exercise any 
other legal remedy, particularly by requiring the consumer to take disputes exclusively to 
arbitration not covered by legal provisions, unduly restricting the evidence available to 
him or imposing on him a burden of proof which, according to the applicable law, should 
lie with another party to the contract. 
 
2 
 
Scope of paragraphs 1(g), (j) and (l) 
 
(a)     Paragraph 1(g) is without hindrance to terms by which a supplier of financial 
services reserves the right to terminate unilaterally a contract of indeterminate duration 
without notice where there is a valid reason, provided that the supplier is required to 
inform the other contracting party or parties thereof immediately. 
 
(b)     Paragraph 1(j) is without hindrance to terms under which a supplier of financial 
services reserves the right to alter the rate of interest payable by the consumer or due to 
the latter, or the amount of other charges for financial services without notice where 
there  is  a  valid  reason,  provided  that  the  supplier  is  required  to  inform  the  other 
contracting party or parties thereof at the earliest opportunity and that the latter are free 
to dissolve the contract immediately. 
 
Paragraph  1(j)  is  also  without  hindrance  to  terms  under  which  a  seller  or  supplier 
reserves  the  right  to  alter  unilaterally  the  conditions  of  a  contract  of  indeterminate 
duration, provided that he is required to inform the consumer with reasonable notice and 
that the consumer is free to dissolve the contract. 
 
(c)     Paragraphs 1(g), (j) and (l) do not apply to: 
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—transactions  in  transferable  securities,  financial  instruments  and  other  products  or 
services where the price is linked to fluctuations in a stock exchange quotation or index 
or a financial market rate that the seller or supplier does not control; 
 
—contracts  for  the  purchase  or  sale  of  foreign  currency,  traveller's  cheques  or 
international money orders denominated in foreign currency. 
 
(d)     Paragraph 1(1) is without hindrance to price indexation clauses, where lawful, 
provided that the method by which prices vary is explicitly described. 
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APPENDIX G: Marine Insurance Act 1906 (relevant extracts) 
 
s. 17 Insurance is uberrimae fidei 
 
A contract of marine insurance is a contract based upon the utmost good faith, and, if the 
utmost good faith be not observed by either party, the contract may be avoided by the 
other party. 
 
s. 18 Disclosure by assured 
 
(1)     Subject to the provisions of this section, the assured must disclose to the insurer, 
before the contract is concluded, every material circumstance which is known  to the 
assured, and the assured is deemed to know every circumstance which, in the ordinary 
course  of  business,  ought  to  be  known  by  him.  If  the  assured  fails  to  make  such 
disclosure, the insurer may avoid the contract. 
 
(2)     Every circumstance is material which would influence the judgment of a prudent 
insurer in fixing the premium, or determining whether he will take the risk. 
 
(3)     In the absence of inquiry the following circumstances need not be disclosed, 
namely:— 
 
(a)     Any circumstance which diminishes the risk; 
 
(b)     Any circumstance which is known or presumed to be known to the insurer. The 
insurer is presumed to know matters of common notoriety or knowledge, and matters 
which an insurer in the ordinary course of his business, as such, ought to know; 
 
(c)     Any circumstance as to which information is waived by the insurer; 
 
(d)     Any circumstance which it is superfluous to disclose by reason of any express or 
implied warranty. 
 
(4)     Whether any particular circumstance, which is not disclosed, be material or not is, 
in each case, a question of fact. 
 
(5)     The term ―circumstance‖ includes any communication made to, or information 
received by, the assured. 
 
s. 20 Representations pending negotiation of contract 
 
(1)     Every material representation made by the assured or his agent to the insurer 
during the negotiations for the contract, and before the contract is concluded, must be 
true. If it be untrue the insurer may avoid the contract. 
 
(2)     A representation is material which would influence the judgment of a prudent 
insurer in fixing the premium, or determining whether he will take the risk. 
 
(3)     A representation may be either a representation as to a matter of fact, or as to a 
matter of expectation or belief. 
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(4)     A representation as to matter of fact is true, if it be substantially correct, that is to 
say, if the difference between what is represented and what is actually correct would not 
be considered material by a prudent insurer. 
 
(5)     A representation as to a matter of expectation or belief is true if it be made in good 
faith. 
 
(6)     A representation may be withdrawn or corrected before the contract is concluded. 
 
(7)     Whether a particular representation be material or not is, in each case, a question 
of fact. 
 
s. 32 Double insurance 
 
(1)     Where two or more policies are effected by or on behalf of the assured on the 
same  adventure  and  interest  or  any  part  thereof,  and  the  sums  insured  exceed  the 
indemnity  allowed  by  this  Act,  the  assured  is  said  to  be  over-insured  by  double 
insurance. 
 
(2)     Where the assured is over-insured by double insurance— 
 
(a)     The assured, unless the policy otherwise provides, may claim payment from the 
insurers in such order as he may think fit, provided that he is not entitled to receive any 
sum in excess of the indemnity allowed by this Act; 
 
(b)     Where the policy under which the assured claims is a valued policy, the assured 
must give credit as against the valuation for any sum received by him under any other 
policy without regard to the actual value of the subject-matter insured; 
 
(c)     Where the policy under which the assured claims is an unvalued policy he must 
give credit, as against the full insurable value, for any sum received by him under any 
other policy; 
 
(d)     Where the assured receives any sum in excess of the indemnity allowed by this 
Act, he is deemed to hold such sum in trust for the insurers, according to their right of 
contribution among themselves. 
 
s. 33 Nature of warranty 
 
(1)     A warranty, in the following sections relating to warranties, means a promissory 
warranty, that is to say, a warranty by which the assured undertakes that some particular 
thing shall or shall not be done, or that some condition shall be fulfilled, or whereby he 
affirms or negatives the existence of a particular state of facts. 
 
(2)     A warranty may be express or implied. 
 
(3)     A warranty, as above defined, is a condition which must be exactly complied with, 
whether it be material to the risk or not. If it be not so complied with, then, subject to any 
express provision in the policy, the insurer is discharged from liability as from the date of 
the breach of warranty, but without prejudice to any liability incurred by him before that 
date. Judith Summer PhD April 2009 
Appendix G: MIA 1906  286 
 
s. 34 When breach of warranty excused 
 
(1)     Non-compliance with a warranty is excused when, by reason of a change of 
circumstances,  the  warranty  ceases  to  be  applicable  to  the  circumstances  of  the 
contract, or when compliance with the warranty is rendered unlawful by any subsequent 
law. 
 
(2)     Where a warranty is broken, the assured cannot avail himself of the defence that 
the breach has been remedied, and the warranty complied with, before loss. 
 
(3)     A breach of warranty may be waived by the insurer. 
 
s. 55 Included and excluded losses 
 
(1)     Subject to the provisions of this Act, and unless the policy otherwise provides, the 
insurer is liable for any loss proximately caused by a peril insured against, but, subject 
as aforesaid, he is not liable for any loss which is not proximately caused by a peril 
insured against. 
 
(2)     In particular,— 
 
(a)     The insurer is not liable for any loss attributable to the wilful misconduct of the 
assured, but, unless the policy otherwise provides, he is liable for any loss proximately 
caused by a peril insured against, even though the loss would not have happened but for 
the misconduct or negligence of the master or crew; 
 
(b)     Unless the policy otherwise provides, the insurer on ship or goods is not liable for 
any loss proximately caused by delay, although the delay be caused by a peril insured 
against; 
 
(c)     Unless the policy otherwise provides, the insurer is not liable for ordinary wear and 
tear,  ordinary  leakage  and  breakage,  inherent  vice  or  nature  of  the  subject-matter 
insured,  or  for  any  loss  proximately  caused  by  rats  or  vermin,  or  for  any  injury  to 
machinery not proximately caused by maritime perils. 
 
s. 67 Extent of liability of insurer for loss 
 
(1)     The sum which the assured can recover in respect of a loss on a policy by which 
he is insured, in the case of an unvalued policy to the full extent of the insurable value, 
or, in the case of a valued policy to the full extent of the value fixed by the policy, is 
called the measure of indemnity. 
 
(2)     Where there is a loss recoverable under the policy, the insurer, or each insurer if 
there be more than one, is liable for such proportion of the measure of indemnity as the 
amount of his subscription bears to the value fixed by the policy in the case of a valued 
policy, or to the insurable value in the case of an unvalued policy. 
 
s. 84 Return for failure of consideration 
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(1)     Where the consideration for the payment of the premium totally fails, and there has 
been  no  fraud  or  illegality  on  the part of  the assured  or  his  agents,  the premium  is 
thereupon returnable to the assured. 
 
(2)     Where the consideration for the payment of the premium is apportionable and 
there is a total failure of any apportionable part of the consideration, a proportionate part 
of the premium is, under the like conditions, thereupon returnable to the assured. 
 
(3)     In particular— 
 
(a)     Where the policy is void, or is avoided by the insurer as from the commencement 
of the risk, the premium is returnable, provided that there has been no fraud or illegality 
on the part of the assured; but if the risk is not apportionable, and has once attached, the 
premium is not returnable; 
 
(b)     Where the subject-matter insured, or part thereof, has never been imperilled, the 
premium, or, as the case may be, a proportionate part thereof, is returnable: 
 
Provided  that  where  the  subject-matter  has  been  insured  ―lost  or  not  lost‖  and  has 
arrived  in  safety  at  the  time  when  the  contract  is  concluded,  the  premium  is  not 
returnable unless, at such time, the insurer knew of the safe arrival. 
 
(c)     Where the assured has no insurable interest throughout the currency of the risk, 
the premium is returnable, provided that this rule does not apply to a policy effected by 
way of gaming or wagering; 
 
(d)          Where  the  assured  has  a  defeasible  interest  which  is  terminated  during  the 
currency of the risk, the premium is not returnable; 
 
(e)     Where the assured has over-insured under an unvalued policy, a proportionate 
part of the premium is returnable; 
 
(f)     Subject to the foregoing provisions, where the assured has over-insured by double 
insurance, a proportionate part of the several premiums is returnable: 
 
Provided that, if the policies are effected at different times, and any earlier policy has at 
any time borne the entire risk, or if a claim has been paid on the policy in respect of the 
full sum insured thereby, no premium is returnable in respect of that policy, and when the 
double insurance is effected knowingly by the assured no premium is returnable. 
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1.  BACKGROUND 
 
1.1  History and Formation of the FOS 
 
In 1981 the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau was founded by three insurers to resolve 
complaints against insurers outside of the court system, to be dealt with independently, 
privately and without charge to the complainant.  It was a voluntary, industry, non-
governmental initiative, backed by the National Consumer Council.  At the time, there 
was no regulator for the conduct of investment or insurance business, and most other 
insurers joined too.  Other ombudsman schemes for complaints against other types of 
institution followed.  In 2000, a single financial regulator, the FSA, was established and 
these separate ombudsman schemes merged to become the FOS.  So the FOS 
replaced the IOB, Office of the Banking Ombudsman, Office of the Building Societies 
Ombudsman, Office of the Investment Ombudsman, Personal Investment Authority 
Ombudsman Bureau, Personal Insurance Arbitration Service and the Securities and 
Futures Authority Complaints Bureau.   
 
At first the FOS followed the rules of the scheme to which the complaint would have 
related before the FOS existed.  Then from 1 December 2001, when the majority of the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (“FSMA”) came into force, the FOS began 
dealing with all new complaints under one set of new rules, the Dispute Resolution: 
Complaints (“DISP”) section of the FSA Handbook of Rules and Guidance.
1  DISP 1 
provides rules and guidance for firms‟ internal handling of complaints.   
 
The FOS treats insurance claims similarly to the IOB, with its “fair and reasonable” 
approach in a private and confidential dispute resolution scheme, paid for by firms and 
free for consumers.  However, the jurisdiction of the FOS is wider, as it can consider 
business interruption policies
2 and complaints from small businesses, charities, trustees 
and residents‟ associations.  
 
                                                         
1 Accessed via the FSA’s website at www.fsa.gov.uk .  Updated DISP 1 came into force on 1/11/07 (with 
minor amendments on 6/07/08).  Updated DISP 2 (FOS jurisdiction) and DISP 3 (FOS procedures) came 
into force on 6/04/08.  Under DISP TP1-1, the version of DISP to apply is that which applied at the date on 
which the firm received the complaint.  
2 eg Case Study 74/08 December 2008/January 2009 Judith Summer: PhD April 2009  2 
Adjudicators and ombudsmen are recruited from a range of backgrounds and tend to 
have financial services, complaints-handling, compliance or legal experience or 
qualifications.  Legal qualifications are not required.  The FOS staffing levels show its 
size; it employed about 1,000 people in 2006
3 and numbers are increasing.  It is one of 
the oldest, biggest and busiest ombudsman systems in the world.
4 
 
1.2  Aims and values 
 
The FSMA established the FOS to help resolve individual disputes between consumers 
and financial firms, “quickly and with minimum formality by an independent person.”
5  
Under s 228(2) FSMA, the Ombudsman must make decisions which are “fair and 
reasonable in all the circumstances of the case.”  It deals with thousands of disputes 
every week.
6  As an independent organisation, it is not a regulator, trade body, watchdog 
or consumer champion.   
 
In order to be fair and reasonable, the FOS aims to be accessible
7 to everyone, and will 
try to communicate in the format or language required.
8  It will approach complaints in a 
practical and business-like manner, looking at the facts, rather than how the case is 
presented, and give clear reasons for its decisions.  It considers that no-one should 
therefore need legal or other professional help to bring a complaint or understand a 
decision, so it will be unusual for the FOS to order reimbursement of any costs incurred 
in obtaining such advice. 
 
Where a consumer might be disadvantaged by having to wait, perhaps financially or 
medically, the FOS will consider if it would be fair to prioritise the complaint.  However, 
                                                         
3 FOS Corporate Plan & 2006/07 Budget 
4 cf FIN-NET organisations (below), and ombudsmen systems in  Australia, New Zealand and Hong Kong. 
5 s 225(1) FSMA 
6 The FOS Corporate Plan and 2006/7 Budget forecast 13,500 new insurance complaints would be received 
by adjudicators respectively in 2006/7 and 2007/8 out of a total 105,000 processed complaints in 2006/7 
and 87,500 in 2007/8. 
7 cf The Hunt Review 9/4/08 “Opening Up, Reaching Out and Aiming High,” an independent review of 
FOS accessibility and transparency.  Although it praises the FOS’ work, management and development 
over the years, it suggests wide-ranging and radical reforms to further FOS accessibility and transparency.  
These include a far-reaching advertising campaign, publication of complaints data relating to firms and 
publication of what Lord Hunt calls FOSBOOK – a handbook setting out current FOS thinking on all 
scenarios and issues on which it bases its decisions.  The FOS response and plan to implement some of the 
suggestions are on its website. 
8 The FOS provided information and handled enquiries in 20 languages over 05/06 (Annual Review 05/06). Judith Summer: PhD April 2009  3 
the identity of the parties and any press involvement will make no difference to the 
position.  
 
The FOS service is an informal, private and relatively quick
9 and flexible alternative to 
the courts, and it does not have the courts‟ formal procedures, hearings or cross-
examinations.  It is geared to the requirements of ordinary people who have disputes 
with organisations which they might otherwise fear as unassailable, well-resourced 
powerhouses.  All complaints are handled in confidence and will not be discussed in 
public, other than in a summarised and anonymised form in FOS publications.  FOS 
adjudicators will generally try mediation or conciliation, often telephoning the respective 
parties to speak informally and suggest a way forward.  Only if this is unsuccessful and 
the parties do not accept their views will all the papers be considered further and a 
formal Ombudsman decision be taken.   
 
1.3  Strict law may not be applied 
 
One of the main differences between the FOS and a court decision is that the FOS does 
not have to apply the law and often does not.  The FOS decides each case in 
accordance with what it considers to be fair and reasonable in the circumstances of that 
particular case.
 10  In determining a complaint, the ombudsman must consider the 
matters set out in DISP 3.6.4R, which include the relevant law, regulations, regulators‟ 
rules, guidance and standards, relevant codes of practice and where appropriate, what 
the Ombudsman considers to be good industry practice at the relevant time.  Even 
though many of the ABI and GISC Codes of Practice relating to how insurance is sold 
have been superseded by the introduction of the FSA‟s Insurance: Conduct of Business 
sourcebook (“ICOB”)
11 on 14/01/05, itself superseded by “ICOBS” on 06/01/08, the FOS 
still sees the former codes as evidencing good market practice, and so may still have 
regard to them.   
                                                         
9 74% of all complaints excluding mortgage endowment complaints were resolved within 6 months, and 
89% within one year, with a total of 120,000 resolved during 05/06. (FOS Annual Review 05/06)  In 04/05 
the percentages were approximately the same, but there were a third fewer in total resolved. 
10 s. 228 (2) FSMA; DISP 3.6.1R and 3.6.2G 
11 ICOB and ICOBS (both in the FSA Handbook) contain the requirements for marketing, sales, product 
literature and claims handling of non-investment insurance.  They apply to general insurance contracts eg 
motor or household, and pure protection contracts eg critical illness and income protection, but not long-
term care insurance which is subject to the FSA’s investment business rules.  Reinsurance contracts are 
exempt from ICOB/S.  Judith Summer: PhD April 2009  4 
 
Although there is no specific requirement in the DISP rules for the FOS to consider FSA 
approved “industry guidance
12” when it deals with disputes, it is expected that this may 
help the FOS establish what was thought to be good industry practice at the relevant 
time.  The FOS may also use its own knowledge of industry practice at the relevant 
period, as long as it is careful to guard against the use of hindsight.
13  
 
The High Court has expressly supported the right of the ombudsman to make an award 
which differs from that which a court would make, as long as it is fair and reasonable in 
all the circumstances of the case and provided he has considered the law and all the 
other matters set out in what was then DISP 3.8.1 R (2), but which is now in the updated 
version DISP 3.6.4R.
14 
 
Where the evidence is contradictory, the FOS will decide what it thinks is most likely to 
have happened, on the balance of probability.  Although the FOS aims to be consistent 
in the way it deals with particular types of complaint, it is not bound by its own decisions. 
 
By comparison, most EEA countries which have ombudsman systems in place take a 
more legalistic attitude.  Even where there may be leeway and they are not obliged to 
apply the law strictly, they do not seem to go as far as the FOS which actually makes its 
own policy in areas where it considers the law unfair, for instance in relation to non-
disclosure and warranties.
15  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
12 cf FSA Policy Statement 07/16 published in September 2007 
13 R (on the application of Keith Williams) v FOS [2008] EWHC 2142 (Admin) 
14 R (on the application of IFG Financial Services Ltd) v Financial Ombudsman Services Ltd (1) and Mrs 
Jenkins (Interested Parties) [2005] EWHC 1153 (Admin) 
15 Eg, the Australian FOS does not have to follow law strictly, (paras 11.15-11.16 of its Terms of 
Reference), but it still applies the law on material non-disclosure, including those parts that are harsh on the 
assured.  Rather than applying its own approaches instead of law, it publishes advice for consumers 
regarding certain common types of policy like travel insurance, telling them to read the policy and 
highlighting possible pitfalls and what might not be covered. Judith Summer: PhD April 2009  5 
1.4  Funding 
 
The FOS is funded both by a general levy from every firm covered by the FSA 
(calculated each year according to a firm‟s volume of business)
16, and also by individual 
case fees billed at the end of the month in which the complaint is closed.  As from 1 April 
2008, firms that pay the annual levy are not charged for the first three complaints the 
FOS receives about them in any year
17, but thereafter a case fee is charged for each 
complaint against them,
18 whatever the outcome.  It is assumed that the case fee will be 
less than the legal and management costs to the firm of a policyholder taking the matter 
to court instead.
19   
 
Complainants may not pay a fee or costs either to the FOS or to a firm
20.  If a firm 
threatens to penalise a customer for bringing a complaint to the FOS, or puts pressure 
on him not to complain, then the FOS may report it to the FSA and the FSA will be 
entitled to take disciplinary action against it for having failed to meet the FSA‟s 
“Principles for Businesses”
21.  The FOS may also award compensation for distress and 
inconvenience for such behaviour.
22 
 
Unfortunately, financial risk is one of the unavoidable flaws of the judicial system, so 
perhaps it is right that it is not a factor for the complainant in a system set up as an 
effective alternative.  However, it means that a minority of vexatious complainants can 
time and again pursue unreasonable complaints costing them nothing, but costing 
insurers in terms of management time, possible solicitors‟ fees and FOS case fees.  And 
                                                         
16 In 2003/4, the levy ranged from less than £100 for a small financial adviser to £300,000 for a large 
insurance company. 
17 From 01/04/04 to 31/03/08, firms paying an annual levy were not charged for the first two complaints. 
18 £360 in 2006/7 for a standard case fee, or £475 for a special case fee (see FSA Handbook for definitions).  
From 01/04/08 the rates were £450 for both standard and special case fees.  The 2009/10 Corporate Plan 
and Budget envisages an increase to £500. 
19 FOS Annual Review 05/06 notes that 81.5% of all firms covered by the FOS had no complaint referred 
to the FOS during the year, 8% had one complaint and 3% had two complaints, so only 7% of firms 
covered by the FOS actually paid a case fee (compared to 5.5% in the previous year).  Also 15 firms alone 
accounted for half all the case fees in 2003/4 (Walter Merricks’ Speech 12 and 28 October 2004) and only 
12 firms accounted for half all the case fees in 2005/6 (FOS Annual Review 05/06). 
20 s 230(3) FSMA 
21 These are Principle 6 (A firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly) 
and Principle 8 (A firm must manage conflicts of interest fairly, both between itself and its customers and 
between a customer and another client). 
22 cf O.N. April 2004 Judith Summer: PhD April 2009  6 
if the value of the claim is less than the cost of the FOS referral, it will be economic for 
insurers to pay even unmeritorious claims. 
 
The government has refused to allow the FOS to make consumers pay towards the 
scheme, despite s 230(4) FSMA which allows the scheme operator to provide costs 
rules with the approval of the FSA for “the making of an award against the complainant 
in favour of the scheme operator…if in the opinion of the ombudsman – (a) the 
complainant‟s conduct was improper or unreasonable or (b) the complainant was 
responsible for an unreasonable delay.”  Although some consider that payment to the 
FOS would be a deterrent for persistent or obsessive complainants, Chief Ombudsman 
Walter Merricks has commented that he thinks that they would be happy to pay and 
would demand commensurate service.
23  In some other jurisdictions, a nominal case fee 
of the equivalent of £20-£40 is charged to the complainant which is recoverable if the 
complaint is upheld in full or part.
24.  It is unclear what is the effect of such charges and 
whether there is an overall profit for the complaints service in question bearing in mind 
the administration involved, but this shows that a fee system for complainants is 
workable.  At the very least, the FOS should be able to make some sort of award against 
vexatious complainants, or those who do not co-operate with the FOS and/or insurers 
and those who have committed a fraud. 
 
The FOS will not charge a case fee where it is readily apparent that: 
 
1.  the firm has not yet had a chance to deal with the complaint;  
 
2.  the complainant is not an “eligible complainant” under DISP 2.7.3R;  
 
3.  the complaint is out of its jurisdiction; or  
 
4.  the complaint should be dismissed without consideration of its merits under DISP 
3.3.4R 
 
                                                         
23 Speech 12 and 28 October 2004 
24 eg in 2009, complaints to the Danish Insurance Complaints Board (DKK150), the Netherlands Financial 
Services Ombudsman (EUR50) and the Icelandic Insurance Complaints Committee (ISK6000). Judith Summer: PhD April 2009  7 
A fee will be charged if the FOS has to investigate matters before it can establish that 
any of the reasons above exist for not considering the complaint, and this practice was 
supported by the Court of Appeal in FOS v Heather Moor & Edgecomb Ltd
25. 
 
1.5  Insurers’ complaints handling obligations 
 
DISP 1 of the FSA‟s Handbook sets out how firms should handle complaints internally.  
The FOS cannot interpret or issue guidance in relation to these rules, which include the 
following:  a firm may display a notice in branches or sales offices showing that it is 
covered by the FOS, although under the updated DISP of November 2007, this is no 
longer a requirement;
26  firms may also use the FOS logo or put a statement on any 
relevant marketing material or correspondence
27 to show that they are covered by the 
FOS;
28 firms have 8 weeks in which to deal with the complaint. 
 
1.6  Time limits for bringing a complaint 
 
1.6.1  The 8 week rule 
 
Once a firm has received a complaint anywhere within its organisation, it has 8 weeks in 
which to exhaust its own internal complaints procedure and send the complainant a final 
response letter or an explanation as to why it cannot make a final response yet, 
informing the complainant that he may now refer the complaint to the FOS.  The FOS 
will not consider a complaint until either there is a final response letter or the 8 weeks 
has expired
29, and will forward to the firm any complaint it receives which has not been 
through this process.  Firms resolve most complaints themselves, generally all but 
approximately 2-5% of non-mortgage endowment complaints.
30.  DISP 1.6 sets out a 
more detailed timetable of what should be done, and by when, within this 8 weeks.   
 
                                                         
25 [2008] EWCA Civ 643 
26 DISP 1.2.5G 
27 DISP 1.2.5G 
28 cf O.N. April 2004 and FOS Briefing Note – “Telling your customers about the FOS.” 
29 DISP 2.8.1R 
30 Figures from speech by Walter Merricks 12 and 28 October 2004. Judith Summer: PhD April 2009  8 
The final response letter should include:
31 
 
1.  a summary of the complaint; 
 
2.  a summary of the outcome of the firm‟s investigation; 
 
3.  whether the firm acknowledges any fault on its part; 
 
4.  details of any offer the firm has made to settle the complaint; 
 
5.  how long any offer to settle the complaint will remain open; 
 
6.  why (if) it thinks the complaint may be outside the FOS jurisdiction.  But the firm 
should explain that jurisdiction is a matter for the FOS, not the firm to decide; and 
 
7.  express mention of consumers‟ right to refer the complaint to the FOS within 6 
months of the firm‟s final response, (otherwise the FOS will accept cases for 
consideration outside of the 6 months, as under DISP 2.8.3G, the time will not 
have started to run.)  
 
Firms must also send to customers the FOS contact details and a copy of the FOS 
standard explanatory leaflet 
32 either with the final response letter or with the explanation 
of why it is not yet in a position to send its final response.  Special rules apply to internet-
based firms
33.  
 
The FOS publishes various guides for firms about complaint handling.  The FOS will not 
treat an apology or expression of regret as an admission of liability, but as recognition of 
the firm having an unhappy customer.
34  Of course, a court may regard the matter 
differently.  The FOS does not like insurers to cite different reasons for rejecting a claim 
                                                         
31 cf the most up-to-date FOS guides for firms on the FOS’ website and the FSA Handbook of Rules and 
Guidance at the glossary/ definitions section of “final response.” 
32 DISP 1.6.2R 
33 O.N. August 2008. 
34 O.N. November 2003. Judith Summer: PhD April 2009  9 
at different times, rather than all together.  The FOS may penalise non-compliance with 
all of the above with an award to the complainant for maladministration.  
 
1.6.2.  The six month rule 
 
The consumer has 6 months in which to bring a complaint to the FOS after receiving the 
firm‟s final response letter.
35  The FOS can consider extending this period where: 
 
1.  it considers that there have been exceptional circumstances,
36 such as the 
complainant‟s incapacity;
37  
 
2.  the firm has not told the complainant about his right to complain to the FOS or 
about the 6 month time limit
38.   
 
3.  it is required to do so by the Ombudsman Transitional Order
39; or 
 
4.  the firm has not objected to the FOS considering the complaint. 
40 
 
1.6.3  Legal limitation periods 
 
The FOS cannot consider a complaint made more than 6 years after the event 
complained of or (if later) more than 3 years from the date on which the complainant 
became aware (or ought reasonably to have become aware) that he had cause for 
complaint, unless 
41: 
 
1.  He has referred the complaint to the firm or the FOS within that period and has a 
written acknowledgement or some other record of the complaint having been 
received.  or 
 
                                                         
35 DISP 2.8.2R 
36 DISP 2.8.2R(3) 
37 DISP 2.8.4G 
38 DISP 2.8.3G 
39 DISP 2.8.2R (4) 
40 DISP 2.8.2R (5) Judith Summer: PhD April 2009  10 
2.  In the view of the FOS, the failure to comply with the time limits was as a result of 
exceptional circumstances.  or 
 
3.  The Ombudsman Transitional Order requires the FOS to review the complaint. or 
 
4.  The firm has not objected to the FOS considering the complaint.
42 
 
If a firm wishes to rely on these limitation periods or the 6 month limit above, the FOS 
will expect it to do so as early as possible in the process, and will give a reminder of the 
requirement in its initial letter to the firm relating to the complaint.  Where a firm regards 
a case as time-barred, it may reject the complaint without considering the merits, but 
must explain this to the complainant in the final response and indicate that the FOS may 
waive the time limits in exceptional circumstances.
43  The FOS has a discretion not even 
to apply the 15 year long stop in the Limitation Act 1980 for tortious claims.   
 
1.7  How complaints are dealt with 
 
The FOS is a sophisticated body dealing primarily with paper claims.  It has set up 
specialist teams as they have become necessary (for instance dealing with the huge 
number of endowment mortgage complaints) and reorganised itself and rapidly grown as 
a result of a large increase in complaints since it began.  There are appropriate support 
teams (including a “quality, information and knowledge” department
44).  It regularly 
surveys both firms and complainants for feedback.  It has systems for applying and 
sharing knowledge, maintaining quality and achieving consistency.  It received a glowing 
report from an independent six month study
45 commissioned by the FOS Board, which 
concluded that it was “doing a good job under difficult circumstances” and that the case 
handling process was efficient and offered good value for money, especially compared 
with other dispute resolution methods.  However, Lord Hunt in his report of 9/4/08
46 has 
                                                                                                                                                                         
41 Also see DISP 2.8.5R, 2.8.6G and 2.8.7 R regarding exceptions for reviews of past business and 
exceptions for certain mortgage endowment complaints. 
42 DISP 2.8.2R(2) to (5) 
43 DISP 1.8.1R 
44 cf O.N. August 2006 for details of quality checking of live and closed cases. 
45 “Fair and reasonable – An assessment of the FOS” by Kempson, Collard and Moore, Personal Finance 
Research Centre, University of Bristol, July 2004 
46 supra Judith Summer: PhD April 2009  11 
criticised it for not being accessible and transparent enough.  Here follows an outline of 
the process. 
 
1.8  Technical advice desk 
 
This answers queries from firms and consumer advisers
47 about the complaints 
procedure and likely outcomes if the complaint were formally brought to the FOS.
48  Its 
suggestions are not binding and the firm must not refer to them when it writes or speaks 
to consumers.  Consumers‟ general queries are answered via the Customer Contact 
Division. 
 
1.9  Customer Contact Division 
 
Consumers can telephone the FOS Customer Contact Division for help and information 
before the FOS gets formally involved.
49  Whilst it will retain some of the details to avoid 
duplication later, the FOS will only begin its procedures to deal with complaints 
unresolved by the firm after the final response letter has been sent, or after 8 weeks 
from the date of the complaint if sooner.  (see above). 
 
The customer contact staff will help the complainant to complete over the telephone a 
complaint form, which he will be asked to check and sign.  The form is concise and well-
designed with clear, sensible questions, including a request for a chronology of all 
relevant telephone conversations, meetings and/ or correspondence, and for copies of 
any relevant documents.  There is a separate box for the complainant to set out what he 
wants.  The answer to some of the questions will enable the customer contact staff to tell 
the complainant immediately if there is anything obvious which would prevent the FOS 
from considering the matter at that time or at all.  They will also look for opportunities to 
deal immediately with a straightforward problem, such as an administrative 
misunderstanding or error.  They may step in to talk to both sides with practical 
suggestions, explain why it might be unhelpful or unproductive for the matter to be 
                                                         
47 such as trading standards officers and Citizens Advice Bureaux 
48 In 2005/6, the technical advice desk dealt with more than 20,000 enquiries (FOS Annual Review 05/06). 
49 In 2005/6, the customer contact division dealt with 672,973 front line enquiries and complaints, (a 10% 
increase on 2004/5), representing more than 2,500 telephone and written enquiries a day. (FOS Annual 
Review 05/06). Judith Summer: PhD April 2009  12 
pursued further, or give an early steer on the likely FOS outcome.  They will provide the 
firm with additional information if it is unfamiliar with the process. 
 
If the complaint survives this process, it will be passed on to one of the adjudicators, the 
firm will be notified and asked for its comments and evidence, and the case will become 
“chargeable.”
50 
 
1.10  Adjudicators 
 
A named adjudicator will then be assigned to the case and keep the parties informed of 
progress.  He will try to find a solution through informal mediation or conciliation, 
perhaps telephoning the parties.  Adjudicators may ask for more documents and 
information, and may also contact third parties for this directly either by telephone or in 
writing.  If the matter cannot be resolved by telephone, or if it is complex, the adjudicator 
may issue both parties with a formal adjudication report, detailing the dispute, his 
findings and any suggested redress.  Either party can respond to the adjudicator, setting 
out if and why they do not agree with him or asking for clarification.  The adjudicator may 
modify his view thereafter.  Usually, both sides accept the adjudicator‟s findings and the 
complaint is settled.  Otherwise, the firm or the consumer may ask for a review and final 
decision by an ombudsman 
51.   
 
This is when any request for a hearing would be considered or when an ombudsman 
might invite the parties to take part in a hearing
52.  The request must be written, setting 
out which issues should be heard and whether the hearing should be private.
53  The 
Ombudsman will decide whether the issues are material, whether a hearing should take 
place and whether it should be held in public or in private
54, and he will have regard to 
                                                         
50 The customer contact division referred 112,923 or 1 in 6 new cases to adjudicators in 2005/6, 
representing a 1.8% increase from 2004/5.  (FOS Annual Review 05/06)  Mortgage endowment complaints 
accounted for about 61% of these referrals, but have been dropping steadily since.  14,270 or 13% 
accounted for insurance related complaints which represents a 24% increase on 2004/5.   
51  About 92% of cases in 2005/6 were resolved informally through mediation, recommended settlements 
and adjudication.  (FOS Annual Review 05/06)  The remaining 8% (or 9,203 cases) were resolved by a 
review and final determination by an ombudsman.  The average figure is about 10% ( FOS “A Guide for 
Complaints Handlers” 31.03.05 edition). 
52 DISP 3.5.5R 
53 DISP 3.5.6R 
54 DISP 3.5.6R (3) to (5) Judith Summer: PhD April 2009  13 
the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights
55.  However, he will not be 
in breach of the Convention if permission is not granted, as the right to a public hearing 
is satisfied by the possibility of judicial review proceedings.
56  Under the updated DISP 
rules, hearings may be held by telephone
57. No hearing can be held after the 
Ombudsman‟s final determination.
58  If cross-examination of witnesses is necessary, 
then the court is the correct forum.  Very few hearings take place.  Since the FOS was 
born, there has only been one reported insurance hearing, Case Study 18/02
59, to help 
the Ombudsman determine whether the insurer had said at inception that the 
complainant‟s husband‟s angina would be covered. 
 
1.11  Ombudsman’s final decision 
 
When an ombudsman becomes involved, he undertakes an independent review of the 
evidence.  He may ask for further evidence and give directions in relation to evidence 
with which the parties must comply.
60  He has his own rules of evidence
61, which may be 
different to a court‟s
62.  He will ensure that both parties have been given an opportunity 
to make representations, particularly the complainant when considering questions of 
jurisdiction, eligibility, or dismissal without consideration of the merits.
63  He will then 
send both parties a provisional assessment with his reasoning and a time limit within 
which either party must respond, before issuing a final determination
64 with a time limit 
within which the complainant may accept the decision and so bind both parties on 
awards up to £100,000 plus interest.  The firm cannot attach any conditions of its own.  If 
the complainant rejects the offer or remains silent, the firm is not bound and the 
complainant remains free to bring court proceedings against the firm
65.  An 
ombudsman‟s decision is final and cannot be appealed, even to another ombudsman.  
Once a decision is accepted, it cannot be re-determined, even if the FOS acknowledges 
                                                         
55 DISP 3.5.7G 
56 R (on the application of Heather Moor & Edgecomb Ltd) v FOS & Simon Lodge [2008] EWCA 642 
57 DISP3.5.5R 
58 DISP 3.5.5R 
59 O.N. July 2002 
60 DISP 3.5.8R, 3.5.11G 
61 cf DISP 3.5.9R, 3.5.10G and 3.5.12G 
62 DISP 3.5.13R, 3.5.14R, 3.5.15R 
63 DISP 3.2.3R, 3.2.4R, 3.3.1R 
64 DISP3.5.4R 
65 s. 228(6) FSMA and DISP 3.6.6R Judith Summer: PhD April 2009  14 
it has made a mistake, unless both parties agree: if they do not, the appropriate remedy 
is judicial review.
66 
 
The FSA‟s rules require the firm to comply promptly with an ombudsman decision 
accepted by the complainant, as well as with any settlement that may have been agreed 
earlier in the process.  Both of these are enforceable by the courts.
67   
 
Excluding mortgage endowment complaints, on average about 40% of Ombudsmen 
cases are decided wholly or partly in the complainant‟s favour,
68 although the 2008/9 
figures will show for the first time a figure of over 50%, due in a large part to payment 
protection insurance disputes.
69 
 
1.12  Referral to Court 
 
Even complainants with rejected complaints rarely turn to the courts after the 
Ombudsman‟s final determination.  This seems natural because: 
 
1.  the ombudsman‟s decision may feel like a pseudo-appeal in itself as the case will 
have been reviewed at the FOS so many times before it reaches him;   
 
2.  the costs and risks of litigation can be substantial, especially where an independent 
body has already determined that it is a losing case, and where the court would 
inevitably be shown the ombudsman‟s reasoned rejection of the complaint;   
 
3.  many complainants will have had enough of the fight;  
 
4.  some cases will be too big for the small claims court, but too small to be 
commercially viable to bring in the county or high court;  
 
                                                         
66 R (on the application of Towry Law Financial Services Plc) v FOS Ltd [2002] EWHC 1603 (Admin) 
67 s. 229(8) and Sched 17, Part III s.16 FSMA 
68 O.N. January 2003; FOS Annual Review 04/05.  The FOS Annual Review 05/06 says that 59% of 
complaints dealt with by adjudicators and 51% of those dealt with by an ombudsman were rejected, and in 
a further 6% and 2% respectively, firms were found to have treated the customer’s complaint fairly 
although the firm still agreed a goodwill payment. 
69 Speech by Tony Boorman (Principal Ombudsman):  PPI complaints and consumer confidence 24/02/09. Judith Summer: PhD April 2009  15 
5.  where the law is applied strictly by the court, but not by the FOS, such as in non-
disclosure cases, it may be less advantageous for the insured to bring a claim to 
court; 
 
6.  Many consumers will feel satisfied that they have already been heard and that an 
independent body has looked at the matter impartially, even if the decision has not 
gone their way.  FOS customer surveys in 2003/4 showed that 80% of the 
consumers who replied were satisfied with the FOS, although only 60% had thought 
the decision had been reasonable.  This may reflect the fact that more complaints 
are rejected than upheld.  The FOS Annual Review 05/06, shows that 96% of 
consumers who said they felt they had “won” were satisfied with the FOS handling of 
the matter, 64% of those who said they felt they had “lost” and 92% of those who felt 
that they had neither won nor lost.  These figures are much the same as in the 
previous year.  Interestingly, the Annual Review also reports that 75% of firms 
responding to the FOS survey thought that the FOS provides a good independent 
dispute resolution service. 
 
There are only a handful of reported cases which began as complaints to either the IOB 
or the FOS and ended up in court.  The insured failed to achieve a successful outcome 
both at the IOB/ FOS and at court in all
70 but two recent cases, that of Margate Theatre 
Royal Trust Ltd v White
71and Lewis v Norwich Union Healthcare Ltd
72,where the 
complaint failed before the ombudsman, but succeeded before the court.  The 
Technology and Construction Court‟s technical ability to deal with and cross examine the 
expert evidence was probably what made the difference in the Margate case.   
 
A common feature of the cases which have failed both at the IOB/FOS and before the 
court is the judge‟s criticism of the assured‟s case, conduct, attitudes and evidence, 
although only one went as far as calling the action frivolous and vexatious.
73 
 
                                                         
70 eg Clark v New Hampshire Insurance Company unreported 27 June 1991, Welch v Cunningham Hart 
(UK) Ltd & Another unreported Court of Appeal 26 July 1994, Tucker v Abbey Life Assurance Co Ltd 
unreported Court of Appeal 4 October 1999, Campbell v BMW Insurance Co [2001] EWCA Civ 1660 and 
Tonkin v UK Insurance Ltd [2006] EWHC 1120 (TCC). 
71 [2005] EWHC 2171 (TCC) 
72 [2009] EW Misc 2 (EWCC) 
73 Welch v Cunningham Hart (UK) Ltd & Another unreported Court of Appeal 26 July 1994  Judith Summer: PhD April 2009  16 
1.13  Judicial Review 
 
In R v IOB, ex parte Aegon Life Assurance Ltd
74, it was held that an insurer could not 
apply for judicial review of the IOB‟s decisions, because the IOB‟s powers were solely 
derived from contract between the IOB and member companies, not from statute and it 
could not be said that it exercised any government functions. Although membership of 
the IOB might have been commercially advantageous to firms, Parliament had decided 
to make membership voluntary.  
 
Before the combined ombudsman service of the FOS, the decisions of the Pensions 
Ombudsman were subject to a right of appeal from final determinations on a question of 
law only, under the pensions legislation
75 of the time.
76 
 
Now, at least under the compulsory jurisdiction of the FOS, firms may apply for judicial 
review of ombudsmen‟s decisions, although there have only been a few such 
applications.
77  Presumably the time and costs involved are prohibitive against the high 
risk of failure where the FOS has such a wide discretion to substitute its own values of 
fairness and reasonableness instead of law, as long as it has considered the law and the 
other matters listed under what is now DISP 3.6.4R (confirmed in R (on the application 
of IFG Financial Services Ltd) v FOS Ltd and Mr and Mrs Jenkins (interested parties)).
 78  
In this case, it meant that an investment adviser had to pay even that part of the loss 
which was unforeseen and which a court would not have awarded.  A court will not 
interfere with an ombudsman‟s sense of what is fair and reasonable, unless the 
ombudsman has made such errors of reasoning as to deprive the decision of legal 
                                                         
74 (1994) CLC 88.  Followed by R v Deputy Insurance Ombudsman ex parte Francis (unreported) 20 May 
1998.  Applied by R v Panel of the Federation of Communication Services Ltd & Anr ex parte Kubis 
(unreported) 3 September 1997, R (on the application of Sunspell Ltd (t/a Superlative Travel)) v 
Association of British Travel Agents (unreported) 12 October 2000 and R v Personal Investment Authority 
Ombudsman Bureau Ltd ex parte Johannes Mooyes [2001] EWCA Admin 247.  
75 Part X of the Pension Schemes Act 1993.  cf in particular sections 146 to 151 
76 Examples of such cases are Alfred James Duffield v The Pensions Ombudsman, The Times April 30 
1996, Law Debenture Trust Corporation Plc v The Pensions Ombudsman (1997) 3 All ER 233, 
Westminster City Council v Haywood [1998] Ch 377, Neil John Macaulay v The Pensions Ombudsman 
LTL 04/02/98, Legal & General Assurance Society Ltd v The Pensions Ombudsman (2000) 2 All ER 577, 
Alma Kearney Ewing v Trustees of the Stockham Valve Ltd Staff Retirement Benefits Scheme LTL 
01/03/2000, Legal & General Assurance Society Ltd v CCA Stationery Ltd [2003] EWHC 2989, Michael 
Ward v South Yorkshire Pensions Authority [2005] EWHC 2711 (Ch). 
77 In September 2008, there were 15 current, judicial review cases against the FOS. 
78 [2005] EWHC 1153 (Admin) Judith Summer: PhD April 2009  17 
rationality, and the ombudsman is entitled to adopt any test he wants to assist him in 
deciding whether something is fair.
79  In R (on the application of Garrison Investment 
Analysis) v FOS 
80, the investment adviser succeeded in the application as the court 
found the award irrational.  The ombudsman had said he was putting the parties back 
into the position they would have been in were it not for the firm‟s error, but he had also 
found that the error had not caused the loss.  There was no connection between the 
redress ordered and the error found.  The ombudsman‟s decision was quashed and 
remitted back to him to determine the appropriate redress in the light of his earlier 
conclusion as to the error.   
 
If an ombudsman makes a small mistake of fact in his determination, it has to make a 
difference to his decision before an application for judicial review will be successful.
81 
 
The clearest situation in which judicial review is available is where the FOS has 
exceeded its jurisdiction.  It was held in Bunney v Burns Anderson plc
82 that an award 
which exceeds the FOS‟ £100,000 limit is not enforceable, and that the firm is entitled to 
plead want of jurisdiction by way of defence to the enforcement proceedings without 
seeking judicial review of the award itself. 
 
According to R (on the application of Heather Moor & Edgecomb Ltd) v FOS & Simon 
Lodge
83, applying R (on the application of Thompson) v Law Society
84, it is the ability to 
apply for a public hearing by way of judicial review which brings the whole FOS 
procedure within the oral hearing requirements of Article 6 of the Convention on Human 
Rights.  
 
The FOS would not usually be ordered to pay judicial review proceedings costs if it had 
made a mistake in law, but rather if it had acted improperly ie perversely or with some 
                                                         
79 R v FOS Ltd, ex parte Norwich & Peterborough Building Society & David Robert Jones [2002] EWHC 
2379 (Admin) 
80 [2006] EWHC 2466 (Admin) 
81 R (on the application of Kenneth Green (t/a Green Denman & Co)) v FOS Ltd [2003] EWHC 338 
(Admin) 
82 [2007] EWHC 1240 (Ch) 
83 [2008] EWCA Civ 642 
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disregard for the elementary principles which every court ought to obey (presumably 
also if exceeded its jurisdiction), and even then only if it was a flagrant instance.
85 
 
1.14  Dismissal or termination without considering the merits 
 
DISP 3.3.4 R sets out seventeen circumstances in which the FOS may dismiss a 
complaint without considering its merits.  These are if the ombudsman is satisfied, after 
giving the complainant an opportunity to make representations
86, that: 
 
1.  the complainant has not suffered, or is unlikely to suffer, financial loss, material 
distress or material inconvenience;  
 
2.  the complaint is frivolous or vexatious;  
 
3.  the complaint clearly does not have any reasonable prospect of success;  
 
4.  the firm has already made an offer of compensation (or a goodwill payment) 
which is: (a) fair and reasonable in relation to the circumstances alleged; and (b) 
still open for acceptance;  
 
5.  the firm has reviewed the subject matter of the complaint in accordance with: (a) 
the regulatory standards for the review of such transactions prevailing at the time 
of the review; or (b) the terms of a scheme order under s. 404 FSMA 2000 
(schemes for reviewing past business); or (c) any formal regulatory requirement, 
standard or guidance published by the FSA or other regulator in respect of that 
type of complaint; (including, if appropriate, making an offer of redress to the 
complainant), unless the firm considers that they did not address the particular 
circumstances of the case;  
 
6.  the subject matter of the complaint has previously been considered or excluded 
under the FOS, or a former scheme (unless material new evidence which the 
                                                         
85 R (on the application of Towry Law Financial Services Plc) v FOS Ltd [2002] EWHC 1603 (Admin).   
86 DISP 3.3.1R Judith Summer: PhD April 2009  19 
Ombudsman considers likely to affect the outcome has subsequently become 
available to the complainant
87);  
 
7.  the subject matter of the complaint has been dealt with, or is being dealt with, by 
a comparable independent complaints scheme or dispute resolution process;  
 
8.  the subject matter of the complaint has been the subject of court proceedings 
where there has been a decision on the merits;  
 
9.  the subject matter of the complaint is the subject of current court proceedings 
unless proceedings are stayed or sisted (by agreement of all parties, or order of 
the court) in order that the matter may be considered under the FOS;  
 
10.  it would be more suitable for the subject matter of the complaint to be dealt with 
by a court, arbitration or another complaints scheme;  
 
11.  the complaint is about the legitimate exercise of a firm's commercial judgment;  
 
12.  the complaint is about employment matters from an employee or employees of a 
firm;  
 
13.  the complaint is about investment performance;  
 
14.  the complaint is about a firm's decision when exercising a discretion under a will 
or private trust;  
 
15.  the complaint is about a firm's failure to consult beneficiaries before exercising a 
discretion under a will or private trust, where there is no legal obligation to 
consult;  
 
16.  it is a complaint which: (a) involves (or might involve) more than one eligible 
complainant; and (b) has been referred without the consent of the other 
                                                         
87 cf R on the application of Cook v FOS [2009] EWHC 426 (Admin) – the FOS could conclude that a new 
expert’s report was not material new evidence unavailable at the time of the investigation, because it could Judith Summer: PhD April 2009  20 
complainant or complainants; and the Ombudsman considers that it would be 
inappropriate to deal with the complaint without that consent; or 
 
17.  there are other compelling reasons why it is inappropriate for the complaint to be 
dealt with under the FOS. 
 
Under DISP 3.3.5R, the ombudsman may also dismiss a complaint without considering 
its merits, so that a court may consider it as a test case, if: 
 
1.  before he has made a determination, he has received in writing from the firm: 
 
(a)  a detailed statement of how and why, in the firm's opinion, the complaint 
raises an important or novel point of law with significant consequences; 
and 
 
(b)  an undertaking in favour of the complainant that, if the complainant or the 
firm commences court proceedings against the other in respect of the 
complaint in any court in the United Kingdom within six months of the 
complaint being dismissed, the firm will: pay the complainant's reasonable 
costs and disbursements (to be assessed if not agreed on an indemnity 
basis) in connection with the proceedings at first instance and any 
subsequent appeal proceedings brought by the firm; and make interim 
payments on account of such costs if and to the extent that it appears 
reasonable to do so; and 
 
2.  the Ombudsman considers that the complaint: 
 
(a)  raises an important or novel point of law, which has important 
consequences; and 
 
(b)  would more suitably be dealt with by a court as a test case. 
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The factors which the ombudsman may take into account in considering whether to 
dismiss a complaint under DISP 3.3.5R are set out in, but not limited to DISP 3.3.6G.  It 
is envisaged that this test case route will rarely be taken.  
 
1.15  The independent assessor 
 
Complaints by either the firm or the consumer about the way in which the FOS has 
handled a complaint, can be made to the FOS Chief Ombudsman, one of the principal 
Ombudsmen or the service review manager.  This is not an appeal of the ombudsman‟s 
decision.  The FOS has three months in which to conduct a review of its own case-
handling and if appropriate issue an apology and/or compensation for damages and/or 
distress or inconvenience.  If the firm or consumer is still dissatisfied, he may complain 
to the FOS Independent Assessor,
88 who is appointed by the FOS board and has official 
terms of reference.
89  He will not investigate complaints about the merits of a decision, 
but will have access to all the FOS files and may seek further information. 
 
If the independent assessor upholds a complaint in whole or part, he may recommend to 
the Chief Ombudsman that the FOS makes an apology or pays modest compensation 
for any damage, distress or inconvenience caused.  Most complaints relate to FOS 
delays.  The assessor has noted
90 that where FOS delay results in the firm paying 
additional interest to the consumer, the FOS should pay compensation for 
inconvenience taking this into account, but without working out exactly how much should 
have been paid, for it is too difficult to estimate how long any particular investigation 
should have taken. 
 
The assessor will communicate his findings in writing to the complainant and to the FOS.  
There is no appeal by a complainant.  However, if the Chief Ombudsman does not 
accept that recommendation, (which in practice is extremely rare
91), the independent 
assessor will refer the matter to the Board of the FOS, who will make a decision at its 
next meeting.  If the Board declines to accept the independent assessor‟s 
                                                         
88 cf the leaflet found on the FOS website. 
89 to be found on the FOS website. 
90 Michael Barnes CBE in Annual Review 2006/2007 
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recommendation, it will inform the independent assessor and the parties and publish the 
result in its annual report.   
 
The assessor has to report annually to the Board of the FOS.  Complaints are made 
about the FOS own service standards in only a tiny fraction of cases.  During the year 
ended 31/03/06, the assessor received 322 referrals (compared to 319 the previous 
year), of which he had to investigate 186 (compared to 164 the previous year).  Of the 
remaining 136, 72 had been referred to him before the FOS had first been given a 
chance to resolve the matter, 53 were enquiries rather than complaints, 9 were out of 
time or outside the FOS jurisdiction and 2 were not pursued by the complainant.  He 
upheld wholly or in part 76 of these 186 cases investigated, (compared to 58 in the 
previous year), and in 68 of those 76 cases he recommended that compensation for 
distress or inconvenience should be paid by the FOS.  The amount awarded ranged 
from £50 to £750, with most awards falling between £200 and £400.   
 
Of the 186 complaints investigated, only 13 came from firms, (mostly independent 
financial advisers or stockbrokers), out of which only 6 were upheld.  Roughly half of 
these 13 complaints related to case fees that had been charged when the complaint had 
subsequently been dismissed without consideration of the merits, or had been deemed 
to be outside the FOS jurisdiction.  However, only in 1 of those cases did the assessor 
consider that the case fee should be refunded in full.  He commented that this is 
because it is often only after a case has been passed for assessment that it becomes 
apparent that the complaint is not one that the FOS can investigate. 
 
1.16  Dealings with customers while the FOS considers the complaint 
 
Whilst the FOS is considering a complaint, the firm should continue to deal with the 
customer as normal, for instance in relation to other claims, but no legal action must be 
taken against the customer in relation to the complaint, and any relevant developments 
should be communicated to the FOS, including any offer or revised offer which the firm 
may make at any time.  In practice, the claims process will be frozen until a FOS 
outcome is reached.  The insurer will have to submit its whole file to the FOS and will be 
prohibited from communicating further directly with the insured on the subject matter of 
the dispute.  The consequential delay may be significant to an insured, for instance, if he Judith Summer: PhD April 2009  23 
is awaiting insurers to agree a reinstatement to a damaged property, as was the case in 
Tonkin & Toureau v UK Insurance Ltd
92.   
 
1.17  The Financial Services Compensation Scheme (“FSCS”) 
 
If a firm goes into liquidation while the FOS is considering a complaint against it, the 
FOS will suspend its investigation, refer the case to the FSCS and inform the consumer.  
The FSCS will then contact the customer to explain how it can help.  If a firm goes into 
liquidation after an award has been made against it, the FSCS will step in to pay a 
proportion of the award
93. 
 
1.18  Awards and interest 
 
1.18.1  Money awards 
 
When making an award, the ombudsman‟s objective is to put the consumer back into the 
position he would have been in had it not been for the firm‟s actions.  If it would be fair 
and reasonable, a determination may include a money award
94 to compensate for 
financial loss
95 or any other loss or damage of a specified kind
96, including damages for 
distress or inconvenience, pain and suffering or damage to reputation, whether or not a 
court would award compensation.
97 
 
1.18.2  Limits on Money awards 
 
An ombudsman‟s award for financial loss is limited
98 to £100,000 (plus interest
99), 
although the ombudsman can recommend an unenforceable, additional payment.
100  
                                                         
92 [2006]EWHC 1120 (TCC).  There the FOS took over a year to reach the end of the adjudicator stage.  
The insured began litigation proceedings before the Ombudsman became involved, so the FOS dismissed 
the complaint at that point.  The court, rightly, did not make an award against the insurer in respect of this 
delay, which was caused by the insured insisting on bringing the complaint to the FOS, despite the insurer 
and the FOS warnings that this would result in a delay in the insurer being able to deal with the claim. 
93 Claims in respect of compulsory insurances are met in full; claims in respect of non-compulsory 
insurances are paid in full for the first £2,000, but are limited to 90% for any loss above this. 
94 s. 229(2)(a) FSMA 
95 s. 229(3)(a) FSMA 
96 s. 229(3)(b) FSMA 
97 DISP 3.7.2R 
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Such a recommendation might carry some weight if the complainant ever brought the 
matter to court.  The FSA plans no change in the maximum figure at present
101, but will 
review the position at regular intervals.   
 
Only a small percentage of FOS cases involve a loss greater than £100,000.
102  
However, if the parties want a quick and relatively cheap dispute resolution, it might 
make commercial sense to put even a large claim before the FOS, perhaps agreeing in 
advance to be bound by a FOS recommendation above the £100,000 limit.  Maybe that 
explains Case Study 65/12
103, relating to building repairs of at least £750,000 under a 
contractors‟ all-risks commercial insurance policy.  It involved complicated questions of 
policy construction and interpretation, although it is unclear how qualified the FOS is to 
deal with these issues, especially as not all the ombudsmen have legal qualifications, let 
alone specialist legal qualifications.  The FOS felt that the claim was covered by the 
policy, and the insurer agreed to the FOS recommendation that it should pay the full 
amount due even if it came to more than the maximum award of £100,000.  In Case 
Study 74/10
104, the FOS contacted both parties before it had finished investigating the 
complaint and obtained confirmation from the insurer that it would pay any determination 
against it in full, even over the £100,000 limit. 
 
1.18.3  Distress or Inconvenience/ Damages for Maladministration 
 
The ombudsman can make an award for distress or inconvenience even if the 
complainant has not requested it or where the complaint is rejected, where 
maladministration in claims handling has caused distress or inconvenience.
105  A court 
cannot make these awards, because, following Sprung v Royal Insurance (UK) Ltd,
106 
payment under a policy is due the moment the insured event causes a loss, and any 
                                                                                                                                                                         
99 DISP 3.7.4R, 3.7.5G 
100 DISP 3.7.6G 
101 FSA/PN/138/2005 15 December 2005.  In June 2006, the FSA confirmed that the £100,000 limit will be 
reviewed again in 2009. 
102 FOS Annual Review 05/06 reports only 3% in that year. 
103 O.N. Oct/Nov 2007 
104 O.N. December 2008/January 2009 
105 Briefing Note from the FOS November 2001; FOS Technical Note on Distress and Inconvenience 
(updated July 2008). 
106 (1997) CLC 70, followed in Pride Valley Foods Ltd v Independent Insurance Co Ltd [1999] Lloyd’s 
Rep I.R 120, England v Guardian Insurance Ltd, [2000] Lloyd’s Rep I.R. 404, Normhurst Ltd v Dornoch 
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delay (maladministration usually causes delay) is dealt with through interest from this 
date until actual payment, however late that is.  Further, following The Italia Express,
107 
there can be no damages for distress caused by maladministration, because an 
insurance contract is not one which has as its specific objective the assured‟s peace of 
mind.  If an insurer deserves a punishment greater than interest, this should be a matter 
for the regulator. 
 
The ombudsman will consider that there has been distress if there has been 
embarrassment, anxiety, disappointment or loss of expectation, and that there has been 
inconvenience if there has been expenditure of time and/or effort by the customer that 
has resulted from a firm‟s conduct.  Maladministration/ bad handling includes extensive 
delays, clerical or procedural errors, rudeness, incorrect or inadequate explanations or 
simply a failure to respond to the customer‟s requests.  It also includes requiring a 
customer to take additional and unnecessary steps to pursue a complaint or where a 
firm refuses to settle a case at an early stage, despite knowing that the FOS has 
previously upheld similar complaints.  Without explicitly saying how, it seems that the 
FOS expects insurers to know of its previous decisions and to keep up to date with its 
approach.  An example is the relatively large award of £750 in Case Study 73/08
108, 
where the insured had to engage an expert to prove the cause of the loss, yet the 
insurer ignored that evidence, and after great delay confirmed that it had not changed 
matters, even though it actually brought the insured within the terms of the cover and the 
FOS test for flood.   And in Case Study 75/10
109, insurers were ordered to pay a modest 
amount to reflect the distress and inconvenience caused by unreasonably requiring the 
insured to replace antique jewellery with modern pieces, and by trying to deduct an 
amount from the alternative cash settlement to reflect the discounted price that the 
insurer could obtain if the insured had agreed to buy replacements at particular stores.  
The maladministration was because all of this contravened the FOS well-established 
views on what was reasonable in these circumstances, and which had been featured in 
Ombudsman News seven years earlier in October 2001. 
 
Bad handling will not include general distress which is inevitable, for instance, in dealing 
with a claim after injury or death, or mere trivial annoyance, such as if a name is spelt 
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incorrectly or the telephone line is sometimes busy.  It would not be bad handling if the 
insurer does everything it should do, but the complainant is still inconvenienced.  For 
instance, in Case Study 01/15
110, no compensation was payable where a video kept 
malfunctioning and the insurer kept trying to get it repaired.  The complainant was put to 
considerable inconvenience in the process, but the insurer had provided a satisfactory 
standard of service because it had done all it could do.  Similarly in Case Study 68/09
111, 
there was no award for distress and inconvenience for the delay caused when the 
insurer appointed a firm of engineers to inspect and report on the flood damage.  Due to 
the technically complex nature of the problem, they were entitled to do this, and they had 
acted promptly both in appointing the engineers and in considering the claim once the 
report was ready. 
 
Most of the ombudsman awards in this category will be modest, usually not more than a 
few hundred pounds.  An example of an exceptional, large award is in Case Study 
18/18
112, where £1,000 was awarded for the distress and inconvenience of living with a 
cesspit full of water, and the insurer refusing cover meant months of living without proper 
sanitary conditions.  £1,000 was also awarded in Case Study 68/08
113 for a couple who 
had to live in alternative accommodation for a further three months (after an initial nine 
months) whilst snagging was undertaken when insurers were repairing subsidence 
damage to their flat.  This is a surprising award, especially when compared to the cesspit 
case above.  It is unlikely that this is a sign that awards are increasing.  It is more likely 
to be evidence of FOS inconsistency, perhaps subconsciously influenced by the fact that 
the insured were making a substantial claim for floor repairs which failed when they were 
given this award instead.  More usual is the example given in O.N. August 2008 of a 
family awarded less than £300 for having to stay in alternative accommodation for 3 
weeks longer than should have been necessary.  That issue of O.N. also gave an 
example of an understandably higher award (between £300 and £1,000) when an 
insurer persisted in addressing all its mail and telephone queries to the insured‟s 
deceased husband, despite being told of the situation.   
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In considering the amount to award, the FOS will look at the severity of the distress or 
inconvenience caused by the firm‟s actions, the period of the problem, the nature of the 
inadequacy, whether any of it was caused by the customer‟s own actions and delays 
and, to a limited extent, the customer‟s own assessment of the distress or inconvenience 
suffered. 
 
1.18.4  Pain and suffering 
 
The ombudsman considers this to be a more extreme form of distress and 
inconvenience and might arise in cases involving delays in arranging or paying for 
medical treatment.  An award for pain and suffering will be more than one for distress or 
inconvenience. 
 
1.18.5  Damage to reputation 
 
This may occur if a firm discloses to a third party incorrect information (eg relating to 
credit worthiness) or private information (eg medical records).  Any award will be based 
on how widely available the information had been made, its nature, its impact and the 
customer‟s previous reputation.  It may be sufficient just for the insurer to correct the 
third party‟s records.  In Case Study 04/17
114 , one insurer passed on information about 
the insured‟s claim to another insurer without authorisation.  The insurer offered to pay 
£100 by way of compensation for distress and inconvenience, and the FOS felt that this 
was enough, as there was no evidence that the disclosure had caused any loss or 
influenced the handling of the claim. 
 
1.18.6  Complainant’s costs  
 
The ombudsman may
115, but does not usually, award the complainant his administrative 
costs of complaining to the firm or to the FOS.  Any such award would be extremely 
modest, and was £25 in Case Study 01/14
116.  The FOS may also make an allowance 
for the time the consumer needs to spend to put things right (excluding his time in 
dealing with the FOS), at a modest rate (around £50 to £100 a day, and not more than 
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£10 per hour).  Although a higher amount may be appropriate for business complaints, it 
is not usually as much as the business‟s charge-out rate.  However, there has been no 
reported insurance example where such an allowance has been made.  Nor will the FOS 
award the fees of a claims management company or solicitor
117, because the ethos of 
the FOS, and indeed most other ombudsman services around the world, is that these 
services are not necessary.
118  The FOS regards the facts more than the presentation of 
the argument, and prefers to hear from consumers in their own words. 
 
The FOS statistics
119 show that there is no difference in outcome between complaints 
brought to it by claims management companies, and complaints brought directly by 
consumers.  Walter Merricks, Chief Ombudsman, commented
120 that there has been an 
increase in judicial review challenges made where increased claims management 
company involvement has made disputes more legalistic and hard fought, which 
challenges the level of informality in sorting out complaints that the FOS seeks to 
provide. 
 
However, the FOS may order reimbursement of the costs of an expert which the 
complainant had to instruct in order to prove his point.  For instance, in Case Study 
28/9
121, the insured had to consult an independent engineer before the insurance 
company would accept that the car repairs it had approved were not satisfactory. 
 
1.18.7  Other awards/ directions 
 
The ombudsman can make other awards or directions as appropriate, whether or not a 
court can
122. This is appropriate in view of its role as an alternative dispute resolution 
service.  In Case Study 01/16
123, the complainant did not want a financial award to 
compensate for a series of oversights and mistakes which meant that a body had not 
been embalmed, so was too decomposed for viewing on arrival back in the UK.  Insurers 
                                                                                                                                                                         
116 O.N. January 2001 
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119 O.N. July 2005 
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were asked to apologise, donate to the British Heart Foundation and set up a system so 
that the problem could not recur.  
 
1.18.8  Interest 
 
Interest may be awarded on a money award
124, and the FOS now uses a rate of 8% per 
year simple, in line with the rate used in the County Court,
125 calculated from when the 
FOS considers that the firm‟s actions caused the problem until the date when payment is 
made.
126  
 
1.18.9  Enforceability of awards 
 
Courts will enforce money awards and interest.
127  Directions are enforceable by 
injunction.
128  Firms are required to pay awards or comply with directions promptly.
129 
 
1.18.10  Is compensation taxable? 
 
That part of an award which relates to the compensation for being deprived of money, 
usually the interest part, may be subject to income tax.
130 
 
1.19  Jurisdiction of the FOS
131 
 
1.19.1  Compulsory, voluntary and consumer credit jurisdictions 
 
Since the FOS gained its powers on 1 December 2001, it has had: 
 
1.  a compulsory jurisdiction for complaints relating to regulated activities.  Included 
are firms that: 
                                                         
124 s.229(8)(a) FSMA and DISP 3.7.8R 
125 Under s 69 County Courts Act 1984. 
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129 DISP 1.4.4R 
130 FOS website for Technical Briefing note “Is Compensation taxable?” 
131 cf DISP 2 for fuller details  Judith Summer: PhD April 2009  30 
 
(i)  were covered by one of the predecessor ombudsman schemes for 
complaints about events before 1 December 2001     AND 
 
(ii)  are regulated by the FSA for complaints about events from 1 December 
2001. 
 
2.  a voluntary jurisdiction which some firms can choose to join in relation to certain 
types of complaint not covered by the FOS compulsory or consumer credit 
jurisdictions.  By joining, they formally agree to deal with complaints and submit 
to the authority of the FOS as if they fall under the compulsory jurisdiction.
132  
These “VJ participants” include: 
 
(i)  since March 2002, general insurance companies based in Europe and not 
regulated by the FSA, that deal predominantly with customers in the UK. 
 
(ii)  since April 2003, certain firms regulated by the FSA from 1 December 
2001, that wanted to be covered for complaints about events which 
occurred before that date. 
 
(iii)  since September 2005, National Savings and Investments, which are not 
regulated by the FSA. 
 
From 6 April 2007, a third type of jurisdiction was created – the Consumer Credit 
Jurisdiction.  Under the Consumer Credit Act 2006, businesses with consumer credit 
licences issued (and regulated) by the Office of Fair Trading are also covered by the 
FOS even if they are not also regulated by the FSA.  From the same date, three 
additional activities became regulated by the FSA and were put within the remit of the 
FOS: advice on self-invested personal pensions, the sale and administration of home-
reversion plans and the sale and administration of Islamic home-purchase products.  
From 1 November 2009, the FOS will also cover money transfer operators.
133 
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1.19.2  Relevant complaints 
 
The complaint should relate to an action by the insurer (as opposed to the insured 
event), which was taken after 1 December 2001 when the FOS came into being.
134   
 
However the Ombudsman Transitional Order allows the FOS to deal, with only a few 
exceptions, with “relevant new complaints” in accordance with its new procedures.  
“Relevant new complaints” are those referred to the FOS after 1 December 2001 relating 
to an event when the firm was subject to a former scheme.  Under DISP 2.7.10G, a 
relevant new complaint must be made by an individual, and must not relate to a 
business or trade carried on by him.  Other transitional arrangements were made for 
complaints already referred to an Ombudsman scheme, but not resolved before 1 
December 2001. 
 
1.19.3  Eligible complainants 
 
DISP 2.2.1 G sets out conditions which need to be satisfied before the FOS can deal 
with a complaint.  The firm or VJ Participant and the act or omission in question must be 
subject to the compulsory, voluntary or consumer credit jurisdiction of the FOS.  The 
complaint must be brought by or behalf of an “eligible complainant,” defined by DISP 
2.7.3R as a private individual, a business with a group annual turnover of less than £1 
million, a charity with an annual income of less than £1 million or a trustee of a trust with 
net assets worth less than £1 million at the time the complainant refers the complaint to 
the firm or VJ participant.  The ombudsman will determine the eligibility of a commercial 
complaint by reference to appropriate evidence such as audited accounts or VAT 
returns.
135  The FOS has a wider jurisdiction than the IOB, as it can consider complaints 
from small businesses which the IOB could not.  From 01/11/09, when the Payment 
Services Directive
136 comes into effect, the FOS will change the definition of small 
business throughout its jurisdiction to match that of micro-enterprise in the EU 
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legislation
137; namely a turnover of 2 million Euro with fewer than 10 staff.  However, 
small businesses only account for about 2% of all complaints referred.
138 
 
To be eligible, the complainant must also have been a customer or a potential customer 
of the firm or VJ participant and the complaint must arise out of a matter relevant to 
that.
139 
 
1.19.4  Intermediaries 
 
Until May 2001, brokers had to be registered under the Insurance Brokers (Registration) 
Act 1977 (repealed by FSMA) to be able legally to call themselves brokers, and thereby 
were subject to codes of practice and conduct administered by the Insurance Brokers 
Registration Council.  After this time until 13/01/05, intermediaries were expected to 
comply with the General Insurance Standards Council (“GISC”) Code of conduct (which 
built on the ABI Code which went before it) and dealt with issues like the obligation to 
explain details of the policy to a potential customer before inception.  The GISC disputes 
resolution service dealt with complaints about intermediaries‟ non-compliance with the 
Codes.  The FOS only had jurisdiction if it determined that the intermediary was acting 
as agent of the insurer, in which case it could deal with the complaint as if it was brought 
against the insurer.  (Although there is not much evidence in O.N. of the FOS carefully 
analysing the broker relationship in terms of agency, as the courts do, although the 
question is addressed in the FOS Consumer Factsheet on Medical Non-Disclosure
140.)   
 
From 14/01/05, the following activities became regulated by the FSA and therefore fell 
within the FOS jurisdiction: 
 
1.  dealing in insurance contracts as agent; 
 
2.  arranging deals in insurance contracts; 
 
3.  advising on insurance contracts;   
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4.  assisting in the administration and performance of insurance contracts. 
 
Exceptions to this extension of the FOS jurisdiction are: 
 
1.  travel agents when the insurance is sold as part of a package holiday
141 
(although as from 1 January 2009 this category was added to the FSA regulation 
and FOS jurisdiction
142); 
 
2.  retailers when selling extended warranties on goods; 
 
3.  loss adjusters – but not loss assessors who act for customers in relation to 
insurance claims;  
 
4.  the handling of insurance claims on behalf of insurers under a delegated 
authority. 
 
The FOS has this jurisdiction over events which occurred on or after 14/01/05, and, if it 
is a “relevant transitional complaint”, also over events which occurred before this date.  A 
relevant transitional complaint is where 
 
1.  the firm was a member of the GISC at the time of the event complained about; 
 
2.  the complaint would previously have been covered by the GISC Dispute 
Resolution Facility; 
 
3.  the complainant is an individual who is acting otherwise then solely for the 
purposes of his business;  AND 
 
4.  the firm became regulated by the FSA on or after 14/01/05. 
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For a relevant transitional complaint, the FOS will take into account what the GISC might 
have decided.  The FOS will not have jurisdiction over any complaints that the GISC was 
already handling before 14/01/05. 
 
In a survey of FOS cases carried out by the current Law Commission (“L.C.”)
143, 25 out 
of the 190 consumer (and 8 out of the 12 small business) cases involving non-disclosure 
or misrepresentation involved allegations about what the intermediary said or did during 
the sales process.  The FOS does not seem to have a policy as to whether it will 
consider that the intermediary is the agent of the insured, (as is usually the case in law) 
so that even an innocent insured is penalised by the fraudulent or negligent non-
disclosure of the intermediary through avoidance of the policy.  The position has not 
been set out in Ombudsman News, and was not clear to the L.C. when it examined a 
further sample of FOS cases selected specifically because agency issues had been 
raised.  The FOS also does not mention relevant caselaw, even if it applies the dicta
144.  
However, the L.C. comments that a consumer who takes an intermediary case to the 
FOS may have a better chance of recovering from the insurer than under the law.   
 
The FOS seems usually to look at the position in the round, asking whether the insured 
was entitled to rely on the intermediary‟s information, as if the intermediary is the 
insurer‟s agent.  In Case Study 23/12
145, the FOS allowed the insured to rely on the 
intermediary‟s letter which confirmed that the policy covered the swimming pool dome 
against storm damage, and that it was not reasonable for the insurer to expect the 
insured to check the policy to make sure that the intermediary was correct.  The insurer 
here met the claim, but refused to cover future loss.  If the intermediary is not the 
insurer‟s agent, it is not fair and is contrary to the law that the insurer should effectively 
be held accountable for his actions and mistakes. 
 
The 1957 Law Reform Committee advocated that an intermediary should be deemed the 
agent of the insurers for the purpose of formation of the contract, to avoid unfairness to 
the insured.  With the basic support of the FOS, the current L.C. originally proposed
146 
that for consumers and small businesses, (a) an intermediary should be the insurer‟s 
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agents for the purposes of obtaining pre-contract information, unless
147 the intermediary 
undertakes to search the market on the insured‟s behalf, and (b) an intermediary 
completing the proposal form should be the insurer‟s agent for this purpose too
148 if they 
would otherwise be considered the insurer‟s agent.  The L.C.‟s latest Policy Statement
149 
changes its position and provides one list of circumstances for when the intermediary will 
be considered the insurer‟s agent, and another for when he will be considered the 
insured‟s agent.  Hopefully the FOS would follow any changes made in the law in 
relation to intermediaries, especially as such change would be after years of discussion 
and consultation.   
 
1.19.5  Group schemes 
 
Under the IOB rules, group scheme beneficiaries could only bring a complaint with the 
policyholder‟s (ie the employer‟s) permission or if the policyholder brought the claim on 
their behalf.
150  As shown in Case Study 32/10
151, where the policy is for the employee‟s 
benefit, he may now complain to the FOS, even if the policy also benefits other 
employees.  And the FOS treats complaints by tenants whose interest is noted on a 
block building policy as if the tenant had arranged the insurance directly.
152  This 
parallels the current L.C.‟s proposals
153 that if the insurance would have been consumer 
insurance had the policyholder arranged it directly, any dispute about a 
misrepresentation would be determined according to the L.C.‟s proposals for consumer 
insurance.  However, there is still no FOS jurisdiction if the policy is for the benefit of the 
company rather than for the employee, such as if it is a “key man” policy (as was the 
position in Case Study 32/8
154), or if the employer is effectively reinsuring its own 
contractual liability to pay sickness benefits.  In such a scenario, the employer can only 
bring the complaint if it is a small enough business to be an eligible complainant.   
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The FOS will look at the policy wording and employment contract to see whether the 
scheme benefits the firm or the complainant.  The latter is likely if the benefits are paid or 
provided direct to him without the employer exercising any practical discretion over 
them, if the employee is involved in the claims process and if the employer is only 
contractually obliged to pay benefits to the employee if the insurer accepts the claim.   
 
1.19.6  Country 
 
The FOS covers activities of a firm carried on from an establishment in the UK
155 (not the 
Channel Islands
156).  The complainant‟s residence or nationality is not important.  In 
some circumstances, the FOS will have jurisdiction over activities carried out from 
another country within the EEA by a firm which falls under the FOS voluntary 
jurisdiction.
157  
 
FIN-NET
158 is a network of financial ombudsmen and consumer complaints 
organisations covering countries of the EEA.  The FOS is a member, and any financial 
dispute resolution body within the EEA can join if it meets certain standards set by the 
European Commission
159.  All members remain autonomous.  Under the scheme, 
members agree to direct a complainant to the appropriate organisation in the firm‟s 
country, co-operate with each other and exchange practical information (for instance 
relating to questions of law in the complainant‟s country).  However, the systems in 
these countries are not simply foreign equivalents to the FOS, as they are structured 
differently, with a different ambit of cover and a generally more legalistic approach.  
Some 
160 have no organisation that will deal with insurance disputes.  Some
161 have 
different ones according to which type of insurance is involved.  None seem to be 
dealing with anything like as many complaints.  By comparison, the FOS is ahead in its 
development. 
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1.20  Where the FOS may decline jurisdiction 
 
1.20.1  Legal proceedings and commercial judgment 
 
The IOB could not consider complaints about underwriting matters or where legal 
proceedings had been issued.  The FOS has discretion to consider such complaints if it 
feels that the insurer has breached race, disability or sexual discrimination legislation or 
an industry code or agreement.  Non-compliance with a code indicates that the firm is 
unlikely to be making an appropriate use of its commercial judgment.  However, the FOS 
will dismiss without consideration of merits a question that it considers involves a firm‟s 
legitimate exercise of commercial judgment, for instance in relation to refusing to insure 
a complainant, increasing the premium or applying special conditions to the policy.  So in 
Case Study 23/13
162, the FOS determined that the insurer was entitled to change its own 
underwriting guidelines and decide not to offer renewal of car insurance.   
 
1.20.2  Claims management services 
 
Claims management providers charge the consumer either a fee or a share of the 
compensation in return for their services.  The Compensation Act 2006 provides rules 
and a code of conduct for the provision of certain claims management services and from 
6 April 2007, it became an offence to provide such services without specific authorisation 
or exemption.  The FOS does not have jurisdiction over claims management providers: 
the Ministry of Justice is the regulator.
163 
 
1.21  The relationship between the FOS and the FSA 
 
There is a Memorandum of Understanding between the FOS and the FSA
164 which sets 
out that both are operationally independent, but they need to co-operate.  An example of 
co-operation is the format and content of the publication of complaints data from the 
respective organisations.
165  The FOS is accountable to the FSA in certain respects, and 
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the FSA is answerable to the Treasury and to Parliament.  Part XVI FSMA provides for a 
statutory ombudsman scheme for financial services and sets out the broad framework 
for the scheme and the respective responsibilities of the FSA and FOS. 
 
Among other things, the FSA is responsible for approving the FOS budget, making rules 
about the scope of the FOS compulsory jurisdiction, approving rules about the scope of 
its voluntary jurisdiction, making rules about the funding of the compulsory jurisdiction, 
setting the levy blocks and applicable tariffs and approving the FOS rules about case 
fees.   
 
The FOS is responsible for operating the scheme, appointing the ombudsmen, making 
rules of procedure about dealing with complaints
166, the award of costs and the levying 
of case fees, making arrangements for the voluntary jurisdiction, recommending an 
annual budget for FSA approval and reporting to the FSA on the discharge of its 
functions. 
 
The FOS will provide the FSA with further detailed and specific information about a 
complaint where: 
 
1.  the circumstances of the case call into question a firm‟s fitness and propriety, 
whether a person is “fit and proper” to carry out the relevant function or if a 
criminal offence or serious regulatory contravention has occurred; 
 
2.  it appears appropriate for the FSA to consider using one or more of its regulatory 
tools; 
 
3.  a firm has failed to comply with an award made by an ombudsman; 
 
4.  a firm has without reasonable excuse failed to comply with a requirement to 
provide information.  
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The FSA and the FOS will try to ensure that any rules or guidance are not inconsistent 
with the principles of fairness and reasonableness applied by the FOS, and with the 
statutory objective of the FOS to resolve disputes quickly and with minimum formality. 
 
The FSA and FOS may also decide jointly that an issue raises wider implications, based 
on whether it is a new issue and whether it affects a large number of consumers or firms, 
the financial integrity of a firm, interpretation of an FSA rule or guidance, or a common 
industry practice.  The FSA may seek a regulatory solution, offer the FOS material for 
consideration or it may decide that it does not need to be involved at all. 
 
For instance, the FOS received a number of complaints about long-term care insurance 
in late 2004, and raised the matter with the FSA under the wider implications process.  
The FSA decided that the mis-selling aspects were best dealt with by the FOS on a case 
by case basis, incorporating its findings into the FSA‟s normal supervisory work.  It dealt 
with the review clause aspect by producing in May 2005 a Statement of Good Practice 
relating to the fairness of terms in consumer contracts with which it expects firms to 
comply.  The FSA felt that the FOS should liaise with the FSA over the number and 
nature of complaints received about these contracts, so that the FSA can take regulatory 
action against firms with poor standards of advice and complaints handling. 
 
Another part of the wider implication process is where a firm (not a consumer) can 
request that the matter be treated as a test case before the court under DISP 3.3.5R 
(see above).
167  Once the court path is chosen, the entire case falls to be dealt with by 
the court.  Once the court decision is made on any test point, the FOS must take 
account of it as it must any relevant law under DISP 3.6.4R. 
 
1.22  OFT
168 
 
The OFT is a non-ministerial government department established by statute and 
accountable to Parliament.  The FSA and the OFT have different, but complementary 
powers and statutory objectives.  OFT is the licensor and regulator for consumer credit, 
the FSA for other financial services.  The OFT and FSA have a Concordat which sets 
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out the division of responsibilities between them in relation to the Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (“UTCCR”).  Broadly, the FSA considers the 
fairness of standard terms in financial services contracts issued by FSA-authorised firms 
for FSA-regulated activities and the OFT considers the fairness of standard terms in all 
other financial services contracts.  There is a Memorandum of Understanding between 
the OFT and the FOS
169.  The OFT joined the wider implications process in June 
2007.
170 
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2.  RESEARCH QUESTION:  Should the FOS apply the law strictly 
 
2.1  History 
 
Membership of the IOB was voluntary, and began with only three insurers.  Any 
occasional rough justice for insurers was outweighed by the cheap and effective 
alternative dispute resolution service which the IOB offered, especially for small 
insurance disputes which were uneconomic to run in the court‟s litigation system, in a 
time before the Woolf reforms.  The IOB did not apply the law strictly, and the industry 
has become used to this, although the FOS is a different body to the IOB - bigger, with a 
statutory authority which is compulsory for all insurers.   
 
2.2  Considering the law 
 
Ombudsmen must consider the law at every complaint.  It is not clear that it does this 
effectively, even outside of areas such as warranties where it has created its own 
alternative approach, because:   
 
1.  The FOS internal information system, KIT, is not complete.  The FOS Annual 
Review 2007/8 noted that KIT covered only over 85% of the financial products 
and services about which the FOS commonly receives complaints.  It is unclear 
how effectively it is updated.  To be effective, it needs to include all relevant 
insurance law, be updated at least once a month by a lawyer and include the 
current FOS approach for each topic.  Ombudsmen‟s decisions should then have 
to refer specifically to the law, the relevant FOS approach and whether and why 
any decision differs from these.  There might then be less chance of the FOS 
unintentionally departing from the law or reinventing the wheel, as it frequently 
does, by going through a breach of code route to reach the same decision that 
the law would.  
 
2.  Adjudicators and ombudsmen are not all lawyers, or may not have current 
experience or speciality in the field in question.  This makes it harder for them to 
apply law, especially if KIT is not sufficiently clear and comprehensive, and if they 
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Parties should therefore ensure that they set out whatever law they want the FOS to 
consider, as they cannot assume that the FOS will know or apply it otherwise. 
 
2.3  Judicial review 
 
This lack of considering the law makes the FOS vulnerable to attack by judicial review.  
But it is not obvious that there would be a flood of judicial review applications if the FOS 
were obliged to apply the law strictly, as that option is rarely economic for insurers and 
insureds rarely take their complaints onto the courts.  Perhaps if the FOS were required 
to apply the law strictly, the role of the independent assessor could be modified so that 
he could answer whether the law had been applied strictly, and if not, refer it back to the 
Ombudsman. 
 
2.4  Certainty and consistency 
 
Certainty is the most important reason for the FOS to apply the law strictly.  It should be 
possible to anticipate and advise on an outcome and to rely on clear, fair policy terms.  
There should not be a difference depending on whether a matter is brought before a 
court or the FOS.  An outcome is not predictable if it is dependent on the whim of the 
FOS, and on whether the FOS has developed, or changed, its approach in a particular 
area.  By not following the law strictly, even with the best intentions and safeguards in 
place, consistency in FOS decisions and certainty of outcome is much less possible than 
through the precedent system of the courts.   
 
2.5  Unfair terms 
 
Applying the law strictly does not necessarily mean that unfair policy terms would be 
applied.  The law protects insureds to some degree through its rules of interpretation, 
and it protects consumers particularly through UTCCR.  Business insureds should either 
understand insurance themselves or employ professionals who do, just as they would 
employ accountants for their books and lawyers for their legal work, and then either shop 
for appropriate cover or negotiate the terms as far as they can.  All insureds should 
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any other goods, and that if they do not consider the terms at all, without a 
misrepresentation, they can hardly complain if they are not as envisaged.  Both insureds 
and insurers should be able to rely on the fair, contracted terms of the policy as they 
could in a court, without the FOS deciding at random that they cannot.  
 
2.6  Law has been developed over many years 
 
Insurance law has been developed over hundreds of years of careful analysis.  How can 
an ombudsman simply choose not to apply it in the particular circumstances of a case?  
The FOS response is that the law is outdated and unduly harsh to policyholders because 
it has not been reformed to keep up with a changing society with different insurance 
needs; it is no longer something arranged in coffee houses for merchant shippers.  But 
that argument does not apply to much other than non-disclosure and warranties.  The 
fact remains that the FOS will substitute its own judgment even outside of these areas, 
to replace law which has already been fine-tuned by Parliament and the courts to 
balance the interests of insured and insurer.  An example is the Limitation Act which the 
FOS is not obliged to follow: it is not right that a firm should never be free from the threat 
of an unhappy customer. 
 
2.7  Law reform 
 
The law attempts to achieve justice in the majority of cases.  If it is consistently not doing 
so, then the remedy is law reform, not the FOS trying to deal with the problem by itself, 
on a piecemeal basis as it receives complaints.  The creation of the FOS and other 
industry initiatives like statements of practice have arguably delayed the implementation 
of statutory amendments to the law which would have addressed many of its 
shortcomings.  For if the perception is that the FOS is protecting the most vulnerable, 
what incentive is there for law reform? 
 
There is a history of criticism of the law of non-disclosure and warranties, with several 
prominent calls for reform of insurance law, all slightly different from the proposals from 
the current L.C., and none of which have been implemented, including: 
 Judith Summer: PhD April 2009  44 
1.  The Law Reform Committee of 1957
171 
 
2.  The L.C. Report 1980
172 
 
3.  The National Consumer Council Report 1997 
 
4.  The Pat Saxton Memorial Lecture 2001 given by Lord Justice Longmore 
 
5.  The British Insurance Association Report 2002 
 
There is a need for reform, but the FOS cannot do this haphazardly, unofficially and 
unmonitored by itself, especially as it only touches a small proportion of people. 
 
2.8  Those that the FOS cannot help 
 
The FOS jurisdiction does not cover everyone or everything.  In particular: 
 
1.  Medium to large businesses cannot bring a complaint even though they may 
have no more insurance knowledge or negotiation power than a small business 
which can; 
 
2.  Awards over £100,000 are non-binding and insurers do not always accept them; 
 
3.  Vulnerable consumers who do not bring their complaint to the FOS
173, because 
they do not understand the system or their rights, they believe that it would be 
pointless, they find it too stressful to fight, or they are too ill.
174  Without the law to 
protect them, they are especially vulnerable to financial businesses who do not 
follow the FOS approach, either unknowingly, or, more worryingly, deliberately, 
hoping not to get caught, or not to get caught too often.   
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4.  Disputed claims where witnesses need to be cross-examined. 
 
2.9  Self-regulation and the FOS system as a substitute for law reform 
 
The industry has successfully resisted law reform to the draconian consequences of 
avoidance for non-disclosure and breach of warranties through promises of self-
regulation for consumer insurance: 
 
1.  In 1977, as part of the deal to exempt insurance contracts from the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977 (“UCTA”), the British Insurance Association (the 
predecessor to the ABI) and Lloyd‟s issued a Statement of General Insurance 
Practice (“SGIP”) and a Statement of Long-Term Insurance Practice (“SLIP”).  
The Statements purported to represent current industry practice, but provided no 
sanctions for non-compliance.  They required insurers to ask clear questions 
about material matters and put warnings in proposal forms of the duty of 
disclosure and the consequences of non-disclosure.  SGIP required actual 
inducement before avoiding as a result of an innocent misrepresentation or non-
disclosure.  SLIP required the insurer not unreasonably to reject a claim.  Brokers 
were regulated through the Insurance Brokers (Registration) Act 1977
175. 
 
2.  The Government agreed not to implement the L.C.‟s 1980 report, if the 
Statements of Practice were strengthened.  However, unless a complaint 
reached the IOB/FOS, there was still no sanction for non-compliance.  The 1986 
version of SGIP remained in force until 14 January 2005, when the FSA 
introduced ICOB, itself replaced by ICOBS on 6 January 2008. 
 
3.  Meanwhile, in 1981 the IOB was established to decide complaints in a “fair and 
reasonable” way.  It might never have been born if the L.C.‟s 1980 
recommendations had been implemented. 
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4.  The General Insurance Standards Council (“GISC”) was established in July 2000 
as a voluntary regulator with one code for consumers and one for business 
insurance.  These Codes also had limited sanctions and were replaced by ICOB. 
 
5.  In February 2006, the ABI issued guidance on the design and wording of 
proposal forms for life and health insurance, (“AFD”), and SLIP became its 
addendum.  However, AFD is not binding in law on insurers. 
 
It cannot be right that a consumer has to rely in the first instance on the forbearance of 
an insurer in not applying the law, and then on a patchwork of confusing and sometimes 
conflicting self-regulation, which has muddled even insurers, and is only enforced if a 
complaint is brought before the FOS, and even then only if the FOS thinks it fair. The 
FOS has developed its own guidance overlaying the Statements/ Codes which may 
differ from them, eg in allowing avoidance of only the most serious negligent 
misrepresentations (rather than all of them), and providing a remedy for innocent non-
disclosure whether or not there has been a claim, (rather than only if there has been a 
claim).  It says that it continues the tradition of the IOB in applying the spirit of UCTA.
176  
Presumably this is so when it uses its reasonableness discretion, although there is 
limited or no reference to the Act in its various reported case studies. 
 
It also cannot be right that whilst small businesses can complain to the FOS, and may in 
reality be similar to consumers, they cannot rely on the Codes/ Statements or ICOBS 
which only protect consumers, other than in the limited circumstances when the FOS 
deems them as consumers in a breach of warranty situation.  If there are to be 
differences in the treatment of consumers and businesses, surely this should be the 
result of much debated and considered law reform rather than as a consequence of the 
jurisdictional limits of the FOS and FSA. 
 
2.10  Accountability of the FOS  
 
The FOS has a wide discretion, but limited accountability for its decisions.  It sets its own 
policies towards complaints.  It is not accountable to the courts if an insured decides not 
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the law strictly in all the circumstances of the case, judicial review applications by 
insurers are relatively rare and are unlikely to succeed.  It must be hoped that even if an 
FOS decision is on occasion unfair for an insurer, and the insurer has a limited chance 
of redress at judicial review, overall the insurer benefits from the system in the 
management and legal costs it has saved though cases that would otherwise have gone 
to court, even taking into account the FOS levy and case fee.  However, this justification 
does not make the FOS any more accountable for decisions which do not follow a 
precedent system and which can be arbitrary and inconsistent.  It would be more 
accountable and less inconsistent if it had to apply the law. 
 
FOS decisions are not public, and the reported case studies sometimes are only roughly 
based on real complaints, although there are plans for many more case reports to be 
written and published.  Unless the FOS chooses to report on a point, its approach may 
not be clear and no comment or feedback can be made by the industry or academics.  
With anonymity in the reports, there is little incentive for firms to follow the FOS 
approach, although this may change with the proposed publication of complaints data 
against named institutions. 
 
2.11  FSA  
 
The FSA is the insurance regulator, so it should be enforcing its own codes, and 
disciplining under s.66 FSMA firms who are not complying.  However, in practice the 
FSA refers an individual‟s complaint to the FOS, and the FOS is effectively policing the 
Statements/ Codes, but only if a complaint is made.  It would be better if the FOS dealt 
with complaints by following the law, and referred to the FSA any breach of the Codes 
for sanction against the insurer involved and/or an award for the insured affected.  This 
would leave the FOS to apply the law strictly, without trying to develop its own set of 
alternatives.  Any injustice could be remedied by the regulator.  This might mean an 
increase in work for the FSA, but if the FOS has grown and developed at the rate it has 
to meet a growing demand for its services, so can the FSA.  For the FOS is a dispute 
resolution service, not an industry regulator and Parliament has chosen to keep the two 
functions distinct. 
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With its emphasis on complying with sales codes, the FOS sometimes seems to 
underestimate the ability of consumers to read and understand clear policy terms, and it 
sometimes holds insurers responsible for the insured‟s assumptions. 
 
2.12  How many FOS decisions would be unfair if the law was applied? 
 
Bearing in mind that the majority of adults has some form of house, car, travel or health 
insurance, the FOS does not receive that many insurance complaints.
177  In 2004/5, 
there were less than 90,000 per year, of which only about 13,500 were considered by 
adjudicators and 1,350 by ombudsmen.  Even at an expected peak in 2009/10, these 
figures will be 150,000, 50,000 and 5,000 respectively, which is tiny compared to the 
number of consumer insurance policies in the UK.  
 
It must only be some of these cases which would be different if the law were followed.  
This study shows that few of those reported would have a different outcome before a 
court.  Should the justice achieved by the few when the FOS does not apply the law be 
worth the uncertainty for the many, possibly at the price of the law never being amended 
as it needs to be for all those who do not or cannot complain to the FOS?  
 
Even if an obligation to apply the law strictly would result in an increase in judicial review 
applications, in view of the overall numbers of cases involved, this could not be so many. 
 
2.13  The contribution of the IOB and FOS  
 
The IOB/FOS experience has highlighted where the law needs to be amended.  The 
FOS policies have had a huge influence on the thinking of the current L.C. which 
proposes to incorporate “the best elements of ombudsman practice.”  However, previous 
law commissions have come to similar conclusions as the current one without the benefit 
of FOS input.  There is a continuing role for the FOS to decide approaches on issues 
with which the law has not yet had to deal.  It is to be hoped that the courts would follow 
the FOS in these, although knowledge of and respect for FOS approaches amongst 
practising lawyers is currently limited.   
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But now that the FOS jurisdiction is compulsory for insurers, perhaps it is time that the 
FOS became obliged to follow the law.  Or if insurance law is indeed amended, perhaps 
that would be the right time.  In the meantime, the FOS could still refer to the law and 
apply legal tools before relying on its own discretion or a breach of ICOBS.  If Parliament 
wanted to retain an element of FOS discretion, the FOS should only use it in the fewest 
of cases, where absolutely necessary, and not just to repair a bad bargain or to be used 
as the norm in certain situations where there has been a breach of ICOBS.  An FOS 
offering quick, cheap and informal dispute resolution is extremely valuable.  It would be 
more so if it also applied the law strictly. 
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3.  STATE OF THE ART and RESEARCH QUESTION ANSWERED:   
The FOS approach versus that of a court 
 
3.1  The FOS Approach To Evidence 
 
The FOS may require a party to provide information and documents within a specified, 
reasonable period, manner and form.
178  Failure to comply without reasonable excuse 
can result in a court finding a party in contempt.
179  As these powers originate directly 
from statute, albeit a different statute to other litigation or arbitration
180, the FOS is 
applying the law strictly.  
 
3.1.1  Admissibility 
 
The FOS can decide whether to admit evidence, and this decision may differ from a 
court‟s
181 even though this power is not based directly on a statute.  It does not seem 
right that the FOS should be able to do this.  The courts have developed systems for 
dealing with admissibility questions fairly and reasonably, and may impose costs 
sanctions on those who do not comply with the provisions of the Human Rights Act 
1998
182 in obtaining evidence.  For instance, in the personal injury case of Jean F Jones 
v University of Warwick
183, the Defendant‟s insurer entered the Claimant‟s home by 
posing as a market researcher.  The Claimant was filmed with a hidden camera.  The 
evidence was admitted, so that the Claimant could not make an exaggerated claim, but 
the Defendant was “punished” for obtaining the evidence in this underhand way by 
having to pay the costs of the admissibility question through to the Court of Appeal, even 
though it had won the admissibility point.  
 
The FOS should be empowered to deal with admissibility in the same way.  There is no 
provision in DISP which even ensures that the person who decides the case has not 
seen evidence which is not admitted. 
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3.1.2  Standard of record keeping 
 
The FOS will expect a higher standard of record keeping from firms than from 
consumers.  Firms must be able to produce records specific to the consumer as well as 
standard documents and marketing material.  If a specific letter is unavailable, the FOS 
may accept a copy of the relevant standard letter with a computer record showing that it 
was actually generated.  In Case Study 13/07
184, the complaint was upheld because the 
insurer could not produce the signed proposal, so could not prove that there had been a 
non-disclosure.  This reflects the position at law, which requires the insured to prove his 
loss and the insurer to prove that the loss is not covered.
185 
 
However, the FOS stresses that a firm without documentation will not automatically lose 
the case.
186  The FOS will look at all available evidence to see what is most likely to 
have happened.  Its approach is sensible, much as a court‟s.  It will not allow a firm to 
put an insured to onerous levels of proof, so in Case Study 69/1
187, the request for 
original damp proofing documentation, even if that had been a requirement of the policy, 
was too onerous when copies were available and there was no question of the 
claimant‟s entitlement to policy benefits. 
 
3.1.3  Replying to requests for information 
 
The FOS may fix and extend time limits for evidence gathering
188 depending on what the 
party is required to do, and expects firms to reply promptly.  A party who cannot comply 
with the time limit should notify the FOS immediately that it realises.  A firm‟s undue 
delays may mean that the FOS will make a decision without the additional information 
and if the delay causes distress or inconvenience, the FOS may award the consumer 
compensation, whether or not the rest of the complaint is upheld.
189  If the complainant 
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fails to comply with a time limit, the FOS may proceed to the next stage of the process or 
dismiss the complaint.
190 
 
3.1.4  Confidentiality 
 
The FOS process is private.  Any information published will anonymise the parties.  In 
contrast, the court process is public.  Both systems have their respective merits, but the 
difference may influence an insured‟s choice of forum.   
 
However, FOS confidentiality is limited.  It may need to consult and pass on details to 
any relevant third party who would be able to illuminate matters.  It may pass information 
about firms to the FSA or any other regulatory or government bodies.
191  It will also 
disclose to the other party anything it receives about the complaint, unless it is asked to 
keep the information confidential and it considers that it should, for example, if there is a 
duty of confidentiality to a third party or the information relates to security precautions or 
is commercially sensitive.  The FOS may decide to release to the other party an edited 
version or a summary or description of the document in question.
192  But it will bear in 
mind that its statutory right to demand information overrides a party‟s duty of 
confidentiality to any third party.  
 
In Case Study 47/7
193, legal expenses insurers settled a case where the insured thought 
she would have achieved a better result at an employment tribunal.  The FOS found that 
the insurers had acted reasonably in relying on the solicitors‟ advice, but kept from her 
the solicitors‟ assessment which influenced their advice; that she would have made a 
poor witness. 
 
3.1.5  Written statements by insurers’ employees 
 
The FOS may ask the insurer to arrange for a signed statement to be taken from 
employees or ex-employees and the insurer must make reasonable efforts to comply.  
The statement should be in the employee‟s own words and should distinguish between 
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what he would usually have done and what he remembers doing in the particular 
instance.  If an important witness is unwilling to provide a statement, the FOS may 
dismiss the case because court may be the more suitable forum, as it can force a 
witness to give evidence.   
 
3.1.6  Recordings 
 
The FOS regards the recording of critical telephone calls as good industry practice and 
expects to be able to resolve disputes about what was said on the telephone by referring 
to these.  Without such recordings, the FOS will require the firm to set out why, on the 
balance of probabilities, its version of events should be accepted, not the insured‟s.  If it 
cannot, the FOS may give the insured the benefit of any doubt and/or conclude that 
there has been a genuine misunderstanding, in which case, the FOS will try to place the 
parties in the position they would have been in had the misunderstanding not occurred.  
So if a request for information or the response was uncertain, the FOS may review the 
claim as though the insured had given the correct information.   
 
In Case Study 18/01
194, the insurer alleged non-disclosure of seven previous claims, but 
the insured said that he was only asked about the last claim which he disclosed.  There 
was no tape recording of the telephone conversation, so the insurer could not establish 
that it had asked him clear questions about material matters.  The FOS found the 
insurer‟s note of a subsequent telephone conversation, which said that the insured had 
denied making any previous claims, did not show what had happened at the sales point.  
The complaint was upheld.  To a cynical insurer, it may be surprising that the insured 
was given the benefit of the doubt.  However, this is really no more than a statement of 
the common law that the burden is on insurers to prove a non-disclosure. 
 
Evidence of a telephone conversation taped by a consumer without the insurer‟s consent 
might not be admitted in court, but might by the FOS.  In making its decision, the FOS 
would consider its relevance, how it was obtained, whether it breached a party‟s rights of 
privacy, whether participants were misled into saying something they would not 
otherwise have said and what was the other party‟s reaction to the evidence. 
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Similar considerations apply to video recorded evidence.  These are most often taken to 
assess an insured‟s medical symptoms.  In Case Study 40/4
195, the FOS told the insurer 
to show a video of the complainant to her doctors, who said she moved differently on the 
video to how she had moved in their consultations, which changed their conclusions as 
to what occupations she could undertake, and her complaint was rejected. 
 
3.1.7  Written versus oral evidence 
 
The FOS considers written evidence and will speak by telephone or in person to the 
parties to try to clarify and resolve issues.  It can hear oral evidence but will rarely do 
so.
196.  The FOS cannot cross-examine witnesses, so if this would be necessary, 
perhaps in fraud cases, it will decline jurisdiction and suggest the insured takes the 
matter to court, as it did in Case Study 48/7
197.   
 
3.1.8  Expert evidence 
 
The FOS will consider expert evidence provided, although it is only likely to award the 
complainant the expert‟s costs if the case could not have been proved otherwise.  In 
Case Study 28/9
198, the FOS gave an award for distress and inconvenience, plus 
engineer‟s fees and interest, where the complainant had to instruct an engineer to prove 
that insurer-approved car repairs were not satisfactory.  Insurers ignore an expert report 
provided by their insured at their peril.  In Case Study 73/08
199 the FOS upheld the 
complaint and awarded the insured £750 for distress and inconvenience where insurers 
had with great delay continued to refuse the claim, even after receiving her expert‟s 
report as to cause of loss. 
 
The FOS contains staff with varied backgrounds and expertise, and also a specialist 
medical insurance team.  However, occasionally, as in Case Study 13/13
200, this will not 
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be enough and it has to choose an independent expert to report directly to it and to 
conduct either a paper review or an examination of the subject matter of the dispute.  
 
The FOS will review and question an expert‟s report, and not just accept its findings. In 
Case Study 65/7
201, its investigations directly contradicted the conclusions of the 
insurer‟s marine surveyor. The FOS had access in that case not only to the expert‟s 
report, but also to his subsequent correspondence with the insurer. 
 
If both sides agree to accept the conclusions of an independent expert, adjudicators or 
insurers may suggest instructing one, with insurers bearing the costs.  Insurers had 
offered this, and the adjudicator had concluded this was the best way to resolve the case 
of Tonkin v UK Insurance Ltd
202 before it went to court. 
 
3.1.9  Assessing conflicting medical evidence 
 
The FOS cannot diagnose a condition, but its specialist medical team will consider all 
the evidence to reach a view about the insured‟s state of health and ability to work, and 
how these relate to the policy coverage.   In Case Study 01/18
203, the medical evidence 
was that 3% vision remained in the eye in question, so the insurer would not pay for 
“loss of sight” under a travel policy, even though the insured for all practical purposes 
could not see out of that eye.  The FOS found that this constituted loss of sight.   
 
The FOS expects insurers to have investigated cases thoroughly before they are 
referred, and to have obtained any necessary medical reports.  Occasionally it will still 
need to instruct its own medical expert as it did in Case Study 24/02
204, in relation to 
what sort of work the insured was now capable.  The insured was awarded reduced, 
rather than no benefits as a result.  And in Case Study 13/04
205, the FOS expert report 
concluded that even though the insured was physically able to return to work, as it was 
such a stressful job, there was a very real risk of his heart problem returning.  The FOS 
considered that this was a foreseeable result of returning to work, so he was not fit to do 
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so and insurers should pay him the benefit under the policy plus interest on the back 
payments. 
 
Where there is conflicting evidence, but no FOS-appointed expert, the FOS will weight 
different medical opinions as follows: 
 
1.  A relevant specialist consultant commenting within his speciality will be preferred 
to a GP. 
 
2.  A doctor involved with the insured for a period of time, trumps one who has seen 
him once or twice. 
 
3.  A report based on a recent physical examination will be favoured over one based 
on a review of notes made after an earlier examination. 
 
4.  Most weight will be attached to the most recent reports. 
 
5.  Reports from independent commentators will carry more weight than those by 
the insurer‟s staff or observations by the insured. 
 
6.  Any special circumstances surrounding the report will be taken into account. 
 
7.  Reports from occupational physicians may help to form an overall picture, but are 
unlikely to overturn assessments made by consultants in the relevant speciality. 
 
8.  Capacity evaluation tests try to measure the insured‟s ability to carry out various 
activities.  They are not decisive and often produce findings inconsistent with 
other test results.  It may be difficult to distinguish between an insured 
exaggerating the effect of physical symptoms, and someone in so much pain that 
he is wary of exerting himself fully in these tests.  The FOS is unlikely to support 
insurers who, having agreed to pay benefits to an insured, subsequently use 
these test results as a sole reason to justify stopping payments. 
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9.  Serious inconsistencies between surveillance and other evidence will weaken the 
insured‟s case and reduce the weight of the medical reports.  However, video 
evidence does not usually produce serious inconsistencies: it only shows activity 
over a limited period and is rarely directly relevant to the dispute.  Performing one 
sort of activity does not mean the ability to carry out another.  Normally the FOS 
will favour medical evidence over video evidence.  It may ask the doctor who 
carried out the independent medical examinations to view the video evidence 
and comment on any inconsistency. 
 
3.1.10  Paying for medical reports 
 
The FOS sought the views of O.N. readers in July 2001 as to who should pay for 
medical reports.  In light of the responses, it wrote in O.N. January 2002 its general 
approach: 
 
1.  Firms‟ procedures should reflect the reality that delays can be expected in 
receiving reports from doctors. 
 
2.  Medical reports should only be requested where there is a clear need to confirm 
the policyholder‟s evidence. 
 
3.  Firms should pay for medical reports which the policyholder has consented to 
release to them.   
 
4.  However, a policyholder should pay for any medical report required primarily to 
prove that the claim is valid or should be validly continued, such cost to be 
reimbursed by insurers if the claim succeeds. 
 
5.  Requests for regular reports for low value, on-going claims may be onerous. 
 
6.  Insurers should pay for evidence which helps them decide whether a claim is 
excluded (for instance because of a pre-existing medical condition).  Insurers 
should handle such cases expeditiously, especially when the policyholder is 
being treated abroad, and sensitively. Judith Summer: PhD April 2009  58 
 
7.  Where claims are rejected or terminated on reasonable grounds, the policyholder 
should produce and pay for any new medical evidence that could support their 
appeal against that decision, subject to reimbursement by insurers if they 
succeed. 
 
The above reflect the common law‟s burdens of proof and seems fair.  
 
3.1.11  Conclusion 
 
The FOS is a unique dispute resolution system, so it is right that it has its own rules of 
evidence, supported by the teeth of the courts.  The point of the FOS as an alternative, 
quick and cheap dispute resolution service, would be defeated if it had to apply the Civil 
Procedure Rules and court standards of evidence.  Where it considers that a case needs 
a formal system with cross-examination, it will decline jurisdiction and suggest the matter 
is taken to court.  Other alternative systems, such as (especially non-construction) 
arbitration under the Arbitration Acts are so saddled with procedural and evidential 
requirements that the practitioner will prepare much as for litigation, at similar cost, 
taking a similar time.   
 
This thesis will argue that law should be applied to the substance of the disputes which 
come before the FOS, if not actually to the FOS approach to evidence.  However, for the 
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3.2  Policy Interpretations 
 
3.2.1  Rules of construction:  law versus FOS  
 
3.2.1.1 Precedent 
 
In the interests of certainty, precedent will be followed by a court where the meaning of a 
term has been established by judicial decision, unless the wording or context in question 
can be distinguished.  As Waller LJ said in Ramco (UK) Ltd v International Insurance Co 
of Hannover Ltd
206, 
 
“If a form of words has been in use for 80 years which describes one sort of insurance 
rather than the other, it would be meddlesome for this court to decide that the selected 
form of words do not achieve their intended purpose, unless there were some real 
reason for supposing that the form of words is unsatisfactory in practice.  The fact that 
the form of words is the subject-matter of a previous decision of this court is a 
compelling reason why the courts should not depart from that settled meaning…” 
 
Under the FOS regime, fair and reasonable in the particular circumstances is more 
important than certainty and following a court-set precedent (which it might not follow, 
and in practice may not know about).  Whilst the FOS aims at consistency, it is not 
obliged to follow its own decisions either.  There are no reported examples where the 
FOS refers to a legal precedent on construction which it refuses to follow.  In fact, other 
than the Rohan Investments Ltd v Cunningham
207 definition of flood, it does not refer to 
any cases at all in this respect, although precedent forms part of the law which the FOS 
is obliged at least to consider.  It is unclear how much legal precedent is set out in the 
FOS internal information system on which its officers rely. 
 
3.2.1.2 Ordinary and natural meaning within the factual matrix 
 
A court should interpret a policy to give effect to the intention of the parties, assuming 
that the parties intend the words to be given their “ordinary and natural meaning” taking 
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into account the factual matrix of the situation of the parties at the time of the contract.
208  
So “fire” will not include “explosion”.  Courts should not manipulate clear language to 
repair a bad bargain, even if the result is harsh and technical.  The court may imply a 
term if it is commercially necessary, unless an implied term would contradict an express 
one.
209  However, if it is clear from the background knowledge reasonably available to 
the parties that something has gone wrong in the drafting, so that the wording does not 
give the meaning intended, the court may also take account of other documents and 
market evidence (although not previous negotiations
210).  This is the so-called “factual 
matrix” surrounding the contract, the principles of which were set out by Lord Hoffmann 
in Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society
211, (giving credit 
to their development to Lord Wilberforce in Prenn v Simmonds
212 and Reardon Smith 
Line Ltd v Yngvar Hansen-Tangen)
213: 
 
 
“…(4)  The meaning which a document (or any other utterance) would convey to 
a reasonable man is not the same thing as the meaning of its words. The 
meaning of words is a matter of dictionaries and grammars; the meaning of the 
document is what the parties using those words against the relevant background 
would reasonably have been understood to mean. The background may not 
merely enable the reasonable man to choose between the possible meanings of 
words which are ambiguous but even (as occasionally happens in ordinary life) to 
conclude that the parties must, for whatever reason, have used the wrong words 
or syntax.  
 
(5)  The "rule" that words should be given their "natural and ordinary meaning" 
reflects the common sense proposition that we do not easily accept that people 
have made linguistic mistakes, particularly in formal documents. On the other 
hand, if one would nevertheless conclude from the background that something 
must have gone wrong with the language, the law does not require judges to 
attribute to the parties an intention which they plainly could not have had. Lord 
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Diplock made this point more vigorously when he said in The Antaios Compania 
Neviera S.A. v. Salen Rederierna A.B. 1985 1 A.C. 191, 201: 
 
". . . if detailed semantic and syntactical analysis of words in a commercial 
contract is going to lead to a conclusion that flouts business 
commonsense, it must be made to yield to business commonsense."       “ 
 
This concept balances the interests of reliance on the ordinary and natural meaning of 
the words with interpreting the contract in a way that the parties intended.  
 
Usually the FOS applies the ordinary and natural meaning, even if the insured has not 
understood the position, as long as there has been no breach of a sales code.  In Case 
Study 73/07
214, the insured honestly misunderstood the extent of accidental damage 
cover, but there was no evidence of insurers misrepresenting the position at the point of 
sale, so the FOS agreed with insurers that accidental damage to a lawnmower was not 
covered, as it was not within the clear list of items included.  In Case Study 74/10
215, 
there was no clear definition in the policy of an exclusion for works carried out “on or at 
airports.”  It applied the ordinary meaning that a reasonable person would be likely to 
understand, rather than a statutory definition, and looked at the context of the wording to 
see what other exclusions were listed around it, so that “airport” did not include an RAF 
base.  It is to be welcomed that these more recent case studies show the FOS focusing 
on the clear wording of the cover in a technical way, much as a court would, and not 
muddling this with sympathy for the assured. 
 
The FOS may disregard the natural and ordinary meaning of a term in the interests of 
fairness, without referring to Lord Hoffmann‟s principles to establish the mutual intention 
of the parties.  In these circumstances, it must be trying to repair a bad bargain for the 
insured.  This is unfair to insurers who have not breached any sales code, but have 
clearly set out the cover and its price, to which the insured has agreed.  It makes a 
mockery of the certainty of clear language.  Three FOS examples follow: 
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In Case Study 07/10
216, cancellation cover clearly applied to illness of a relative, but the 
FOS required insurers to apply it to an unrelated next of kin when a priest was taken ill.. 
In Case Study 13/09
217, there was an exclusion for damage by animals, but the FOS felt 
that it should not apply when the insured‟s dog died and the carpet was stained.  And in 
Case Study 65/3
218, insurers were asked to treat the person giving hydrotherapy to a dog 
as if he was a member of a particular organisation as was specified in the policy, 
because he was the only qualified person within some hours travelling time, the 
treatment had been recommended by a vet and the dog had responded well. 
 
The result would probably have been different before a court in each of these examples.  
It does not seem right that the FOS should be able to override clear language when the 
insurer is not at fault, perhaps because it feels sorry for the insured.  It is going beyond 
the “factual matrix” principles of West Bromwich, which has not been mentioned in these 
or any other reported case studies, either by name or by reference to its principles, 
although that case is included in almost every legal judgment which involves 
construction
219.  Perhaps the case is not mentioned in KIT.  FOS construction decisions 
seem to be based more on gut reaction than careful analysis.  This may not give the 
fairest result.  The FOS considering “all the circumstances of the case” is not enough 
guidance when trying to interpret policy wording, and its discretion would not be stifled if 
it referred to West Bromwich at each decision.  
 
3.2.1.3 Context of the wording (as opposed to context of the surrounding circumstances) 
 
The statutory context of compulsory insurances may be relevant, so “accident” in a 
motor policy has a broader meaning than in another type of policy, and will include a 
deliberately caused crash by an insured vehicle.
220  The context of the position of the 
words within the policy will be important.  Unless specifically excluded, the eiusdem 
generis rule will take effect.  It limits the meaning of a general word if it is linked to a 
specific word, to the same genus as the specific word.   So, (emphasis added) 
“household furniture, linen, wearing apparel and plate “ was held to include household 
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linen, but not linen drapery goods bought on speculation.
221  The context of the type of 
insurance obtained will also be relevant, so that a clause in a property policy dealing with 
radioactive waste applied only to property damage, although out of context it might have 
seemed also so apply to consequential loss, which would have brought it outside of the 
insuring clause itself.
222  
 
The courts have used these tools over the decades to help construe terms.  The FOS 
would find them similarly useful if it used them properly and consistently.  In the reported 
case studies, there is little evidence of the FOS doing this, perhaps because it requires 
skills or experience which only the most senior insurance officers or lawyers experienced 
in the field might have, and these qualifications and experience are not required for FOS 
staff.  In Case Study 73/09
223, lead for household roof repairs and scrap metal were 
stolen from the insured‟s garden.  The insurer said these were outside cover for 
“household goods, valuables, personal money, deeds and documents, business 
equipment and personal belongings.”  The FOS mediated a settlement whereby the 
insurer paid only for the loss of the lead.  The FOS comment is that it was reasonable for 
the lead intended for household repairs to be covered under a household policy.  It does 
not mention the eiusdem generis rule or comment about whether the lead was included 
as “household goods” and the scrap metal excluded.  Without the context of the whole 
policy, it is not possible to comment on how the court would have interpreted this 
wording, but its approach would have been different, starting with the words, rather than 
the reasonableness of cover being provided, and dealing with the eiusdem generis rule. 
 
3.2.1.4 Technical Terms 
 
In law, a technical or standard meaning in the relevant trade will usually apply to a 
technical term, even if it could also have an ordinary meaning, unless there is some 
contextual or other reason for a different approach, such as where the assured is 
situated outside of the jurisdiction.  For example, the Court of Appeal in Commonwealth 
Smelting v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Ltd
224 gave “explosion” its technical 
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meaning, so that there was no explosion where a piece of metal caused the outer casing 
to shatter, as there was no physical or chemical reaction.   
 
The FOS is unlikely to uphold a special meaning which a consumer would not generally 
recognise, unless it has been brought specifically to the insured‟s attention before 
inception.  In Case Study 07/03
225, a bag with valuables was stolen from the locked boot 
of an unattended car.  These valuables were excluded from cover due to a wide and 
unusual definition given in the travel policy.  The FOS upheld the claim in part:  the 
exclusion was unusually onerous and had not been specifically drawn to the insured‟s 
attention at the sales point.   
 
The FOS tendency is to interpret a policy as it thinks a consumer might, even assuming 
it will recognise a technical term.  This may be harsh on insurers who should be able to 
rely on a technical meaning that may be common throughout the industry.  But by now 
they know what the FOS expects of them if they want to rely on a special meaning.  The 
difficulty comes when what is clear to insurers is not clear to a consumer, and then the 
FOS balance is toward the consumer. 
 
3.2.1.5 Reasonable construction 
 
There is an assumption in West Bromwich
226 that the parties do not intend an 
unreasonable result.  The more unreasonable the result, the less likely it was intended.  
Although the law does not construe a policy in accordance with the reasonable 
expectations of the insured, the courts try to construe terms in a way which gives the 
policy the purpose for which it was entered into.  Sometimes the wording will be so 
inappropriate that the court will have to construe a meaning which is not commercially 
sensible.  The court will also try to construe a policy to make it an effective legal 
document, with a meaning for any obscure term so that a clause is not void for 
uncertainty.
227   
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The FOS does not seem to struggle so hard to rely on the wordings, and will impose 
whatever meaning it considers fair and reasonable in the circumstances, even if that 
meaning is contrary to the obvious meaning of the wording.  It should not be re-writing 
policies like this to repair a bargain. 
 
3.2.1.6 Contra proferentem rule 
 
Where a term is ambiguous, the contra proferentem rule means that it must be 
construed against the party who drafted it, usually the insurer, so exclusions would be 
construed narrowly.  If the context, definitions or factual matrix make the meaning clear, 
it will not become ambiguous just because a literal construction would produce an 
unexpected and irrational result.
228  However, such a result might indicate that the 
meaning is not actually obvious and that looking at the policy as a whole, the contra 
proferentem rule should apply.  This occurred in the Court of Appeal‟s interpretation of a 
warranty that the ship be crewed “at all times” in Pratt v Aigaion Insurance Company SA, 
The Resolute
229. The court at first instance
230 applied the obvious meaning, that there 
had to be a crew on board at all times, except when it was impossible.  Although this 
might be expensive, commercial considerations were irrelevant.  The Court of Appeal, 
overturning the decision, held that the primary purpose of the warranty was to protect the 
vessel against navigation hazards, so was only meant to operate when the ship was 
moving.  “At all times” was therefore an ambiguous phrase, to be interpreted contra 
proferentem against the insurers.  So a crew member had to be on board “at all times” 
when the warranty was in effect and the ship was moving, but not when it was safely 
moored. 
 
The FOS seems to use the contra proferentem rule quite frequently without a particularly 
technical analysis of the policy, although often in circumstances where a court might 
apply the rule too
231.  Unlike a court, the FOS might also do this where the layout of a 
policy is confusing, for instance where exclusions are printed on different pages to the 
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paragraphs they modify or where wordings in schedules, policies and marketing material 
are contradictory.   
 
In Case Study 18/15
232, a baby quad-bike was stolen.  The insured‟s assumption that the 
bike was covered under the household policy was reasonable in view of the explanatory 
leaflet, even though the policy contradicted this.  She was entitled to the benefit of the 
wording that was most favourable to her.
233  This conclusion is surely “fair and 
reasonable,” but the FOS did not seem to analyse the wordings in a legal or technical 
way, and rarely seems to.  A court might well have come to the same conclusion with a 
careful analysis, finding firstly that the leaflet formed part of the contract, then, looking at 
the policy as a whole, deciding that the leaflet should be given priority, and/or finally 
applying the contra proferentem rule in the insured‟s favour where the meaning of the 
policy was unclear, and maybe also considering whether there had been an estoppel – a 
misrepresentation by insurers as to what was covered on which the insured relied, and 
was entitled to rely upon, to her detriment.  
 
Confusion as to which policy limits apply to which loss can result from poor sales 
performance and an unclear wording of the confirmation details, as in Case Study 
04/09
234, or because the policy wording is simply confusing, as in Case Study 04/14
235.  
In both cases, the insurer had to meet the claim up to the highest limit.  This is really no 
more than an application of the contra proferentem rule, and a court would probably 
have come to the same conclusions. 
 
Even if a term is unclear, the FOS may require this to make a difference to whether the 
insured would have taken out the policy before it goes against the insurer.  In Case 
Study 71/05
236, the insured was likely to have taken out the policy however clear the 
particular term complained about was, so the complaint was not upheld.  This would not 
be the court‟s approach.  The natural and obvious meaning of a clear term, or adoption 
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of the contra proferentem rule if the term is unclear, applies whatever the consequences, 
and whatever the motives for taking out the policy.  If the complaint is that the term is 
unfair, then the FOS should look at the law on unfairness. 
 
3.2.1.7 Policy to be looked at as a whole 
 
A policy needs to be looked at as a whole to give effect to the plain and obvious intention 
of the parties and to try to give every clause some meaning, although a word may be 
ignored where it has plainly been included in error.  This approach was key to the Court 
of Appeal decision in Seele Austria GmbH & Co KG v Tokio Marine Europe Insurance 
Ltd
237.  If there are conflicting or redundant clauses, a court will decide which should be 
given priority.  Words specifically added will have priority over standard terms, and a 
later document will have greater weight where a contract is contained in more than one 
document.  There is no rule that large print is to be preferred to small print or that a 
clause can be ignored simply because it is difficult to read, although this reasoning may 
now have been superseded by the principle that unusual or onerous terms must be 
brought to the attention of the other party.(see below).  Recitals are relevant only to 
construe an ambiguous term.
238   
 
In practice, FOS policy analysis is limited in this regard.  However, it has set out its 
approach to misleading policy (or associated leaflet) headings, especially where less 
cover is provided than other policies with a similar title.  Unlike a court, the FOS 
considers that the customer may rely, at least to some extent, on the policy headlines.  
The FOS will look at what a reasonable person would have concluded about the nature 
of the cover from the information available.  If a wider cover could reasonably have been 
expected, it will conclude that the firm has not adequately explained the main features of 
the policy or ensured that it is suitable for the policyholder‟s needs, and will allow 
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avoidance ab initio with a return of premium, or, where better alternative cover is readily 
available, tell the insurer to handle the claim as if the unusual and/or misleading 
restrictions did not apply. 
 
An example is Case Study 18/13
239.  The upholstery on a sofa came loose.  The 
description on the first page of the extended warranty was “for upholstery” but insurers 
said the terms only covered structural damage to the sofa.  There was no special 
definition of “upholstery”, and none communicated to the insured, so the FOS applied its 
ordinary meaning.  The insured would not have bought the policy if he had realised how 
restrictive the cover was, so the FOS required insurers to pay the claim for upholstery as 
if the cover was not restricted, plus £100 for maladministration.  The FOS seems to have 
assumed that the insured relied on the heading over the wording, when he may not have 
looked at either, but taken out the policy believing that everything that could go wrong 
with the sofa would be covered.  It is unlikely that a court would have allowed reliance on 
a heading over the actual terms, and would not have awarded maladministration.  
Although unlikely, a court might have found a misrepresentation that the policy covered 
upholstery, coupled with reliance on that misrepresentation and an entitlement to rely on 
it, leading to the insured acting to his detriment, which would estop insurers from 
refusing the claim. 
 
However, the FOS will not permit an obvious “try-on” under this head.  In Case Study 
18/25
240, the FOS found that the policy meaning was clear from the policy‟s title.  So it 
did not accept that because of a lack of explanation at the sales point, the insured 
thought that the policy covered any personal accident at all, rather than only injuries 
involving a motor vehicle.  
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3.2.1.8 Subsequent conduct 
 
A contract must be construed as at the time it was made.  Subsequent conduct, such as 
an endorsement, cannot be admitted as an aid to the original wording.
241  There are no 
published case studies which turn on this point.  It is not clear that every FOS officer 
would be aware of this principle.  In any case, the FOS would ignore it if was unfair or 
unreasonable in the circumstances. 
 
3.2.1.9 Custom and Codes of Sale   
 
The custom of the market may assist construction and cause a court to imply a term.  A 
custom will be made out if it is notorious, universally followed and reasonable.  Although 
it can explain express words or give them a less obvious meaning, it cannot be permitted 
to contradict them.
242  The FOS would probably treat a custom as it does a technical 
term.  It is doubtful that the FOS would be aware of most market customs other than 
those reflected in the codes of sale.   
 
Sales, including internet sales
243, should conform with good practice as embodied in the 
FSA‟s ICOBS (and previously embodied in the ABI and GISC Codes, and ICOB).  The 
courts are not required to take account of these codes, unless and to the extent that they 
set out a custom.
244  The court‟s tendency is not to focus much on sales at all, but more 
on the wording, unless dealing with misrepresentation and also in the few cases where 
Interfoto applies (where an unusual or onerous term should have been brought to the 
attention of the other party) (see below).  
 
If poor marketing or sales techniques in contravention of the codes significantly reduces 
or changes the cover which the insured legitimately expects, and the insured is 
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prejudiced, the FOS may require the insurer to meet the claim even if the wording is 
clear, unless the insurer can show that it drew it to the customer‟s attention before the 
policy was sold.  The FOS will expect the insurer, rather than the insured, to produce 
contemporaneous information from the time of sale, including explanatory literature 
given to the customer before sale, a statement from the seller, a tape recording of any 
relevant telephone conversation or a saved web page from the time of sale.  Telephone 
or on-line sales should preferably be followed by a completed form sent out for checking 
and signature.   
 
In Case Study 01/04
245, an insured switched insurers when the salesperson assured her 
that the new cover would be the same as the old, and that her previous hip operation 
was irrelevant.  The insurer later refused to pay for a hip replacement, saying it was 
excluded as a pre-existing medical condition.  The insured said that she had never 
received any policy documents and was not aware of the exclusion.  The FOS accepted 
her story that she had been seriously prejudiced through bad sales as there was no 
sales point evidence from the insurer.  Insurers were required to pay the claim as if the 
exclusion did not apply, with an additional £500 for distress and inconvenience. 
 
In Case Study 13/08
246, an insured purchased loan protection insurance for his car, 
pointing out that he wanted this because of a heart attack eight years earlier.  He then 
suffered another heart attack and could no longer work.  Insurers refused critical illness 
cover relying on an exclusion for pre-existing conditions.  Although the insured had 
signed a declaration that he had read and understood the policy, he probably had not.  
The wording was complex and the exclusion was not highlighted in the policy or 
customer leaflet or specifically drawn to his attention as the FOS said it should have 
been, because it was particularly significant.  If the insured had known, he would not 
have bought the car or would have made other financial arrangements.  The insurer was 
required to pay the claim in full, along with the loan company‟s penalty charges and 
£300 for distress and inconvenience. 
 
The FOS approach to these two case studies is more akin to misrepresentation and 
estoppel, although Ombudsman News does not use this terminology.  A court would 
                                                         
245 O.N. January 2001 
246 O.N. January 2002 Judith Summer: PhD April 2009  71 
probably have concluded similarly using reasoning based on these legal principles rather 
than codes of sale, and perhaps differing in respect of the awards for distress and 
inconvenience.  
 
The FOS has noted a particular problem in sales and marketing with health-related 
products, extended warranties, payment protection and travel insurance.  These 
products are often sold by untrained staff who do not understand or describe them 
properly, with unclear leaflets in support and without key features being pointed out to 
customers.  The OFT investigated poor sales practice in payment protection insurance 
following a “super-complaint” by Citizens Advice
247 and the FOS referred it under the 
wider implications process in July 2008.  Since September 2007, the FOS has received 
more than 500 of these complaints every week, of which the 80% uphold rate is 
unusually high.
248  Examples follow. 
 
(a)  Payment protection insurance 
 
In Case Studies 62/5, 62/6 and 62/8
249, lenders mis-sold payment protection policies by 
not highlighting in the documentation their key features
250 and there was no record of the 
initial conversations.  The lenders were required to refund the full amount of the premium 
plus all the interest that the complainants had paid on this amount.  In Case Study 
62/9
251, insurers were required to pay the insured as if the misleading exclusion did not 
apply.  The exclusion was for unemployment caused by dismissal (whereas 
unemployment through redundancy was covered).  The insured had wanted, and 
believed she had obtained, cover for all types of unemployment.  Whilst the full terms 
and conditions of the policy clearly stated the position, the FOS found that it was 
misleading that the insurer did not highlight the exclusion and it was not mentioned at all 
in the policy summary which referred only to unemployment.  Interfoto, mistake and 
misrepresentation arguments with all these cases may well have succeeded at court and 
produced a similar result. 
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In Case Study 71/1
252, insurers had to return the premium with interest where the 
insured had not been told that the payment protection policy was an optional extra when 
obtaining his credit card, or what the cost or benefit of the policy was.  The agent had 
filled out the application form, ticking the box that said that the insured wanted the 
insurance, and the insured had just signed where the agent had marked.  The FOS 
found no evidence that he had been told anything about the cover.  The fact that the 
premium was itemised on his monthly bank statements did not indicate that the 
insurance was optional.  The FOS noted that the writing in different pens and styles in 
the application form supported the insured‟s story and that the insured‟s age (19 years) 
and limited financial experience was relevant to what he would know.  In terms of law, 
however, these factors would all go towards questions of misrepresentation and 
reliance, and the result would probably have been the same if this was the insurer‟s 
agent. 
 
(b)  Travel insurance 
 
In Case Study 07/07
253, the insured tried to cancel her holiday, but had inadvertently 
filled out the proposal form so that the insurance did not start until the first day of her 
holiday.  The travel agent had not advised her.  The FOS asked the insurer to meet the 
claim without admitting liability, but without paying interest or her GP‟s fee for completing 
the claim form.  In Case Study 76/09,
254 the insurer had to pay holiday cancellation costs 
with interest, even though the policy did not start until the first day of the holiday, 
because the evidence of the recording of the sale showed that the insurer said that it 
was suitable for her to start the annual policy on the date of the start of the first trip 
without explaining the consequences.  A court would have read the contract literally for 
both cases (subject to a possible misrepresentation by insurers in the latter case), and in 
the interests of certainty, the cover would not start until the policy said it did.  By 
contrast, in Case Study 36/10
255, cover ran from the day of travel, so did not cover the 
family for cancellation of the holiday when the father died.  The online sales process was 
straightforward with clear instructions, and with a warning that cancellations would only 
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be covered from the date that the insured asked cover to begin.  Therefore the FOS felt 
that the insurer‟s offer of a goodwill sum towards the cancellation costs was more than 
fair.  But was this offer made only in light of Case Study 07/07?  And whose agent was 
the intermediary?   
 
(c)  Extended warranties 
 
In these policies, the FOS may find unfair any complex claims procedure with strict time 
limits which have not been drawn to the customer‟s attention.  In Case Study 01/14
256 it 
found it unacceptable and inappropriate that largely procedural obstacles - a 
requirement to register within 21 days of purchase before a claim could ever be made - 
should be placed in the way of policyholders.  The insurer was ordered to issue the 
insured with a certificate of registration and to pay the insured £25 for the costs of 
pursuing the complaint.  This might be a classic Interfoto situation at law. 
 
(d)  Unsuitable cover 
 
Care must be taken at the point of sale to ensure the suitability of policies or eligibility of 
prospective policyholders.  In accordance with the relevant sales code, the FOS expects 
the seller to record what the insured discloses, ask questions to determine suitability and 
eligibility, and point out the main features and relevant restrictions.  If the insurer fails to 
ensure that sellers meet these requirements, the FOS may consider that the insurer has 
waived any right it might have to avoid providing cover.  Without saying so, this makes 
such a seller the insurer‟s agent.  In Case Study 01/05
257, a policy excluded medical 
treatment abroad, although the insurer knew that the insured lived abroad.  The insurer 
settled the claim as if the exclusion did not apply.  In Case Study 76/08,
258 the 
applicant‟s travel companion was not eligible for cover because she lived abroad, but as 
the travel agent had not checked eligibility and had not enquired further when her 
address was left blank, and nor had the insurer, the claim had to be paid as if there was 
cover.  In Case Study 76/11
259, the insured paid for an extension of cover, without 
insurers explaining that a base cover also needed to be purchased.  This was not clear 
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from the documentation.  Insurers had to pay the claim as if the base cover had been 
purchased, subject to the additional premium of the base cover, as they should have 
ensured that the insured purchased the suitable policies in the first place. 
 
However, if the insured has not been prejudiced because he could not have obtained a 
suitable policy elsewhere, then the remedy will be to refund all premiums since inception 
of the first unsuitable policy, with interest, rather than to pay the claim.  This happened in 
Case Study 24/04
260, where the sale of an unsuitable income protection policy also 
resulted in an award of £250 for distress and inconvenience  
 
The problem of unsuitable policies occurs especially in the context of loan protection 
insurance.  Case Studies 71/02, 71/03 and 71/04
261 provide examples.  The policies‟ 
cost and flexibility were unsuitable in light of the financial circumstances and 
employment status of the respective complainants.  With proper explanations, they might 
have realised this.  A written summary is not enough on its own as it does not 
adequately highlight the limited cover.
262  The FOS required the loans to be recalculated 
as if the complainants had not bought the insurance, with the part of the premium 
already taken to be paid back with interest.  In Case Study 71/02, the lender was also 
asked to look at assisting the complainants with a wider settlement of the debt, including 
waiving its fees for overdue loan repayments.  In Case Study 71/04 the lender was also 
asked to pay a modest sum for distress and inconvenience. 
 
The FOS does not deal, in these or other cases, with the issues between the insurance 
company and the lender which result from the FOS determinations.  The implication is 
that the insurance is effectively reversed or avoided, with the insurer being placed back 
into the position it was before and the lender having to pay the interest and any distress 
and inconvenience. 
 
The law would be more likely to consider these situations and other FOS unsuitable 
cover/ breach of sale code cases, under misrepresentation and estoppel.  It would be 
better for the FOS to rely on these well-established principles, especially as its own 
approach to misrepresentation provides wider remedies than a court.  It would not then 
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have to rely on breaches of sales codes and try to re-invent the wheel in finding reasons 
to make decisions. 
 
3.2.1.10  Incorporation 
 
An existing document may be incorporated into the policy by express or implied 
reference.  A basis of the contract clause will incorporate a proposal form and turn the 
answers it contains into express warranties.
263  The FOS does not recognise this sort of 
express warranty (see “Warranties” below). 
 
3.2.1.11  Deletions 
 
In a recent case on deletions, Mopani Copper Mines Plc v Millennium Underwriting 
Ltd
264, Christopher Clarke J concluded that the tenor of the diverse authorities was that, 
it was illegitimate to use deleted words as an aid to construction unless the deletion 
showed what the parties had agreed that they did not agree and there was ambiguity in 
the words which remained.  There has been no FOS report on point, so it is unlikely that 
it has developed its own approach.  However, it may not be aware of Mopani, and would 
be more likely to decide the point on the basis of a subjective fair and reasonable gut 
reaction than on the law.   
 
3.2.1.12  Onerous and unfair terms 
 
UCTA does not apply to insurance contracts, although the FOS applies its spirit.  
However insurance contracts are subject to the common law rule set out in the Court of 
Appeal in Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd
265, and consumer 
contracts are also subject to the UTCCR.
266   
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(a) Interfoto 
 
The Interfoto rule is that particularly onerous or unusual terms will not be given effect 
unless expressly brought to the attention of the other party.  In Interfoto, transparencies 
were delivered in an envelope which also contained the delivery note setting out the 
terms.  The onerous term charged £5 per transparency per day, whereas the normal rate 
would have been £3.50 per transparency per week.  Bingham LJ said,  
 
“…the more outlandish the clause, the greater the notice which the other party, if 
he is to be bound, must in all fairness be given.”   
 
Although the Defendant would have seen the delivery note with its small but visible 
lettering and recognised that it probably contained contractual terms, this would only 
have bound it to conditions so displayed which were common terms regularly 
encountered in the business – even without reading them.
267.  But the onerous terms in 
the delivery note were not binding as they had not fairly and reasonably been brought to 
the Defendant‟s attention and there had been no discussion of terms  Some clauses 
“would need to be printed in red ink on the face of the document with a red hand pointing 
to it before the notice could be held to be sufficient.”
268  The Defendant was required to 
pay only what the usual rate should have been, as determined by the evidence.   
 
In practice the courts tend not to apply Interfoto, but distinguish it saying that the term is 
not unusual or onerous enough for Interfoto to apply
269, or finding that it has been 
expressly brought to the attention of the other party.
270 The courts seem to prefer the 
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certainty of clearly expressed terms applying, especially when they can be found 
commonly in insurers‟ standard terms.
271 
 
In contrast, O.N. often reports that a term is unfair and therefore onerous, especially if 
the average insured would not usually expect it, and however clearly expressed in the 
policy, it will require the term to be expressly brought to the insured‟s attention at the 
sales point before it takes effect.  However, it may not be clear in advance that the FOS 
is going to consider a term onerous.  In Case Study 76/12, the FOS said that the term in 
question was not onerous and did not need to be specially highlighted where it was clear 
in the policy documents and the literature, it was not unusual for a policy of this type to 
limit cover the way it had, and the seller had not misrepresented the position.  Perhaps 
this is how the FOS tests the question.  However, it is telling that in this example, the 
insured admitted that she had never been entirely sure that the policy covered what she 
wanted it to.  It seems that the FOS might then be using the actual insured‟s 
understanding as a benchmark to test whether a term is onerous.  Interfoto has never 
been expressly mentioned and the argument is usually about breach of code.  The FOS 
expects insurers to provide evidence as to what information was given to the insured.  
Perhaps if this is effectively how the FOS treats unfair terms, it does not need to mention 
UTCCR and indeed, hardly ever does.   
 
In Case Study 65/5
272, the FOS found that a 12 month limitation on the treatment of any 
one condition in a pet insurance was a significant term which should have been brought 
to the insured‟s attention at the claims stage.  The insured said that it had not, and 
insurers could not prove that it had.  Because postponing the treatment had not 
prejudiced the insurer, the insured had renewed her policy each year and she was not 
trying to claim more than her original entitlement, the FOS told insurers to cover the cost 
of the late treatment, limited to what it would have cost if done within the original 12 
months.  It is doubtful a court would have applied Interfoto here. 
 
The FOS will also regard as onerous a term which requires the insured to exercise an 
excess of care over possessions or well-being beyond that which most people actually 
exercise.  Examples are minimum security requirements for household and caravan 
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policies and the common exclusion for theft of items from cars left unattended or with 
keys left in the ignition (see “Keys in cars” below).  The courts do not deal with excess of 
care requirements specifically, except in as far as they might fall under Interfoto or 
UTCCR. 
 
The FOS remedy for not alerting an onerous term is to put complainants back into the 
position they would have been in had the term been alerted.  If the information would 
have made no difference to the complainant, the complaint may be rejected, as it was in 
Case Study 71/05
273 and a court would decide similarly under Interfoto.  If the 
complainant would not have bought the policy, a return of the premium might be 
suitable.  If he could have bought an alternative policy with wider cover, he will have 
been prejudiced and the FOS may require the firm to meet the claim in full.  The FOS is 
applying concepts of misrepresentation and estoppel – but it would be clearer if it used 
these legal labels.  In no reported court case has it been argued that not advertising an 
onerous term is akin to misrepresentation, although that would be a sensible argument.   
 
(b)  UTCCR 
 
A term judged unfair under UTCCR will not bind a consumer.  The rest of the contract 
will be unaffected if it can exist without the unfair term
274.  A term is unfair if: 
 
(i)  it has not been individually negotiated,
275 as with standard insurance policies (the 
insurer has the burden of proving an individual negotiation
276); and  
 
(ii)  “contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the 
parties‟ rights and obligations arising under the contract to the detriment of the 
consumer.”
277 
 
Under Reg 6(1), unfairness is to be assessed by taking into account the nature of the 
contract, the circumstances of its conclusion and its other terms.  Schedule 2 sets out an 
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indicative, non-exhaustive list of terms which may fall foul of the fairness requirement.
278   
Provisions expressed in “plain intelligible language, ”Reg 6(2) are excluded from judicial 
scrutiny if they relate either to: 
 
(i)  the definition of the main subject matter of the contract; or 
 
(ii)  the adequacy of the price or remuneration. 
 
The premium, insuring and exceptions clauses will fall within Reg 6(2), unless they are 
unclear, in which case they will be construed under Reg 7 against the insurers.  Reg 7 
applies to unclear written terms, not implied terms
279, and is in effect a codified version of 
the contra proferentem rule as it usually applies against insurers.  
 
The OFT has a duty to consider a complaint made to it that a contract term drawn up for 
general use is unfair and may apply to the court for an injunction to prevent its further 
use
280.  An example is the litigation about the fairness of bank charges.
281  If the FOS 
sees certain unfair terms repeatedly, it might refer them to the OFT.  This occurs 
infrequently. 
 
For a court, the insured‟s reliance on the unfair term is not part of the test of unfairness, 
although judging from Case Study 71/05 (supra), it may, but should not be, for the FOS. 
Under UTCCR, it is unacceptable for standard terms to be unfair, whether or not they 
were relied upon at inception.  The terms in question about early repayment were clear 
enough but the insured thought they were excessive.  The FOS did not uphold the 
complaint because the insured would have taken out this, or indeed any suitable 
payment protection policy whatever the detail of its standard early repayment terms, as 
he did not envisage the circumstances which resulted in early repayment.  Without 
knowing more detail, it is unclear whether the term might actually have been unfair under 
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UTCCR.  Perhaps the case of Michael James Gillin v Lloyds TSB Bank Plc
282 might 
apply - that if a term was clearly expressed, it could not be classed as unfair under 
UTCCR merely because the customer claimed the charges were excessive.   
 
By referring to reliance, the FOS seems to be merging the separate notions of policy 
construction, fairness of a term and whether the insured may be estopped from relying 
on any unfairness.  Estoppel can only be made out if there has been a misrepresentation 
by insurers on which the insured has relied, and there was no misrepresentation in the 
above case study.  The FOS would do better to adopt a more analytical and legalistic 
approach. 
 
The UTCCR are under-utilised and little understood and have had little impact on the 
insurance industry even though they have applied in their original form (now revoked 
and replaced by the 1999 version) to all consumer contracts entered into after 1 July 
1995.  Their profile would be raised if the FOS referred to them as often as it could, so 
that it applied its discretion as to fairness within the guidelines of the law, rather than at 
random, setting its own criteria.  If UTCCR were more widely used, by the courts as well 
as the FOS, it is unlikely that there would be a flood of new cases or a whole wealth of 
uncertainty in contract law.  The number of court cases dealing with the reasonableness 
of terms under UCTA, which Act does not apply to insurance contracts, is limited.  Once 
the first cases were litigated, parties operating standard terms tended to learn relatively 
quickly which wordings would withstand the appropriate test.  The same would probably 
be true with UTCCR, as long as the FOS were consistent in applying the court‟s 
interpretation of them.  
 
3.2.2  Should the FOS apply the law strictly to issues of policy construction 
 
3.2.2.1 A summary of the FOS approach to construction 
 
The FOS will support an insurer who rejects a claim on the grounds of reasonable 
restrictions and limitations stated clearly in the policy.  It recognises insurers‟ commercial 
right to determine the limit of the risks it is prepared to cover.  But it is concerned that 
insureds understand the cover, so the wording and set out of the policy must be clear 
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and the policy headings must reflect the policy meanings.  It wants marketing and sales 
of policies to be conducted in accordance with ICOBS, so that policies are suitable, and 
onerous or unusual terms are specifically explained.   
 
3.2.2.2 Sales Issues 
 
Whenever the FOS reports on a breach of sales code, it does not, but should for the 
sake of clarity and accountability say which one or which part has been breached.  Sales 
codes are not part of the law, and there are no plans for this to happen, so they should 
not be part of FOS decision-making, especially when they are never referred to 
specifically.  Notwithstanding the huge and noble contribution the FOS has made to 
fighting bad sales practice, that should not be its job, but the job of the regulator ie the 
FSA.  It would be better if the FOS followed the law, and relied on legal principles like 
misrepresentation and estoppel.  In almost every sales example above, that would give 
the same result.  Where it does not, perhaps the FOS has the balance wrong and 
insureds should be made more responsible for the insurance they choose to take out.  
The FOS could notify the FSA each time it discovers poor sales practice and the FSA 
could record the problem and take appropriate action, which would help even those who 
do not or cannot complain to the FOS.  Perhaps there is a tacit understanding between 
the FSA and the FOS that the FOS will police ICOBS, or maybe it is just easier and 
cheaper for the FSA to rely on the FOS to do this.  
 
3.2.2.3 Technical rules of construction 
 
Even though the FOS results from relying on the sales codes may be fair, the above 
comparisons show that the FOS construes terms with little or no careful analysis of the 
policy or consideration of each possibly relevant legal tool which might do the job just as 
well, with the same result.  This may be due to a lack of skill, experience or knowledge of 
the relevant FOS officer, who may not be legally qualified, or not legally qualified in the 
relevant field, or due to flaws in the internal information system.  Each case is decided 
more on the FOS gut feeling based on the circumstances of the case.  If that gut feeling 
dictates that the determination should be in favour of the insured, the FOS often relies 
on a breach of sales code when a legal tool might be just as effective.  The technical 
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process, and to prevent the collective thought process from reinventing the wheel each 
time and coming to inconsistent conclusions.  They give flexibility to the law and should 
be adopted by the FOS. 
 
It is not advocated that the FOS should be spending hours analysing the relevant 
wordings against a law text book.  But it should at least have a checklist of legal 
principles in its internal information system which it should be required to tick off as it 
considers them.  That would also reduce the chance of an application for judicial review 
succeeding on the basis that the law has not been considered.   
 
This non-technical approach does the reputation of the FOS no favours.  It seems like 
the FOS cannot deal with and/or does not know the appropriate law or legal tool.  It 
prevents it from being taken seriously by the courts or by lawyers, which means that it is 
less likely that an FOS approach, especially to something which has not yet reached the 
courts, will be considered or adopted by the courts. 
 
3.2.2.4 Where the court results would be different 
 
The main category where FOS cases are decided differently to a court is where the FOS 
chooses in the interests of fairness to disregard clear policy exclusions where the 
insurer‟s actions are not at fault.  Contract certainty for the industry is compromised and 
the insurer in question is unfairly penalised.  It would be better to have occasional harsh 
results and not to stray from the strict legal interpretation, especially as these situations 
are not much reported in O.N., so it is assumed that they do not occur often.  The FOS 
should not be able to force insurers to make payments outside of the terms of the 
contract.  Sometimes an event occurs which is bad for the claimant, but is simply 
uninsured.  Sympathy for the claimant should be irrelevant to policy construction.   
 
3.2.2.5 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, FOS adoption of the law and its tools in relation to construction would be 
useful, would reduce the threat of judicial review proceedings, would give confidence in 
the market about contract certainty and would make little difference to FOS results.  Not Judith Summer: PhD April 2009  83 
applying clear terms when the insurer is faultless is inexcusably unfair.  Policing ICOBS 
is something that the FSA should do, not the FOS.  
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3.3  Travel Insurance  
 
The law interprets travel insurance in accordance with the principles of construction set 
out above, and applies no special rules.  However, the FOS probably sees a lot more of 
these complaints
283, and has developed some of its own approaches (as follows) where 
there is no case law on point, mostly based on standards it expects from the sales 
codes. The comments above in relation to sales codes apply here too. 
 
Travel insurance may be different to other insurance, as it is normally sold as an add on 
to another product, such as the holiday itself, consumers are often more influenced by 
price than the terms of the cover and the quality of claims administration, and consumers 
may only consider an explanatory brochure rather than the policy itself.  However, 
ICOBS must still be followed, and key and/or unusual features must be explained at the 
sales point and in the explanatory leaflets.  Indeed the FOS will expect consumer 
travellers to rely heavily on this.  Sending consumers a copy of the policy and expecting 
them to review its terms is not sufficient.  Otherwise insureds tend to believe that their 
policy covers them for every travel related eventuality.  
 
The FOS approach to travel insurance might be too consumer-sympathetic.  The 
presumptions that consumers make are not necessarily the fault of the insurer, who is 
expected to anticipate and actively neutralise them. 
 
3.3.1  Renewal 
 
See section 3.10.8 under Non-disclosure below for a discussion of renewal of annual 
travel policies and the need to disclose medical conditions. 
 
3.3.2  Cancellation   
 
Assuming that the policy was sold in accordance with the relevant code, the FOS tends 
to uphold strictly the limits on a travel policy‟s cancellation clauses, much as a court 
would.  In Case Study 56/1
284, the insured did not make suitable arrangements to obtain 
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a visa in time, but cancellation cover was only available if cancellation was beyond the 
insured‟s control.  The FOS agreed with insurers that it was not, even though the travel 
agent had wrongly represented that if the insured cancelled the holiday when he did, 
insurers would refund 50%.  A court would have agreed, especially as the travel agent 
was probably the insured‟s agent, and the lack of visa was unrelated to the 
misrepresentation, although these two points are not discussed.  In Case Study 07/11
285 
the complaint was rejected when the insured missed his flight because of a traffic jam 
getting to the airport, and cancellation cover only applied under the policy if the flight 
failed or was disrupted. 
 
3.3.3  Curtailment where the policyholder has no financial loss   
 
If an insured has to curtail his holiday, insurers might consider that he has suffered no 
financial loss if they have paid for the return flight, or if the airline has allowed him to 
change his return date without additional charge.  Either way, he has paid for and taken 
two flights.  However, few would choose to pay for a return trip to Australia for instance, 
only to have to return home in a couple of days.  In such situations, the FOS has said 
that it has considerable sympathy for the argument that insurers should reimburse 
proportionately the cost of the flights, bearing in mind the number of days spent on 
holiday compared to the length of holiday originally scheduled.  There has been no 
published case study on point, so it is not clear if this truly represents the current FOS 
position in practice.  However, it is not clear why the FOS thinks it fair that the insurer 
should perform over and above the requirements of the policy just because the insured 
might suffer some non-financial loss for which he is not insured.  A court would not. 
 
3.3.4  Curtailment because of ill health or death   
 
If an insured does not consult the insurer‟s emergency helpline as required by most 
travel policies before curtailing a holiday because of ill health, the FOS does not 
generally accept that there was any need for the holiday curtailment.  A court would also 
apply the requirement strictly.  If a person is confined to his room due to illness, the FOS 
will uphold his partner‟s claims for holiday curtailment (ie without a call to the helpline) if 
                                                         
285 O.N. July 2001 Judith Summer: PhD April 2009  86 
there was a medical need for the partner to stay with the patient.  In Case Study 56/2
286, 
there was no such need for the wife to stay with her husband in his cabin after he broke 
his leg, so the insurer‟s offer to pay for the cost of the cruise from when he was laid up, 
but only in respect of the husband, was fair and reasonable, especially as the policy only 
provided cover if the insured had been forced to return home.  It is good that FOS 
sympathy for the predicament of the wife has not clouded its judgment about applying a 
clear term. 
 
A holiday may have to be curtailed due to death of a relative.  In Case Study 01/21
287, 
the policy unambiguously covered holiday curtailment in the case of death of a relative 
resident in the UK.  The relative in question had died in Kenya.  The FOS declined to 
apply the wording strictly, as the insured would have had to return home to the UK first 
wherever the relative had died.  This is one of the rare examples of a case study where 
the FOS has decided the matter contrary to and in spite of the clear policy wording.  Its 
reasons are understandable, and the results may be fair, but this goes against contract 
certainty.  A court would not have been able to contradict the clear policy wording, but 
might have tried to employ a tool to circumvent the result, such as considering the term 
unfair or onerous and needy of express notification.  However, the risk that even the 
most uneducated insured must realise he is taking by not reading the policy, is that there 
will be something in that policy which will not suit. 
 
3.3.5  Pre-existing medical conditions
288   
 
Although standard, the FOS views an exclusion for pre-existing medical conditions to be 
onerous, and therefore requires it to be expressly drawn to the attention of any 
prospective policyholder.  A signed declaration that the insured has read and understood 
the policy will make no difference to this requirement.  The FOS will make a detailed 
enquiry as to whether there was in fact a pre-existing medical condition about which the 
policyholder should reasonably be taken to have known and disclosed.  By contrast, 
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because it is in every standard policy, a court would be unlikely to consider such a term 
onerous
289, and if it did, its decision would not be based on a breach of sales code. 
 
In Case Study 07/08
290, the insured booked a holiday without disclosing an operation 
due to take place after the holiday.  The operation was brought forward, the insured 
cancelled the holiday and the insurer refused cover.  The FOS felt that the insured could 
not have been expected to disclose the operation unless the travel agent who sold the 
policy had made him aware of the need to do so and of the fact that the insurer would 
not otherwise cover any claim resulting from the medical condition.  There was no 
evidence that the travel agent had done this.  The insured‟s signed declaration that he 
had read and understood the policy terms did not affect the position.  It seems that, 
probably without analysing the position, the FOS regards a travel agent as the agent for 
the insurer.  However, at the time of this case study, it had no jurisdiction over travel 
agents.  In Case Study 76/10,
291 it was not reasonable for the insured to be expected to 
disclose his cough when he thought nothing of it and did not suspect that it would 
worsen so that he would have to cancel his holiday. 
 
In contrast, the complaint in Case Study 07/09
292 was rejected where a family holiday 
was cancelled due to complications with the daughter‟s kidney transplant operation.  The 
girl had had kidney problems for years, none of which had been disclosed to insurers.  
The FOS found the exclusion and the advice to call to arrange cover for any pre-existing 
medical conditions to be clear. 
 
Details of the respective sales evidence in these complaints is limited, but the difference 
in outcome might in reality be related to how foreseeable the FOS thinks the likelihood of 
cancellation was to the policyholder, rather than to how the policy was sold.  Perhaps the 
father of the kidney transplant girl might not have booked a holiday if he had believed 
that he, rather than insurers, would be at risk if there was a problem (and a highly 
foreseeable one at that). 
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3.3.6  Medical care   
 
The FOS seldom upholds complaints about the standard or availability of care in a 
holiday destination.  Insurers agree to pay for the cost of appropriate treatment, not to 
ensure that it is available or that it will meet UK standards.  Decisions about repatriation 
will depend on the advice of the local practitioner, and insurers are not responsible if that 
advice is incorrect.  However, the FOS will uphold a complaint if it is satisfied that an 
insurer has refused to sanction proper treatment.  There is no reason to think that a 
court would approach these situations differently. 
 
3.3.7  Hazardous activities    
 
A standard travel policy will not generally cover medical expenses and personal accident 
for hazardous activities, but the exclusion must be clear about what activities will be 
regarded as hazardous, or the contra proferentem rule will be applied, as a court would.  
The FOS says that if there was a list of hazardous activities, it might not allow insurers to 
rely on further relevant exclusions which are contained only in a different segment of the 
policy.   
 
In Case Study 07/01
293, insurers had not explained that motorbike travel was excluded 
as a hazardous activity in an annual travel policy, and delayed sending out the policy so 
the family did not have a chance to check it was suitable before they left for the US.  The 
FOS said that as a result, the insurer would not have been able to rely on the exclusions 
if a claim had arisen during this US trip.
294  A court would probably agree, as it is not 
obvious that motorbike travel should be classed separately as a hazardous activity which 
might be excluded, and the condition was not brought to the insured‟s attention.  Indeed, 
that is the basis of the recent Court of Appeal decision in Quantum Processing Services 
Co v Axa Insurance UK Plc
295.  There hazardous activities were excluded, but when the 
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holidaymaker had disclosed that he was going scuba diving, the insurance company had 
agreed to cover him for this, without telling him that in fact they would not include cave or 
solo diving.  The court held that he was covered when he went cave diving, as the 
insurer had not given him any limitation as to what he could do as a diver, so the policy 
only made sense if the general conditions were read in context as covering all scuba 
diving. 
 
A court might also apply UTCCR to determine whether an exclusion for a particular 
hazardous activity is fair.  One of the very few cases on UTCCR is Bankers Insurance 
Co v South.
296  Buckley J held that the exclusion for accidents involving “motorised 
waterborne craft” was in plain, intelligible language and was a core term to this travel 
insurance, so was exempt from scrutiny.  He added that anyway, it was not an unfair 
exclusion, as it was available to the holidaymaker to read if he had wanted to.  He 
pointed out that the insurance was relatively cheap.  These are sensible attitudes, but 
the FOS might not have agreed.  Sometimes it seems that the FOS is so concerned to 
try to protect the interests of a consumer that it does not give the consumer enough 
credit for having common sense or an ability to read something set out clearly in plain 
language.  How many policyholders purchasing holiday insurance would expect 
everything they did on holiday to be covered by the insurance, no matter how 
dangerous?  Would the reasonable policyholder expect this sort of comprehensive cover 
when the purchase price was cheap?  Would they expect cheap clothes to be as good 
as hand-tailored ones?  And if they were interested in what was covered by the 
insurance, why did they not read the policy, especially one set out clearly and in plain 
language?  If they would have water-skied anyway, knowing that there was no cover for 
such a sport, then the terms of the insurance are not relevant to them.  If they would not 
have water-skied if they had known, then it is up to them to check that they have bought 
the cover they require.  
 
3.3.8  Baggage 
 
Few insureds are aware of the standard exclusions for lost or stolen baggage (eg if they 
are left in an unlocked, unattended vehicle), that settlement is usually on an indemnity 
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that the FOS may be more lenient than a court in interpreting these policy restrictions.  In 
Case Study 63/8
297 baggage had to be kept in “locked accommodation” or in “a locked 
and covered luggage compartment/ boot of a motor vehicle.”  The FOS decided that a 
camper van was more of a vehicle than an accommodation, but that as it did not have a 
luggage compartment or boot, securing the items out of sight within the locked van might 
have been enough to satisfy a valid claim.  The complaint was rejected anyway, 
because the FOS did not believe that the items were secured out of sight as the insured 
had changed her story. 
 
3.3.9  Earthquake 
 
Typically the policy will list circumstances in which the travel policy will respond, but 
usually earthquakes, terrorist attacks and epidemics are not included in the list.  This 
leads to misunderstandings about policy coverage.  If there has been no breach of sales 
code, the FOS will consider in the circumstances of the case what are the reasonable 
expectations of the policyholder.   
 
In Case Studies 01/19 and 01/20
298, earthquakes were not covered although the FOS 
commented that they did not need to be specifically excluded.  In Case Study 01/19, the 
FOS agreed with insurers that the policy covered curtailment due to a list of specified 
reasons (natural disasters were not among them), but did not cover relocation costs 
when the insured swapped hotels because of his fears about the cracks which had 
appeared in his original hotel after the earthquake.  By contrast, in Case Study 01/20, 
the elderly couple were not allowed back into their hotel.  They flew home.  Although 
curtailment for earthquakes was not actually covered, so a court would have rejected the 
claim, the FOS upheld it because it was fair and reasonable to expect curtailment for 
earthquakes to be covered, and its absence had not been highlighted in the policy 
material.  The FOS was also influenced by the possibility that they might have ended up 
ill if they had slept out in the open for the rest of the holiday, so would have been eligible 
for curtailment due to illness.  The law does not recognise cover for preventative loss. 
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A cynic might comment that the cases were decided differently due to the FOS having 
more sympathy for the elderly couple.  But the facts are sufficiently different that a 
different outcome is understandable - stretching a curtailment cover is not the same as 
inventing a relocation one. 
 
3.3.10  Conclusion 
 
In relation to travel insurance, the FOS continues to rely on breaches of sales code more 
than on technical and careful interpretation of wordings, and arguably allows the insured 
too much leeway in not being expected to have read or understood any terms.  
However, it has considered situations which have not been before the courts.  Hopefully 
these FOS approaches might be useful to the court, but that would be dependent on 
them being more easily accessible in the public domain and available for a court to 
consider.  At the moment they are only referred to in one main insurance text-book.
299  
Counsel do not usually refer to FOS approaches to bolster their arguments, and they are 
not usually within a judge‟s own knowledge.  
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3.4  Life And Personal Accident 
 
3.4.1  Chronic Conditions  
 
Private medical expenses insurance usually excludes “chronic” (ie not curable) 
conditions and limits cover to “acute” (ie treatable) conditions.  The FOS considers these 
to be significant terms to be explained to insureds before inception, along with a warning 
that an acute condition can become redefined as chronic, and alleviation of chronic 
symptoms will not be covered.   
 
In Case Study 01/01
300, insurers decided that a heart condition had become chronic five 
days before a scheduled open heart surgery.  The FOS said that this was insufficient 
notice for the insurer to withdraw its support, and anyway, the medical evidence showed 
an uncertain prognosis and that the surgery might cure the patient, which made the 
condition acute, not chronic, so fell within the policy.  In Case Study 01/02
301, the insurer 
considered that further physiotherapy was not covered as the paralysed condition had 
become chronic.  The FOS found that the medical evidence showed that the condition 
would continue to improve with further physiotherapy, so was still acute.  “Acute” was not 
clearly defined in the policy and the insurer‟s apology and ex gratia payment of £1,800 
towards the cost of home care was sufficient to cover the distress caused by the 
maladministration. 
 
The courts would look at both the wording and the medical evidence as the FOS did, 
and the results would probably be similar.  There is no caselaw directly on point. 
 
3.4.2  Unproven and experimental treatment 
 
Many medical insurance policies exclude unproven or experimental treatment.  
However, where a condition is covered, but the consultant has advised a newer, 
untested treatment instead of an established one, the FOS considers that it will generally 
be fair and reasonable for the insurer to indemnify the insured‟s costs of this, up to the 
                                                         
300 O.N. January 2001 
301 O.N. January 2001 Judith Summer: PhD April 2009  93 
sum of the cost of the conventional treatment for which the insurer would have been 
liable. 
 
There is no caselaw on point, and as this approach is fair, it would be good if the courts 
adopted the same reasoning if they get the opportunity. 
 
3.4.3  Mental illness  
 
Most policies exclude disability claims which arise from stress or other mental illness, 
require the person to be in work when a disability arises and exclude a claim for 
employment benefit when the person is not actively seeking work.  The FOS regards 
these as significant terms which must be highlighted before inception.  When looking at 
employment benefit, the FOS will consider whether any illness suffered by the insured 
was so severe that it would have prevented him from working and how likely it is that the 
insured would have found work were it not for the illness.  Also, if an employment benefit 
would be payable but for a mental illness, or a disability benefit would be payable but for 
a redundancy, the FOS may allow all or part of the claim. 
 
In Case Study 04/05
302, the insured was made redundant and then suffered depression. 
The policy terms were clear.  Because the insured would have been entitled to 
redundancy benefit if she was not depressed, the FOS felt that payment of 50% of the 
maximum redundancy benefit was appropriate.  This seems a strange result and one 
with which a court, following the clear language of the policy, would not agree.  It is odd 
that an insurer may be prevented from excluding, even with clear language, a common 
problem – depression following a redundancy, making it less likely that the insured will 
be able actively and effectively to seek and find work and come off the insurance 
benefits.  Perhaps the FOS approach reflects a feeling that the exclusion of mental 
illness after redundancy needs to be highlighted to the insured at the sales point.  A 
court would only agree if it thought it an onerous term. 
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3.4.4  Critical illness cover  
 
Most critical illness policies list terminal illnesses which will be covered and any 
limitations on cover.  The FOS considers that insureds should be made aware of all the 
policy cover, limits and exclusions at the point of sale for critical illness cover, otherwise 
their complaints are likely to be upheld.  The FOS will assess the medical evidence to 
determine whether a condition was pre-existing and whether it is – or should be in the 
circumstances - covered within the policy definition.   
 
In Case Study 24/03
303, the insured needed an angioplasty.  The policy terms were such 
that the insurer would only pay if there was a 70% blockage in each heart artery.  The 
insured‟s consultant said that the blockage was 95-99% in one artery and 50% in the 
other, and that the condition was very life threatening.  The FOS said that by any 
ordinary definition, this would be a critical illness that needed urgent treatment.  A 
formulaic definition such as this was an onerous condition which had not been made 
clear in the literature.  The FOS commented that insurers should be cautious relying on 
a formulaic basis for assessing how blocked an artery was, since this was not an exact 
science, and should look at the overall seriousness of the situation which here was too 
serious to rely on a strict formulaic interpretation.  In any case, if the insured did not have 
the angioplasty, he would have had to have bypass surgery that would have entitled him 
to claim under the policy anyway.  The FOS told insurers to pay the claim - £100,000 
plus interest with a recommendation that they met the remaining £50,000.  The FOS was 
surely right to uphold this complaint, and it is likely that a court would have found a way 
of interpreting the policy similarly or relying on the onerous condition point of Interfoto.
304  
The FOS comments indicate that the FOS would not have upheld the formulaic definition 
even if the insured had been warned of it before inception.  It is not clear that this would 
be fair.  In any case, there is usually an NHS option which the FOS never mentions. 
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3.4.5  Pre-existing medical conditions
305  
 
The FOS 
306 does not think consumers need to be asked about their medical history 
when they apply for a policy that excludes pre-existing medical conditions, as long as 
they are made aware that the policy contains such an exclusion and are given clear 
information about how it will operate.  So in Case Study 62/7,
307 the FOS rejected a 
complaint about non-payment of sickness benefit within a payment protection policy, 
where the insured‟s incapacity related to an undisclosed pre-existing condition.  This 
decision seems sensible and in line with what a court would decide. 
 
When assessing whether a condition is pre-existing, the FOS continues the IOB‟s 
approach of following the House of Lords definition of “condition” in Cook v Financial 
Insurance Co Ltd
308 to be a medical condition diagnosed as such by doctors, not simply 
some generalised symptoms.  The FOS will look at the position when the policy was 
taken out, and will review the insured‟s medical history, including the: 
 
1.  intensity of symptoms,  
 
2.  seriousness with which symptoms are regarded,  
 
3.  diagnosis,  
 
4.  treatment, 
 
5.  difference between the symptoms at inception and the medical condition which 
gave rise to the claim – the more remote the connection, the less likely the FOS 
is to accept that the condition existed at inception, and 
 
6.  knowledge of the insured about the condition at inception. 
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To avoid Cook, some insurers changed their wording to include symptoms which were 
apparent before inception, even if the condition was not diagnosed.  An example is in 
Case Study 56/3
309, but the FOS still applied Cook, and told the insurer that it was acting 
unlawfully in relying on the exclusion to refuse a claim for holiday cancellation.  The 
insured had collapsed before inception and both he and his GP thought that this was 
migraine-related.  The insured booked his holiday, but after a brain scan ordered by the 
GP as a sensible precaution, found out just before he left that he had in fact suffered a 
minor stroke.  His doctor told him not to fly.  The FOS also required the insurer to 
compensate the insured for distress and inconvenience caused by their refusal to pay 
the claim.  A court would not have found that the insurer had been acting unlawfully, but 
might have found the terms unfair under UTCCR or onerous and un-notified under 
Interfoto.   
 
Other insurers try to get around Cook by providing for a moratorium exclusion.  This 
excludes cover for a medical condition whose symptoms existed at inception until they 
have not been treated or advised about further for a set period, often two years after 
inception.  There is no specific caselaw dealing with moratorium exclusions.  A court 
would begin with the wording and interpret it in accordance with its usual principles.  The 
FOS seems to accept moratorium exclusions and applied one in Case Study 13/03.
310 
 
A common question is whether high blood pressure at inception is a pre-existing 
condition for stroke so as to exclude stroke cover.  In January 2002, the FOS reported 
that its initial view was that such an exclusion had the potential to be an onerous term 
which needed to be highlighted to the insured before inception.  The FOS has not 
commented further as yet, although in Case Study 13/03 in the same edition of O.N., this 
situation arose, and it rejected the complaint without labelling the moratorium an onerous 
condition.  The insurers had refused to pay the claim when the insured suffered a stroke 
during a two year moratorium, and had been treated for the previous few years for high 
blood pressure.  A court would probably have agreed. 
 
Many complaints to the FOS about pre-existing medical conditions are actually about 
non-disclosure, so will be re-visited below under “Non-disclosure.” 
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3.4.6  The effect of a pre-existing condition contributing in part to the loss 
 
If a pre-existing condition has contributed to the loss, the law will not allow any of the 
claim, whilst the FOS may allow a proportionate recovery in accordance with common 
industry practice.
311  So if the accident caused 10% of the injury, and the other 90% was 
due to degenerative change which was excluded, the FOS would usually ask the insurer 
to pay 10% of the benefit.  The FOS view is that the mere presence of degenerative 
change should not exclude genuine personal accident claims to which policies are 
designed to respond.   
 
The FOS has not commented further following Blackburn Rovers Football and Athletic 
Club plc v Avon Insurance plc
312.  A footballer had a spinal injury.  The Court of Appeal 
held that an exclusion for injury caused by degeneration applied whether or not the 
degeneration was normal in the population as part of the normal ageing process.  If 
normal degeneration often led to injury, there was good reason to exclude it.  If normal 
degeneration did not often lead to injury, then the law was unlikely to conclude that it had 
been a cause of injury induced by trauma on the sports field.  The assured therefore 
could not recover if it could be shown that the player‟s disablement was attributable, 
even only in part, to the degenerative pre-condition, whether or not that pre-condition 
was normal.  In the subsequent trial, Dobbs J found that the degenerative condition had 
been a cause of the injury, so on the Court of Appeal‟s reasoning, the assured could not 
recover.
313  The FOS would have probably awarded a proportionate recovery, saying 
that part of the injury related to the pre-existing condition, and that part was not, as it did 
in Case Study 13/18
314, where an RAF engineer suffered back injury but had a history of 
such injury.  The FOS felt that the insurer should pay 50% of the claim because the 
accident in question had made the condition that had been caused previously, 
significantly worse. 
 
The FOS approach may seem fair.  After all, the assured has suffered in part an insured 
loss.  But what makes it unfair, is that it ignores the fact that insurers exclude pre-
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existing disabilities for very good reason, precisely so that they will not be liable for an 
injury which is partly caused by that condition, which makes the total of the injury and 
therefore the liability, greater.  Insurers are not obliged to adopt the eggshell skull rule of 
tort and criminal law, and so take their insured however they come.  They have a power 
to contract according to terms which should prevail, as they do in the law, and insureds 
have a power to choose between different covers, some which have more exclusions for 
pre-existing disabilities than others. 
 
3.4.7  “Any occupation” cover against disability 
 
In order of the most expensive type of disability policy first, cover can be obtained for (i) 
the insured being unable to continue his own occupation, (ii) any occupation for which he 
is suited because of education, training or experience or (iii) any occupation whatsoever.  
The policy should state clearly what level of cover it offers, as the courts tend to interpret 
narrowly the third option.   
 
3.4.7.1 “Any occupation” 
 
The Court of Appeal in Sargent v GRE (UK) Ltd
315 held that “any occupation” is by itself 
an ambiguous term, and must be interpreted in context.  The context of that case was 
that the policy was marketed to armed forces personnel, so the term was construed as 
referring only to the insured‟s occupation prior to his injury, and he could recover even 
though he was fit for other work.   
 
The FOS comments
316 that this judgment broadly corresponds with its own “fair and 
reasonable” approach.  It views as harsh limiting benefits to those rare situations where 
an insured is unable to carry on any occupation at all, unless this has clearly been 
explained to the insured before inception.  If there are no further qualifications or 
definitions, the FOS will interpret “any occupation” as meaning “any relevant 
occupation,” that is, any occupation for which the insured is suited by reason of his 
education, training, experience and social standing.  The FOS would not usually 
consider it reasonable to expect an unskilled manual worker to retrain as a skilled 
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professional and vice versa.  Probably, based on the Sargent context test, nor would a 
court. 
 
It would be better if the FOS simply committed to adopting the Sargent approach without 
the above flourishes.  It is unnecessary for the FOS to apply a slightly different test when 
a perfectly adequate and fair one exists in the law.  The “regard to context” part of the 
Sargent approach would give the FOS enough flexibility to make fair and reasonable 
decisions and would probably produce the same results as their “any relevant 
occupation” test.   
 
3.4.7.2 Scope of the previous occupation 
 
If may be necessary to determine the scope of a previous occupation which the assured 
can no longer carry out.  The wording and context of every policy is different, but if there 
is a similarity to a decided case, there is also a thread of precedent to follow.  In Johnson 
v IGI Insurance Co Ltd
317, the court found that a taxi driver who could no longer drive 
could not undertake “similar gainful employment,” simply because he could derive an 
income from renting out his taxis to other drivers.  In Hooper v Accidental Death 
Insurance Co
318, the assured could recover under the policy where he was substantially 
unable to “follow usual business or occupation,” not only when he was entirely unable to.  
If the latter had applied, the court held that the policy should have expressly said so, and 
the FOS would have agreed wholeheartedly.  In Howells v IGI Insurance
319, a 
professional footballer was not permanently disabled from carrying on his “occupation” 
when injury forced him to drop from the Premier League to a lower division, since he 
was still a footballer.  
 
Case Study 13/12
320 is the only one on point.  Insurers refused to pay income protection 
insurance because the insured‟s illness meant that she could no longer be a nurse, but 
she could still do her other stated occupation as housewife, as she could still do “normal 
pursuits.”  The FOS looked at the purpose of the policy as a court would, and upheld the 
complaint because the policy was meant to protect her from not being able to earn an 
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income as a nurse.  Insurers had not explained to her before inception that they would 
only pay under the policy if she could no longer do both nursing and housewifery.  The 
wording was vague and there was no definition of “normal pursuits,” so the FOS 
interpreted it contra proferentem.  Even if the FOS did not look at the caselaw (and none 
is mentioned), it has still made a fair and reasonable decision which a court would also 
have been likely to make.   
 
3.4.7.3 Scope of “any occupation whatsoever” 
 
The caselaw decides the scope of “any occupation whatsoever” on a case by case 
basis.  In Pocock v Century Insurance Co Ltd
321, the assured was no longer able “to 
attend to business of any kind” by carrying out different and part-time functions for the 
same employer, as this was only a minor contribution.  In Walton v Airtours Plc
322, a pilot 
who could only undertake temporary employment was not capable of doing any 
occupation, as “occupation” implied full-time employment with an element of continuity 
rather than sporadic, part-time work, or work that could not be carried out without 
structured support.  In McGeown v Direct Travel Insurance
323, to fall within the wording, 
“permanent disability which prevents you from doing all your usual activities,” the insured 
had to be unable to carry on the normal incidents of living, including reasonable mobility, 
coping with domestic chores and personal care, not just unable to continue one pastime, 
in this case horse-riding. 
 
Case Study 40/5
324 is the only one on point.  A professional dancer could no longer 
dance due to injury, but she could do other things. As the cover clearly related to “any 
occupation whatsoever” and the insured had signed a specific endorsement which said 
“any occupation whatsoever,” the FOS supported insurers who rejected the claim.  
Although she was able to claim state benefits, the FOS rightly pointed out that 
qualification for these was different to qualification under the policy.  A court might have 
come to the same conclusion on the basis of the clarity of the language, but it might 
have relied on Pocock and Walton to decide that in the context of the policy, the 
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professional dancer should recover if she could no longer dance.  The FOS does not 
mention, and so probably did not consider any caselaw. 
 
3.4.8  Causation in a personal accident policy 
 
For personal accident cover to apply, the assured‟s death or disablement must have 
resulted from bodily injury proximately caused by an accident.  The courts tend to look at 
the immediate cause, and not to any earlier one in the chain.  In Winspear v Accident 
Insurance Co
325, the assured suffered a fit (excluded under “natural disease or 
weakness”), which meant that he fell into a stream (an accident) and drowned.  The 
court found the cause of death to be drowning, so was covered by the policy.  In 
Lawrence v Accident Insurance Co
326, the cause of death was being run over by a train 
when the assured had a fit (not covered) which meant that he fell onto a railway line (an 
accident, so covered). 
 
In law, if there are concurrent causes of loss, with an exclusion of liability for one of 
them, the exclusion prevails and the whole claim can be refused.
327  The FOS has 
commented
328 that, at least in the context of personal accident policies, it may not follow 
this practice, but may instead take a proportional approach.
329 
 
The FOS case studies on point only relate to surgical complications resulting in patient 
death or bodily injury following surgery. The FOS splits these cases into two types: 
 
(i)  where the injury or death is a natural consequence of the risk of surgery and the 
patient was unlucky enough to suffer complications, it will reject a complaint 
about non-payment of an accident claim, as in Case Study 44/12
330.   
 
(ii)  where the injury or death is the result of something unplanned or negligent that 
happened before, during or after the surgery, and which although was a 
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possibility, was not a natural result of the procedure, insurers should pay under a 
personal accident policy.  In such a case the injury or death is as a result of an 
external, violent and visible cause.  An example is Case Study 44/11
331, where 
the patient died as a result of surgeon negligence. 
 
Although the FOS does not use the law‟s wording, namely “immediate cause,” these 
case studies show that actually, it is adopting the same approach.  So in Case Study 
44/11, the immediate cause of death was the surgeon‟s negligence (an accident), but in 
Case Study 44/12, the immediate cause was effectively the illness (not covered as an 
accident).  
 
3.4.9  Calculation of benefits  
 
Disputes arise as to calculation of benefits, particularly under income protection policies.  
The FOS will check the calculations are accurate and in accordance with the policy.  It 
will consider whether there are ambiguities in the wording, discrepancies between what 
was offered and provided and any over- or under-insurance, and will look at documents 
showing the insured‟s financial circumstances, demands and needs at the sales point. 
 
Often in relation to income protection policies, the insured has not understood that: 
 
1.  benefits are linked to earnings immediately before incapacity, which may be less 
than previous earnings; 
 
2.  pre-disability earnings of a self-employed policyholder may be calculated on the 
basis of net profits, rather than turnover, and without including benefits-in-kind, 
bonuses, commission, drawings and dividend payments; 
 
3.  insurers may deduct disability benefits payable under a different policy such as a 
payment protection policy.  Unless the policy clearly shows what other types of 
insurance payments will be deducted from the benefit, the FOS will not interpret 
                                                                                                                                                                         
330 O.N. March 2005.  Here the patient had surgery to remove a lump from her neck and died as a result of 
complications, although the surgeons had not been negligent. 
331 O.N. March 2005 Judith Summer: PhD April 2009  103 
any clause purporting to deduct income from other „similar‟ policies as including 
payment protection policies. 
 
The FOS tries to deal with any unfairness.  It interprets ambiguous wording contra 
proferentem.  If the problem is a sales one, it may interpret the policy as if the insured 
purchased the policy he thought he had.  If assessment of average income over the 12 
months before the claim produces harsh results, (for instance, if the insured has been 
struggling to cope with his disability for some time or if there has been a recent market 
downturn), the FOS may take an average of earnings over a longer period, say 3 years, 
unless the policy clearly restricts this. 
 
The FOS will support an insurer who takes into account any income that a self-employed 
policyholder receives from the business during any period of incapacity, if the policy 
clearly allows this, eg in Case Study 52/1
332.  Despite his disability, the insured‟s 
business earned him more than he would have been entitled to in benefits, so insurers 
stopped paying the benefits altogether. 
 
A policy may provide for a reduced benefit if the insured returns to work in a reduced 
capacity or to a different occupation, with reduced earnings.  If a policyholder‟s condition 
improves but he does not return to work, he may lose his entitlement to the full benefit 
and there may be no proportional or rehabilitation benefit.  If the insured cannot go back 
to work, perhaps because his business has failed, or he cannot return to a similar 
occupation, a proportional payment would be appropriate, depending on the policy 
wording. 
 
There is little or no caselaw on this topic, and so the FOS setting out its approach is of 
potential usefulness to a court. 
 
3.4.10  Conclusion 
 
Breach of sales codes play a large role in the FOS approach to interpreting life and 
personal accident cover as it considers that consumers often believe that they have 
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developed policies for this cover where the courts do not seem to have encountered the 
issues, which is useful.  However, the FOS should consider court precedents where they 
are available and would benefit from a more technical approach to the wording, 
especially where it chooses an interpretation directly in opposition to clear policy terms.  
The FOS departs from the law most significantly in its proportional treatment of pre-
existing disabilities and concurrent causes.  In these respects it should follow the law, 
which is not overtly unfair, but over the years has balanced the conflicting interests of 
insurers and insured differently. 
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3.5  Household Insurance 
 
3.5.1  Storm 
 
Over the years, the courts have developed the definition of storm, beginning with the 
ordinary and natural meaning of the Oxford English Dictionary and refining it to include 
rain and wind.
333  The FOS seems to decide storm cases in the same way, although 
because it does not mention any caselaw, it is questionable whether this is only a 
coincidence most likely to happen because the court adopts an ordinary and natural 
meaning and because the FOS, especially with its non-legal staff, is unlikely to adopt 
anything else.   
 
The reported FOS case studies on storm damage causation would be decided the same 
way as a court, even though the FOS applies an apparently different test.  The FOS 
looks for the “dominant or effective” cause and applies a but-for test, whilst a court looks 
for the “proximate” cause.
334  The FOS will investigate whether there was a storm, and 
whether and how much of the damage is as a result of that storm or general wear and 
tear, as demonstrated in Case Studies 18/08 and 18/09
335.  This would also be a court‟s 
approach, the only difference being that the FOS has a wider ability to obtain informal 
evidence. In Case Study 18/08, it telephoned the glazier who had replaced the damaged 
windows to hear his views on the cause of the damage. 
 
The FOS illustrates its approach to storm damage causation.
336  It says that if there is 
evidence of a storm, but the roof tiles would have fallen off the house in a light breeze 
anyway, sooner or later, due to poor maintenance, then the dominant or effective cause 
of the damage was wear and tear, not storm.  The storm was merely the occasion of the 
damage, rather than the cause.  Requiring insurers to pay for such damage would be 
turning an insurance contract into a maintenance contract. 
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In a separate case
337, where water leaked through a poorly maintained roof during a 
rainstorm, the FOS concluded that the storm was the dominant or effective cause of the 
damage caused to the interior.  The roof was not completely dilapidated and would have 
remained watertight during normal levels of rainfall, but it could not withstand the storm.  
Even though but for the lack of maintenance, the water would not have entered, the 
damage in question was caused by the storm. 
 
The FOS adopted a similar approach in a small business claim for storm damage and 
business interruption in Case Study 74/08
338.  Although there had been structural 
problems with the roof, there was evidence of repair with nothing to indicate that the 
repairs had been faulty, so it was the severe weather which had caused the water 
ingress, not the supposed roof defect. 
 
3.5.2  Flood  
 
3.5.2.1 The law 
 
What constitutes a flood?  The earlier cases, Young v Sun Alliance
339 and Computer & 
Systems Engineering Plc v John Lelliott (Ilford) Ltd
340, consider that flood must be 
caused by a natural, external source and is limited to inundations of water through 
severe weather conditions.  The later cases emanating from Rohan Investments Ltd v 
Cunningham
341, give a wider definition, and consider that the impact of the water and the 
volume which ingressed, is more important than its source, so that heavy, abnormal 
rainfall lasting over a period of some days can also constitutes a flood.  The Court of 
Appeal in Rohan decided that both Young and Lelliott were unusual cases and that 
neither court intended to set a definition of flood. In Tate Gallery (Trustees) v Duffy 
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Construction Ltd,
342 Jackson J attempts to reconcile the authorities.  He concludes that 
flooding does not have to come from a natural source, does not need to involve a large 
amount of water accumulating rapidly, and: 
 
“In determining whether the unwelcome arrival of water upon property constitutes a 
“flood”, it is relevant to consider (a) whether the source of the water was natural; (b) 
whether the source of the water was external or internal; (c) the quantity of water; (d) the 
manner of its arrival; (e) the area and character of the property upon which the water 
was deposited; (f) whether the arrival of that water was an abnormal event.  Ultimately, it 
is a question of degree whether any given accumulation of water constitutes a flood.” 
 
Jackson J regarded both Young and Lelliott as “fairly unusual.”  In Tate there was a 
significantly greater volume of water than in Young, in a larger area, the water had come 
from a source outside the insured premises and its arrival had been abnormal: it did not 
matter that the source was not natural.  Young should be limited to its specific facts – a 
gradual ingress by seepage of a small amount of water which was not the result of some 
form of external event was not a flood. 
 
3.5.2.2 The FOS 
 
The FOS says it has changed its approach from its IOB days and now applies the Rohan 
definition of flood, as that is closer to the ordinary expectations of household 
policyholders.  The FOS says that Rohan shows that a flood can originate from a slow 
and steady build up of water, not necessarily from a natural phenomenon.  It then 
applies this test to the case studies without referring to further caselaw.  That might be 
reasonable if it decided to prefer Rohan as being dicta from a higher court than the later 
caselaw, but it does not look like it is aware of this caselaw, and caselaw even from a 
lower court can still be helpful.  It looks like once the FOS has decided the standard 
which it wants to adopt, it does not look any further and does not keep up with 
developments in the law.  So applying its test in Case Studies 10/01
343, 18/18
344 and 
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73/08
345, the FOS found that there had been flooding from, respectively, a rise in the 
water table, rising ground water and rapid build up of water behind a wall which 
collapsed.  Only by the time of Case Study 73/08 had the cases later than Rohan been 
decided and could their dicta have been included.  Jackson J‟s guidelines for looking at 
the circumstances of the case might have been particularly useful. 
 
How would the courts have decided the same cases?  In Case Study 10/01, a cellar 
filled with 4 inches of water due to a rise in the water table.  The FOS commented that 
under Young, this might not have constituted a flood, but that the insured was entitled to 
the benefit of the more favourable case of Rohan, so that it was indeed a flood.  We are 
not told the size of the cellar, but the volume of water involved – 4 inches compared to 
Young‟s 3 inches – is greater, and would be significantly greater if the cellar was a lot 
bigger than the lavatory.  It is unclear how much water got through the roof in Rohan, but 
Walker LJ estimated that it must have been at least 1,000 litres, which is significantly 
more than in Young.  Assuming that the water in the cellar in Case Study 10/01 was 
significantly more than in Young, under Rohan it would be possible to call it a flood.  But 
if the ingress in the case study was a slow seepage or percolation as it was in Young, 
rather than involving something sudden or abnormal, as the build up of rain during a 
period of about a fortnight was held to be in Rohan, it is questionable, even following 
Rohan, that the law at the time would find that this constituted a flood.  However, the 
contrary is certainly arguable, so the FOS may have, as it claims, applied the law strictly. 
 
In Case Study 18/18, heavy rainfall over 5 months led to water entering a cesspit due to 
rising groundwater.  The FOS determined that this was a flood in the ordinary and 
natural sense of the word with the Rohan judgment supporting a flood from a prolonged 
and steady rain or a steady, slow, build up of water.  Whilst the law might consider this a 
flood - assuming that there was lots of water and abnormal rains – it might not have 
found that there was a claim under the policy, depending on the wording, as the cesspit 
was not damaged, so the only loss was loss of its use. 
 
Finally, Case Study 73/08 is most like Rohan, although it and subsequent caselaw is not 
mentioned and should be.  A garden wall collapsed after three months of exceptionally 
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heavy rainfall, due not to the age and condition of the wall, but the build up of water 
behind it.  The FOS found that this constituted a flood which was covered under the 
policy.  The relevant facts of this case study and Rohan are analogous, so a court would 
probably also have found there had been a flood. 
 
3.5.2.3 Exclusions 
 
The FOS seems to regard clear exclusions in flood cover relatively strictly, as a court 
would.  In Case Study 58/1
346, the FOS agreed that there was cover for escape of water 
damage but not for tracing, accessing and repairing the pipe which was the source of the 
leak, as this was clearly excluded.  In Case Study 58/3
347, the FOS found that the 
wording clearly covered an escape of oil, but not a heating pipe blocked by an 
accumulation of oil, which was a problem of maintenance or wear and tear and which 
was specifically excluded.  In Case Study 58/4
348, the FOS rejected the claim for a new 
bathroom suite and tiles where, in breach of a clear notification and preservation of 
evidence condition, the plumber had allegedly removed and disposed of them in order to 
locate a leaking pipe beneath the bathroom floor. 
 
3.5.2.4 Conclusion 
 
Flooding is one of the few areas where the FOS has explicitly referred to and applied 
some legal caselaw, although it is not clear whether it has kept abreast of developments 
or whether there are internal FOS systems to enable it to do this.  It has not stabbed at 
concepts of breach of sales code and fairness and re-invented the wheel by coming to 
its own conclusions without considering carefully enough the position at law. 
 
In sticking to the law like this, the FOS position on flooding is clear and there is some 
certainty and consistency of approach both in applying the law strictly and within the 
FOS itself.  It has a firm and reliable anchor on which to base its own determinations, 
and this works well.   
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3.5.3  Subsidence 
 
3.5.3.1 Meaning 
 
Unless there is a history of subsidence, most buildings policies will cover it, although 
they do not usually define it.  The ordinary meaning indicates a collapse or sinking of the 
property in a vertical direction.  The caselaw
349 indicates that it can also include 
movement in a horizontal direction ie settlement, but probably not heave ie a bulging in 
the soil commonly caused by a chemical reaction.  The NHBC scheme mentions 
subsidence and heave separately, and covers both.  The FOS says that unless the 
policy clearly explains otherwise, it will consider subsidence to include any downwards 
movement of soil, including, for instance, the compression of soil under the weight of a 
recently constructed building.
350  It would be strange if the FOS definition was narrower 
than a court‟s, so perhaps either the FOS has not had to consider horizontal movement 
or is unaware of the appropriate caselaw. 
 
3.5.3.2 What is included in subsidence works 
 
As demonstrated in Case Study 59/10
351, the FOS expects subsidence cover to include 
both the cost of repairs and stabilisation works.  It will not accept that stabilisation should 
not be covered because it is preventative rather than restorative work.  This is a practical 
and sensible response which the courts should support.  However, like the court, the 
FOS will not consider that there should be coverage for uninsured perils discovered 
during the stabilisation works, such as the dry rot discovered in Case Study 10/02
352.   
 
3.5.3.3 Which insurer is responsible 
 
Strictly, and before the Latent Damage Act 1986
353, an insurer was only required to 
repair or pay for the repair of damage that occurred after the start of its policy.  The 
position changed in practical terms since the beginning of 1994, with the ABI Domestic 
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Subsidence Agreement between property insurers.  The Agreement says that if a claim 
is made within the first eight weeks of a change of insurer, the previous insurer will deal 
with the whole claim; claims between 8 weeks and 1 year from the changeover will be 
handled by the new insurer with the cost of settlement shared equally between the two 
insurers; and any claims made at least a year after the changeover will be dealt with by 
the new insurer alone.  
 
The FOS says that it will take account of this ABI Agreement, but also comments that an 
insurer will need to carry out stabilisation works anyway to stop the movement in order to 
comply with the obligations to repair areas damaged during its policy coverage, and so 
should therefore be responsible for this work, even if the movement began when another 
insurer was on cover.  This was the approach it adopted in both Case Studies 59/8 and 
59/9
354, where the claims were made over one year after a change of insurer.  
Presumably, the FOS comments only relate to claims made at least a year after the 
changeover and that for claims made earlier, its decisions would also reflect the ABI 
Agreement.   
 
3.5.3.4 Delay in subsidence repairs 
 
A number of FOS complaints relate to the delay in effecting subsidence repairs, often 
due to a period of monitoring to assess the pattern and rate of movement.  The FOS has 
hinted
355 that an award for distress may be made against insurers who do not keep the 
insured properly informed of what is happening.  The FOS will also assess whether the 
insurer took a reasonable and proportionate time to investigate and monitor the situation, 
and whether the insurer was responsible for any delay.  The courts would not deal with 
delay like this, but through an award of interest. 
 
3.5.3.5 Conclusion 
 
The FOS and the law are broadly in line with each other in relation to subsidence.  There 
is a difference in the definition of subsidence which might well fall away if and when the 
appropriate facts and caselaw came before the FOS, as there has been no criticism that 
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the law is unfair in this regard.  The FOS has given some guidance as to what works 
should be included in subsidence works, which seem reasonable and may prove useful 
to a court.  Where there is possibly more than one insurer involved in subsidence 
damage, the FOS applies the ABI Agreement where a court cannot, but it is precisely 
because of the Agreement that the court should never have to decide the point.  
 
3.5.4  Unoccupied  
 
3.5.4.1 The law 
 
Often certain cover in household insurance is expressly excluded where the premises 
are unoccupied for a period of time, commonly thirty consecutive days.  The caselaw 
defines “occupation” narrowly: although temporary absences are permitted, there must 
be a regular, actual, daily occupant, who not only attends as a night watchman but also 
enters the property
356, and who not only attends by day to take care of the property, but 
also sleeps there at night
357, and the property must be used as a dwelling house, not 
merely for storage
358. 
 
3.5.4.2 The FOS 
 
The concept of “unoccupied” is rarely defined by the policy, so the FOS views it as 
ambiguous and will interpret it contra proferentem.  The FOS may consider a property to 
be occupied if it is visited on a reasonably frequent basis, even though it is not being 
slept in every night, and even if a court would decide differently, although the FOS does 
not refer to any specific caselaw.  It should, so that it is clear that it has considered the 
current law in each case it decides.   
 
In Case Study 34/1
359, the exclusion was unclear, so the FOS decided that the house 
was occupied when the insured had visited almost every weekend to carry out 
renovations, sometimes staying there overnight.  That would not have counted as 
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occupancy under the above caselaw, because at no point was there a regular, daily 
attendant.  In Case Study 34/3
360, the FOS rejected a complaint where an elderly insured 
had unexpectedly been admitted to hospital and had remained there for more than a 
year without arranging for the house to be checked.  The courts would have agreed with 
that result, although checking a house would not be enough for occupancy under the 
caselaw.  And nor should it.  Insurance premiums are charged at a higher rate for 
unoccupied premises, and may have different conditions attached. 
 
The FOS took a proportionate approach in Case Study 10/15
361.  The exclusion was 
clear and all reasonable steps had been taken to draw it to the insured‟s attention.  
Although the insured did not inform the insurer that the house was unoccupied, he left 
the central heating on and inspected the property once a week, which is what the insurer 
would have asked him to do if it had known.  Therefore, the FOS felt that the insurer 
should deal with the claim for escape of water.  However, as the insured had not been 
able to check the house for two weeks when he was ill, there was a gap in the 
inspections, which increased the damage.  Therefore the FOS felt that the insurer should 
only pay 80% of the claim, less the excess.  This is where the FOS lenient interpretation 
of occupation does not quite gel together, because it appears that the insured could not 
take a holiday from his weekly inspections, even though the FOS found that weekly 
inspections equalled occupation, when he would have been able to take a fortnight‟s 
holiday without consequences if he had been living in the house.  A court would have 
approached the case differently.  Based on the caselaw, the property was not occupied, 
so the loss would not have been covered. 
 
As the FOS does not consider it good practice for insurers to decline a claim due to a 
technical breach which has not prejudiced the firm
362, it comments
363 that if a property is 
damaged during the first 30 days in which it has been unoccupied, cover should be 
given even if the property was actually unoccupied for longer (assuming 30 days is the 
relevant period in the policy), eg Case Study 58/2
364.  The insured were on a cruise and 
away from the property for more than the 60 days permitted.  The burst pipe probably 
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occurred within the first 10 days, when the weather had been particularly cold, and the 
insured had not yet breached the occupancy provision.  The FOS required insurers to 
pay for the claim, but not all the cost of replacing the wooden floor which suffered rot 
damage, as if the house had not been unoccupied for so long, the water damage could 
have been dealt with more quickly and the floor would probably not have started to rot.  
The court would not have required insurers to pay the claim, which is fairer.  It was not 
possible to prove when the damage actually occurred.  The insured could and should 
have contacted insurers before they travelled, and if necessary, paid a higher premium. 
 
The FOS is unlikely to support an insured who misrepresents the true position on 
occupation when taking out or renewing insurance, or one who abandons his property or 
so neglects it that it practically invites unwelcome attention, as was the case in Case 
Study 34/2
365.  A court would agree. 
 
3.5.4.3 Conclusion 
 
The FOS defines occupancy more widely than a court (when it is not defined in the 
policy).  The results are unfair to insurers.  When an assured only visits the property 
once every week, which is enough for the FOS for occupation, it is more likely that the 
event which causes the damage is going to occur whilst he is away from the property.  It 
is also statistically more likely than where the law‟s occupant who is there every night 
goes on a fortnight‟s holiday.  Whatever the policy terms are, checking a property once 
every week is not the definition that an ordinary person would give to occupation.  He is 
only checking the property because he knows that it is not occupied.  In such 
circumstances he should either risk being uninsured, or tell insurers and comply with 
their requirements or pay a higher premium for them to continue to insure what may now 
be a greater insurance risk.  If the common law definition of occupation is too narrow, 
and it is not clear that it is, the FOS is not a forum which can change this.  The FOS 
should follow the law strictly. 
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3.5.5  Preventative Damage 
 
3.5.5.1 The law 
 
Marine policies usually include a suing and labouring clause which makes recoverable 
the costs preventing or mitigating damage, although probably only in relation to perils 
which have actually occurred.  Non-marine policies rarely include such a clause.  
Without one, there will be no recovery for preventative action taken by the assured, even 
if such action might save the insurer from having to pay out on a large insured risk.  
Such a clause cannot be implied, as confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Yorkshire 
Water v Sun Alliance & London Insurance Ltd
366 where the assured spent more than 
£4.6 million on flood alleviation works to prevent further pollution liability.  The policy 
afforded protection not against the occurrence of an event but against any liability 
flowing from the occurrence of that event.  There was an express duty to mitigate in that 
policy, but even without one, the Court of Appeal has confirmed in Pilkington United 
Kingdom Ltd v CGU Insurance Plc
367 that a suing and labouring clause cannot be 
implied. There the assured‟s liability policy responded only to liability for personal injury 
and physical damage, not its prevention.  To allow the assured to be able to recover the 
costs of preventing fractured glass panels in the ceiling from falling, would have 
converted a product liability policy into a general liability policy covering remedial costs.   
 
Gerling General Insurance Co v Canary Wharf Group Plc
368 was another recent case, 
this time about business interruption insurance, which produced the same result.  Where 
a self-climbing crane collapsed causing death, injury and property damage, the assured 
was not covered for thereafter using the other two cranes in a different, more expensive 
way to prevent any further such damage.  The assured‟s action in diverting the cranes 
was part of its duties under the policy to take all reasonable precautions, at its own 
expense, to prevent or minimise any loss which might give rise to a claim.  This was not 
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emergency action, which would have been covered.  A change in working methods to 
prevent a business interruption was not covered by business interruption insurers. 
 
The law treats property insurance similarly.  Most property policies only cover the 
physical loss of or damage to the insured subject matter.  So unless explicitly included, 
there is no cover for economic, diminution in value
369 or any other loss, and 
repairing/replacing a defect is not covered, unless it gives rise to an insured loss by 
causing damage to the property insured.  So in Shell UK Ltd v CLM Engineering Ltd
370, 
there was cover for replacing defective parts of an oil pipeline which had been physically 
damaged by an insured peril, but not for replacing undamaged, but defective parts.  
Courts sometimes find ways to interpret contracts so as to provide cover for replacing a 
defective item, but these cases can usually be distinguished on their facts and their 
wordings.
371  
 
3.5.5.2 The FOS 
 
In relation to preventative damage in a household property context, the FOS comments 
that if a policyholder acts reasonably to prevent a much larger insured damage, which 
would have cost significantly more, it is reasonable to require the insurer to meet the 
costs, even though a court would not.  It effectively implies a suing and labour clause in 
direct contravention of the caselaw.  So in Case Study 10/3
372, the FOS required the 
insurer to pay for a plumber‟s invoice (£70.50) for his time and the cost of a replacement 
to the blocked pipe he had deliberately broken to prevent flooding of the kitchen, which 
would have cost the insurer a lot more.  A blocked pipe was not an insured peril.  A court 
would have treated it as a defective pipe like the pipe in the Shell case above, and not 
allowed a recovery for the preventative loss, without an insured peril occurring, which in 
this case study would have been an escape of water.   
 
Perhaps the FOS is right, and it would be sensible for insurers to have to pay for work 
which would prevent a much greater insured loss.  But if the FOS is willing to imply a 
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suing and labouring clause, is it also prepared to imply a duty on the insured to take 
preventative action?  The law does not imply the latter duty unless the insured‟s actions 
are reckless, or in the few situations that they are so inexcusable that it is tantamount to 
the insured being the author of his own misfortune, as was the case in James v CGU 
Insurance
373, where the assured failed to take simple steps to put out a small fire.  And 
where will the FOS draw the line between general household maintenance which is not 
covered by property insurance and action which is preventative of certain insured loss?  
Much house maintenance could be argued to be preventative of insured perils, for 
instance expensive maintenance or installation of a damp proof course.  Maybe it is for 
this practical reason that insurers do not cover preventative loss.  Maybe also, on a 
practical note, insurers are willing to provide ex gratia payments in relation to 
preventative (as opposed to maintenance) work, and maybe that explains why the FOS 
has reported only one, early, case study on this topic.   
 
3.5.5.3 Conclusion 
 
Perhaps the law should be changed in respect of cover for preventative work, at least in 
household policies, but perhaps not.  It is not clear that the FOS has considered the 
caselaw carefully and thought through the consequences of its stance.  In any case, 
even if it has done so, it is not for the FOS to change the law, although its voice is the 
basis of a powerful lobby.  It is not right that insurers should be obliged by the FOS to 
pay for a loss which the law says is not for them to pay. 
 
3.5.6  Buildings or contents cover 
 
3.5.6.1 The Law 
 
Generally buildings insurance covers permanent fixtures and fittings which cannot 
reasonably be removed and taken to another home, and have essentially become part of 
the fabric of the property.  Contents insurance covers items which can be reasonably 
removed.  There is little caselaw on what comes under contents insurance and what 
buildings, but there is parallel caselaw on what constitutes a chattel and what a fixture. 
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Botham v TSB Bank Plc
374 is a modern Court of Appeal case which summarises the 
position established through ancient caselaw
375 and which has been applied through the 
20
th century
376.  The two tests are: (i) the method and degree of annexation and (ii) the 
object and purpose of annexation.  Where an item is attached to the property by more 
than its own weight, if it was objectively intended to be permanent and to afford a long-
lasting improvement to the building, it is a fixture.  If the attachment is temporary and no 
more than necessary for the item to be used and enjoyed, then it remains a chattel.  A 
relevant factor is whether or not the item can be removed without damaging the fabric of 
the building.   
 
3.5.6.2 The FOS 
 
The FOS will consider the individual circumstances of each case, but has set out the 
following guidelines, (with which a court applying the Botham tests would agree unless 
specified otherwise below.)  Buildings policies would usually cover: 
 
1.  fitted wardrobes; 
 
2.  fitted kitchens and built-in appliances.  However, contrary to its own guidelines 
which at least it is not blindly following, and without referring to any caselaw, the 
FOS found that the kitchen units installed by the council tenant in Case Study 
30/3
377 were contents because she purchased them, they could easily be 
removed and the tenant claimed that she would take them with her if she moved.  
The FOS thought this was feasible, although it seems hard to imagine.  Had she 
kept the old kitchen to re-install if she moved?  Would the tenancy agreement 
have allowed her to leave this property with no kitchen?  Would she really have 
ripped out any kitchen she found installed at a new premises, so as to install 
these particular kitchen units?  Perhaps the FOS merely had sympathy with the 
complainant who did not have buildings cover, but had suffered damage to her 
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new kitchen units through escape of water.  The law would class kitchen units as 
fixtures, as it did in Botham.  
 
3.  most laminate wooden flooring, where the individual planks are glued together 
and fixed under a skirting board or beading, as a fixture
378.  Unlike a carpet, they 
are difficult to remove intact and have essentially become part of the building. 
 
4.  outside aerials fixed permanently to the roof, even if the policy lists them under 
contents.  This is because few would remove them when moving house, most 
would regard them as part of the building and any damage caused would most 
likely be as a result of an insured event such as storm or lightning covered by 
buildings insurance.  So in Case Study 30/2
379, the FOS required the buildings 
insurer to pay for both the roof and the TV aerial which were damaged in a storm, 
even though the wording clearly stated that the aerial was part of the contents 
cover which the insured had not taken out.  The law would pay more heed to 
clear wording than the FOS does in this situation. 
 
5.  parts of the building which have been temporarily removed and are then lost or 
damaged while being stored. 
 
Contents policies would usually cover: 
 
1.  furniture; 
 
2.  appliances which are free-standing or easily unscrewed from the wall; 
 
3.  fitted carpets.
380  The FOS says this is in accordance with industry convention.  
Although not mentioned, it is also in accordance with the caselaw.
381  
 
4.  re-useable click-together laminate wooden flooring, which is more like a fitted 
carpet than glued laminate flooring.   
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5.  new items which are damaged or stolen before being fitted, such as flat packed 
kitchen units or laminate flooring, as they are the owner‟s personal possessions.  
So the flat packed conservatory stored in the garage and damaged when the roof 
collapsed was part of the contents cover in Case Study 30/6
382, where the 
insured only had contents cover. 
 
Where there is real ambiguity in the wording about whether the buildings or contents 
insurer is responsible for a loss, the FOS considers that each should meet 50% of the 
claim.  It is understandable that the FOS should mediate in this way, although it means 
that it may not be in the interests of insurers to accept that they are on cover if there is a 
chance that the FOS will only hold them liable for half.  A court would decide who was on 
cover, and if it was both of them, would consider if the liability was several or joint, and 
deal with any questions of contribution. 
 
3.5.6.3 Personal possessions temporarily away from the home - contents cover? 
 
Personal possessions temporarily away from the home will only usually be included in a 
contents policy if an additional premium is paid.  Such cover is usually limited with lists of 
included and excluded items even in a supposedly “all risks” cover.  The FOS considers 
that all this must be explained before inception, so insureds understand exactly what 
cover they have paid for.  If the wording is unclear, the FOS will interpret it contra 
proferentem.  If the policy has been explained and is clearly worded, the FOS 
acknowledges
383 that it is for an insurer exercising its commercial underwriting decision, 
not the FOS, to define the nature and scope of the cover.   
 
The FOS has considered this issue in relation to satellite navigation equipment and 
taken a common sense view.
384  Unless the insurer can establish a valid reason why not, 
if the device can only be used and is only used in a car, then the motor policy should 
respond, and if it can be and has been used outside the car, such as by walkers, the 
personal possessions section of a domestic contents policy should respond. 
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3.5.6.4 Double insurance  
 
Under the law, double insurance is lawful, as long as there is no over indemnity.
385  The 
problem arises where both policies try to exclude their liability if another policy exists 
which could cover the loss.  Neither the courts
386 nor the FOS will allow a self-cancelling 
situation.  The courts will construe such a clause reasonably so as not to have been 
intended to apply to any cover which is expressed to be itself cancelled by such co-
existence.  The FOS, encountering the problem in a household context, and without 
mentioning any caselaw, views this as a clause to prevent double recovery, not to 
prevent policyholders legitimately spreading their risk between insurers.  In Case Study 
35/1
387, the insured accidentally dropped his camera.  The FOS found that he could 
recover on his household contents insurance up to that policy limit, and then recover the 
rest from his purchase protection insurance which excluded loss covered by another 
policy or loss which would be so covered if it were not for a policy limit.  The FOS does 
not discuss contribution between insurers, so nor will this work. 
 
3.5.6.5 Conclusion 
 
The law and the FOS tend to decide whether something is covered by a buildings, 
contents or another policy, in the same way.  But it is not clear whether the FOS 
approach is determined or influenced by the law, or simply by its application of common 
sense.  No criticism is levelled at the law applied strictly on the subject, so there is no 
policy reason for FOS decisions to be different.  The only obvious difference in approach 
is in relation to television aerials, which the FOS reclassifies in contravention of clear 
contract terms.  In the interest of contract certainty, it should not do this.  It may be too 
influenced by the fact of an insured not having contents insurance, as this was evident in 
all the case studies reported.   
 
Hopefully a court would find it useful where the FOS determines an issue which a court 
has not, for instance in relation to satellite navigation equipment. 
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In an ambiguous set of circumstances the FOS will hold two insurers equally liable for 
paying for a loss.  Whilst this is a quick and simple method of mediating an argument, it 
is not the same as a court decision which determines the question, and it might be better 
if an Ombudsman would decide the actual issue.   
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3.6  Exclusion For Keys Left In Vehicle/ Unattended Vehicle 
 
3.6.1  Compliance with a sales/marketing code 
 
The FOS regards an exclusion for theft if the keys have been left in or near the vehicle 
and/or it has been left unattended as a major restriction, which must be drawn to the 
proposer‟s attention before inception or will not be applied.  The FOS experience is that 
this exclusion is a shock to most insureds even though it is included in almost every 
motor policy.  The FOS wants these restrictions highlighted on the policy certificate, 
(which insureds have to possess by law), and on the policy schedule, (which document 
insureds are more likely to read than the policy).  The comments above in relation to 
breaches of sales code apply equally here. 
 
In Case Study 38/6
388 an insured parked opposite a letterbox, turned his back on the car 
without taking the keys and walked away to post a letter.  While he was crossing the 
road, the car was stolen.  The policy documents sent to him did not refer to the keys in 
the car exclusion, which was only mentioned in the policy booklet, and was not 
highlighted at the sales point.  The FOS considered that it was fair and reasonable to 
assume that he had been prejudiced by these sales failures, and although he had not 
acted recklessly, if he had known, he might have acted differently.  There is no mention 
of any evidence going to whether he would in fact have behaved differently.  The 
complaint was upheld despite the clear wording of the exclusion which would have 
prevailed before a court. 
 
This FOS reasoning does not hold together.  If the insured in Case Study 38/6 would 
have left his keys in the car whatever the terms of the policy, then the breach of sales 
code made no difference.  If he would have acted differently if he had known of the 
exclusion, is he recklessly taking a risk which he would not be prepared to take if he 
were uninsured or is he entitled to take some reasonable risks, knowing that he is 
insured?  Perhaps it is unreasonable for him to leave his keys in the car in these 
circumstances.  Presumably, insurers think it is, as this is not a risk they are willing to 
insure, and not one for which the insured has paid.  So why should he be covered just 
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because he did not know for sure whether he was?  This may be an example of the FOS 
policing the sales codes, rather than doing justice to the situation. 
 
Once it is satisfied with the sales and marketing history, the FOS will look to see whether 
the exclusion applies in the circumstances of the case.  The courts go straight to 
whether the facts of the case fit within the exclusion. 
 
3.6.2  Unattended vehicle exclusion 
 
3.6.2.1 A court‟s approach 
 
To determine whether on the facts a vehicle has been left unattended, a court will apply 
the test formulated by Lord Denning in Starfire Diamond Rings Ltd v Angel
389:  whether 
there was “someone able to keep it under observation, that is, in a position to observe 
any attempt by anyone to interfere with it, and who is so placed as to have a reasonable 
prospect of preventing any unauthorized interference with it.”  Later cases followed and 
built upon Starfire.  (see tables below which show the combination of factors in each 
case which determined whether the vehicle was unattended).  In chronological order 
they are: 
 
1.  Plaistow Transport Ltd v Graham,
390  
 
2.  Ingleton v General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corporation,
391  
 
3.  Langford v Legal & General,
392  
 
4.  O‟Donoghue v Harding
393.  Otton J commented that the observation requirement 
of the Denning test did not mean that the driver had to keep all the car under 
observation on all sides, all the time.  That a thief is unobserved does not 
conclusively mean that the car was not under observation.  Otton J also 
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commented that having a reasonable prospect of preventing interference would 
include being close enough to raise the alarm to lead to the apprehension of the 
thieves, even if the driver could not physically stop the thieves himself.   
 
5.  Sanger t/a SA Jewels v Beazley,
394   
 
6.  Hayward v Norwich Union.  This case is different to those above as the exclusion 
in question was for keys “left in or on the car,” as opposed to an unattended 
vehicle.  DJ Michael Tugendhart QC at first instance
395 found the word “left” to be 
ambiguous and interpreted it to mean “left unattended.”  He then applied the 
Starfire tests to find that the keys had not been left unattended in the Porsche.  
The Court of Appeal
396 reversed the decision on 22 February 2001.  “Left” on its 
plain and ordinary meaning did not need to be interpreted as “left unattended.”  
Even if it did, “it would not follow that the same test should apply to keys being 
left unattended as to vehicles being left unattended.”  The question was “whether 
the keys have been caused or allowed to remain in or on the car by a person 
who has moved away from them, no one else being left in charge of the keys.”  
Whether the person has moved away from the keys is a question of fact and 
degree, and “the test must be whether that person is close enough to make a 
theft unlikely.”   
 
On the facts, the Court of Appeal in Hayward decided that the keys had been “left.”  
Moving 15-25 yards away from the car was too far to make the prevention of a theft 
unlikely, in circumstances where the driver did not see the thief open the car door, get 
into the car, shut the door, lock the doors and start the engine before being alerted.  
Obiter, had he left an adult passenger in the car with the keys, so that such a person 
stands in for the driver, he would not have “left” the keys in the car.  Insurers accepted in 
argument that if the driver got out of a car to attend to a child in the back or to take 
something out of the boot, whilst leaving the ignition keys in the car, the driver would still 
be sufficiently proximate to the keys so that they had not been left.  
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Unattended                   
Case  Location  Item 
insured 
Distance 
from vehicle 
Vehicle 
locked 
Key in 
vehicle 
Vehicle 
visible 
Proper 
Lookout 
Time away  Aware of theft 
Starfire  Car: lay-by. 
Driver: walking 
on track leading 
off lay-by. 
Jewellery.  37 yards.  Yes. 
Thief broke 
window to take 
jewellery case. 
No.  Only the roof 
was visible 
when the 
driver was 
facing the 
car. 
No – the 
driver‟s back 
was turned 
away from 
the car when 
he went 
down the 
track. 
5 mins 
(estimated) 
Yes when thief 
was already 
walking away 
with the 
jewellery.  
Driver could 
not catch him. 
Ingleton  Car: parked in 
road.  Driver: 
chatting in shop. 
Van.  Distance btw 
road and 
shop. 
No. 
Van stolen. 
Yes, in 
ignition. 
No.  No.  15 mins.  No. 
Sanger  Car: petrol 
station 
Driver: lavatory 
then kiosk. 
Jewellery.  Distance btw 
pump and 
lavatory/ 
kiosk. 
Yes.  No.  Not for the 
68 seconds 
whilst the 
theft 
occurred, 
and the view 
from the 
kiosk was 
obscured. 
No.  Even 
when part of 
the car was 
visible, the 
driver did not 
keep looking 
at it when he 
went into the 
kiosk. 
5 mins 
(estimated) 
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Attended                   
Case  Location  Item 
insured 
Distance 
from vehicle 
Vehicle 
locked 
Key in 
vehicle 
Vehicle 
visible 
Proper 
Lookout 
Time away  Aware of theft 
Plaistow  Lorry: lay-by. 
Driver: asleep 
inside cabin. 
Goods in 
transit. 
0.  N/A.  Ingots 
stolen from 
under lorry 
tarpaulin. 
Yes, along 
with the 
driver. 
N/A  Yes – driver 
expected a 
theft would 
wake him. 
0 mins.  No. 
Langford  Car: house 
driveway. 
Driver: opened 
porch and front 
door and slipped 
inside house to 
put bags down. 
Jewellery.  17 ft, of 
which only 8 
ft was without 
view of the 
car 
Yes.  
Thieves broke 
in and stole 
two suitcases 
of jewellery. 
No.  Not for 5 
seconds. 
Yes, but 
could not 
see when in 
part of the 
house. 
Moments.  Yes.  Ran out 
of the house 
and confronted 
the thieves, 
but unable to 
stop them. 
O‟Donoghue  Car: quiet petrol 
station. 
Driver: kiosk. 
Jewellery.  Petrol pump 
nearest 
kiosk. No 
more than 
14-16 ft. 
Yes. 
Professional 
thieves had 
probably been 
tracking the 
driver and 
broke in with 
own duplicate 
key. 
No.  Most of car 
visible but for 
a few 
seconds  
when signing 
the credit 
card slip, 
walking to 
the kiosk, 
and walking 
from the 
counter to 
the door. 
Yes.   
 
Few 
moments. 
No. Thieves 
on unobserved 
side of car, 
unlocked, stole 
and re-locked 
within a matter 
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Hayward 
(first 
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immobilizer. 
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see and hear 
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throughout. 
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and 
reasonable. 
Few 
moments  
Yes.  Touched 
car as it was 
driven away. 
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Whilst it is a combination of factors which determines whether a vehicle was attended, 
the feature which stands out above as most likely to make a difference is the attitude of 
the driver and whether he kept a careful lookout.  That is the only feature universally 
answered in the negative for unattended vehicles, and in the affirmative for attended 
ones. 
 
3.6.2.2 The FOS approach compared to a court‟s 
 
Assuming that there are no sales code issues, the FOS will begin with the Starfire test, 
as a court would, to determine whether a vehicle has been left unattended.  But the 
FOS, making no distinction between exclusions for unattended vehicle and those for 
keys left in the car, has set out issues and guidelines which affect its decisions, some of 
which a court might not share.  There is a danger that these will become rules of thumb 
which the FOS will follow whatever the circumstances and however the caselaw would 
respond:   
 
1.  Was the driver in reasonable proximity to the vehicle or had he “moved away?”  
In determining this, the FOS considers the nature of the location to be of prime 
importance – a responsible person needs to be nearer to a car left in a busy 
street or petrol station than to one left in the middle of an empty field.  Someone 
leaving the engine running in the driveway whilst opening or closing his garage 
door (such as in Case Study 01/06
397) has not moved away and is not 
necessarily reckless.  But if this was done whilst the car was in the road, however 
close to the driveway or private property, and the driver turned his back on the 
vehicle or went inside to fetch something, then the insured might have “left” the 
car.  If the FOS had had to decide the Langford case
398, it might have applied this 
inaccurately as a rule of thumb so that when she went inside the house, she had 
left her locked car unattended, whereas a court considering all the aspects of the 
Starfire test found it attended. 
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2.  Was the driver able to keep the vehicle under observation?  The FOS notes that 
in some circumstances, a vehicle can still be attended if it is not in view.  A court 
would also take account of the obscuring of the view and the time during which it 
could not be observed. 
 
3.  Would the driver have had a reasonable prospect of intervening?  The mere fact 
of a theft does not necessarily mean that the driver was not in a position to 
intervene.  A driver standing next to his car can have a deterrent effect even if he 
is not physically able to prevent a theft.  A court would agree, but would also look 
as they did in Starfire at what was done in the driver‟s absence. 
 
4.  The length of time the driver anticipated the car being unoccupied and 
unattended.  A court might be more concerned with the actual time spent away 
from the vehicle, the distance and during how much of this time the vehicle was 
observed, as all the court cases mention these factors rather than the intention of 
the assured. 
 
5.  The general attitude to the specific risk – if the complainant‟s behaviour is likely 
to be regarded by other drivers as “reasonable,” for instance if the insured was 
standing only a few feet away, the FOS is likely to consider the vehicle attended.  
Following Starfire, the objective reasonableness of the behaviour is not really the 
point, and is not strictly part of the test, although it might go towards 
recklessness.  The courts seem more concerned with carefulness and trying to 
keep the vehicle under observation. 
 
6.  The car‟s value and its attractiveness to thieves.  Following Starfire, a court 
would be more interested in the object of the policy, and would require a higher 
level of stringency in looking after high value goods such as jewellery.  The FOS 
does not specifically note the object of the insurance as affecting its decisions. 
 
Case Studies 01/06 to 01/12
399 deal with unattended vehicle/ keys left in car cases.  With 
each case turning on its own facts, and as the Court of Appeal had not yet given its 
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ruling in Hayward, it is reasonable to assume that the court would have interpreted them 
to give the same results, except in Case Study 01/07 which turned on a sales point.   
 
The FOS decided that it did not need to adjust its approach materially following the Court 
of Appeal decision in Hayward, and that applying this test would have produced the 
same results for Case Studies 01/06 to 01/12.  It is not obvious that this would have 
been so, particularly in relation to Case Study 01/06 which was a keys left in car case.  
The FOS upheld the complaint and its reasoning was in line with the first instance 
decision of Hayward.  The driver stopped his car on his driveway, got out leaving the 
engine running and the door open in order to open his garage, put his briefcase in the 
unlocked porch adjacent to his garage, and turned around to see someone jump into his 
car and reverse away at high speed.  It is arguable that the driver was not sufficiently 
proximate to the keys so that a theft was unlikely. 
 
Although the FOS considers that it is following the Court of Appeal ruling in Hayward, the 
reasoning of some of the case studies suggests that it may be applying the Starfire test 
for “unattended” to decide if an insured has “moved away” from the vehicle in a left keys 
exclusion.  The FOS comments
400 that it views the two tests as “very similar.”  The 
temptation to merge the tests is understandable, especially as many exclusions now 
include both unattended and keys left elements.  However, this may not be a correct 
application of the caselaw in light of the comments referred to above made in the Court 
of Appeal‟s judgment.  
 
In Case Study 38/5,
401 the FOS thought that the insured had probably accidentally left 
the keys in the car when it was stolen from her driveway but parked close to the road.   
They were unattended as she was in the house so was too far away to prevent a theft 
and did not hear or see anything.  Applying the Court of Appeal reasoning of Hayward, 
surely the keys were left in the car in the sense of their ordinary meaning, rather than 
needing to imply the words “left unattended.”  Were the keys left in the car?  Yes.  Had 
she moved away from them?  Yes, because she was not close enough to make a theft 
unlikely.  The position of the parking seems irrelevant. 
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Although there have been no reported FOS case studies relating to car-jacking, perhaps 
because the industry deals with these fairly, the FOS has commented that it would not 
let an insurer rely on a keys left in vehicle exclusion, even where hijack was not 
specifically excepted from the exclusion.  So probably would a court, based not on the 
FOS idea of fairness and reasonableness, but on LJ Gibson‟s obiter comments in the 
Court of Appeal in Hayward, that the duress in a hijacking situation would make the keys 
“taken” as opposed to “left.”  There would therefore be no need for the FOS to rely on 
anything but law in such circumstances. 
 
3.6.2.3 Conclusion 
 
These exclusions are so commonplace that it is surprising that the FOS has made a 
policy decision to regard them as onerous and worthy of particular highlighting.  Where 
the FOS accepts that there has been no breach of a sales code, and in view of the 
flexibility of the court‟s approach deciding each case on its facts, the FOS should follow 
the law more carefully.  It should actively consider in each unattended vehicle case the 
Starfire test as modified by the later caselaw, and in each left keys case the Court of 
Appeal ruling in Hayward, without muddling the two together, and without relying instead 
on its own rules of thumb.  The caselaw deals adequately and fairly with the issues and 
there is no need for the FOS to think differently.  It says that it does not, although the 
existence of its guidelines in addition to the caselaw indicates that it might.     
 
3.6.3  Recklessness 
 
Insurers (both in law and according to the FOS) can still refuse a claim if they can prove 
that the insured has been reckless and so breached the general condition to take 
reasonable care of his vehicle, which condition exists independently of the exclusions 
and any sales code.  The FOS says that its approach in determining recklessness is 
consistent with the Court of Appeal test in Sofi v Prudential Assurance
402, which defines 
reckless as recognising a risk but deliberately courting it.
403   The case studies below 
bear this out. 
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It is difficult for insurers to prove recklessness, as most people who leave their keys in 
the car or their vehicle unattended fail to recognise the risk, so do not have the requisite 
intent.  If they had been aware of the risk, they might have acted differently.  However, 
the FOS might expect the degree of attention required for a high value car to be greater 
than for a low value car.   
 
In Case Study 01/10
404, the FOS found the driver reckless when he saw a suspicious 
character loitering near his car at a petrol station, but still left the keys on the driver‟s 
seat when he went to the tap to wash his hands.  Another driver in Case Study 31/4
405 
was not reckless when he stopped at a petrol station to buy chocolate, having left the 
keys in the car with a lady whom he had met in a nightclub the night before.  Both she 
and the car had disappeared by the time he came out of the shop.  He trusted her, so he 
was not reckless.  Because she was in the car, he had not left it unattended. 
 
The FOS applied the Sofi test in Case Study 63/7
406 to the condition to “take all 
precautions to reduce or remove the risk of loss of the insured vehicle.”  This effectively 
softened it so that the insured had to take only reasonable care rather than all 
precautions.  The FOS concluded that he had not been reckless in leaving keys in his 
van whilst he was moving his tools into a residential garage, because he said that it had 
not occurred to him that he was taking a risk.  On the Sofi test, this is right, but it is 
arguable that a court might have taken a stricter approach to the wording and said that 
recklessness was not the appropriate standard. 
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3.7  Measurement Of Loss, Abandonment And Salvage 
 
The common law has long ago established rules about measurement of loss.  In general, 
the FOS seems to accept and follow these.  Many of the problems which the courts have 
decided have not yet reached the FOS, or at least not the published FOS material, so 
will not be included below.  The FOS has also set out some guidelines, the equivalent of 
which do not exist in the law.  These and any differences between the law and the FOS 
approach are below. 
 
3.7.1  Insurer’s option to repair, reinstate, replace or offer a cash settlement 
 
Most household policies allow the insurer to opt to repair, replace, reinstate or offer a 
cash settlement to deal with the claim.  The FOS says that the insurer must exercise this 
power reasonably, in the circumstances of the individual case.  In Case Study 58/5
407, 
following expert evidence and photographs of the units, the FOS found that it was not 
reasonable for the insurer to opt for repair instead of replacement.  This requirement of 
reasonableness is a welcome feature which is not present in the law unless required by 
the wording of the policy. 
 
3.7.1.1 Repair  
 
The measure of loss for repair is normally the cost of restoring the goods to their pre-loss 
condition. The FOS seems to agree.  If the assured intends the goods for resale, the 
measure is the market value of the goods before and after the loss.
408  The FOS has not 
published any material which tests this. 
 
If the cost of repair is more than the market value of the goods prior to the loss, and only 
if the policy permits, an insurer may choose either to pay for a total loss or to indemnify 
the insured for the cost of repair.  Motor insurers are most commonly affected by this 
matter and usually pay the market value prior to loss.  The FOS seems to support that 
practice, although it is not clear whether it first requires the policy to include this option 
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as the law does.  (see below FOS vehicle valuations)  Without such policy terms, the law 
entitles the assured to an indemnity representing the reinstatement cost, although there 
is no modern case on point.  
 
The FOS considers that an insurer opting for repair (or reinstatement) must explain that 
if the insurer/its agent chooses or controls the repairer, then it is normally the insurer 
who will be liable to make good any deficiencies in the repair, even if this brings the 
claim above policy limits.  If however, the insured insists on a particular repairer, the 
insured will generally be responsible for the quality of the repairs, unless the insurer 
controls the work such as by requiring the repairer to cut his costs or to use particular 
materials or parts.  In Case Study 68/07
409, the FOS said that the insured could look to 
the insurers for the costs of remedying the defects in repairs of the insured damage, but 
would have to claim against the surveyor directly for remedying defects in additional 
work for which she had paid, even though insurers had paid for the surveyor overseeing 
all the work.  The position at law would be the same. 
 
3.7.1.2 Reinstatement and under-insurance 
 
When an insurer opts to reinstate, it is bound to replace as new with no deduction for 
wear or tear or depreciation.  However, if there has been under-insurance, the law 
applies the principle of average to marine policies, under which the assured must bear 
the uninsured proportion of any partial loss.
410  The principle applies in non-marine 
policies usually only where an average condition is incorporated into the policy.  Most fire 
policies contain one, and because they are so common in commercial fire policies, one 
may be implied with those.  There is little authority on the application of average outside 
of marine and fire insurance, the assumption having been made in a number of ancient 
cases that average has no place outside of these categories.  In any case, average is 
only required to ensure that the assured bears the uninsured proportion of a partial loss.  
For a total loss, insurers only have to pay up to policy limits, so the assured necessarily 
bears the uninsured balance. 
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The FOS supports insurers who adopt the principle of average when there has been 
under-insurance, as long as the reduction proposed by insurers is not communicated 
and imposed too late in the process.  In Case Study 04/18
411, the insurer agreed to 
reinstate in full an under-insured, fire-damaged property, as long as the policyholder 
increased the sum insured.  The FOS would not allow the insurer then, in the middle of 
agreed works, to impose the sum insured as a ceiling on its liability, which would have 
left the first floor a shell.  The law would not generally impose a time limit on applying 
average, although in the circumstances, insurers might have waived the average option 
or be estopped from asserting otherwise when they had agreed to reinstate in full.  If the 
FOS applied legal principles to these situations, it would probably be achieving the same 
result without needing to create its own policy for them. 
 
Even where a building is adequately insured, it is possible, although unusual, that this 
will not be enough to cover reinstatement, as was the position in Case Study 04/20.
412  In 
these circumstances, the FOS does not believe it reasonable for the insurer to limit its 
liability to the sum insured.  For it is this sort of unusual eventuality that insureds expect 
their insurance to cover.  There is no recent caselaw on point, but the general principle 
applied by the law is the same: that a total loss is subject to the policy limits, but 
reinstatement is not.  If an insurer discovers at the outset that the reinstatement costs 
are going to be more than policy limits, and if the policy so provides, insurers can choose 
to treat the loss as if it were total instead.  They cannot make one representation at the 
beginning that they will cover the loss and then change their minds. 
 
If the FOS considers that the householder has acted honestly in assessing the amount 
for which contents should be insured, but a loss adjuster later suggests that there has 
been under-insurance, the FOS will take a sympathetic line to the insured when it comes 
to replacement, as valuation is not an exact science and can be difficult. 
 
3.7.1.3 Replacement and cash settlements 
 
There is no relevant caselaw on this topic, only guidance from the FOS as set out below, 
which it would be good for the courts to follow should the opportunity arise. 
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The FOS will regard replacement as a reasonable option if the object can be replaced, a 
suitable alternative is found (antique jewellery cannot be replaced by a modern piece) 
and the insured wants a replacement (personal circumstances may have changed his 
desire to own the item).  Otherwise, the FOS will normally ask the insurer to agree a 
cash settlement.  As demonstrated in Case Studies 75/09 and 75/10
413, the FOS would 
not regard it as reasonable for the insurer to make a deduction from the cash settlement 
to represent any discount it would have got if the policyholder had bought a replacement 
from one of the insurer‟s nominated suppliers.   
 
If there is to be a replacement, the FOS may consider it unreasonable to limit the choice 
to a particular retailer or for the insurer to offer vouchers to the insured.  Insureds should 
be allowed to choose where they purchase a replacement. 
 
Where there is a new for old policy (commonly in household insurance), both the law and 
the FOS will oblige the insurer to provide a new replacement or equivalent money, even 
if the damaged item had been subject to wear and tear, unless there is a clear exclusion 
for wear and tear.  This overcomes difficulties of calculating the amount of loss, although 
might mean that the insured receives a windfall.  In Case Study 58/5
414, the FOS 
required the insurer to replace all the kitchen units, where all but one of them had been 
damaged by flood.   
 
3.7.2  Matching sets 
 
There is no caselaw on matching sets, but policies usually exclude cover for replacing a 
whole set where only one part is damaged and a matching replacement cannot be 
located.  Whilst the law might apply the exclusion strictly, the FOS typically awards 50% 
of the cost of replacing the undamaged items in buildings and contents insurance, in an 
attempt to balance the unacceptable finish that the insured would have to his property if 
the wording was applied strictly, especially as he probably did not appreciate its meaning 
until that point, against the unfairness of distorting clear policy wording sold in line with 
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the appropriate industry codes.  In Case Study 10/08,
415 the dog knocked a tin of paint 
over a sofa, and if a matching replacement could not be found, the insurer had to pay 
50% of the cost of replacing the rest of the suite. 
 
Where the FOS considers that there has been no substantial loss, the 50% approach is 
inappropriate and no compensation should be paid above the cost of replacing the 
damaged item, for instance, with re-tiling a room when only a few of the tiles have been 
damaged.
416  But where matching is intrinsic to the value of the objects, the FOS will 
make an award for full replacement, so in Case Study 10/05
417 the insurer was required 
to pay for a replacement suit where only the trousers had been damaged.  The wording 
was, “We will treat an individual item of a matching set of articles…as a single item.”  
The FOS felt that it was fair and reasonable to treat the whole suit as a single item.  This 
seems a sensible way of dealing with the issue and a court might well have approached 
the problem in the same way. 
 
In Case Study 75/06
418, the sink was damaged, but insurers were not required to pay 
50% of the cost of the matching bathroom suite that the insured had purchased.  The 
tape recording of the relevant telephone conversation showed that the insured had been 
told to wait for insurers to report back as to whether they could find a matching basin, 
which they thought was unlikely, but which they managed to do.  By contrast, in Case 
Study 75/07
419 insurers had to pay for a replacement bath plus 50% of the rest of the 
bathroom suite the insured had purchased.  She had been given no clear explanation of 
how her claim would be progressed, and insurers‟ representatives who were meant to 
assess whether it would be possible to source a matching suite twice failed to turn up to 
appointments without contacting her to cancel them.  
 
On the one hand, the FOS 50% approach seems reasonable, especially as it is only 
applied in suitable circumstances.  On the other, it is not fair for insurers who have 
clearly excluded matching items, it is not clear to insurers when the FOS will apply the 
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50% approach and policyholders are receiving payment for an uninsured loss for which, 
unless the 50% approach has been factored into the premium, they have not paid.  
Sometimes a loss is simply uninsured and that is unfortunate for the policyholder.  The 
law recognises this but the FOS seems unhappy to. 
 
3.7.3  Total Loss 
 
If goods are destroyed or cannot be reinstated or repaired, the assured will generally be 
entitled to their market value immediately before the insured event
420 up to policy limits.  
Unless specifically included in the policy, there will be no provision for consequential 
losses or loss of profits.  Most consumer policies are unvalued, so the market value has 
to be calculated.  It is common practice amongst insurers to judge the market value from 
the amount that the goods would have realised if sold, not the normally greater amount 
that they would cost to replace, which would be the tortious measure.
421  The sum is 
payable even if the assured has not replaced the chattel and has no intention of doing 
so.  The price originally paid is not relevant in determining actual loss, so that if the 
claimant has had the good fortune to obtain the subject matter cheaply, he is 
nevertheless entitled to recover the full cost of replacement, (minus depreciation if that is 
claimed).
422 
 
As a matter of practice, insurers often pay for a total loss following serious damage 
which renders repair uneconomic.  The FOS allows this but has set out some further 
guidance in relation to vehicle valuation which the law does not have and a court might 
wish to adopt.   
 
3.7.4  Vehicle valuation: FOS
423 
 
In the more unusual case of a valued policy, both the FOS and the courts will only allow 
recovery of the value set out in the policy (assuming it is set out clearly), not the 
replacement cost, eg Case Study 66/04
424.  However, for unvalued motor policies at 
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least, the FOS has taken the view that the tort measure of replacement value should 
prevail.  So the market value of a written-off car would be the likely cost to the customer 
of buying a vehicle as near as possibly identical to the one that has been stolen or 
damaged beyond repair.  This is not the same as the amount the vehicle was worth 
when purchased.   
 
The FOS expects insurers to know the FOS approach to vehicle valuation, as it is like 
that of the IOB, make a reasonable assessment and then to pay this amount.  This is 
one of the very few occasions where the FOS makes reference to IOB decisions.  
Perhaps it should therefore be inferred that usually IOB decisions/ policy will not apply.  
If insurers do not assess vehicle valuations in line with good industry practice, the FOS 
might require them to and also to pay for distress and inconvenience.  Following industry 
practice is not a requirement of the law. 
 
3.7.4.1 The price guides  
 
To establish a vehicle‟s true market value, the FOS will expect the insurer to consult 
trade guides and to adjust the price to allow for any unusual features in the vehicle‟s 
mileage or condition.  The FOS looks at all three of the major industry valuation guides, 
Glass‟s, Parker‟s and CAPcalc to form an overall view.  The insurer should usually refer 
to the guide retail price (the price a member of the public might reasonably expect to pay 
at a dealership), although it may be suitable to use the guide trade value (the price that a 
motor trader might pay) if the vehicle was not in guide retail condition or where there is 
evidence that the insured intended to buy a replacement privately. 
 
The FOS would also expect the insurer to look at price guides available to the public, 
especially where they give significantly different prices to the trade guides. Specialist 
publications might be necessary for the valuing of unusual or classic vehicles, and 
evidence from the firm‟s in-house or an independent engineer might be useful, especially 
in relation to non-standard vehicles.  The FOS would expect insurers to contact the 
compilers of a relevant guide and make further enquiries where a vehicle has unusual 
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66/02
425, it required the insurer to do this, which resulted in a higher valuation for the 
insured‟s car with its specialist sports body. 
 
The FOS may penalise an insurer who does not make a valuation on the basis of these 
guides or on any reasonable basis, and where this happened in Case Study 66/01
426, it 
awarded the insured £150 for distress and inconvenience.  In contrast, a court would 
penalise unreasonable behaviour through costs and interest awards under CPR.   
 
If the insurer has behaved reasonably in consulting the appropriate guides and making 
appropriate adjustments to come to a market value within the range of what could be 
considered reasonable, then the FOS will not substitute its own judgment. 
 
3.7.4.2 Forecourt prices, local factors and owner‟s own assessment 
 
The FOS places little weight on forecourt prices advertised in local papers and internet 
sites, as these are widely understood to be too high and only a starting point for 
negotiations.  Also, the information provided is often insufficient to ensure a like-for-like 
comparison of age, condition and mileage.  This point was specifically made in Case 
Study 66/01.
427   
 
However, the FOS does sometimes take into account local factors, for instance, if the 
vehicle has recently been bought from a reputable source, then this may be a sensible 
starting point, as it was in Case Study 22/17
428.  There, a car was stolen one month after 
it had been bought new, with only five miles on the clock.  The insurer said that the 
dealer‟s registration for 5 weeks before the purchase reduced its value.  However, the 
FOS said that there was no evidence of this, and the insurer paid the full purchase price 
with interest from the date of the theft. 
 
An owner‟s assessment of the usefulness or reliability of a vehicle will make no 
difference to a fair market valuation which will already have taken into account the 
condition of the vehicle. 
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3.7.4.3 Accessories or modifications 
 
Special features, accessories or modifications added or made by an insured may reduce 
or not add substantially to a vehicle‟s market value.  If a vehicle has been permanently 
modified, it may be appropriate to look at the closest equivalent vehicle and then make 
adjustments for the quality of the modifications.  Provided the overall approach is 
reasonable, the FOS will not require the insurer to cover the policyholder for the precise 
mixture of features of the car in question.  However, the insurer may have to include in a 
settlement the market value (rather than new value) of detachable accessories, which is 
what they did in Case Study 18/12
429, in relation to a CD player, roof bars and tow bar 
which had been on the damaged car, but did not fit on the replacement car.  The FOS 
felt that the insurer had calculated the offer fairly. 
 
3.7.4.4 Hidden defects – actual re-sale value 
 
The market value of a vehicle which is found to have been clocked or imported from an 
unauthorised source, will be reduced.  If the owner knew of such hidden facts, the 
insurer may be justified in rejecting the entire claim for fraudulently trying to obtain a 
benefit to which he was not entitled.  Although an innocent victim of fraud should receive 
the vehicle‟s actual market value, he will still not receive the value of the car he thought 
he had bought, but only an equivalent replacement of the actual car that he did buy.  
These are faults which might have been reasonably discoverable from the sales 
documentation or the car itself.  So in Case Study 22/18
430 the FOS supported insurers‟ 
valuation of a grey import car at £17,950 which was in line with the trade guide for grey 
imports, although the purchase price two months earlier had allegedly been £25,000.  
This approach is in line with the court, which might also require insurers to replace the 
item with a similar one representing its actual value, rather than the purchase price, 
following Grimaldi v Sullivan.
431 
 
In Grimaldi, the assured purchased Cartier watches for £57,000, but they proved to be 
fakes with a market value of about £3,500, and a scrap value of £750 and were seized 
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by the police.  The Court of Appeal held that the assured could not claim £57,000 from 
insurers of a policy covering defects in title, as that would have indemnified him for loss 
of genuine watches which he had not purchased.  It also held that the scrap value was 
not appropriate as this disregarded that fact that fake watches had some resale value.  
The proper measure was £3,500, as this is the amount that could have been realised for 
the watches had the trade mark owner granted permission for re-sale, so was the actual 
value of the watches.  As it was the defect in title which allowed the trade mark owner to 
prohibit re-sale, the loss was the amount which would have been realisable but for that 
prohibition. 
 
3.7.4.5 Hidden defects – re-sale value as if no defect 
 
Hidden rust and car cloning are two instances where the FOS may not adopt the 
replacement of actual equivalent approach, but rather the market value on re-sale as if 
there was no defect, as long as the insured is innocent and has taken all reasonable 
precautions on purchase.  The difference between these and the clocking, grey imports 
or Grimaldi situations, is that the defects for hidden rust and car cloning may not be 
reasonably discoverable from the documents or vehicle itself on purchase and re-sale. 
 
There is a New Zealand Court of Appeal judgment on hidden rust
432 which held that the 
assured was entitled to the re-sale value of the car, so the hidden rust could be ignored 
for valuation purposes because it would have remained hidden from a reasonable 
purchaser on re-sale.  There is no English caselaw on point.  
 
Car cloning is where the number plates, often of a stolen car, are changed to those of an 
almost identical car.  The FOS will usually expect an insurer to deal with a consumer‟s 
claim relating to a cloned vehicle if the buyer had a comprehensive or third party motor 
policy with the premium paid, and if it is satisfied that the buyer reasonably believed the 
purchase was legitimate.  To establish the buyer‟s reasonable beliefs, the FOS will 
consider whether he: 
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1.  carried out an HPI check into a vehicle‟s history, which the FOS regards as a 
sensible precaution for any buyer of a second hand vehicle, although the FOS 
appreciates that this check will probably not uncover cloning; 
 
2.  had a vehicle registration form; 
 
3.  received a purchase receipt showing the seller‟s contact details (even if these 
details are subsequently found to be false); and 
 
4.  paid a purchase price comparable to that of other vehicles of a similar make, 
model and age. 
 
The FOS view is that an insured who took all reasonable steps to ensure the vehicle‟s 
authenticity will have a defeasible title and insurers should pay the full market value of a 
similar vehicle with an unblemished history.  Some deduction might be appropriate 
where the buyer acted in good faith but failed to take reasonable steps which probably 
would have alerted him to the problem.  Presumably the FOS would look to see if an 
insured has taken the above steps when looking at all hidden defect issues, not just car 
cloning. 
 
The FOS has probably got the balance of interests right on hidden defects.  For hidden 
rust and cloned car cases, insurers are basically paying out on what both they and the 
assured thought they were insuring and could not have reasonably discovered 
otherwise.  It is to be hoped that a court faced with the same problem might come to the 
same conclusion.  Instead, it might consider that the actual replacement value was 
appropriate, making analogies with Grimaldi in light of the paucity of other caselaw on 
the subject, and because Grimaldi is a Court of Appeal decision, even though it deals 
with defects in title of another type in a defects in title policy with defects that were 
reasonably discoverable.   
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3.7.5  Abandonment and salvage  
 
Ancient caselaw has developed the principles of salvage and abandonment primarily in 
relation to marine insurance, but they are equally applicable to non-marine insurance.
433  
Abandonment is the transfer of the insured subject matter from the assured to the 
insurers, which takes place on payment of a total loss by the insurers. No notice of 
abandonment is required outside of constructive total losses in marine insurance.  There 
is a right to be paid for a total loss only where the assured is willing to hand over what, if 
anything, remains, of the insured subject matter to the insurers.  Salvage is the insurer‟s 
right to claim for its own benefit the right of ownership of that subject matter where it has 
paid for a total loss, and where the insured is not underinsured and has received a full 
indemnity.  Once the insurer has agreed to pay for a total loss and to adopt the subject 
matter by way of salvage, it cannot thereafter seek to change its position and seek 
recovery of its payment should facts subsequently show that no loss has occurred. 
 
It is commonly the case, particularly with cars, that the assured wishes to retain 
ownership of the property even though the insurer has classified it as a total loss.  The 
insurer will usually be willing to sell the property back to the insured for its scrap value, 
although the insurer is not obliged to offer to do this, and the insurer may treat it as he 
wishes as soon as he has agreed to pay for a total loss.  This is where the FOS begins 
to diverge from the law. 
 
The IOB took the view that the insured had the right (in terms of good insurance practice, 
as opposed to the right at law), to repurchase the property, and that accordingly, the 
insurer should not dispose of it until the insured had been given an opportunity to 
repurchase.
434 Unusually, the IOB view may be relevant in this context, as the FOS has 
specifically said that the way it deals with vehicle valuations after a total loss is the same 
as the way they were dealt with under the IOB.  The FOS has not specifically mentioned 
repurchase, but says
435 that the salvage of a vehicle remains the insured‟s property until 
settlement has been agreed, so insurers will need the insured‟s express permission to 
dispose of it before this point.  Thereafter, if the insured seeks to retain and repair the 
vehicle, the insurer should consider the request on the basis of the extent of repairs 
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required.  The FOS would think it reasonable for insurers to agree to the request where 
the damage is merely cosmetic, but it may not be so where the car has sustained 
structural damage which cannot be repaired economically, and there are serious issues 
of road safety.  It seems extraordinary that the FOS should not only require insurers to 
do something which they are not obliged in law to do, but also to make them responsible 
for the consequential health and safety issues, whilst giving the insured the right to a 
double recovery.  The law surely has the position right, leaving the matter entirely in the 
insurer‟s ex gratia discretion.  Why should an insured have some sort of right to a full 
indemnity and to keep the salvage?  The answer might be that the full indemnity might 
not be adequate compensation, for instance if in fact the insured cannot find a 
replacement vehicle of the same quality and reliability for the amount of the full 
indemnity.  However, the valuation of the indemnity takes all factors into account so as to 
be as fair as possible, and if an insurer chooses to keep the salvage, that is in fact its 
rightful return for paying for it.  A customer in a shop would not be expected to pay for an 
item in full, but to leave that item in the shop for someone else to have, sell, enjoy etc, 
and it does not seem right that an insurer should be required to act differently to the shop 
customer. 
 
The FOS provides two examples of the way it deals with car salvage.  In Case Study 
07/22
436, the insurer paid a reasonable amount for a damaged car on a total loss basis, 
but refused to allow the insured to keep the salvage.  It accepted that it should have, and 
because of this and other minor failings, offered £500 compensation, which the FOS 
assessed as reasonable.  The FOS required the insurer in Case Study 66/03
437 to pay 
the insured £400 for the distress and inconvenience of undervaluing a “write-off” car and 
for selling it when the insured had made it clear at the accident report stage that he 
wished to repair it.  Although the car was uneconomical for the insurer to repair, it was 
repairable and it had been regarded as a Category C in the Code of Practice for the 
Disposal of Motor Vehicle Salvage.  In both these cases, the insurer could not have been 
forced under the law to give away the salvage, and for the reasoning set out above, 
these decisions must be unfair. 
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3.7.6  Conclusion 
 
The FOS deals with measurement of loss, abandonment and salvage in pretty much the 
same way as a court, and gives some further guidance where the court gives none.  It is 
to be hoped that a court would refer to and adopt such guidance as in general it is both 
reasonable and fair.  
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3.8  Premium 
 
3.8.1  Non payment and overpayment of premium 
 
In law, if the premium is unpaid, there is no cover, but the FOS might find that there is.  
In Case Study 23/14
438, the insured thought his car insurance had renewed 
automatically.  He had not noticed that the premium was no longer being taken from his 
bank account.  The FOS found this understandable in view of the small amount involved.  
The FOS found no evidence that he had cancelled the policy as the insurer alleged.  It 
therefore felt the failure to renew and pay the premium was an innocent oversight, and 
asked the insurer to reinstate the policy and pay for the car repairs with interest, subject 
to the outstanding premiums.   
 
In Case Study 31/1
439, a bank had mistakenly cancelled the direct debit, so the insured 
was uninsured when burgled.  The FOS found the bank 40% to blame, the insurer 40% 
(because it should have contacted the insured before cancelling cover) and the insured 
20% (because he should have noticed that no payments were being made over a six 
month period).  The insurer had to pay 40% of the claim less the outstanding premium.  
The bank had already offered £8,000 in full and final settlement in respect of its liability, 
which the insured had accepted, and the FOS was satisfied that this was fair and 
reasonable.   
 
The FOS will try to remedy overpayment of premium where the insured is over-insured.  
In Case Study 04/17
440, because of an automatic annual premium increase over many 
years, the insured was heavily over-insured and paying too much premium.  The FOS 
thought that the insurer should refund 50% of the premiums paid over the previous five 
years plus interest.   
 
All of the above show a sensible, practical and fair approach by the FOS, which a court 
might not be able to duplicate, although it might try to, based on who made the mistake, 
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whether that party was an agent of the assured or of the insurer, and whether any term 
could be implied.
441 
 
3.8.2  Repayment of premium on policy cancellation 
 
Where regulatory rules require „cooling-off‟ periods for contracts,
442 , insurers cannot 
charge anything where cancellation occurs during this cooling-off period.  Other than in 
this situation, most policies stipulate that if sufficient notice is given of the insured 
cancelling a policy, he will be entitled to a pro rata refund of premiums paid, less a 
cancellation charge/ administration fee reflecting the costs incurred in setting up and 
cancelling a policy.  The FOS find these requirement reasonable, so dismissed a 
complaint in Case Study 54/5
443 about a pro rata refund of premiums less £50 for 
administrative costs.  The FOS also feels that it is fair for a term to stipulate that 
premiums for an annual contract are not refundable if a claim has been paid. 
 
Some premium refunds may be unfair and inadequate.  There is no caselaw on point, 
although for consumers a court should look at UTCCR (the relevant parts being Reg 5(1) 
and paragraph 1(d) of Schedule 2).  The FOS says it would ask the firm to explain how 
its approach complied with both UTCCR and the FSA publication “Challenging unfair 
terms in consumer contracts.
444”  This says that terms which charge policyholders a 
disproportionately large sum if they do not fulfil their obligations under a contract or if 
they cancel it, are likely to be unfair.  Where a policy provides that insureds will receive 
less premium refund if they cancel the policy than if the insurer cancels, the FOS 
445 
shares the FSA‟s view that this is likely to be unenforceable in law, as well as unfair and 
unreasonable. 
 
The FOS recognises that a premium refund calculation will be affected by the particular 
circumstances of the policy.  Whatever the calculation, the firm needs to have fair 
reasons for its approach which it can explain clearly to the insured.  The complaint in 
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Case Study 54/4
446 was upheld because the firm could not justify how its costs could be 
so large that the policy provided that there would be no refund at all if an insured 
cancelled a policy more than four months after inception. 
 
It seems, however, that the FOS may not necessarily consider UTCCR correctly or 
without prompting.  In Case Study 71/05
447, the complaint about the insured only 
receiving a small proportion of premium back when he cancelled the 30-month policy 
after 6 months was not upheld, because the FOS decided that he would have taken out 
the insurance even if the terms had been highlighted.  However, this is not part of 
determining whether a term is unfair under UTCCR, and this point is discussed above 
(under construction of policies).  Hopefully, this case study is nothing more than an FOS 
inconsistency. 
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3.9  Fraud / Proof Of Loss 
 
The Fraud Act 2006
448 defines fraud in the criminal law, although it is unclear if this 
applies to the civil law.  It is not mentioned in any relevant civil case, nor by the FOS, 
and as it post-dates both the most significant caselaw and all the FOS examples relating 
to fraud, it will not be mentioned further for the purpose of this discussion.    
 
There has been a wealth of modern cases dealing with what constitutes fraud and what 
are its consequences on the claim and the policy.  The most significant are: 
 
1.  Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Shipping Co Ltd, The Star Sea, [2001] 
UKHL 1, decided on 18/01/2001;  
 
2.  K/S Merc-Scandia XXXXII v (1) Underwriters Of Lloyd's Policy & Ors, The 
Mercandian Continent, [2001] EWCA Civ 1275, decided on 31/7/2001; 
 
3.  Agapitos v Agnew, [2002] EWCA Civ 247, decided on 06/03/2002;  and 
 
4.  Axa General Insurance Ltd v Gottlieb, [2005] EWCA Civ 112, decided on 
11/02/2005.  
 
3.9.1  What constitutes a fraud 
 
Mance LJ in Agapitos said that fraud would exist when there had been (i) no actual loss; 
(ii) a substantial exaggeration of loss, (iii) fraudulent means or devices used to gain an 
advantage, (iv) a subsequent discovery that no loss, or lesser loss, had been suffered; or 
(v) suppression of a defence.  The FOS broadly agrees with the first three situations, but 
has not reported in relation to the last two. 
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3.9.2   Loss and proof 
 
3.9.2.1 Proof of fraud 
 
A claim for a loss which did not occur or which is self inflicted, is fraudulent.  It is for the 
assured to prove loss.  Insurers must prove fraud to the criminal standard of beyond 
reasonable doubt.  Insurers must provide concrete evidence of inconsistent statements 
or acts of deception and show the appropriate dishonest intent to induce the insurer to 
pay more than the policyholder‟s entitlement.   
 
The same burdens are applied by the FOS.  It will expect careful investigations to have 
been carried out before the complaint reaches it, as by then it is unlikely that new 
evidence will be uncovered.  It is presumed that insurers will not be penalised if they 
have good reason for not having all the evidence before the complaint reaches the FOS.   
 
The FOS expects insurers to inform an assured if fraud is suspected, so that the assured 
can respond, and it is unlikely to support an insurer if, instead, it uses a separate and 
spurious reason to justify rejecting a claim.  Although this sounds fair in view of the 
seriousness of the allegation and the possible police involvement, it may be impractical 
due to the difficulty in accumulating evidence.  Notification to the assured too early may 
result in the evidence being destroyed or witnesses intimidated into refusing to give 
statements.  The law does not penalise insurers for bringing a fraud allegation late – 
unless perhaps it is new allegation brought at a very late stage in proceedings, such as 
during the trial.  If insurers do not have the appropriate evidence for fraud at the time, 
they should not be penalised for trying to rely on another legitimate (as opposed to 
spurious) reason not to pay the claim, even if it is not a strong reason, as it may be 
easier to prove, with a lesser burden.  
 
The case of James v CGU Insurance Plc
449 shows how hard it can be to prove fraud.  
There, insurers could not prove arson to business premises and Moore-Bick J found the 
evidence pointing towards an accidental fire, probably caused by the assured throwing a 
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lighted cigar-butt into the wastepaper basket.  How could insurers possibly prove that the 
assured did this on purpose? 
 
The fact that a policyholder has lied in another context, (perhaps regarding a different 
claim under another policy), is not sufficient proof of fraud in the current claim (either 
before the court or the FOS), although it may raise doubts about the accuracy of the 
policyholder‟s version of events in the current claim. 
 
There is no facility for the FOS to award insurers their costs of proving a fraud, although 
at law, if proceedings are issued and fraud is proven, such costs are payable by the 
insured on an indemnity, rather than standard basis.
450  It is an unfair feature of the FOS 
system that it cannot make any financial award against a policyholder, even only in 
respect of the case fee, even in extreme cases where the policyholder has acted 
dishonestly or fraudulently, and so has wasted the time and resources of the FOS and 
insurers.  Perhaps the FOS should have a policy at least of reporting fraudulent 
behaviour to the police, if insurers do not, because it cannot be right that such culpable 
behaviour can go unpunished. 
 
3.9.2.2 Requiring proof of ownership and loss 
 
Sometimes neither the insurer nor the FOS use the word fraud, as they will rightly refrain 
from such a serious allegation without sufficient evidence.  However, a fraudulent claim 
will often flounder at the proof of ownership/loss stage and it is a wise insurer or 
practitioner who deals with a suspected fraud by first requiring the insured to prove 
ownership and loss.  The FOS, without expressly saying so, seems to be in tune with 
this line of thinking.  It supported insurers in Case Study 07/14
451, where they refused to 
pay the claim, but promised to reconsider it if the complainant could provide proof that 
she had reported the loss to the police.  This was reasonable in view of the alleged 
circumstances: that she had left her wash bag in an aeroplane toilet; it contained 
jewellery; there was no police record even though she said she had reported the loss, 
(although she had made a contradictory statement to the airline crew about this).  A 
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court would have responded similarly.  Where in Case Study 75/08
452 the FOS supported 
insurer‟s request for proof of ownership of an allegedly lost designer watch, suggesting 
various ways of doing this, the complainant withdrew his complaint. 
 
However, insurers should not be too difficult about requiring proof of loss.  In Case Study 
13/10
453, a bag with a Game Boy and games inside had been accidentally left in a taxi on 
the way to the airport to catch a flight home.  The FOS felt that the insured had done all 
he could reasonably be expected to do to get it back, so insurers were wrong to reject 
the claim for lack of police report.  A court would have agreed.  And in Case Study 
21/3
454, the complainant was awarded £500 for maladministration for the insurer‟s late 
notification of non-renewal and poor claims handling in relation to the proof of loss.  The 
insurer took nearly a year to investigate a burglary claim and then rejected it because the 
list of items stolen which was given to the police on reporting the burglary did not quite 
match the list given to the insurer a little later.  The FOS felt that the insured had given a 
credible explanation for the discrepancy and had receipts for nearly every item claimed, 
so their burglary claim should be settled.  Although a fair decision, a court would not 
have awarded damages for maladministration. 
 
If a policyholder fails to resolve discrepancies or to co-operate with insurer‟s enquiries, 
both a court and the FOS will consider that insurers may be justified in refusing to meet 
the claim eg Case Study 13/17.
455 
 
3.9.2.3 Unsuitable forum 
 
The FOS can decline jurisdiction to deal with claims which are more appropriately dealt 
with by a court which, unlike the FOS, can compel witnesses to attend and can examine 
and cross-examine witnesses.  The main examples in O.N. of the FOS declining 
jurisdiction on this basis are in the context of suspected fraud claims.  Examples are 
Case Study 07/13
456 where the complainant said that the receipt for a pendant had been 
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altered not by her, but by her friend, and Case Study 48/7
457 where following a shop fire, 
there were allegations of fraud and conflicting evidence about the complainant‟s 
finances.  A truly fraudulent claim would probably be abandoned at this point.  
 
3.9.3  Exaggerated loss 
 
3.9.3.1 Bargaining, innocent overvaluation, use of insurance monies, materiality and 
inducement 
 
A substantially exaggerated claim will constitute fraud unless on the facts the court 
decides that it is merely part of a bargaining process, there has been an innocent 
overvaluation or if the insured does not use the policy monies to reinstate the damaged 
property (eg Tonkin v UK Insurance Ltd).
458  The FOS agrees and adds by way of 
example that it would not be fraudulent to recall a purchase price inaccurately or 
mistakenly give an exaggerated replacement cost, nor to give an exaggerated view of a 
car‟s worth when the insurer would assess the market value independently, which last 
point it says goes to inducement, although it is not clear that the law requires inducement 
for fraud.  The FOS classes this last point as an “immaterial fraud.”  See below 
“fraudulent means and devices.” 
 
The application of the language of materiality and inducement to fraud is a result of early 
confusion in the law between fraudulent claims and the continuing duty of good faith.  
Since it has now been established that there is no continuing duty of good faith, the 
language should be obsolete, although the concept of materiality will still be important in 
that the fraud must be sufficiently serious and substantial to taint the entire claim, and 
inducement may have been brought back as a result of Danepoint Ltd v Underwriting 
Insurance Ltd
459.  There HHJ Coulson QC found that the lie (relating to the extent of 
necessary rebuilding work after a fire) was so blatant (because it would have been 
obvious to the loss adjuster that the amounts claimed did not match expenditure), that it 
was utterly disregarded by the insurers, who were therefore not induced by the fraud.
460 
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However, because the fraud on the loss of rent claim would not have been obvious to 
the loss adjuster, that part of the claim was fraudulent, and so tainted the rebuilding part. 
However, Danepoint does not stand with earlier authorities,
461 and has been 
subsequently undermined by the Privy Council in Stemson v AMP General Insurance 
(NZ) Ltd
462 .   
 
The FOS comment on inducement occurred before Danepoint, so it is either ahead of its 
time, or, if Danepoint is wrong, operating a policy different to the law.  Either way, it is not 
clear that the FOS has established its approach through a deep consideration of the 
caselaw, but rather through deciding somewhat arbitrarily that inducement is a fair 
requirement. 
 
3.9.3.2 Partly genuine and partly fraudulent claims 
 
The fraudulent part of a claim is not severable from a non-fraudulent part, so if the fraud 
is substantial, the entire claim will be tainted.
463  According to the Court of Appeal in 
Galloway v Guardian Royal Exchange (UK) Ltd,
464 to determine whether a fraud is 
substantial, looking at the proportion it bears to the rest of the claim is not sufficient, as a 
small proportion of a large claim can still be large in absolute terms.  The court should 
“consider the fraudulent claim as if it were the only claim and then to consider whether, 
taken in isolation, the making of that claim by the insured is sufficiently serious to justify 
stigmatising it as fraud.”  So a claim is fraudulent if the fraud is substantial either in 
proportion to the total claim or in absolute terms.
465  The following table of cases gives 
an indication of what the courts have decided constitutes a substantial fraud.  
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Name of Case
466 
 
Total claim (in rounded 
figures) 
Of which, how much was fraudulent 
(in rounded figures) 
Verdict 
Nsubuga   £150,000 fire claim  £10,000 (goods which did not exist), 
£6,000 (altering an invoice), and 
£114,000 (failing to disclose in the 
business interruption part of the claim 
that the business was in difficulty and 
that distress for rates had been levied.) 
Entire claim tainted. 
Thomas J commented that any one of 
the four instances of fraud would have 
been enough on its own to defeat the 
whole claim both under the policy terms 
or at common law. 
Galloway   £16,000 burglary claim  £2,000 (computer which had not been 
stolen) 
Entire claim tainted. 
Baghbadrani   Fire claim.  The figures 
are unavailable in the 
judgment, but 
represented damage to 
an Islamic school and 
business interruption 
from 60 alleged new 
students having to be 
turned away as a result 
of the fire.  
The whole business interruption claim. 
Also a sum in excess of £3,000, 
representing VAT on building costs 
which was fraudulently claimed to have 
been due. 
 
Entire claim tainted by the false claim 
for business interruption.   
Obiter, the £3,000 VAT sum would 
have been enough on its own to taint 
the whole claim, for it qualified as a 
substantial fraud in absolute terms, as 
opposed to in proportion to the rest of 
the claim. 
Khan   £69,500 fire claim   £8,250 in respect of the fraudulent 
alternative accommodation claim, 
supported by a fraudulently 
manufactured rental agreement and 
rent receipt 
Entire claim tainted 
Gottlieb   Claim 1: £40,000 dry rot 
plus £20,000 alternative 
accommodation.  
The whole £20,000 claim for alternative 
accommodation. 
Entire claim tainted 
Gottlieb   Claim 2:  £14,250 escape 
of water 
£1,200 false electrician‟s invoice  Entire claim tainted 
Tonkin   c £700,000  £2,000 or 0.3% claim  Not enough to taint the claim (obiter) 
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There is only one reported Case Study on what constitutes “substantial” for fraud.  The 
FOS found that the complainant in Case Study 10/06
467 was fraudulent when she falsely 
said that all three pieces of her suite had been stained when the insurer had refused to 
clean any but the stained one.  She was trying to gain an advantage by deception.  In 
view of the caselaw above, it is likely that a court would agree.  The fraud related to two 
thirds of the total claim, which is a high proportion, even if the actual amount involved 
was small.   
 
This FOS case was reported in October 2001, before Agapitos and Gottlieb had been 
decided, but there was still relevant caselaw on what constitutes substantial fraud, most 
notably the Court of Appeal ruling in Galloway.  Yet there is no reference to it, or to its 
test, either in the report of the case study or in any commentary to be found in any O.N.  
It seems that the FOS decision has been arrived at in an arbitrary, instinctive fashion, 
without consideration of the applicable law, which exposes it to risk of judicial review.  It 
is of course possible that behind the scenes the FOS officers and its internal information 
system has kept up with the caselaw, both now and when the case study was decided at 
the beginning of the FOS existence, but there is no evidence of this from O.N. which in a 
later edition, even with an abundance of relevant cases, only mentions Merc-Skandia.   
 
3.9.4  Use of fraudulent means or devices 
 
Mance LJ in Agapitos said that insurers are entitled to treat even a genuine claim for an 
insured peril as fraudulent if it has been furthered by the use of fraudulent means or 
devices.  This would include using forged documents or false statements in support of a 
genuine claim, although not every such document or statement will taint the entire claim.  
Mance LJ said that for there to be fraud, a false statement must be (i) directly related to 
the claim; (ii) intended to improve the assured‟s prospects of obtaining a settlement or 
winning the case, and (iii) if believed, objectively – prior to any final determination at trial 
– capable of yielding a not insignificant improvement in the assured‟s prospects of 
obtaining a settlement or better settlement.  This seems to mean that if there is a causal 
link between the fraud and the claim, whether or not the insurer was induced is 
irrelevant.   
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Applying these principles, a property insurer could refuse to pay where the assured 
falsely stated that his burglar alarm was set at the time of the loss
468.  And insurers could 
deny a claim under a valued policy for a vessel lost through an insured peril, where 
forged documents gave its value as US$ 1.8 million, the sum for which it had been 
insured, rather than the actual value, which was US$150,000 for scrap.
469 
 
Even if the intention is not to make a profit, but only to ensure that the assured receives 
the full indemnity to which he believes he is entitled, it is still a use of fraudulent means 
or devices which will defeat the claim following the House of Lords in Lek v Mathews
470, 
and in the more modern day it will still be a fraud if there is also an Agapitos causal link 
between the use of fraudulent means and devices and the claim.  In Lek, police 
recovered most of a stolen stamp collection under a valued policy (£44,000).  In order to 
make up to £44,000 the difference between the value of the stamps that remained and 
those that were taken, the assured fraudulently claimed that he had owned various 
stamps that he had not, to ensure that he recovered the full amount that he thought was 
due to him. 
 
Whatever the scope of the common law, the policy may expressly impose a condition 
upon the assured requiring him to submit full and accurate details of his loss to insurers.  
This will mean that any material fraud will defeat the claim even where it did not cause 
the insurer any loss, and even a minor fraud will defeat the claim if insurers have been 
prejudiced, for instance, in relation to subrogation rights.  In Cox v Orion Insurance Co 
Ltd
471, a motor policy obliged the assured to submit particulars of an accident to the 
insurers.  The assured damaged his car while intoxicated, but lied to insurers and said 
that it had been stolen and damaged by the thief.  He was in breach of the notification 
clause so the Court of Appeal would not allow recovery, even though the policy would 
have responded if he had been truthful.   
 
The FOS does not quite follow the law where it comes to the use of fraudulent means or 
devises in support of a genuine claim, as it requires an insured to have an intention of 
trying to obtain more than that to which he is entitled, contrary to Lek.  The FOS is trying 
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to prevent the harshness of a genuine claim from not being paid or a policy forfeited 
where a policyholder is put under so much unreasonable pressure to provide receipts, 
that he forges an invoice to substantiate the claim.  The FOS calls this an “immaterial 
fraud.”  If the insurer‟s ultimate liability to pay the claim is unaffected by the fraud, the 
FOS considers that it should, in effect, be disregarded.  However, the FOS is ignoring 
the general policy point that the assured should be discouraged in the strongest way 
from producing a fraudulent document even in support of a genuine claim.  A truly 
honest assured should ask insurers, consumer bodies or the FOS itself about ways to 
prove part of a loss where a receipt cannot be produced, and should bear the 
consequences of acting dishonestly, whatever the intent, as he would under the law. 
 
The FOS acknowledges that insurers may not wish to continue to insure someone who 
has committed an “immaterial fraud” and suggests that insurers can thereafter cancel the 
policy in accordance with the policy terms or not invite renewal.  The FOS does not 
mention though, that with cancellation of a policy there would be some return of 
premium.   
 
Worse than the FOS creating a new category of “immaterial fraud,” is its apparent 
reliance
472 on the law, to do so, namely the Court of Appeal decision in Merc-Scandia, 
which it says has bolstered its view.  The FOS says that Longmore LJ held that an 
insurer should only be able to avoid a policy for fraud if the fraud would have an effect on 
the insurer‟s ultimate liability and where the fraud, or its consequences, were sufficiently 
serious to entitle the insurer to repudiate the policy for fundamental breach of contract if 
it so desired.  However, the FOS has ignored the context of Longmore LJ‟s comments. 
 
Firstly, Merc-Scandia did not involve a fraudulent claim, but the assured‟s breach of his 
co-operation obligations when it manufactured a letter to defeat a jurisdiction agreement 
in relation to the third party liability claim that insurers were defending on its behalf.  
Secondly, Longmore LJ‟s discussion of underwriters‟ lack of prejudice related to his 
finding that the co-operation obligation was a mere condition, and in line with Alfred 
McAlpine v BAI (Run-off) Ltd
473, its breach was only repudiatory if it had caused insurers 
to suffer serious prejudice, which in this case it had not, as underwriters remained liable 
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to indemnify the third party.  This is not at all the same thing as saying, as the FOS does, 
that producing a fraudulent document in support of a claim has to have prejudiced 
insurers for it to have any consequences on the cover. 
 
It is astonishing that the FOS did not refer to Agapitos, which the Court of Appeal 
decided after Merc-Scandia and more than two years before the relevant edition of O.N., 
and which was a case on point about a fraudulent claim.  Agapitos flies in the face of the 
FOS approach, as it is authority for insurers‟ inducement to be irrelevant if there is a 
causal connection between the fraud and the claim. 
 
The FOS applied its reasoning is Case Study 42/3
474.  The loss adjuster had over-
zealously insisted on receipts for every item stolen from a van, so the assured‟s friend 
faked a receipt for him.  As this was a genuine loss, the FOS asked the insurer to pay 
the claim.  A court would not have decided the case in this way unless the amount of the 
invoice was an insubstantial part of the whole claim. 
 
As mentioned above, another example is where the policyholder is asked to substantiate 
the purchase price of a written-off vehicle, and produces a fraudulent document, when 
insurers do not use this information anyway when calculating the market value that they 
pay, eg in Case Study 10/10
475.  Whatever the motive of the assured, and however 
sympathetic the FOS is, an honest policyholder would not have produced such a 
document, and would have been covered, and it is fair that a dishonest one trying to 
obtain an advantage by his fraud, runs the risk of consequences for his dishonesty, even 
if the FOS thinks them harsh. 
 
3.9.5  Consequences of fraud under the law 
 
The consequences of fraud are mainly the non-payment of the claim in question and not 
being liable for any future claims under the policy.   
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3.9.5.1 Express Wordings 
 
Policy wordings usually provide for the assured to forfeit all benefit under the policy in 
the event of a fraudulent claim or the use of fraudulent means or devices.  Lord 
Hobhouse in The Star Sea and Mance LJ in Agapitos said that this means the loss of the 
right to claim and does not imply avoidance of the policy ab initio.  Sometimes the 
wording may add that the policy is to be treated as void, but it follows that this only 
means that the policy is brought to an end as from the date of the fraudulent claim, 
rather than ab initio.  In the absence of any express term setting out the consequences 
of a fraudulent claim, the common law takes effect and is similar to the above. 
 
3.9.5.2 Common Law:  Basis of the insurer not paying a fraudulent claim 
 
The obligation not to commit fraud is separate to the continuing duty of utmost good 
faith
476, so the remedy available in law for breach of the latter, namely avoidance ab initio 
which takes with it all previous valid claims and settlements, is not available in cases of 
fraud.  ` The Court of Appeal in Merc-Scandia concluded that the continuing duty of good 
faith could only operate in the most exceptional cases, where the assured was under a 
contractual obligation to provide information to the insurers and had in bad faith failed to 
do so in a manner which amounted to a repudiation of the policy.  
 
The true basis for the assured‟s inability to recover under the policy once he has 
committed a fraud is the common law principle that no man may profit from his own 
wrong.
477  In the words of Lord Hobhouse in The Star Sea: 
 
“The fraudulent insured must not be allowed to think: if the fraud is successful, then I will 
gain; if it is unsuccessful, I will lose nothing”. 
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3.9.5.3 Non-payment of any part of the fraudulent claim 
 
The primary remedy for insurers is refusal to pay any part of a fraudulent claim, and 
reclaim of interim payments.  In Agapitos, Mance LJ identified five types of fraud where 
this would be the remedy, where the assured had: 
 
1.  suffered no loss. 
 
2.  suffered a loss less than that claimed (and the additional amount claimed was 
significant). 
 
3.  believed at the time of the claim that he had suffered a loss, but had failed to correct 
the position when he subsequently discovered that he had suffered no loss or a loss 
smaller than that claimed, (and the additional amount claimed was significant). 
 
4.  suffered a genuine loss, but had suppressed a defence known to him that might be 
available to insurers. 
 
5.  furthered a genuine claim by the use of fraudulent means or devices. 
 
3.9.5.4 Repudiation of the policy so that future claims are not payable 
 
Additionally, and certainly in relation to situations 1-3 above, insurers can repudiate the 
policy, ie terminate the policy so that future claims are not payable.  In situation 5, Mance 
LJ felt that there was less of a case to be made for treating the policy as repudiated, so 
the only remedy was to refuse to pay the claim itself.  Mance LJ did not elaborate in 
Agapitos or in Gottlieb whether situation 4 would allow an insurer to repudiate the 
contract.  Perhaps the suppressed defence would be enough when used for insurers to 
achieve this or equivalent objective, and if it were not, such as if the defence were 
breach of a mere policy condition, maybe it would not somehow be a serious enough 
fraud. 
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3.9.5.5 Separate, genuine claims prior to the fraud are untouchable 
 
A fraud cannot have a retrospective effect on prior, separate claims settled under the 
same policy before any fraud occurs.  The right of insurers not to pay the claim backdate 
only to the date of the loss in question.  Any right to treat the contract as repudiated in 
respect of future claims, arises only on the date of the fraud, thereby protecting earlier, 
genuine, accrued losses even if claims have not at that point been made in respect of 
them.  Following Gottlieb, once the policy has reached the end of its natural life, it will be 
too late for the insurers to treat it as repudiated.  In Gottlieb, although insurers could 
recover their interim payments on the fraudulent claims, they could not recover 
payments made in respect of other separate, genuine claims which were made after the 
fraudulent claims but before the fraud itself.  
 
Before Gottlieb was decided, the FOS recognised that previous genuine claims were 
untouched (unless the fraud was at the proposal stage), and that insurers could refuse to 
pay all parts of a fraudulent claim, but could refuse future cover only from the date of the 
fraud.  It has not published any case studies on point.  The FOS was perhaps ahead of 
its time in deciding its approach, but now at least, perhaps coincidentally the law agrees.  
Perhaps the FOS approach even influenced the way that the law was determined in 
Gottlieb.   
 
3.9.5.6 Premium is unaffected 
 
With both non-payment of the claim and repudiation of the contract, insurers are entitled 
to retain the premium, and there has been no recent case in which the contrary has been 
held. 
 
3.9.6  FOS approach to the consequences of fraud 
 
Other than where there is an “immaterial fraud” on a genuine claim, the FOS approach to 
the consequences of fraud seem to parallel that of the law, even though it does not 
discuss the technical ambit of concepts such as repudiation or refer to the policy wording 
in any detail or at all.  Generally, it will not make an insurer pay a fraudulent claim and it 
is unlikely to expect an insurer to pay subsequent genuine claims, as it recognises that a Judith Summer: PhD April 2009  164 
fraudulent claim can rightly taint the future of the policy and insurers‟ wish to continue to 
insure that party.  All the FOS material indicates that if there is proof of fraud or mere lies 
by the policyholder, the FOS will lose sympathy for the assured. 
 
Where the FOS treats the consequences of fraud differently is where a fraudulent 
document has made no difference to the amount properly recoverable under a genuine 
claim, so the insurer has not been induced by the fraud.  In these circumstances, the 
FOS considers that the harshness of the consequences in law of fraud cannot be 
justified, whilst in every other circumstance of fraud it can be.  The FOS disagrees with 
the courts that as a matter of policy, substantial fraud is to be discouraged, and that it is 
unacceptable to make fraud acceptable even in limited cases.   
 
If it wanted to alleviate the harshness of certain fraudulent actions, rather than invent 
new concepts of “immaterial fraud,” it would be better if the FOS first looked to see if 
there were legal tools available which would achieve this.  For instance, the FOS could 
decide that the fraud was not substantial or was part of a negotiation or an innocent 
overvaluation.  If the FOS approach truly began by considering the law, it would be able 
to use the tools of the law and provide consistency both between it and the courts and 
within its own walls.  If the FOS realised that these tools, which have been reasoned and 
tuned over the years, were open for it to use, it is unlikely that it would want or need to 
create the differences it has.  Again, the issue could probably be addressed if the FOS 
had a better internal information and education system. 
 
3.9.7  Conclusion 
 
The FOS approach to fraud now generally matches that of a court, although it has not 
developed in the same time-line as the law and little of the abundantly useful and recent 
caselaw is mentioned.  It may therefore not have a good understanding of the law or 
have kept up with developments.  The FOS recognises the severity of fraud and the 
need to make it unacceptable so as to deter future fraudsters, except in relation to its 
own concept of “immaterial fraud.”  This is an unnecessary addition to the FOS 
repertoire and is contrary to recent and carefully developed, considered and argued 
caselaw about the public policy issue of dealing harshly with fraud.  The law itself has its Judith Summer: PhD April 2009  165 
own tools to soften the effects of fraud where fraud is not really intended, and if these 
tools were considered carefully enough, they might be enough for the FOS too. 
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3.10  Non-Disclosure And Misrepresentation 
 
The law looks to see if the underwriter has been given a full and fair presentation of the 
risk so as to make his underwriting decisions.  The FOS approach is very different as it 
perceives the law‟s avoidance in all cases of non-disclosure or misrepresentation to be 
harsh to the insured.  It is for those reforming the law to decide how the balance between 
insurer and insured should fall, after great debate and widespread consultation, and not 
for the FOS to decide alone that the balance should be in favour of the insured. 
 
3.10.1  A Summary of the Strict Legal Position 
 
3.10.1.1  The duty of disclosure 
 
In insurance law, there is a duty of utmost good faith
478 at the pre-contractual stage and 
the insured must disclose material facts, even if not asked, else the policy will be void ab 
initio.  This is so even if he is unaware of his duty or which facts are material.  The FOS 
imposes no duty of disclosure, only a duty to answer clear questions.   
 
The current L.C.
479 proposes that the law in this respect is changed to reflect the FOS 
approach.  So consumers would have a duty to act honestly and take all reasonable care 
to answer questions accurately and completely.  There would be no avoidance for non-
disclosure of information about which there had been no question, or about which the 
question was too general for a reasonable consumer to realise he should have given the 
information.   The L.C. would retain the duty of disclosure for businesses, making no 
distinction between big and small businesses, but limiting the duty so that the insurer 
would have to show that a reasonable insured in the circumstances would have 
appreciated that the fact in question was one that the insurer would want to know about 
or that the proposer actually knew the fact was one that the insurer would want to know 
about.  
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The law has good reason to require a duty of disclosure, namely because the insured, 
rather than the insurer, knows the relevant information, and the insurer has to trust the 
insured to share it.  Despite the problems, it is not so obvious that the duty should be 
abolished, even if only in respect of consumers, in favour of the FOS‟ clear questions 
approach, especially as the courts have regard to the clarity of questions in interpreting 
whether they have been answered satisfactorily. 
 
3.10.1.2  Materiality and inducement 
 
The legal test of what is material for non-disclosure is at s 18(2) MIA.
480  The same test 
applies for materiality for misrepresentation at s 20(2) MIA.  In addition, the insurer has 
the burden of proving the two House of Lords requirements of Pan Atlantic Insurance Co 
Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd
481, namely the prudent underwriter test and actual 
inducement.  As the caselaw develops, it provides further guidance as to what will be 
counted as objectively material,
482 although this does not feature in FOS reports.  The 
courts will not allow immaterial facts to be added together to produce a finding of 
collective materiality.
483  Each fact must be assessed individually for materiality.  A fact 
can still be material and there is no waiver of disclosure even if the proposal form does 
not ask the question.
484 
 
The FOS test does not mention materiality.  Instead it considers firstly whether the 
question posed about the matter in dispute was clear, (presumably implying that it was 
material if it was clear to the prudent underwriter), and secondly whether the insurer was 
induced by the answer to enter into the contract at all or under terms and conditions that 
it otherwise would not have accepted.  As the effect of this is so like the Pan Atlantic test, 
it is not clear why the FOS has chosen its own test, or why materiality is not expressly 
part of it.  
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The L.C.
485 criticises that, even with clear questions, in law the consumer has to guess 
what is material to the insurer.  Instead, it proposes that, for a consumer, the insurer 
should show a misrepresentation leading to actual inducement and that a reasonable 
person in the circumstances would not have made the misrepresentation.  The 
reasonable person test would involve the courts taking into account the type of policy, 
the way it was advertised and sold, the normal characteristics of consumers in the 
market and any of the consumer‟s particular personal circumstances which the insurer 
knew about, like their command of English.  The FOS has commented
486 that this is 
harsher than the subjectively reasonable standard it applies.  For businesses, the L.C. 
proposes a similar default regime – a misrepresentation which caused actual 
inducement which a reasonable person in the circumstances would not have made – but 
with rules about contracting out of the default regime.  A business insured will have 
acted reasonably if they believed that what was said was true, or if they answered a 
general question and reasonably did not appreciate what information was required, their 
reasonableness depending on the type of market, whether the business received 
professional advice and the clarity of the questions asked. 
 
3.10.1.3  Remedies 
 
The remedy in law for misrepresentation/non-disclosure is avoidance ab initio.  Unless 
fraud is involved, the premium is usually returned.  The result can be harsh for an 
insured if, for instance, the difference between a disclosed and a hidden fact would be a 
£20 increase in the premium, which was the position in Case Study 18/03
487.  So the 
FOS takes a more flexible approach, taking account of good industry practice, which it 
says
488 is reflected in the ABI Statements of Practice and the GISC Codes for 
Intermediaries (even though many of these no longer apply following the introduction of 
the ICOB on 14 January 2005) and ICOB/S.   
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In fact, the FOS goes even beyond the Codes/ Statements in some circumstances such 
as where they: 
 
1.  specifically permit insurers to avoid for all negligent misrepresentation, but the 
FOS allows avoidance only for serious negligence (which it calls recklessness), 
not for minor negligence (which it calls inadvertence).  
 
2.  only offer insurers a remedy for innocent misrepresentation where a claim has 
been made, but the FOS offers a remedy whether or not there has been a claim. 
 
The current L.C.
489 wants to incorporate some of the FOS‟ flexible approach.  It wants to 
distinguish, at least in consumer cases, between misrepresentations which are 
deliberate or reckless, reasonable (the FOS would say “innocent”) and negligent 
misrepresentations (the FOS would say “inadvertent”) for which there might be 
proportional remedies.  However, it is for the law to be amended, rather than for the 
FOS, without industry and legal consultation, to develop its own pseudo-law which it can 
change at will, and does without advertisement, as shown by the L.C.‟s note
490 of a 
change in the way that the FOS viewed recklessness between its survey of FOS non-
disclosure cases dated 2003-2005 and the Consultation Paper in 2007. 
 
3.10.2  Codes of Practice  
 
Courts do not take note of and cannot enforce the Statements/ Codes which the industry 
never even made binding on itself and were only intended as statements of good 
practice.  The court ruled in Lewis v Norwich Union Healthcare Ltd
491 that the ABI‟s SLIP 
1996 was not incorporated into the policy and was not legally binding, so its terms were 
to be disregarded.  Theoretically, a consumer can bring an action against an insurer 
under s 150 FSMA for breach of statutory duty in not complying with ICOB/S, and asking 
for damages to compensate him for the loss he has suffered as a result, through a court 
having given judgment against him in accordance with the law which is harsher than 
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treatment he could have expected under ICOB/S.  Such an action is unlikely and 
impractical.  
 
ABI Statements and GISC only require consumers to answer questions at the proposal 
stage to the best of their knowledge and belief and the policy should not be avoided 
unless: 
 
1.  insurers have asked clear questions about facts they consider to be material; 
 
2.  the proposal form sets out the consequences of failing to disclose all material 
facts; 
 
3.  the proposal form warns that if the proposer is unclear about whether a matter is 
material, he should disclose it anyway; 
 
4.  any intermediaries involved at proposal have explained the duty to give 
information and the consequences of failing to do so; and 
 
5.  the non-disclosure or misrepresentation was deliberate or reckless, not innocent.   
 
The ABI guidance dealing with long-term protection policies
492 says that insurers should 
not avoid where: 
 
1.  the degree of materiality associated with the non-disclosure is relatively low (for 
example where it would have increased some part of the premium by no more 
than 50%). 
 
2.  the information relates only to a “severable benefit” such as a Total Permanent 
Disability benefit, where the claim is for critical illness, or 
 
3.  the insurer only knows about the incorrect statement because it has conducted 
an unjustified trawl through medical information. 
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These guidelines are reflected to some extent in ICOBS 8.1.1R, 8.1.2 R
493, and 
5.1.4G.
494  
 
If insurers cannot show the FOS that they have used reasonable endeavours to ensure 
good industry practice and compliance with the applicable Statement/Code, the FOS 
may support a policyholder who blames non-disclosure on his belief that he did not have 
to disclose the information, or that he was following an intermediary‟s advice.  This 
elevates the status of the Statements/ Codes to law, even though they are different to 
each other and the Statements (other than SLIP) are obsolete.  If the FOS were obliged 
to follow the law strictly, and ignore the Statements/ Codes, then either the law would be 
amended to include these, or the FOS could refer the matters to the FSA.  By not doing 
so, the FOS is acting as industry regulator, which is inappropriate.
495  Lord Mustill ruled 
in Pan Atlantic that discipline did not form part of the law, which was only concerned as 
to whether there had been a distortion of the risk. 
 
3.10.3  The FOS approach to non-disclosure/ misrepresentation 
 
Taking account of the law and good industry practice, the FOS takes a three-stage 
approach: 
 
1.  When the customer sought insurance, did the insurer comply with good practice 
for instance in asking a clear question about the matter in dispute? 
 
The FOS will consider proposal forms, tape recordings of telephone proposals or 
print outs of on-line applications, and/or a copy of the statement of facts that the 
insurer should probably have sent the customer after a telephone or internet sale.  
Without such evidence, and if the customer gives a credible account, the FOS 
may find it more likely than the insurer‟s version.  Whilst the implication is that the 
FOS finds matters about which clear questions are asked to be material, it does 
not use this terminology, but has invented its own test of clear questions.  
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Although this has proved helpful to the L.C., the FOS is not the appropriate body 
to achieve law reform.
496 
 
By contrast, the first question a court would ask would be whether the fact was 
material and it would look to the evidence of a prudent underwriter in this respect, 
although it presumes materiality of the insurer‟s express questions put to the 
assured.
497   
 
2.  Did the answer to that clear question induce the insurer to enter into the contract 
at all, or under terms and conditions that it otherwise would not have accepted? 
 
The FOS will apply the Pan Atlantic test of actual inducement, but whereas a 
court would usually require evidence of the actual underwriter in each case, the 
FOS would only require this and/or a copy of the underwriting manual where the 
position is not clear cut.  An example of a clear-cut case might be where a 
customer fails to disclose that his house has serious cracks.  There the burden 
on insurers would not be high.  This study does not argue that the evidential 
requirements for a court and the FOS should be the same.  The FOS can be 
trusted to exercise its discretion when deciding what inducement evidence it 
needs and will accept. 
 
3.  If the answer to either question above is no, the FOS will not support an 
avoidance.  If the answer to both is yes, the consequences will depend on 
whether the FOS considers it to be fraudulent, deliberate, innocent, reckless or 
inadvertent.  In law, the insurer will only have two options: to avoid or affirm the 
whole policy.  Whilst avoidance may in some instances be draconian, if the law is 
to be changed, this should be done through proper law reform, not through 
occasional, non-binding FOS determinations applying to a limited number and 
type of complainant. 
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3.10.4  Fraudulent, deliberate, innocent, reckless or inadvertent non-disclosure 
 
3.10.4.1  Fraudulent and deliberate non-disclosure 
 
A deliberate non disclosure involves dishonestly providing information which the 
proposer knows to be untrue or incomplete.  It will be fraudulent if coupled with the 
intention to deceive the insurer into giving the proposer an advantage to which he is not 
entitled.  It will not be fraudulent if the intention is, for instance, merely to try to hide 
something embarrassing.  Both a deliberate and fraudulent non-disclosure will result in 
policy avoidance before the courts and the FOS.  The L.C. does not propose to change 
this.   
 
The FOS says
498 that only a small proportion of non-disclosing policyholders are found to 
have had any dishonest intent.  However, the L.C. has noted that ombudsmen do not 
necessarily state the category of intent, are adverse to applying the categorisation of 
deliberate, fraudulent or even reckless, especially when writing to grieving relatives or 
terminally ill patients, and instead talk of the policyholder not giving the questions and 
answers the care and attention required or not giving reasonable or accurate answers, or 
that the mis-statement was not innocent or inadvertent.
499 
 
The FOS found a deliberate non-disclosure in Case Study 61/06
500, where the disparity 
between the proposer‟s actual weight (over 21 stone) and height (5ft 9in) and the figures 
he put on the proposal form (16 stone and 6ft respectively) was so great that, on the 
balance of probabilities, he could not have believed his answers were accurate.  It is not 
clear why this did not have a fraudulent intent. 
 
The non-disclosure was not deliberate in Case Study 25/17
501, where the insured did not 
disclose a consultation with a GP because he thought that the insurer already knew 
about it.  The insurer had indicated that it had received the GP‟s notes after the time that 
the relevant information would have been included.  The FOS required the insurer to 
meet the claim for prostate cancer and pay £200 for distress and inconvenience.  The 
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L.C. considered
502 providing for this sort of situation, but concluded
503 that the proposed 
reasonable consumer test was wide enough to protect the consumer in these 
circumstances.  The law as it stands would be able to protect any insured in this situation 
if an estoppel could be made out, but the FOS rarely mentions, let alone relies on, such 
equitable remedies.  If it did, it might not have to deviate or appear to deviate from the 
law.   
 
Under the law, it is generally accepted that for fraud, the insurer can retain the 
premium
504 but risks waiving the non-disclosure if it keeps the premium in anything but a 
fraud situation.  The FOS experience is that most insurers return the premium in any 
event.  It is unclear whether the FOS has a particular policy on premium return after 
avoidance.  In Case Study 72/02,
505 the FOS found that the non-disclosure of a claim for 
car theft within the previous three years and an accident in the previous year could not 
have been accidental or casual, although it found no evidence of dishonesty.  So under 
which of the FOS non-disclosure categories did this case study fit?  It is unclear what 
would have convinced the FOS of the insured‟s dishonesty, especially as his premium 
would have been £1,000 more expensive with full disclosure.  The FOS found the insurer 
was entitled to refuse the claim, but was wrong to retain the premium, which was to be 
returned with interest.  Whilst it might make sense to award interest on a premium which 
is to be returned to the insured, it is unclear why the insurer was wrong in the first place 
to retain the premium if it was allowed to refuse the claim, or whether the FOS here 
really meant to indicate its future approach to premium return.  A careful and considered 
approach applying the law, or at worst its own standard approach might have prevented 
the strange results of this case study. 
 
3.10.4.2  Innocent non-disclosure 
 
If the disclosure is innocent, the FOS will not allow the insurer to avoid the contract and 
will require it to pay the claim in full whatever it would have done had it known the true 
position, subject to policy terms and conditions. The FOS will take into account, and 
expect insurers to ask for and take into account, any explanation for the discrepancy.  In 
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Case Study 18/21
506, the FOS penalised an insurer for not asking why the insured had 
not disclosed tinted windows as a modification to the car.  The law would not have 
required this.  She genuinely did not realise she had to and the FOS felt this was an 
innocent non-disclosure.  When insurers cancelled the policy the insured had to get 
other insurance quickly and at a much higher premium.  Insurers had to cover her repair 
claim, with interest and pay £300 for distress and inconvenience. 
 
The FOS might be more easily persuaded in internet sales that there is an innocent 
reason for the non-disclosure where the proposer answered a question incorrectly, but 
did not see the question for long, did not write the answer down himself, did not get a 
chance to re-read the information and/or was not sent something to read and sign after 
the internet procedure had finished. 
 
The FOS will consider a non-disclosure to be innocent where one of the following apply: 
 
1.  contemporaneous evidence shows that the question was unclear or ambiguous, 
or did not clearly apply to the facts, eg Case Study 07/21.
507  
 
The law too makes allowance for innocent non-disclosure in relation to question 
ambiguity, where the meaning intended by the insurer would not be readily 
apparent to a reasonable man.  It may apply the contra proferentem rule so that 
questions drafted at the proposal stage by insurers will be construed narrowly 
against them.  The insured will still have to give accurate, complete and not 
misleading answers, but the FOS would expect the same.  If an insured is 
dealing in Rolex watches, it is not accurate or adequate disclosure only to 
mention clocks.
508  The courts have typically been generous is construing an 
assured‟s answers as accurate.
509  The law will not allow the insurer to avoid the 
policy if the assured has misunderstood or misinterpreted the question in giving 
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what he believed to be a truthful answer.
510  The law considers that a wide 
question is to be confined within reasonable limits
511 and that limited questions 
may waive otherwise material facts falling outside the precise scope of the 
questions
512, the burden being on the insured to establish that the right to 
disclosure has been waived.
513  Despite the FOS concentrating on the questions, 
there are examples (see renewals below) where it expects disclosure of a matter 
whether or not it is strictly within the ambit of the questions on the proposal form, 
if it is obvious to the insured that it might influence acceptance or assessment of 
the proposal and if it relates to something about which the insured cannot 
seriously believe that the insurer would not want to hear.  The position is the 
same in law, especially if there is a general declaration that all material 
information has been disclosed.
514  So the three serious armed robberies over a 
five year period about which there had been no insurance claims in Noblebright 
Ltd v Sirius International Corporation
515 should have been disclosed, even though 
the proposal form only asked about claims in the previous five years and claims 
worth over £10,000.   
 
 
2.  the proposer should not reasonably have known the relevant information, (nor 
should the questions relate to matters which the proposer could not possibly 
have known). 
 
The law‟s parallel to this is the caselaw following Carter v Boehm,
516 which has 
established that the insured is not obliged to disclose facts which he could not 
reasonably have discovered, did not know or did not deliberately shut his eyes 
to.
517  This softens the insured‟s duty of disclosure under s.18(1) MIA.  The FOS 
could just as fairly use and apply this law, whilst also saying that an insured 
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would not have realised that a fact was material if there was no clear question 
about it.  It would not then have to invent categories of innocent non-disclosure.  
s.18(1) is harsher for a business policyholder who is “deemed to know every 
circumstance which, in the ordinary course of business ought to be known by 
him.”  It is difficult to see how this offends FOS principles.  
 
3.  it was reasonable for the proposer to have overlooked the information, for 
example, minor childhood ailments or minor motoring offences that occurred 
more than 4 years earlier.   
 
The law also allows four further exceptions to the duty of disclosure, where the facts: 
 
1.  reduce the risk; 
 
2.  are about which the insurer knows or is presumed to know
518 and has not 
specifically asked; 
 
3.  are common knowledge; 
 
4.  are about which the insurer has waived disclosure, for instance if the insurer has 
expressly limited its question, so the insured remains silent about that part of the 
information, or where an answer in a proposal form is left blank and the insurer 
makes no further enquiries. 
 
Again, the FOS could, but does not make use of these, and so bring its decisions about 
innocent non-disclosure within the law.  In Case Study 25/15,
519 the answer in the printed 
statement of facts was left blank.  Instead of using the legal argument that the insurer 
had waived its right to object to the resulting non-disclosure, the FOS upheld the 
complaint on the grounds that it was not good industry practice that the insured had not 
been asked to check the statement or sign and return a proposal form. 
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Although the law does not have any more official ways to prevent avoidance where the 
insured is “innocent, ”Staughton LJ noted in Kausar v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd
520 
that the insurer‟s right to avoid liability for an “innocent” insured should be confined to 
“plain” cases.  Presumably this means cases in which the evidence of materiality is 
overwhelming.  Simon J has commented
521 that Staughton LJ was merely expressing “a 
broad caution against too readily accepting allegations of material non-disclosure.” 
 
In summary, the law makes enough allowance for innocent non-disclosure without the 
FOS having to invent its own criteria, to which it expects insurers to comply, but with 
which it may not itself comply, for instance where there are matters which even the FOS 
would expect to be disclosed even if there was no question on point.   
 
3.10.4.3  Reckless non-disclosure 
 
If the non-disclosure is not fraudulent, deliberate or innocent, the proposer must have 
been negligent – either reckless in answering the questions or having made an 
inadvertent error.  Both the law and the FOS allow avoidance for reckless non-
disclosure, and view it as seriously as a deliberate non-disclosure.  
 
The FOS says that the meaning it gives to recklessness derives from Lord Diplock‟s test 
in 1967, “made with actual recognition by the insured himself that a danger exists, and 
not caring whether or not it is averted.”
522  The FOS will consider a non-disclosure to be 
reckless where it finds it difficult to believe that the proposer could have overlooked a 
matter of significance and well known to him, but there is not enough evidence to show 
deliberate non-disclosure.  The proposer must have given his answers without caring 
whether or not they were true or accurate, for instance if he had signed a blank proposal 
form and left it to be filled in by someone who was not an intermediary whom he had 
thought had accurately recorded his answers.  He must also have understood, if only in 
a limited way, that an answer was required, it was important to the insurer and there was 
a consequence to the answer.   
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In Case Study 61/05
523 the late proposer had been reckless.  The proposal asked 
whether she had ever sought or been given medical advice to reduce the level of her 
drinking.  She did not disclose her alcoholism or her continuing treatment from a 
consultant psychiatrist in relation thereto.  Although there was no evidence to show that 
she had deliberately given the wrong answer, it was unlikely that the non-disclosure had 
been innocent or inadvertent.  For if she had properly considered the point, she would 
not have answered as she had, because the question would have raised issues that 
were fresh in her mind and that the FOS believed she knew were important to the 
insurer.  What evidence could there ever be of a deliberate intent in these 
circumstances?  What difference does it make if the non-disclosure was deliberate or 
reckless?  Perhaps the FOS should merge this category with deliberate non-disclosure.   
 
The L.C. has criticised the FOS as it is unclear whether the FOS means recklessness as 
to the circumstances or as to whether the answer would affect insurers‟ decision, and it 
does not set out clearly upon whom the burden of proving the state of mind rests once 
the insurer has established a misrepresentation.
 524  
 
3.10.4.4  Inadvertent non-disclosure 
 
For an inadvertent non-disclosure, the FOS will apply a proportionate remedy, based on 
putting the parties in the position they would have been in had there been no non-
disclosure.  Based on this, the L.C. proposes a proportionate remedy for serious or 
minor negligence.
525 
 
Inadvertent means merely careless, but not reckless.  The proposer unintentionally and 
not deliberately misleads the insurer through an understandable oversight or moment of 
carelessness relating to minor matters, distant in time or otherwise easy to overlook.  It 
will be more difficult for a proposer to prove inadvertence if he answered several 
questions badly, in which case he will probably have been reckless.   
 
For instance, if there was a clear question about motoring convictions, and a proposer 
disclosed a drink-driving conviction, but not a less serious penalty points speeding 
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conviction because he did not realise the latter type counted, his mistake will have been 
inadvertent.  In Case Study 48/1
526, the proposer claimed on her policy following a breast 
cancer diagnosis, which the FOS found insurers should cover, even though because she 
had failed to read and check the questions thoroughly enough, she had inadvertently not 
disclosed back pain that she had suffered following childbirth more than five years 
before.  In Case Study 61/01
527, the FOS thought that the non-disclosure of recurrent 
back and neck problems in response to a clear, specific question, was understandable 
and therefore inadvertent in the proposer‟s difficult family circumstances and because he 
had only had one orthopaedic consultation two years before the proposal.  It was also an 
understandable oversight that he had forgotten to mention a health insurance application 
several years earlier which had been deferred when he did not have time to deal with the 
further enquiries due to the family circumstances.  The FOS required a proportionate 
response, asking that the policy be rewritten as if there had been full disclosure.  This 
meant coverage for the insured‟s heart attack, although spinal conditions would have 
been excluded.   
 
The FOS considers that policyholders should exercise a reasonable amount of care at 
the proposal stage.  In determining inadvertence, the FOS will look at: 
 
1.  the circumstances surrounding the proposal and whether the information was 
transcribed by an adviser.   
 
The FOS will not uphold a complaint against an insurer just because an 
intermediary, who in law is usually the insured‟s agent, completed the form 
incorrectly eg Case Study 27/6
528.  However, where this occurred in Case Study 
25/14
529, the FOS awarded a proportionate settlement based on the proportion of 
extra premium she should have paid if the speeding convictions had been 
disclosed on the proposal form.  It was an innocent oversight that she had not 
checked the proposal filled out by the broker before signing.  In Case Study 
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61/03
530 the non-disclosure of asthma was inadvertent where the assured 
claimed that the intermediary told her that its disclosure was unnecessary as her 
condition was mild.  The FOS was uncertain whether this was true, but as the 
intermediary had made several other mistakes on the proposal form, and the 
complainant had disclosed her asthma in a subsequent application to the same 
insurer, it concluded that she had not intended to mislead the insurer.  She had 
signed the proposal form assuming that the intermediary had recorded her 
answers accurately, but without recklessly not caring whether her answers were 
true.  The FOS asked insurers to pay a proportion of her claim, based on the 
proportion of premium charged versus that which should have been charged with 
full disclosure.  In Case Study 68/10
531, there had been non-disclosure of a 
conviction for which one of the insured was serving a prison sentence.  Their 
bank had sold them the policy along with their mortgage, they regarded the bank 
and the insurer as one, and the mortgage department of the bank knew of the 
conviction.  The FOS felt the mortgage department should have passed the 
information to the insurer.  Although this insurer said that it would not have 
offered cover if it had known, the FOS thought that it would have been possible 
for the insured to find cover elsewhere, with an additional premium.  It therefore 
told the bank to pay what insurers would have for the claim, deducting the cost of 
the additional premium.  This is an interesting development for the duties of an 
intermediary. 
 
In all these examples, the FOS does not discuss whose agent the intermediary 
is, but inadvertent non-disclosure seems to be a way of circumventing the 
consequences of the inadequacies of the intermediaries who were probably 
agents of the insured.  In law all of these non-disclosures would have resulted in 
avoidance. 
 
2.  how clear, concise and relevant the firm‟s questions were in relation to the issue.   
 
The FOS is unlikely to give much weight to “catch-all” questions, which require 
significant and wide-ranging disclosure of minor matters that the firm knows will 
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not be relevant to its assessment, or questions where it would be impractical to 
expect a policyholder to provide a fully accurate response.  An example would be 
a request for information about all visits to a doctor over the past five years.  
 
3.  whether the firm gave any/ any clear warning about the consequences of giving 
false or incomplete information. 
 
4.  the degree to which the policyholder should have been aware of the information 
and its significance to the firm.  So the FOS would expect awareness of the 
insurer‟s likely interest in recent major illnesses for heath insurance, and 
significant convictions like dangerous or drink driving for car insurance. 
 
5.  the more recent and significant an event is, the less likely the FOS is to consider 
its non-disclosure in response to a clear question to be inadvertent.   
 
6.  if the non-disclosure relates to changes since a previous proposal, the firm 
should have provided a copy of that proposal.   
 
In Case Study 61/02
532, the insurer had put a warning both on its proposal form 
and on relevant correspondence, reminding the complainant of his duty to inform 
them immediately if as a result of anything that happened before the start of the 
policy, he needed to change his answers.  However, the FOS still considered the 
non-disclosure of a change in medical condition to be inadvertent, because the 
insurer had not sent the complainant a copy of his original proposal with the 
letter, so that he could assess what changes he had to make. 
 
3.10.4.5  Remedies for inadvertent non-disclosure 
 
If the insurer would have declined the insurance had it known the true position, the FOS 
may support an avoidance of the policy and no payment of the claim, as a court would, 
eg Case Study 61/02.  
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If insurers would have offered the insurance but on different terms, the FOS will expect it 
to re-write the terms as if there had been full disclosure, especially where the matter 
undisclosed is irrelevant to the claim.   This might result in the FOS adopting a 
proportional approach, where it calculates the proportion of the premium that was paid 
against the higher premium that would have been charged on full disclosure, and bases 
the settlement on that proportion.  Examples are above.  This is a solution tentatively 
supported by the L.C., on the basis that the insurer will be compensated for the lower 
premium it has received in cases where no claim has been made.   
 
In a proportional settlement, it is not always clear how the FOS has calculated the 
figures.  In Case Study 25/14
533, the insured was awarded 85% of the value of her claim, 
based supposedly on the proportion of extra premium she should have paid if there had 
been full disclosure, this being 12% more in the first year and 5% more in the second. 
 
If the result of full disclosure would have been a reduced premium with more exclusions 
in the policy, the FOS might allow the insurer to add the premium refund to the 
settlement.  If the firm would merely have added an exclusion or amended a term without 
changing the premium, then the FOS may simply treat the claim as if that amendment or 
exclusion were in place, eg Case Study 48/1
534.  Similarly in Case Study 27/5
535 the non-
disclosure of ear problems was probably inadvertent, and its disclosure would have 
resulted in an exclusion for hearing related problems, leaving intact the leukaemia claim 
from which the insured died.  The FOS asked insurers to pay the full critical illness 
benefits.   
 
That the remedy for a non-disclosure or misrepresentation does not have to be 
avoidance is the FOS‟ most useful innovation and is supported by the L.C..  But if the 
FOS had applied the law, perhaps the need for law reform for those most vulnerable 
would have been more obvious.  Especially as the law has not yet been changed, the 
arguments against such a discretionary remedy should not be overlooked.  The 
individual circumstances of a FOS complainant should not override general public policy 
that there may be a stronger incentive to answer proposal questions entirely accurately 
and carefully if the alternative is always avoidance.  It might also be hard to prove what 
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an underwriter would have done.  Before the FOS, such evidence is usually only a letter 
from the relevant underwriter saying what he would have done, as judged by an 
ombudsman through his own knowledge and experience. 
 
3.10.5  Distress and inconvenience 
 
The FOS may award compensation for distress and inconvenience where it finds that an 
insurer has wrongly avoided a policy for non-disclosure, especially in a medical context, 
even if the insurer was entitled to avoid in law.  In Case Study 13/06
536 this award was 
£400.  The insured developed skin cancer but in relation to specific questions about 
growths and doctors‟ treatments over the previous five years, she did not mention that 
she had recently asked her GP about a mole.  The GP had said it was nothing to worry 
about, she had had it since birth, no treatment was given and she had only mentioned it 
casually at the end of a consultation about something else.  The FOS said that this was 
not a consultation about the mole, so the proposal answers were correct.  A court might 
have applied the contra proferentem rule and interpreted the proposal likewise, although 
would not have made the award for distress and inconvenience.  That award is all the 
more surprising as it is not obvious that insurers‟ initial refusal to pay the claim was 
unjustified.  
 
It is unfair that insurers should be penalised like this for following the law, or for being 
unclear as to what the current, relevant good practice is, or if they have followed 
ICOB/ICOBS, but the FOS standards are higher.  Whilst the FOS should have a 
discretion in general to make awards for distress and inconvenience, perhaps it should 
only be able to do this when it is following the law and if such an award could have been 
made by a court.  
 
3.10.6  Convictions and Spent Convictions 
 
Criminal convictions may be material in law depending on the questions asked, the type 
of policy, the seriousness of the offence and the time between the conviction and 
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inception, but general dishonesty may always be material
537.  Through a series of recent 
cases, the courts have addressed whether rumours, charges and allegations of 
dishonesty might also be material.
538  The law is, in summary, that a rumour/ criminal 
charge/ suspicion of dishonesty is a material circumstance which should be disclosed at 
inception, along with any evidence which might disprove the allegation.
539  If it is not so 
disclosed, insurers will be able to avoid the policy, unless they first receive proof of the 
innocence.  
 
It is to be hoped that the FOS, if it had to deal with the same issues, would follow the law 
which has now been so carefully developed.  This is an area where its “clear question” 
approach might be inappropriate.  For it would be disingenuous for an assured not to 
disclose a conviction or an allegation of dishonesty simply because the insurer has not 
asked.  For if he was asked why he did not disclose or volunteer such information, if he 
responded truthfully, he might be likely to say that he was scared that the insurer would 
not grant him cover.  Which is precisely why the fact should be disclosed.  This was why 
the FOS in Case Study 23/15
540 felt that a policyholder should have disclosed on 
renewal of a motor policy, without specifically being asked, a drink-driving 
disqualification, even though the renewal notice said that he needed to do nothing.  For 
the FOS thought that any driver should know that this was something that they would 
need to tell their motor insurers on renewal. 
 
In law, under s.4 Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, a proposer does not have to 
disclose a spent conviction to insurers even if asked.  A question about previous 
convictions, offences or proceedings is to be construed as not relating to spent 
convictions, and the rehabilitated person is not to be prejudiced in law, for instance by 
insurers trying to avoid the policy through his failure to disclose them.  The FOS seems 
to follow the law in this respect, at least loosely.  It considers that if an insurer insists on 
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asking about spent convictions, it must effectively ignore the answers it receives.  
Similarly, the FOS will uphold a complaint if a policy is voided for non-disclosure of a 
driving licence endorsement relating to a spent conviction.   
 
The law will allow a spent conviction to be admitted in evidence at the discretion of the 
court under s 7(3) of the above Act if it goes to the credit of a party to the proceedings.  
The situation is unlikely to come before the FOS, and if it did, the FOS has a wide 
discretion as to admissibility of evidence, so it would decide the matter in accordance 
with the circumstances, rather than the statute. 
 
3.10.7  Previous losses and previous losses becoming “spent” 
 
In law, previous losses will be material where they indicate a lack of ordinary prudence 
on the part of the proposer, or where they show that the proposer‟s business or lifestyle 
make him especially liable to suffer losses of the kind with which the policy deals.  
Although proposals usually ask about previous losses, if one did not and as a result the 
information was not disclosed, if this was because the proposer thought that disclosing 
the information would affect his cover, it is likely that it would be material to the insurer.  
The FOS would usually say that if there is no question on the matter, the information 
does not have to be volunteered.  In Case Study 01/23
541, as there was no tape 
recording of the disputed evidence, non-disclosure of the motorist‟s one previous claim 
was found to be innocent, and insurers had to pay the claim in full with interest.  
 
A policy, especially life insurance, may include a term which waives insurers‟ right to 
avoid for non-disclosure which occurred after a certain time before inception.  Without 
such a term, the law does not provide a general cut off point after which a non-disclosure 
or misrepresentation at inception will have no effect.  The FOS goes further.  If the 
proposal question asks whether there has been a claim, loss or accident which occurred 
within a certain period, typically three years, the FOS considers
542 that there will be a cut 
off point after which that non-disclosure will no longer be material.  So in the typical three 
year period above, a loss 2.5 years old will only be relevant if there is another claim in 
the first year of cover, but will be too old to be relevant after renewal as it will be 3.5 
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years old.  The L.C.
543 is considering whether there should be a five year cut off point for 
non-fraudulent misrepresentations under life policies, but not for any other type of policy.  
It would not be right for an insured to escape the consequences of deliberately not 
disclosing previous losses in the hope that enough time will pass for the FOS to consider 
it “spent.”  
 
3.10.8  Renewals 
 
Policyholders should be notified in good time when a policy is about to expire.
544  The 
law requires disclosure on renewal of any change in circumstances which might be 
material, whether or not the renewal notices reminds the insured.  The duty is the same 
as at inception and the insurer is not required to provide a copy of the proposal form.  If 
an insured gives incorrect information at renewal because he cannot remember exactly 
what he said at inception, even if he thinks he does, he is at fault for not checking first or 
requesting a copy of his original proposal and the law will hold him accountable for such 
a mistake, however innocent.  The FOS thinks this unfair.   
 
The FOS would only require disclosure at renewal where an insurer clearly asked for 
details which the insured could reasonably be expected to possess.  The FOS considers 
that the insured cannot reasonably be expected to remember all information provided at 
inception, so expects the insurer to provide the insured with a copy of the original 
proposal form, which he should be asked to check and re-confirm, or ask all the 
questions afresh.  Otherwise the FOS will not support an insurer who declines a claim 
based on non-disclosure following a general question about whether anything has 
changed from the previous year, or an unclear question, unless it is obvious that the new 
information needs to be disclosed.  In Case Study 64/9
545, there was a clear reminder at 
renewal to disclose any change of health since the previous year‟s annual travel policy.  
The heart murmur was so serious that even without being sent details of previously 
provided information, the insured should have realised that it needed to be disclosed.  In 
Case Study 23/15
546, there was no clear question, but the insured should still have 
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disclosed on renewal a drink-driving disqualification, even though the renewal letter said 
to “do nothing.”  Any driver should know that this is something that they need to tell their 
insurers on renewal.  Direct proof of the non-disclosure was unavailable because there 
was no recording of the relevant telephone conversation, but the FOS felt it was 
improbable that if the policyholder had told the insurer, it would have ignored the fact, as 
it would not have covered him on any basis if it knew. 
 
Although the L.C. at first suggested that consumers should be provided with the original 
proposal form on renewal
547, it does not now consider that this is necessary in light of its 
proposal that there would only be a remedy for non-disclosure in relation to a general 
question if a reasonable consumer would understand that the question was asking about 
that information.
548   
 
Sometimes the FOS seems to overlook that insurers are not out to dupe vulnerable 
insureds into making misrepresentations so that they can avoid paying out on claims.  It 
is not in their interests to do so, both in respect of the resulting bad publicity to the 
insurer and the industry, and in light of the resulting extra claims disputes which cost 
time and money.  Unless there has been a factual misrepresentation, courts will not rush 
to find that there has been a non-disclosure at renewal.  As Longmore LJ said in relation 
to misrepresentations of opinions and intentions in Limit No 2 Ltd v Axa Versicherung 
AG,
549  
 
“I do not, for my part, consider that a court should struggle to hold that everything said at 
inception is to be impliedly repeated on renewal.” 
 
If an insured discloses at renewal a material change in circumstances, the insurer may 
make a legitimate commercial decision not to renew at all or on the same terms, as long 
as it makes this clear to the insured.  The FOS will support such a decision.  However, 
the insured may be in a predicament if cover is excluded on an annual travel policy, but 
a holiday has been booked before renewal to commence after.  There may be no policy 
grounds for cancelling the holiday before renewal and the insured may not know whether 
the condition will affect the travel and so whether he needs the specific cover.  The FOS 
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considers it neither fair nor reasonable that insureds should be placed in this difficult 
position.  Had they realised it was a possibility, they might have taken out a single trip 
policy instead.  So the FOS has decided that if insurers exclude the condition post 
renewal, the insured may cancel the holiday before renewal at insurers‟ cost eg Case 
Study 49/1.
550  If the insurer does not offer to reimburse these cancellation costs, the 
FOS will ask it to, eg Case Studies 49/3
551 and 74/07.
552  Even if an insured not acting in 
bad faith fails to disclose a condition at renewal which leads him to cancel the holiday 
after renewal, the FOS still expects insurers to pay the holiday cancellation costs as they 
would have been at renewal.  However, if this situation occurred, but insurers had also 
failed to remind the insured to disclose any material change of circumstances at renewal, 
as in Case Study 49/2
553, the insurer will have to pay the full holiday cancellation costs, 
rather than the lesser amount it would have been at renewal. 
 
The law would not oblige insurers to pay for holiday cancellation costs when not obliged 
to by the policy terms.  Perhaps the FOS should not force this obligation on insurers, 
especially if there has been a non-disclosure.   
 
3.10.9  Is there a continuing duty of disclosure after inception? 
 
There is generally no continuing duty of disclosure outside the process up to inception 
and acceptance of the risk, renewal or claims, unless the risk changes so fundamentally 
that the subject matter of the insurance is completely different, such as with a new car or 
house,
554 in which case, it would be reasonable for the insurer to vary the terms of the 
policy.  A condition such as the right to inspect and examine any property insured, or for 
the insured to provide any information requested, is an innominate term, not a condition 
precedent, as that would turn it into a continuing duty of disclosure.
555   
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Subject to UTCCR, a court will uphold a policy term which obliges the insured to notify 
certain information during the currency of the policy.  Breach of such a term has 
contractual remedies.  Although avoidance may be included in the policy as a remedy, it 
is not the automatic avoidance of a breach of utmost good faith.
556  The FOS may not 
consider such an information notification term to be fair and reasonable, especially if the 
duty was not highlighted at the sales point.  The most common example is where an 
insured is required to notify insurers of a change in health between inception of a travel 
policy and the start of the holiday.  In Case Study 36/9
557, the FOS found such a clause 
arguably unfair.  It was acceptable to exclude pre-existing medical conditions, but unfair 
to exclude illness between inception and the start of the trip, which insurers had tried to 
do.  Insurers met the cancellation charges.  In Case Study 64/6
558, the FOS found a 
similar condition too onerous, especially as the insurer wanted to withdraw cover for any 
claims arising from a newly-disclosed medical condition.  The insurer was required to 
pay the medical expenses claim for a heart attack suffered abroad, and the insured was 
not penalised for not disclosing a temporary loss of vision which occurred between 
inception of the cover and the holiday.   
 
The FOS expects insurers to cover any condition notified during the remaining annual 
travel policy period, for an annual policy should be just that, even if the risk changes 
during its currency, and any exclusion for the new medical condition should only apply if 
the customer travels against medical advice.
559  This explains why insurers notified of 
cancer just before a holiday-wedding departure in Case Study 64/8
560 were penalised for 
refusing to cover any cancer-related illness during the trip and offering to pay the holiday 
cancellation charges, on the basis that a continuing disclosure obligation once a holiday 
had been booked is so inherently unfair.  Insurers had to reimburse the cost of the 
alternative policy which the insured had to find at short notice, plus £200 for distress and 
inconvenience.  However, if people delay cancelling their holiday if they become too ill to 
travel, the FOS may adopt a contradictory position, allowing an insurer to refuse to 
continue cover for the condition notified, to offer to refund a deposit for a holiday 
cancelled then, and to refuse to pay any additional sum for later cancellation due to the 
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condition notified.  This was its approach in Case Study 07/06
561 where a broken foot 
was notified but the insured refused to cancel the holiday until later, when the 
cancellation charges had increased. 
 
The FOS does not discuss the basis for its assessment of unfair in the above case 
studies and does not mention UTCCR, which a court would.  If the FOS relied more on 
UTCCR there would be little difference between its decisions on fairness for consumers 
and those of a court, and it would be more likely that its decisions would have a sound 
base, structure and consistency. 
 
The FOS did not consider that an obligation to disclose a “change in health” after 
inception of an annual travel policy included a change in medication.
562  (Even if it had, 
the FOS would have treated it as an onerous term.)  As there was no definition in the 
policy, a court would probably have similarly interpreted the term strictly under the contra 
proferentem rule. 
 
3.10.10  New terms on renewal or on change of insurer 
 
Insurers must notify an insured, clearly, of any change of terms on renewal,
563 otherwise 
the FOS may not hold the insured bound by the change.  In Case Study 01/26,
564 details 
of the new cover had been sent to the insured, but without drawing attention to any 
differences, and as the insurer‟s agent had used the word “renew”, the insured had been 
misled.  The insurer had to deal with the claim as if the original policy applied so the 
insured received the cost of a new car, rather than market value for his old one, plus 
interest and £25 for out of pocket expenses.  In law, an estoppel might arise in this 
situation.  It would be better if the FOS could fit its decisions within the law‟s rules of 
estoppel, rather than seeming to adopt a new approach to a situation which the law 
already covers. 
 
Where employers change the terms or the insurers of a group policy, the FOS expects 
insurers to play an active role in notifying employees of all changes, or requiring the 
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employer to.  Insurers may not simply delegate this responsibility to the employer as they 
might be able to in law.
565  Otherwise, the FOS may not support insurers who refuse a 
claim based on a term which was changed at renewal but not highlighted for the 
employee.  In Case Study 13/02
566, the new insurer was liable to pay for the employee‟s 
elective caesarean, even though the new policy did not cover this, as the original policy 
did, and no one had told either the employee or the employer before the birth, of any 
differences in cover.  The FOS is likely to find insurers responsible for notifying 
employees whom they are told would be adversely affected by any change.  In Case 
Study 13/01
567, a new insurer excluded mental ill health without telling at least the one 
employee it had been informed would be affected, and without requiring the employer to 
tell him.  The employee was prejudiced because if he had known he was not covered, he 
could have taken out his own policy.  The FOS asked the new insurer to cover the 
employee‟s claims for mental illness during the first year of cover.   
 
3.10.11  Misrepresentations 
 
Misrepresentation of a material fact will afford grounds for avoidance under s 20(1) MIA, 
whether or not the proposer was aware that it was incorrect, although under s 20(5), a 
representation as to expectation or belief is true if it is made in good faith, and following 
Economides v Commercial Union Assurance Co
568 it does not have to be based on 
reasonable grounds. 
 
The FOS tends to take the same approach with misrepresentations as it does with non-
disclosures, so the discussion above applies here.  It looks at the sales position, 
determines on the evidence if there was a misrepresentation, decides if it was 
fraudulent/deliberate (eg Case Study 63/9
569), innocent, reckless or inadvertent, and 
applies the remedies as it does for non-disclosure.  Examples are where the insured 
falsely purports to be the main user of a car with a young driver as a named driver, so as 
to avoid the higher premium of insuring the young driver as the main user.  In Case 
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Study 07/18
570, the insurer voiding the policy ab initio was justified as the insurer would 
not have offered cover if it had known who was the main driver.  In Case Study 07/19
571, 
the FOS thought that the insurer‟s offer of a proportional settlement based on the 
premium it would have charged if it had known the truth, was fair, and so the insurer paid 
52% of the total claim for the stolen car.  It is not clear why these were not 
deliberate/fraudulent misrepresentations, but the law would have justly allowed insurers 
to avoid in both cases. 
 
3.10.12  Conclusion 
 
The FOS has an innovative approach to non-disclosure and misrepresentation, and even 
where it could apply legal tools to minimise any harshness of result, it will apply its own 
approach instead.  However, it is not the FOS place to change the law. 
 
The L.C. notes
572 that the current position on non-disclosure and misrepresentation for 
consumers is “needlessly complex, confusing and inaccessible,” with overlapping layers 
of law, regulation and ombudsman discretion.  There is a need for reform and as 
Scottish Re put it,
573 “reform should also provide guidance to the FOS on what 
Parliament considers to be a reasonable balance between the interests of the consumer 
and the insurance industry.”  It is added in this study, that even if insurance and FSMA 
law is not reformed, the L.C.‟s conclusions should be adequate guidance for the FOS as 
to where the balance should lie.  The FOS agreed the need for statutory reform and was 
against the view that ombudsman discretion was adequate to ameliorate the harshness 
of the law.
574  In this context it also said: 
 
“Our preference is for our decisions to be based on law and for our decisions on 
what is “fair and reasonable” to coincide with the law.  It is much easier to defend 
and justify our decisions when they are consistent with the legal position and it is 
advantageous to all our potential users if our decisions can be predicted….  We 
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also take the view that it is logically and morally unjustified to hang on to old law if 
it is widely agreed that the law is bad and no longer serves any useful purpose.” 
 
Some insurers argued
575 that once the law had been changed, the FOS should be 
required to make decisions that followed it rather than by reference to a wider concept of 
what is fair and reasonable.  The FOS responded by stating that the industry had no 
reason to fear that it would use law reform as a stepping stone to make further changes 
in favour of consumers.  The reforms by and large reflected its current approach and it 
had no reason to change this.  In handling consumer credit, pensions and investment the 
FOS said that it strove to follow the law and regulations.  If the insurance law were 
updated, it would be able to follow the same approach in insurance.   
 
However, as shown in this study there are other areas where the FOS does not follow 
the law, and may not even realise it. 
 
It is telling that in another context
576, the FOS commented that even if the L.C. decided 
not to include a certain judicial discretion in the new insurance statute, the FOS could 
and would operate such a discretion in light of its overriding obligation to reach a 
decision that is fair and reasonable.  This shows that it has only a limited intention or 
ability to follow even an amended law.  
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3.11  Breach Of Warranty And Other Conditions 
 
3.11.1  A court’s approach 
 
The definition of warranties under s.33(1) MIA is wide and may apply to past or existing 
facts or to future conduct.  s.33(3) requires strict compliance with a warranty, whether or 
not it is material to the risk.  By comparison, insurers can only avoid for non-
disclosure/misrepresentation if the breach is material.  s.34(2) and Bank of Nova Scotia 
v Hellenic Mutual War Risks (“The Good Luck”)
577 state that a contract will be 
automatically discharged from the date of the breach, even if the breach is later 
remedied before any loss. An untrue warranty of fact at inception will result in a 
repudiated contract and repayment of the whole premium, even if the true statement 
would have decreased the risk insured.
578  “Basis of the contract” clauses in proposal 
forms, once signed by the insured, turn all statements made on the proposal form into 
warranties whose truth the insured effectively guarantees. 
 
A warranty can turn a representation about the present position into a continuing 
obligation in the future, so that the risk incepts, but automatically terminates from the 
date of the breach, although the insurer retains and collects the full premium eg Hales v 
Reliance Fire Assurance.
579  There the claimant said in the proposal form that the only 
inflammable material it stored on the business premises was fuel for cigarette lighters, 
but failed to mention that once a year they also bought fireworks for sale.  McNair J held 
that this answer must be regarded as a warranty relating to the position at the date of the 
proposal as well as to the position throughout the insurance.  Although the breach was 
material to the risk and relevant to the fire in question, the draconian effect of the law 
would have been the same if this had been otherwise.  
 
Because of the immediate and automatic effects of a breach of warranty, an insurer 
cannot waive the breach by electing to affirm the contract as it can for a 
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misrepresentation.
580  It can only waive the breach by estoppel, where the insured shows 
that the insurer made an unequivocal representation by words or conduct that it knew of 
its legal rights, but would not rely on them, and the insured relied on the representation 
to his detriment, for instance, by not taking out another policy.  In HIH v AXA
581 there 
was no waiver by estoppel because it was not until the Court of Appeal in HIH v New 
Hampshire Insurance Co
582 ruled that the term relating to the number of films which 
would be made was in fact a warranty, that the reinsurers appreciated that they had a 
defence based on breach of warranty. 
 
There might be much wrong with the law of insurance warranties.  It might be unfair that 
compliance must be strict and cannot be remedied in retrospect, and that materiality to 
the risk and causation of the loss are irrelevant.  It is a “major mischief”
583, that general 
statements in a proposal form can be turned into warranties through a basis of the 
contract clause, and that the consequences of even an entirely innocent breach are 
draconian and probably unexpected by most insureds.  Nonetheless, even if the law is 
harsh, it is not for the FOS to change it.  There has been much past and recent 
discussion to amend the law.
584  The L.C.‟s proposed reforms include:
585 
 
1.  Abolishing basis of the contract clauses in consumer and business contracts.  
Instead, any statement pre-inception of past or current fact will be treated as a 
representation, and any remedy for misrepresentation will depend on whether it 
was made deliberately, recklessly, negligently or innocently. 
 
2.  Enshrining into mandatory law the existing FOS guidelines for consumers relating 
to warranties as to the future (not mere exceptions), namely that: 
 
(i)  A warranty should be set out in writing. 
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(ii)  An insurer may only refuse a claim for a breach of warranty if it has taken 
sufficient steps to bring the requirement to the consumer‟s attention. and 
 
(iii)  The consumer‟s claim should be paid if he can prove on the balance of 
probabilities that the breach did not contribute to the loss. 
 
3.  For businesses, the default rules should not be those set out in MIA, but instead: 
 
(i)  A warranty should be set out in writing. 
 
(ii)  Subject to the parties making express agreements to the contrary, (which 
would in turn be subject to controls if they appeared in insurers‟ standard 
term contracts), a business‟s claim should be paid if it can prove on the 
balance of probabilities that the breach did not contribute to the loss.  and 
 
(iii)  A breach of warranty would give the insurer the right to terminate cover 
for the future, rather than an automatic discharge from liability. 
 
3.11.2  The FOS approach 
 
3.11.2.1  Term classification 
 
The FOS approach is entirely different to that of a court.  It does not ask how a term 
should be classified and then apply the consequences of breach.  It would be clearer if it 
did.  Instead, it concentrates on what it thinks the effect should be of the breach in 
question and then whether the complainant qualifies for the extra protection as a 
consumer that ICOBS or the relevant statement provide for breaches of warranty.  So in 
Case Study 74/09
586, it applied a requirement of causal connection between a breach 
and a loss, to a term which was labelled a condition precedent, effectively as if it were a 
warranty.  In Case Study 31/5
587, it effectively found that providing a death certificate for 
a parrot was a condition precedent to liability.  Instead of saying this, it said that the 
insured breached “an important and material condition,” which meant that the insurer 
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could not verify the cause of death for the accidental death benefit, and so did not have 
to pay the claim. 
 
3.11.2.2  Causal connection between breach and loss: consumers 
 
A “consumer” is defined
588 as “any natural person who is acting for purposes which are 
outside his trade or profession.”  Anyone else is a “commercial customer.”.
589  
 
The FOS requires a causal connection for consumers between breach of any term and 
the loss.  Clause 2(b)(iii) of SGIP (now obsolete) says that unless fraud is involved, the 
loss must be connected to the breach of warranty or condition before the insurer can 
repudiate liability to indemnify a policyholder.  ICOBS 8.1.1R and 8.1.2R (3)
590 and for 
long term insurance SLIP or COB/S have similar provisions.  Although common in most 
other jurisdictions, such a causal connection plays no part in the current law, so should 
play no part in FOS decisions.  That the insurer can repudiate a contract does not fit with 
the legal concept that an insurer is automatically discharged from liability for breach of 
warranty.  In any case, the Codes/Statements will not protect an insured from an insurer 
repudiating on technical grounds and without a causal connection, as it is entitled to 
under the law, if it suspects but cannot prove fraud.  It is uncertain how the FOS would 
respond to such a scenario. 
 
In Case Study 04/22
591, the FOS applied SGIP and required the insurer to meet the 
claim because there was no evidence of a causal connection between the caravan 
owner‟s failure to comply with all the required security conditions, and this particular 
theft.  The report does not mention what sort of term this was.  A court would have 
established this first.  If it was not a warranty or a condition precedent to cover, then it 
was a mere innominate term, breach of which might result in a claim for damages by the 
insurer.  But if there was no causal connection between the breach and the theft, 
insurers could not argue that they had suffered a loss as a result of the breach. 
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By comparison, in Case Study 04/23
592, there was a causal connection between the 
breach (failure to buy a lock for the caravan) and the theft, and because the insured 
knew of his obligation but had failed to deal with it, the FOS rejected his complaint.  
Does this mean that over and above the requirements of the relevant Statement/Code, 
the insured has to be aware of his obligations?  Again there is no mention in the report 
as to what type of condition this was, but a court would have been likely to end up with 
the same result.   
 
3.11.2.3  Basis of the contract clauses 
 
Although SGIP and SLIP banned basis of the contract clauses, ICOB and ICOBS did 
not.  There is no explanation and reasons of freedom of contract are unlikely.  There 
have been no reported FOS cases involving basis of the contract clauses, so perhaps 
insurers do not in practice tend to use or rely on them in consumer contracts.  However, 
it is unlikely that the FOS will uphold the draconian effects of a technical breach based 
on a basis of the contract clause either for general or life insurance, which approach 
would therefore be stricter than both the law and the FSA.  How then should an insurer 
know what to do in the situation where there has been a breach of warranty which was 
created by a basis of the contract clause?  The law should be applied, even if it is unfair, 
for the sake of certainty. 
 
3.11.2.4  Treating businesses like consumers 
 
The FOS realises that if it only followed the Statements/Codes, its approach to breaches 
of warranty/condition, would protect consumers but not those small businesses who 
within its own logic would also need protection.  So it treats some businesses as 
consumers in this context.  However, until the FOS decides, no-one knows for sure 
whether a business is going to get the added consumer protection.  The law is more 
certain.   
 
The FOS looks at the nature and resources of a business to decide whether its 
understanding of insurance issues is similar to that of a consumer, and expects the 
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insurer to do the same.
593  A business is more likely to obtain consumer protection if the 
interest disputed is commonly covered under personal insurance, the policyholder is self-
employed, without experience in financial and legal matters and/or without any easy 
access to expert advice (eg from brokers) on insurance matters, and it should have been 
clear to the insurer or intermediary that the business was an unsophisticated buyer of 
insurance.  A business is less likely to be treated as a consumer if it is a limited 
company, employs a number of staff, rents substantial business premises, has detailed 
legal agreements with suppliers and/or could reasonably be expected to have a greater 
understanding of business issues than a private individual, for instance in view of the 
director‟s previous employment, perhaps as a solicitor or insurance broker.   
 
In Case Study 39/1
594 a small café was burgled.  The FOS treated it as a commercial 
entity as it employed four full-time staff, was a limited company and had access to expert 
advice from insurance brokers through whom it bought the policy and made the claim.  
The claim for the loss, including part which was not caused by the breach of security 
warranty, was not paid and the complaint was rejected.  By comparison, in Case Study 
74/09
595, the FOS found that a small graphic design business, with a modest turnover 
and only two part-time employees should be treated as a consumer.  So the claim had to 
be met because the breach of a condition precedent (that the doors should be made of 
solid wood) was unconnected to the theft (the front door was forced off its hinges, so 
ingress would have been achieved regardless of the construction of the door). 
 
However, these tests to not consider the business‟s actual knowledge and 
understanding, only what the FOS would expect from them.  There are many large, well-
resourced companies, who are clueless about insurance and do not employ brokers.  
Why should they be forced to?  Even if a business does understand the effects of a 
warranty or basis of the contract clause, it may not have the bargaining power to exclude 
warranties from its policy, so is subject to the same harshness of the law which the FOS 
is trying to avoid.  Should a knowledgeable consumer be treated as a business?  If the 
FOS is going to apply its own rules, it should apply them to everyone over whom it has 
jurisdiction in the interest of certainty.  It is strange that the FOS will treat the same claim 
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differently according to whether it is made by a commercial entity.  The law of warranties 
does not try to find a dividing line between different types of businesses. 
 
3.11.3  How the law avoids the unfairness of warranties 
 
Through UTCCR, a court can consider unfair and refuse to give effect to a term which 
has not been individually negotiated in a consumer contract and causes a significant 
imbalance in the parties‟ rights and obligations.  It may be that many warranties will 
cause such an imbalance, especially those created through basis of the contract 
clauses.   
 
Where UTCCR does not apply, the courts can use policy construction to protect against 
the draconian effects of the law or warranties.  The courts construe warranties strictly 
against the party who has put them forward, usually the insurer, as follows:  
 
1.  A warranty could be interpreted as only applying to past facts or those at 
inception, but not to the future.  In Hussain v Brown
596, a warranty that the 
premises were fitted with an intruder alarm needed only to be true at inception. 
 
2.  The warranty might be interpreted as relevant only to some sections of a 
severable policy.  In Printpak v AGF Insurance Ltd
597, the court found an alarm 
warranty only applied to the theft not the fire risk, so that the fire was still 
covered. 
 
3.  The clause may not be a true warranty but merely descriptive of the risk.  In Farr 
v Motor Traders Mutual Insurance
598, cover only existed when the risk was as 
described (when the taxi was only used for one shift a day), and was suspended 
on the limited occasions when the warranty was not adhered to. 
 
4.  The wording of the warranty may not apply to the facts in question.  In Provincial 
Insurance Co v Morgan
599 the insured had warranted that their lorry would be 
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used for coal, although on the day in question, but not at the time of the incident, 
it had been used to transport other goods.  The warranty was held to mean only 
that transporting coal was to be the normal use, which was the case, and 
transporting other goods would not terminate liability under the policy. 
 
5.  At its most extreme, a court might disregard clear language and call a warranty a 
suspensive condition.  In Kler Knitwear v Lombard General Insurance Co,
600 a 
sprinkler system was not inspected 30 days after renewal as warranted, but 60 
days late, although it was working at the time of, and unconnected to, the storm 
damage claim.  The court held that the policy coverage was suspended until the 
sprinkler system was inspected, but was in place thereafter. 
 
The FOS could and should use a similar approach to warranties, or any other term it 
considers harsh, drawing analogies to the caselaw as appropriate, especially where it 
has not considered a business to be a consumer.  At the moment O.N. totally ignores the 
above caselaw, although the FOS will interpret a warranty contra proferentem as it did in 
Case Study 07/23
601 where it had to decide whether a commercial contractor had 
satisfied the policy condition of “suitable fire extinguishing appliances to be kept 
available.”  
 
The court‟s approach should discourage insurers from taking purely technical points or 
using warranties unreasonably, although it cannot protect against every harsh decision, 
and its flexibility makes the law of warranties less certain, with insurers trying to 
circumvent a known problem by using different language to achieve the same effect.  
However, the same criticisms can be made of the FOS approach.  Its decisions are less 
consistent that a court‟s as although it aims for consistency, it does not follow a 
precedent system.  The FOS too deals with repeatedly similar issues, partly because 
only a few examples are published in O.N., and partly because each case is decided on 
its merits.  And as the FOS will not apply the standards of a consumer to all businesses, 
it still makes some harsh warranty decisions.  The court system is not perfect in the way 
it deals with warranties, and is due for amendment.  But it is not doing a bad job, or any 
worse job than the FOS in this context and the FOS should follow it. 
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3.11.4  Late notification of claims conditions 
 
In Case Study 39/2
602 a self-employed forest management adviser with no employees 
gave late notification to insurers of a public liability claim made against him, 18 months 
after a third party was injured by a falling tree.  This was when it was spelt out to him in a 
solicitor‟s letter that the owner of the estate was passing on the claim to him.  The FOS 
felt that in view of his circumstances, it was not reasonable to expect him to know that he 
was potentially liable and so to notify insurers any earlier.  Insurers had to ignore the late 
notification and deal with the claim.  The FOS did not explore the type of term that was 
breached, or consider the caselaw. 
 
Without having to decide whether the insured should be treated as a business or a 
consumer, a court would have found that there had been a breach of the notification 
provision, the effect of which would depend on how the court classified the term.  
Because of the harsh effect if a condition precedent has been breached, the courts will 
generally refrain from holding that a notification of loss provision amounts to a condition 
precedent, even in the face of express terminology.
603  If it was not a condition 
precedent, the remedy under the current law would lie in damages only, following the 
Court of Appeal decision of Friends Provident Life and Pensions v Sirius International 
Insurance,
604 such damages being nominal, as it would usually be difficult to point to a 
particular and calculable loss as a result of the breach.  So the result in the above case 
study would have been the same before a court applying the current law.  
 
At the time that the FOS considered this matter, the ruling of Alfred McAlpine Plc v BAI 
(Run-Off)
605 would still have been law.  This would have allowed damages if the breach 
of the condition was minor, but if it was so significant as to have seriously prejudiced the 
insurer, the insurer might be permitted to repudiate the claim (as opposed to the policy).  
The insurer in the case study said it was prejudiced by not being able to obtain any 
evidence from the time of the accident that could have given it a better chance of 
successfully defending the claim, so a court might have considered allowing repudiation 
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of the claim.  The FOS could have come to the result it did by applying BAI, and deciding 
that the prejudice was not so serious as to entitle the insurer to reject the claim or to 
result in any real loss, so that the claim should be paid. 
 
3.11.5  Conclusion 
 
It is not right that an insurer can breach an FSA code by refusing to meet a claim for 
which it is not liable under the law, and that even if it complies with the code, it can still 
offend FOS principles, for instance in relation to basis of the contract clauses.  Whilst the 
law may need reform, this does not mean that the FOS should try to do this by not 
respecting basis of the contract clauses and requiring materiality and a causal 
connection between a breach and loss for a consumer claim.  It would do better to follow 
the law, especially where the law provides get-outs for harsh consequences for all 
insureds, through applying UTCCR or contra proferentem interpretations.  Instead the 
FOS has adopted its own approach which does not cater for non-consumer–like 
businesses at all and involves arbitrary and subjective distinctions between different 
types of businesses.   
 
The role that the FOS has had in shaping the proposed future law cannot be denied, 
although the L.C. would probably have been able to reach its conclusions without the 
benefit of the FOS experience, especially as previous law commissions have made 
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3.12  Legal Expenses Insurance 
 
Legal expenses insurance, defined in FSMA 2000,
606 is a before-the-event insurance 
against the costs of litigation.  It is relatively new, but increasingly used.  There is little 
caselaw on the topic, other than relating to the possibility under s 51 Supreme Court Act 
1981 of insurers having to pay costs above policy limits, but there is no FOS material on 
that.   
 
3.12.1  Reasonable prospects of success 
 
Insurers usually require any legal action to have a “reasonable prospect of success” 
before it provides cover.  The courts have not yet considered this phrase in this context, 
but the FOS has, and there seems to be nothing with which a court might disagree.  
Insurers may use their own staff to assess the claim in the first instance, who may or 
may not be legally qualified.  If they consider a claim should be pursued, they usually 
pass it to solicitors on the insurer‟s panel to assess.  
 
The FOS will not look at the merits of a complaint about whether a case has reasonable 
prospects of success, but only whether the firm has given the matter proper 
consideration, and it will have if it has adopted the advice of legal experts.  
Notwithstanding this, if a complainant can show a legal opinion which “trumps” that 
obtained by insurers, then the FOS may uphold the complaint.  In Case Study 47/8
607, 
the opinion of the complainant‟s barrister, who was a specialist in the field, trumped the 
opinion of the insurer‟s panel solicitor.  The FOS considers that an expert opinion from a 
barrister is highly persuasive, and should only be disregarded if it was obviously 
erroneous and/or based on factual mistakes. 
 
The FOS interprets reasonable prospects as a 51% or better chance of success.  If a 
privately funded case with worse prospects than this ultimately succeeds, that does not 
prove that the insurer was wrong to deny funding, as long as the insurer acted on legal 
advice. 
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3.12.2  Commercial judgment 
 
FOS supports policy terms which allow the insurer to opt to pay the consumer the sum of 
money at stake where the costs of the claim make it uneconomical to pursue.  If the 
insured wants an injunction, the insurer will assess the damages that a court is likely to 
award rather than granting an injunction against the costs of an action for the injunction. 
 
If cover is not provided, or is withdrawn, but the assured is subsequently successful 
before the courts, a typical policy will allow him to recover from the insurer any of his 
reasonable costs which he is not able to recover from the other party to the litigation.  
The FOS has not commented on this situation.  
 
3.12.3  Who should be appointed as the legal representative 
 
Where the insurer accepts liability under the policy, the assured has a right under the 
Insurance Companies (Legal Expenses Insurance) Regulations 1990
608 to nominate a 
solicitor to act on his behalf.  Reg 6(1) provides: 
 
“Where under a legal expenses insurance contract recourse is had to a lawyer…to 
defend, represent or serve the interests of the insured in any inquiry or proceedings, the 
insured shall be free to choose that lawyer….” 
 
Under Reg 6(3), this right should be written in the policy.  It arises out of an EC 
Directive
609 to ensure that there can be no conflict of interest where the third party‟s 
liability insurer is also the insured‟s legal expenses insurer.  The limited exception to this 
right is set out in Reg 7 and involves a motor claim where both the motor insurer does 
not carry out liability business and there are arrangements to ensure that if both parties 
have the same insurer, representation for each is provided by completely independent 
lawyers.  Reg 3 sets out the limited circumstances in which the Regulations do not apply:  
they include legal expenses insurance for marine risks, proceedings which are also done 
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in the insurer‟s own interest and foreign travel assistance where the traveller falls into 
difficulties whilst abroad. 
 
The FOS mentions these Regulations in passing.  It says
610 that insurers can appoint 
solicitors when a claim is notified, but that the Regulations entitle insureds to choose 
their own solicitor only once administrative or legal proceedings have started.  It would 
not require an insurer to offer the insured a choice of solicitor at the pre-action stage 
unless or until the courts support such an interpretation of the Regulations.  For it is 
unclear whether the word “inquiry” in Reg 6(1) is enough for this.  It is unusual that the 
FOS says that it is waiting for the court‟s guidelines, rather than deciding the position on 
the fairness of the individual circumstances.   
 
The FOS adds that if the panel solicitors act incompetently at the stage of determining if 
there is a reasonable chance of success, the insured can instruct his own lawyers then.  
In Case Study 47/8
611 the FOS found the insurers‟ advisers to be incompetent because 
they had not found that there was a reasonable prospect of success, although the 
insured‟s barrister had, and insurers had not instructed their own Counsel for an opinion.  
The conclusion of incompetence on these facts does not necessarily follow, especially 
as it cannot be reasonable to expect insurers always to obtain Counsel‟s opinion.  Does 
this mean that an insured should always try to find a second opinion from Counsel when 
insurers decide that the case has no reasonable chance of success, and if it is 
favourable, require insurers to fund that opinion?   
 
In view of what it says above, it is unclear why the FOS gives further examples
612 of 
where it might support insureds choosing their own representation, in cases: 
 
1.  that involve large personal injury claims;  
 
2.  that are necessarily complex, (eg medical negligence);  
 
3.  that involve significant boundary or employment disputes (especially those with a 
considerable history);     
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4.  where the policyholder‟s own solicitors have had considerable involvement and 
knowledge of the issue or related matters; 
 
5.  where there is a suggestion of conflict of interest and there was a reasonable 
prospect of success, the solicitor and insurer agreed fees and arrangements for 
monitoring the conduct of the claim, and the chosen solicitor had the necessary 
experience.  The FOS comments that such a conflict might exist in the Imran 
Sarwar v Muhammad Alam
613 sort of case, where it was not reasonable for the 
claim of a car passenger to be conducted by his opponent‟s, the driver‟s, insurers 
and the Court of Appeal gave guidance for similar future cases;  or 
 
6.  where the panel solicitors have shown themselves to be incompetent. 
 
Perhaps these examples only make sense when put with the FOS‟ next set of comments 
which seem to indicate that actually, in contravention of the Regulations, the insured 
should not be able to choose his own representation in other sorts of cases.  The FOS 
says that apart from the above sorts of cases, it is not inherently unreasonable or unfair 
to policyholders for insurers to require them to use the legal services of its own 
appropriately trained staff or a pre-selected panel.  It has seen no evidence of any 
systematic difference in quality between the work of panel and non-panel solicitors, 
except in the occasional case where the panel does not include solicitors with the 
relevant expertise or specialist knowledge.  So the FOS concludes that, in general, 
policyholders making claims in connection with motor accident disputes, minor personal 
injury claims and routine consumer disputes are unlikely to suffer any significant 
prejudice if the insurer simply appoints a solicitor for them from its own panel.  Although 
this may be true, it is not the point of the rights given by the Regulations. 
 
The policy should set out clearly whether the insurer will fund all or any part of a claim 
handled by the insured‟s solicitor, else insureds may be prejudiced if they incur fees.  
The FOS considers it fair and good industry practice for the insurer to pay such fees.  
The Regulations do not mention fees.  Perhaps the FOS is actually saying when it 
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produces a list of circumstances in which the insured should be entitled to choose its 
own representation, that those are also the circumstances in which the FOS would 
consider that insurers should pay for the insured‟s choice, whatever the policy terms.  If 
that is indeed the case, then it is not clear from the reports in O.N., although it would be 
a fair and sensible guideline.   
 
3.12.4  Handling of the claim  
 
The FOS will reject a complaint about whether the insurer should have settled a case if it 
acted on solicitors‟ advice and there is nothing to suggest that the advice is wrong, eg 
Case Study 47/7.
614  Whilst policies usually provide for insurers to pre-approve any 
proposed settlement, the FOS expects the insurers to exercise reasonably its discretion 
not to cover a settlement made without its permission.  In Case Study 26/12
615, the 
settlement in question was the best outcome for the claim.  The FOS required the insurer 
to reimburse the insured with the amount of the agreed settlement plus interest from the 
date that the insured had made the payment.  A court would not be able to require the 
insurer to act outside of the policy terms, however unreasonable the insurer. 
 
3.12.5  Conclusion 
 
The FOS approach to legal expenses insurance seems to follow that of a court‟s.  The 
cases decided by the courts on this topic and those seen by the FOS do not deal with 
the same points, so a direct comparison cannot be made.   
 
Where the FOS approach seems to differ from the law is in which circumstances an 
insured can instruct his own solicitors and who should pay for this.  There is apparent 
FOS confusion, perhaps because of the context of its comments, in response to a 
question about its position following the Sarwar v Alam
616 case.  From its comments in 
O.N.
617 it is not clear that it was already aware of the case or that it was familiar with the 
Regulations.  The FOS said that it was going to set out its position which was first 
established by the IOB, but if the FOS‟ first point of reference is what the IOB said before 
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it, possibly before 1 July 1990 when the Regulations came into effect, rather than the 
relevant statutory instrument itself, then that would explain the disparities mentioned 
above.  
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4.  CONCLUSIONS  
 
4.1  Conclusions 
 
This study shows that the FOS should apply the law strictly: 
 
1.  The FOS is a sensible, effective alternative dispute resolution service, relatively 
cheap and quick compared to a court.  (Section 1)   
 
2.  It is appropriate that the FOS has its own rules and powers to deal with evidence, 
supported by court enforcement, although it should develop rules for dealing with 
admissibility which reflect the safeguards built into the court system, (Section 
3.1.) 
 
3.  It is unfair that it is compulsory for insurers to submit to the FOS‟ authority and 
therefore to its discretion not to apply the law.  (Sections 1 and 2.1) 
 
4.  The law should be applied for the sake of certainty and consistency for the many, 
and for the insurance industry, even at the expense of justice for the few.  
Injustice would indeed be for few.  (Sections 2.4 and 2.12)  
 
5.  The law respects contract certainty more than the FOS which will override clear 
policy wording even when there has been no breach of sales code. (eg Section 
3.2.1.2). 
 
6.  The law considers whose agent is an intermediary and makes the consequent 
ruling.  The FOS rarely does. (Section 1.19.4) eg Sections 3.2.1.9 (a), 3.3  and 
3.10.4.4) 
 
7.  The courts over the years have developed the law to achieve balance between 
insurers and their insured.  (Section 2.6)  
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8.  The main exceptions are non-disclosure, misrepresentation and warranties, 
where the law may be harsh for insureds and the L.C. is working on 
amendments. 
 
9.  The FOS has adopted its own approach to these, not without injustice, eg where 
all types of business over which it has jurisdiction are not protected by its 
approach to warranties.  (Section 3.11.2.4)  
 
10.  These are not the only areas in which the FOS adopts its own approach.  Others 
include its treatment of pre-existing disabilities proportionately, (Section 3.4.6), 
concurrent causes of loss in a personal accident policy, (Section 3.4.8), 
unoccupied premises definition (Section 3.5.4), preventative work, (Section 3.5.5) 
aerials as part of buildings cover (Section 3.5.6), a 50% approach to the cost of a 
matching set, (Section 3.7.2) allowing cover when the premium has not been 
paid, (Section 3.8.1) intention when fraudulent means or devises are used in 
support of a genuine claim, inventing “immaterial fraud” (Sections 3.9.4 and 
3.9.6) and finding that non-disclosure of previous losses can become “spent” 
(Section 3.10.7).   
 
11.  No-one can be sure in which circumstances the FOS is going to apply an 
alternative approach to the law, and sometimes a new approach seems not to 
have been thought through, eg who should appoint the legal representative in 
legal expenses cover. (Section 3.12.3) 
 
12.  Sometimes the FOS does not apply its own approaches.  For instance, its staff 
are reluctant to use the FOS non-disclosure classifications. (Section 3.10.4.1) 
 
13.  The FOS mentions little caselaw and may be unaware of the current position eg 
in relation to fraud. (Section 2.2).  
 
14.  On the rare occasion where the FOS says it is following a legal precedent, there 
are embellishments to its approach which show that it might not be, or that it has 
not kept up with developments eg when it refers to Rohan,(flood ) Sargent (any 
occupation), Starfire (unattended) and Merc-Scandia (“immaterial” frauds).   Judith Summer: PhD April 2009  213 
 
15.  By not referring properly to the law, it may accidentally create a new approach, 
eg in the definition of subsidence. (Section 3.5.3.1) 
 
16.  The FOS sometimes muddles legal concepts together eg referring to reliance as 
part of an UTCCR test (Section 3.2.1.12 (b)), or where the premium should be 
returned following avoidance ab initio (Section 3.10.4.1). 
 
17.  Where the law is not considered properly or at all, the FOS is vulnerable to 
judicial review.  It is only a question of time before insurers and insureds realise 
the extent of this weakness. (Section 2.3) 
 
18.  The FOS, in adopting its own approaches, has confused the position, as now 
there is a patchwork of overlapping and sometimes contradictory codes, FOS 
opinions and law eg for remedies for negligent non-disclosure. (Section 2.9).   
 
19.  FOS results are less arbitrary, inconsistent and unpredictable where it applies the 
law eg for flood. (Section 3.5.2.4) 
 
20.  This study shows that the outcome of most decisions would be the same if the 
FOS applied the law strictly, or the appropriate legal tool, rather than relying on a 
non-specific breach of ICOBS.  (Sections 2.12, 3.2.2.4 and 3.2.2.3)  
 
21.  Such tools include: 
 
21.1  Using legal precedent which has construed warranties strictly, to avoid 
draconian consequences of technical breaches. (Section 3.11.3)  
 
21.2  Taking a technical approach to policy construction eg for hazardous travel 
Insurance (Section 3.3.7). 
 
21.3  Applying Interfoto or UTCCR rather than FSA codes for onerous or unfair 
terms, including warranties (Section 3.11.3), terms requiring continuing 
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repayment of premium on policy cancellation. (Section 3.8.2)  This would 
also make it clearer as to which terms should be highlighted at the sales 
point. (Sections 2.11; eg in Travel insurance in Section 3.2.1.12 (a)).  
 
21.4  Deciding through the use of legal precedent that a fraud is not substantial, 
or is part of a negotiation or an innocent valuation, rather than place it 
under its own category of “immaterial fraud.” (Sections 3.9.3.1 and 3.9.6) 
 
21.5  Couching its “clear question” test for non-disclosure in the materiality 
language of Pan Atlantic (Section 3.10.3), applying the contra 
proferentem rule and relevant caselaw to ambiguous questions for 
innocent non-disclosure, (Section 3.10.4.2) relying on Carter v Boehm 
where the proposer could not have known the information (Section 
3.10.4.2), and especially for innocent insureds, applying the four 
exceptions to the duty of disclosure that the law does. (Section 3.10.4.2) 
 
21.6  Using estoppel especially when dealing with mis-sales (Section 
3.2.1.9(d)), misrepresentation or non-disclosure or questions of breach of 
sales code. (Section 3.2.1.9) 
 
22.  To apply the law and its legal tools, the FOS needs to have a much better 
internal information provision and update system than it has, to which its staff, 
who may not be legally qualified or experienced, must be made to refer explicitly. 
(Section 2.2) 
 
23.  Although ombudsmen from other countries have a similar discretion not to apply 
the law strictly, they do not produce their own alternative approaches as the FOS 
does. (Section 1.3) 
 
24.  The FOS is not a suitable forum for law reform, as its jurisdiction, powers and 
accountability are limited.  (Sections 2.7, 2.8, 2.9 and 2.10).  The L.C. agrees.
618  
Law reform should come from the courts and Parliament.   
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25.  The FOS innovations may have delayed reform of insurance law by seemingly 
catering for the most vulnerable. (Section 2.9) 
 
26.  If the FOS applies the law strictly, the courts are more likely to respect its 
contribution in areas not yet considered, such as aspects of travel insurance, 
chronic conditions, unproven and experimental medical treatment and car 
valuations. (Section 2.13) 
 
27.  The FOS has effectively taken on the role of policing ICOBS and other 
Statements of Practice and making awards for maladministration.  That is the role 
of the regulators and the practice should be changed so that they do this instead.  
Whilst the FOS continues to do this, the regulators will not.  (Sections 2.11, 
3.2.1.9 and 1.18.3)   
 
28.  If the FOS or Parliament want to retain its discretion to override the law, this 
should be used only rarely, where the result would be obviously unfair otherwise.  
The discretion should not be used to repair bad bargains, or as the default for 
breach of ICOBS. (Section 2.13) 
 
29.  It would be understandable if the FOS or Parliament decided that it should only 
apply the law strictly after reform of insurance law.  (Section 3.10.12)  In the 
meantime, the FOS should still refer to the law and legal tools before relying on 
its discretion. (Section 2.13) 
 
30.  If the FOS had to apply the law strictly, FOS decisions could be more 
accountable through judicial review.  It is unlikely that there would be a huge 
number of such applications, or that this number would be greater than the 
current potential in a system where the FOS should, but does not refer to the law 
at each decision. (Section 2.3) 
 
31.  Perhaps a better option would be for the role of the independent assessor to be 
modified so that he could answer whether the law had been applied strictly, and if 
not, refer it back to the Ombudsman. (Section 2.3) 
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32.  The FOS should apply the law strictly.  Even without statutory amendment, it 
could resolve now to try harder to apply it or its tools to achieve its aim of fair and 
reasonable decisions in light of the circumstances of the case.  
 
4.2  Summary Of Contribution 
 
This is the only study which exists: 
 
1.  of the FOS system and all its published insurance case studies and approaches 
to insurance law, completed by a lawyer. 
 
2.  of how the FOS decides insurance matters compared to a court. 
 
3.  which analyses whether the law should be applied strictly by the FOS. 
 
4.3  Future Research 
 
1.  The FOS or FSA may wish to research how the system could be changed so that 
the regulators police the application of ICOBS or other relevant codes. 
 
2.  Whether individuals should pay something towards the FOS (or insurers‟) costs if 
they are pursuing one or more insurance claims vexatiously, not co-operating 
with FOS or insurer‟s investigations, or found to be fraudulent.  
 
3.  The Law Commission may find this study useful for ideas on how insurance law 
should be reformed and how the FSMA should be changed so that the FOS must 
apply the law strictly. 
 
4.  The FOS may want to upgrade and overhaul its internal information system, 
employ an insurance know-how lawyer to keep the insurance law updated, and 
require its staff to refer explicitly to it and to the relevant law in each adjudication 
or determination, whether or not the law is changed to require it to apply the law 
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5.  The FOS may consider amending some of its approaches which apparently differ 
from the law, for instance where this study has shown that a true application of 
the law would give the same result. 
 
6.  The FOS plans to publish a more comprehensive journal of cases decided, and 
appointed someone to facilitate this in March 2009.  Further academic analysis 
can be done of that, using this study as a base.  
 
5.  APPENDICES (see Volumes 2 & 3) 
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www.centroarbitragemlisboa.pt 
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DISP (original rules) 
 
DISP 1.2.9(2)R  
DISP 1.2.9(3)R 
DISP 1.2.15G 
DISP 1.4.5(2) R 
 
DISP 2.2.1 G (15) 
DISP 2.3.1 R (1)(a) 
DISP 2.3.1 R (1)(b) 
DISP 2.3.1 R (1) (c) 
DISP 2.3.1 R (2) 
DISP 2.3.3 G 
DISP 2.3.4 G 
DISP 2.3.5R 
DISP 2.3.6R 
DISP 2.4.1 R 
DISP 2.4.3 R 
DISP 2.4.5 G 
DISP 2.4.7 R 
DISP 2.4.8 R 
DISP 2.7.1 R 
DISP 2.7.2 R 
 
DISP 3.2.3 R 
DISP 3.2.4 R 
DISP 3.2.5 R 
DISP 3.2.7 R 
DISP 3.2.8 R 
DISP 3.2.12 R 
DISP 3.2.13 R 
DISP 3.3.1 R Judith Summer: PhD April 2009  238 
DISP 3.3.1A R  
DISP 3.3.1B G 
DISP 3.5.1 R 
DISP 3.5.2 R (1) 
DISP 3.5.2 R (2) 
DISP 3.5.6 G 
DISP 3.6.1 R 
DISP 3.6.2 R 
DISP 3.6.3 R 
DISP 3.8.1 R (2) 
DISP 3.8.3 R 
DISP 3.9.2 R 
DISP 3.9.5 R 
DISP 3.9.6 G 
DISP 3.9.8 G 
DISP 3.9.10 R 
DISP 3.9.11 G 
DISP 3.9.14 R 
DISP 3.10.1 R 
 
DISP 5.3.18R 
 
ICOB  
 
ICOB 4.3.2R(3) 
ICOB 4.3.3G 
ICOB 5.3 
ICOB 5.3.18R 
ICOB 5.3.29R  
ICOB 7.3.6 R 
ICOB 7.5 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 